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Abstract 
This thesis aims at defining, both legally and normatively, the nature and scope of 
consumers' rights to commercial copies of copyright works as an essential means to 
preserve the coherence and legitimacy of copyright. It explores the interaction between: 
( 1) technological developments, which empower consumers to experience copyright 
works in unprecedented ways, but also augment copyright holders' control over access to 
and use of their works; (2) the progressive expansion in scope of copyright holders' 
exclusive rights as conferred by copyright law; and (3) the contract terms and 
technological protection measures under which copyright works are made available to 
consumers. The nature and scope of consumers' rights to commercial copies of copyright 
works are defined by applying property law and theory, in particular, through an analysis 
of the concepts of ownership, property limitations and the numerus clausus principle. The 
nature and scope of consumers' rights to commercial copies of copyright works are also 
analyzed through the application of consumer protection law and theory. The thesis 
explores the use of consumer law concepts such as implied obligations of quality, fitness 
for purpose, title, quiet possession, information disclosure requirements and prohibitions 
of unfair practices to assert claims against restrictions on uses of commercial copies of 
copyright works. Commercial copies of copyright works emerge as a peculiar form of 
personal property, the rights in which are determined to a large extent by the exceptions 
to copyright infringement laid out in Canada's Copyright Act or similar statutes in other 
jurisdictions, and by the commercial transactions through which consumers access 
copyright works. Consumers' ownership rights to commercial copies of copyright works 
are progressively eroding. The thesis provides various recommendations to clarify and 
strengthen consumers' rights to commercial copies of copyright works on the basis of the 
prima facie normative force of ownership freedoms and the instrumental justifications of 
copyright to incent the creation and the dissemination of copyright works. 
ii 
Pour ma mere Florence, et en la memoire de mon pere Benoit. 
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I. Preliminaries 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The Copyright Consumers' Bargain 
We are all copyright consumers. On a daily basis and for different purposes, we access 
works that are protected by copyright, in an unprecedented volume. The variety of ways 
through which we access copyright works continues to increase and evolve. We browse the 
Internet for work, entertainment, or instructive purposes. We download music, films, e-
books, or applications for our smart phones. We purchase or rent film DVDs, books, video 
games, or computer programs. We use streaming services to watch a movie online or 
through our on-demand TV service provider. We store the copies of copyright works we 
own on our computer or through an Internet storage service. The variety of ways in which 
we are enjoying works protected by copyright is also multiplying: we make copies for time, 
place, device-shifting, or backup purposes; we share copies of copyright works with friends 
online, we post links of our favourite songs, YouTube clips, or news article on Face book, 
and we incorporate existing music and videos into home creations that we post online. 
Evolving technologies empower us to consume more copyright works in ever changing 
ways and make us increasingly dependent on them in our insatiable desire to stay 
uninterruptedly connected to the world. 
While modem citizens interact with copyright works on a daily basis, the rights they have to 
them are often less than clear. What is more certain is that the scope of the exclusive rights 
of copyright holders has been expanding continuously, including through increased 
enforcement powers against individual users who make unauthorized uses of copyright 
works. What is the copyright consumers' bargain as the scope of copyright progressively 
increases and as the commercial offerings and possible uses of commercial copies of 
copyright works continue to evolve? 
The primary objective of my thesis is to define and substantiate copyright consumers' rights 
to commercial copies of copyright works to provide a better understanding of the 
1 
transformation of the copyright consumers' bargain that is currently taking place. As I will 
argue in my thesis, defining and substantiating consumers' rights to commercial copies of 
copyright works begins with an understanding of what consumers own, as the baseline to 
situate other forms of legal relationships that involve copyright works. Defining consumers' 
rights to commercial copies of copyright works also requires an understanding of the nature 
and scope of exceptions to copyright infringement under Canada's Copyright Act [CCA] 1 
(or similar statutes in other jurisdictions). Although exceptions to copyright infringement or 
so-called users' rights impact on the scope of consumers' ownership rights to commercial 
copies of copyright works, they are two distinct concepts.2 
Property, copyright, sale of goods, and consumer law and theory offer a broad and rich 
perspective on how the law currently regulates commercial copies of copyright works and 
information products. It enables us to identify common regulatory trends and deficiencies 
and to look for solutions that transcend the various fields of the law. The ultimate goal of 
my inquiry is to search for more coherence with respect to the regulation of copyright users' 
rights in the context of conflicting values and interests and the pressures brought on by the 
digital environment. Why and how do we incentivize and protect creativity and innovation 
and for the benefit of whom? Under what rules of engagement do we want to make the 
fruits of creativity and innovation available to users? 
A better understanding and more coherent definition of copyright consumers' rights brings 
many benefits in addition to addressing the immediate interests of copyright consumers. As 
I will argue throughout my thesis, the future and legitimacy of the copyright house depends 
to a large extent on better defining copyright users' rights. The metaphor of the copyright 
house renovation project that I apply in my thesis emphasizes the strong property theory 
foundations of my work. The copyright house metaphor also alludes to the progressive 
expansion of copyright in scope, as accelerated in the last decades, adding building blocks 
to strengthen copyright holders' exclusive rights to their works. Finally, the metaphor is 
conducive to situating the current location of users, i.e., outside the copyright house. One of 
I RSC 1985, c. C-42. 
2 See the discussion on exceptions to copyright infringement in the CCA, supra note 1, in Chapter 3 
Part II, and see the discussion on the nature and scope of ownership rights in commercial copies of 
copyright works in Chapter 6 Part II. 
2 
the objectives of my thesis is to demonstrate why and how we need to bring users into the 
copyright house, alongside authors, copyright holders, parties with other vested interests 
and the public. 
My research on the contribution of property, copyright, sale of goods, and consumer law 
and theory to better understand and define copyright users' rights, enables the filling of 
important gaps in the current literature on copyright users and information products. First, 
the legal nature of commercial copies of copyright works, as well as the theoretical 
justifications and normative considerations that surround the right to own commercial 
copies of copyright works (Chapter 6, building upon Chapter 4 and Chapter 5), are 
relatively underexplored. Approaching users' rights from the perspective of property, 
including through the theory of property limitations to mediate between the competing 
rights of copyright holders and users in the copyright works (Chapter 7), contributes to the 
copyright user literature by providing a novel approach to justify and clarify the scope of 
copyright users' rights. Second, the research conducted on the concepts of tangibility, 
goods, services, sales, and licences (Chapter 8) allows me to make important links across 
property, copyright, sale of goods and consumer law that have been little explored so far. 
My research underscores the pivotal function of these concepts to the remedies copyright 
consumers have in consumer law, to consumers' ability to invoke the exhaustion or first 
sale doctrine in copyright law, and to determine which exclusive rights of copyright holders 
are involved in a commercial transaction. Third, the framework that I propose through 
different scenarios for the application of consumer protection law obligations to commercial 
copies of copyright work (Chapter 11, building upon Chapter 9 and Chapter 10) shows the 
potential and also important structural limitations of the relatively little-explored interaction 
between consumer law and copyright law. Overall, the research that I conducted in 
property, copyright, sale of goods and consumer law and theory advances the knowledge 
and understanding of the relationship between copyright holders and end-users, an area 
where there is increased pressure to properly balance competing interests. 
3 
II. Particulars 
In Canada and the other jurisdictions examined here,3 copyright has progressively expanded 
throughout the last century in duration, in subject matter, and in scope (Chapter 5).4 The 
continuous expansion of copyright often resulted from Canada's willingness and 
commitment to comply with international copyright law conventions that have followed the 
same expansionist trajectory. 5 After three previous failed attempts at legislative reform, the 
CCA was amended significantly in 20126 to comply with Canada's proposed assumption of 
·international obligations under the World Intellectual Property Organization Internet 
Treaties of 1996 [WIPO Internet Treaties]. 7 The amendments to the CCA include the 
exclusive right of copyright holders to control how their works are made available, 
including on the Intemet,8 the extension of the term of protection of performers' 
performance and sound recordings,9 and the introduction of provisions dealing with 
technological protection measures [TPMs]. 10 The TPM provisions create separate acts of 
infringement for the circumvention of TPMs put in place by copyright holders. 11 The 2012 
3 I.e., the US, the European Union, the UK, and France. I discuss the reasons that justify this choice 
further below in Part III of this chapter. 
4 In Chapter 5 Part II, I summarize the main changes that have been made to copyright in Canada in 
the last century, leading to its continued expansion. 
5 In Chapter 5 Part II, I summarize the main international copyright conventions and how they relate 
to the evolution of copyright law in Canada. 
6 Before Bill C-11, An Act to Amend the Copyright Act, 1st Sess, 4 lth Parl, 2011 (assented to June 
29, 2012) leading to the entry into force of the Copyright Modernization Act, S.C. 2012, c. 20, three 
previous bills were introduced to amend the CCA, supra note I, to address the various issues brought 
on by the digitization of copyright works, i.e.: Bill C-32, An Act to amend the Copyright Act, 3rd 
Session, 40th Parl., 2010 (1 sr reading June 2, 2010); Bill C-61, An Act to Amend the Copyright Act, 
2nd Sess, 39th Parl, 2008 (first reading 12 June 2008); Bill C-60, An Act to Amend the Copyright 
Act, I st Sess, 38th Parl, 2005 (first reading 20 June 2005). 
7 WIPO Copyright Treaty, 20 December 1996, W0033EN, online: 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocs wo033.html#P8 189 [WCTJ; WIPO Performances 
and Phonograms Treaty, 20 December 1996, W0034EN, online: 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt./trt.docs wo034.html [WPPTJ. The main purpose of the 
treaties is to address "the profound impact of the development and convergence of information and 
communication technologies on the creation and use of literary and artistic works." WCT, ibid, 
preamble. 
8 CCA, supra note 1, s 2.4 (I.I). 
9 Ibid, s 23 (1), (I. I). 
10 Ibid, ss 41-41.21. I discuss the scope and issues around the newly introduced TPMs in Chapter 3 
Part III B. 
II Ibid. 
4 
amendments to the CCA also include new exceptions to copyright infringement that I will 
discuss in Chapter 3. 12 
The latest manifestations of the increased protection of intellectual property (in particular 
copyright) at the international and national levels impact more specifically online service 
providers and online users of copyright works by providing additional enforcement powers 
to copyright holders in the digital environment. The French law of 2009[HADOPIJ, 13 the 
UK Digital Economy Act 2010, 14 and the signature of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement in 2011 [ACTA] 15 illustrate this new wave of regulation to strengthen the means 
by which copyright holders can enforce their exclusive rights and deter copyright 
infringement. 16 Attempts in the US to introduce similar laws have met fierce resistance 
from intermediaries and from members of the public, one culminating point being the 
complete blackout of Wikipedia for one day in January 2012. 17 The Bill introduced by the 
US House of Representatives, Stop Online Piracy Act [SOPA], 18 and the Bill introduced by 
the US Senate, Protect Intellectual Property Act [PIPA], 19 were subsequently abandoned.20 
In Canada, Bill C-5621 was introduced in 2013 and, if adopted, will further amend the CCA 
by strengthening the civil and criminal remedies for copyright infringement.22 At the 
12 See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part II D. 
13 LOI n° 2009-669 du 12juin 2009 JORF n°0135 13 June 2009, 9666."HADOPI" stands for "Haute 
Autorite pour la diffusion des reuvres et la protection des droits sur internet" (High Authority for the 
distribution of works and the protection of rights on the Internet). 
14 (UK), c. 24. 
15 October 1, 2011, online: http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-a2reements-accords-
cornmerciaux/fo/intellect property.aspx?view=d ACTA's signatory members include Canada, the 
EU and its member states, the US, Japan, and Australia. 
16 Ibid; HADOPI, supra note 13; Digital Economy Act 2010 (UK), supra note 14. For a discussion 
on the procedural adoption and substantive issues around ACTA, see Peter K. Yu, "Six Secret (and 
now open) Fears of Acta" (2011) 64 SMU L. Rev. 975. 
17 Amy Goodman, "The SOPA blackout protest makes history," January 18, 2012, The Guardian, 
online: http://www. guardian .co.uk/ corn men ti sfree/ ci famerica/201 2/j an/ 1 8/ sopa-bl ackout-protest-
makes-h i story 
18 US, Bill HR 3261, Stop Online Piracy Act, I 12th Cong, 2011. 
19 US Bill S 968, Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual 
Property Act of 2011, I 12th Cong. 
20 Jonathan Weisman, "After an Online Firestorm, Congress Shelves Anti piracy Bills", January 20, 
2012, NYTimes; Stephanie Condon, "PIPA, SOPA put on hold in wake of protests" January 20, 
2012, CBS News. 
21 An Act to amend the Copyright Act and the Trade-marks Act and to make consequential 
amendments to other Acts, 1st Session, 4lst Parl, 2013, (first reading, March 1, 2013). 
22 Ibid, cl. 3-5. 
5 
international level, the future of ACTA is uncertain. In July 2012, in an unprecedented 
move, the European Parliament formally r~jected the ratification of ACTA by the EU.23 The 
eventual ratification of ACTA by the EU and its Member States had given rise to broad 
opposition across Europe, the main fear being its limitations on Internet freedom. 24 
The progressive increase of the protection of copyright holders' exclusive rights at the 
international and national levels confirms two related phenomena. First, copyright holders 
throughout the world have been successful at coordinating, articulating, and advancing their 
interests.25 Second, governments, legislative bodies, and international organizations 
worldwide have responded to copyright holders' concerns by progressively expanding the 
scope of copyright in international instruments and in national laws.26 Similar and 
successful coordination, articulation, and advancement of the interests of copyright users 
are not as apparent. 
The continuous increase in copyright holders' exclusive rights and protection occurs at the 
expense of copyright users' rights and interests. Legislative reforms that have brought on 
this increase often overlook and trivialize copyright users' rights and interests (Chapter 2, 
Chapter 3). 27 Failure to adequately take into account copyright users' rights and interests 
risks undermining copyright's coherence, credibility, and ultimately its legitimacy.28 The 
recent massive public response against ACTA and its implementation in the US and in the 
EU may illustrate that governments, legislative bodies, and international organizations have 
23 Charles Arthur, "Anti-piracy agreement rejected by European Parliament, but Acta could be 
revived by European Commission" 4 July 2012, The Guardian, online: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/j ul/04/acta-european-parliament-votes-against. 
24 Ibid. On how European copyright consumers are becoming increasingly organized, see: Antonina 
Bakardjieva Engelbrekt, "Accomodating the interests of the copyright consumer: New institutional 
dynamics in the wake of the infosoc directive" in Antonina Bakardjieva Engelbrekt, Ulf Bemitz, 
Bengt Domeij, Annette Kur & Jonas Nordell, eds, Siirtryck ur Festskrift till Marianne Levin 
(Norstedts Juridik: 2008) where the author applies institutional choice theory to demonstrate the 
increased involvement of consumer groups in Europe in the legislative process of copyright and 
consumer law reforms and before the courts. 
25 See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part III Band Part V. 
26 See the discussion on the progressive expansion of copyright in Chapter 5 Part II, and reference in 
Part II of this chapter to ACTA, supra note 15, HADOPI, supra note 13, Digital Economy Act 2010 
(UK), supra note 14. 
27 See the discussion in Chapter 2 Part II on the place of users in copyright law, and in Chapter 3 Part 
II, III & IV. 
28 See the discussion in Chapter 2 Part III. 
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reached that point. 29 It also shows that copyright users and other actors supporting their 
interests are getting more organized and are becoming more efficient at advancing the rights 
and interests of users.30 Defining the legal and normative boundaries to copyright users' 
rights is the approach that I pursue here to advance the rights and interests of users. This 
approach also aims to provide greater consistency in the law. 
As I define copyright users' rights, I look at one specific category of users: copyright 
consumers, i.e., individuals who conclude a commercial transaction with copyright holders 
or their distributors for personal purposes. 31 The first reason that motivated that choice 
when I started my research was the need to explore a relatively under-theorized area of law, 
i.e., how consumer protection, as a body of law, can offer arguments to counterbalance the 
copyright holder-centric nature of copyright law and help ascertain copyright users' rights 
to commercial copies of copyright works. Another reason for focusing on copyright 
consumers among the larger community of users is that it brings us to the heart of one of the 
most pressing challenges in contemporary copyright law: the effects that the increasing use 
of non-negotiated standard end-user agreements have on copyright law and its underlying 
objectives.32 Last but not least, the study of the specificity of copyright consumers among 
the larger community of users brings out important distinctions between their interests and 
the ones of other users. 33 This enables a more refined approach to the promotion of 
copyright consumers' rights while offering points of comparison with the other copyright 
users.
34 
The lack of clarity of consumers' rights to commercial copies of copyright works flows to a 
large extent from the unique regime that the CCA (as well as similar statutes in other 
jurisdictions) creates: it confers exclusive rights on copyright holders to protect their literary 
29 See the discussion above in this chapter on ACTA, supra note 15, SOPA, supra note 18 and PIPA, 
supra note 19. 
30 Ibid. See also Englebrekt, supra note 24. 
31 I discuss the specificity of copyright consumers in comparison to other copyright users in Chapter 
2 Part IV. 
32 See in particular the discussion in Chapter 3 Part III. 
33 See the discussion in Chapter 2 Part IV. 
34 Ibid. 
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and artistic works for a limited duration. 35 The main purpose of the CCA is to define 
copyright holders' exclusive rights, as well as to provide the remedies for copyright 
infringement. While the CCA includes exceptions to the exclusive rights of copyright 
holders for the benefit of users, it offers little enlightenment on the nature and scope of 
copyright users' rights. The CCA is primarily copyright holder-centric. 36 The 
commercialization of copyright works through non-negotiated standard end-user 
agreements and their interaction with copyright holders' exclusive rights as conferred by the 
CCA add another layer of complexity when defining the nature and scope of copyright 
users' rights. 37 
The disembodiment of commercial copies of copyright works from a physical object, as 
well as the panoply of means through which they are made accessible, force us to 
reconsider traditional concepts in law when defining the nature of copyright users' rights: 
are the copyright works accessed as goods, services, or as a sui generis product? 38 Did a 
sale, a licence, or both take place?39 When can the commercial copies be owned? When and 
how are copyright holders' exclusive rights involved in the distribution of their works 
online, e.g., reproductions, communications to the public by telecommunication? 
The future and legitimacy of the copyright house depends in great part on adequately 
delineating copyright users' rights. In that context, defining the rights of copyright 
consumers as a large group within copyright users, is particularly important for at least 
three reasons. First, to define copyright consumers' rights requires consideration of the role 
of copyright users in furthering the objectives of copyright.40 I will argue that giving more 
consideration to users' rights increasingly needs to form an integral part of the objectives of 
copyright law.41 Based on the assumption that users play a central role in furthering the 
objectives of copyright law, clearly setting the scope of users' rights will determine how 
35 In Canada, the CCA, supra note I confers exclusive rights to the authors and copyright holders 
with respect works of authorship as they are defined. 
36 See the discussion in Chapter 2 on the place of copyright users in the CCA, supra note I and in the 
copyright statutes of other jurisdictions. 
37 See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part III. 
38 See the discussion in Chapter 8 Part II A and B. 
39 See the discussion in Chapter 8 Part II C. 
40 See the discussion in Chapter 2 Part II and Part III and Chapter 6 Part III. 
41 Ibid. 
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business intermediaries will support users and the goals of copyright even further. Business 
intermediaries can only support and enhance users' rights to the extent that they are 
reasonably clear. One recent example is the start-up company ReDigi.42 The company put in 
place a Web interface platform for the resale of lawfully purchased copies of digital 
music.43 ReDigi started offering the service on the premise that users were allowed to resell 
the digital copies that they had lawfully acquired as a result of the application of the 
exhaustion or first sale doctrine. Under this doctrine, copyright holders' exclusive 
distribution rights are exhausted after the lawful first sale of copies of their works.44 The 
application of the first sale doctrine to copies of copyright works distributed online without 
a supporting physical medium is an unsettled area of the law.45 Less than one year into 
ReDigi's operations, a legal action was launched by Capitol Records against ReDigi and 
partial summary judgment was recently granted in favour of Capitol Records on the basis 
that ReDigi' s service infringed Capitol Records copyrights and that the first sale doctrine 
did not apply to the digital copies of musical recordings resold through ReDigi's platform.46 
The example of ReDigi is one among several other examples that illustrate the practical 
significance of defining the appropriate scope of copyright users' rights at a legal and 
normative level. 
Second, the rights that consumers have to commercial copies of copyright works are 
becoming a moving target. Through specific applications of property, copyright, and 
consumer protection law, my research work emphasizes various trends toward a decrease in 
scope of copyright consumers' rights to commercial copies of copyright works. The 
progressive expansion of copyright increases copyright holders' powers to restrict and 
control how copyright consumers enjoy commercial copies of copyright works and to 
expand powers and control further through TPMs and non-negotiated standard end-user 
42 See the ReDigi official website at: https://www.redigi.com. 
43 Ibid. 
44 See the discussion on the application of the first sale doctrine in Chapter 3 Part II F. 
45 Ibid. 
46 See Capitol Records LLC v Redigi Inc., US SDNY (2012), motion for preliminary injunction by 
Capital Records was denied. Capitol partial summary judgment granted: Capitol Records, LLC v 
ReDigi Inc., 2013 WL 1286134 (SDNY) on the basis that ReDidigi infringed the copyrights of 
Capitol Records, i.e., their exclusive reproduction and distribution rights. The Court held that as the 
first sale doctrine was no available defence to ReDigi as it only limits copyright holders' distribution 
rights and not their reproduction rights which the Court found were infringed by ReDigi. I discuss 
the nature and scope of the exhaustion or first sale doctrine in Chapter 3 Part II F. 
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agreements.47 In recent years, copyright holders have enforced their rights directly against 
consumers.
48 Recent international developments and national legislative reforms confer to 
copyright holders even greater enforcement powers against consumers.49 
By contrast to the trend toward a decrease in scope of copyright consumers' rights to 
commercial copies of copyright works, consumers' expectations of uses continue to 
increase. New technologies and networks empower consumers and other users in 
unprecedented ways. 50 This further exacerbates the tension between copyright holders and 
copyright users. The heated debates around Canadian copyright reform in the last twenty 
years and around the world attest to that increasing tension. 51 One of the main goals of my 
thesis is, to substantiate both legally and nonnatively what legitimate claims consumers 
should have with respect to copyright works. On the one hand, copyright consumers have 
high expectations and growing desires for more uses of copyright works brought on by ever 
more empowering technologies. On the other hand, copyright holders pursue their efforts 
toward increased protection of their works based on the threats that the same empowering 
technologies pose to their subsistence by enabling massive copyright infringement. How do 
we mediate between these competing interests? Is there a hierarchy between the rights of 
copyright holders and the rights of copyright consumers, as copyright reforms of the last 
decades have led us to believe, or should not copyright consumers' rights be seen as equally 
deserving competing rights? 
47 See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part III and in Chapter 5 Part II. 
48 This is particularly true in the music industry. In recent years, lawsuits against consumers have 
made headlines, including the highly publicized legal actions by corporations in the music industry, 
including Sony BMG Music Entertainment against Joel Tenenbaum, a university student, for the 
illegal download and distribution of music on the Internet through peer-to-peer file sharing networks. 
Tenenbaum received the assistance of a Harvard law professor Charles Nesson and Harvard law 
students to prepare his defence. See: "Joel Fights Back.com," online: 
http://joelfightsback.com/2012/09/mvth-and-facts-the-latest-upclate-in-joels-case/ . A recent 
development in that case is: Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum, 2012 WL 3639053 
(D.Mass.), 2012 Copr.L.Dec. P 30,306, 103 U.S.P.Q.2d 1902, where the US District Court 
(Massachusetts) upheld the damages of $675,000 previously awarded for the plaintiffs against 
Tenenbaum. For a review of legal actions by copyright holders against consumers, see: Matthew 
Rimmer, Digital Copyright and the Consumer Revolution - Hands off My iPod (Cheltenham, UK: 
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2007). 
49 See the discussion above in Part II of this chapter on the recent signature of ACTA, supra note 15, 
and on related recent legislative reform in France, the UK, the US, and recently Canada. 
50 See Part I of this chapter. 
51 See in particular Chapter 3 Part III B. 
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Third, consumers, and in particular copyright consumers, are more vulnerable individually 
and as a group than copyright holders. Consumers are generally less organized and less well 
represented in any legislative reform process than private industry corporations and 
associations, even though various initiatives in the context of the recent Canadian copyright 
reform show that efforts are being made to improve their representation. 52 At an individual 
level, consumers are more vulnerable than sellers and suppliers as a result of asymmetries 
in information, bargaining power, and their ability and resources to remedy an unfair 
bargain. 53 In addition, particular attention needs to be devoted to copyright consumers as 
part of the larger group of consumers. Access to and enjoyment of copyright works touch 
upon fundamental values that modem societies generally promote: access to knowledge, 
education, creativity, innovation, and freedom of expression.54 These are some of the values 
that are frequently invoked to justify the existence of the exclusive rights that copyright 
confers.55 Any restrictions imposed on copyright consumers that can impede the promotion 
and flourishing of these core values make copyright consumers particularly vulnerable and 
should be of concern to law and policy-makers.56 
Throughout my thesis, I will argue that defining and substantiating consumers' rights to 
commercial copies of copyright works begins with understanding what they own. Given the 
intricacy of consumers' copy ownership rights and copyright holders' exclusive rights in the 
works, I approach this relationship through the concept of property limitations developed by 
James W. Harris.57 The legal and normative analysis of copy ownership is the starting point 
for understanding what copyright consumers are sacrificing through the progressively 
52 On the dangers of legislative reform capture by powerful interests particularly in the area of 
copyright, see Ian Hargreaves, "Digital Opportunity, a review of intellectual property and growth" 
2011, at 93 (para I0.9ff). On the lack of involvement of the public in intellectual property matters 
see: David Vaver, Intellectual Property Law Copyright, Patents, "Trade-Marks, 2d ed. (Toronto: 
Irwin Law, 2011) at 680-681. In Canada, a wide public consultation on copyright reform was 
initiated by the Government of Canada as part of recent copyright reform. See: 
http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/008.nsf/eng/home. On how European copyright consumers are becoming 
increasingly organized see Engelbrekt, supra note 24. 
53 See the discussion on the theoretical justifications of consumer protection obligations in Chapter 
10. 
54 See the discussion in Chapter 6 Part III. 
55 Ibid. 
56 See the discussion in Chapter 2 Part II and in Chapter 6 Part Ill. 
57 James W. Harris, Property and Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996). See the discussion in 
Chapter 4 Part V and in Chapter 7. 
11 
increasing scope of copyright protection in contrast to the unprecedented empowerment by 
the multiple possible uses of copyright works. 58 
To approach copyright consumers' rights through the concept of property and ownership 
and, more particularly, to look at their interdependence with the exclusive rights of 
copyright holders through the concept of property limitations, may appear paradoxical and 
even counterintuitive. When I started my research, my main objective was to see how 
consumer law and theory could help substantiate consumers' rights to commercial copies of 
copyright works. I quickly came to realize that to achieve this goal successfully, it was 
essential to develop a better understanding of the nature of the property and ownership 
rights that consumers have in commercial copies of copyright works. This forced me to 
look at the property attributes of copyright, which in turn led me to the heart of an ongoing 
debate about the rapprochements made between copyright and property. 59 While many 
scholars associate the nature of copyright with a form of property, other scholars point to 
the misfits between copyright and property.60 Among the latter group, there are 
commentators who argue that the property rhetoric around copyright is one of the main 
causes for its progressive expansion.61 Particularly from that perspective, substantiating 
copyright consumers' rights through property law and theory may appear to be paradoxical. 
I will argue how, on the contrary, property law and theory provide adequate tools and 
insights to understand the nature, scope, and limitations of copyright consumers' rights to 
commercial copies of copyright works, as well as of copyright holders' exclusive rights in 
copyright works. 
The increasing dematerialization of copyright works (i.e., the absence of a physical object 
embodiment of the works, e.g., a book, DVD, or CD) and the myriad offerings through 
which copyright works are made available without involving the transfer of ownership of 
commercial copies to copyright consumers may make the application of property law and 
theory appear at first blush to be ill-suited to, perhaps even out of place with, the current 
58 See the discussion in Chapter 4 Part II, Chapter 6 Part II and Chapter 7. 
59 See Chapter 5, in particular Part III, IV, V. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
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environment.62 I will demonstrate how, on the contrary, concepts of property and ownership 
are still highly relevant, particularly so when new technologies continue to challenge the 
law as a result of the loss of familiar points of reference.63 
Approaching consumers' rights through property and ownership departs from the more 
common avenue that copyright scholars have so far taken by looking at consumers' rights 
through copyright policy arguments.64 While policy arguments can successfully support 
copyright consumers' rights, I will argue that a property law and theory approach to 
copyright consumers' rights can be supported by policy arguments and make them even 
stronger. It offers a solid anchor and point of departure from which to look at copyright 
consumers' rights to commercial copies of copyright works. 
Common wisdom dictates that users who enter into a commercial transaction with copyright 
holders (or their distributors) should be at least in as good a position as other users who 
access the same copyright works without a contract. As the primary successful argument 
invoked to strengthen the scope of copyright holders' exclusive rights has been to counter 
copyright piracy, one would assume that copyright holders would want to encourage lawful 
consumption of their works and design the commercial transaction as an incentive to 
achieve that goal. Defining copyright consumers' rights through property, copyright, and 
consumer (contract) law and theory allows the exploration of these questions: What is 
copyright consumers' bargain? Are consumers better off than other users who access 
copyright works without a commercial transaction? 
III. Scope of research and definitions 
The focus of my thesis is Canadian copyright law and consumer (contract) law as situated 
in a global context. Therefore, I refer to international conventions and other instruments 
when they are relevant to contextualize the law. 65 I also look at jurisdictions that have a 
particular affinity with Canada, either for historical reasons or because the laws in those 
62 See the discussion in Chapter 8, in particular Part II and Part IV. 
63 Ibid. 
64 See the discussion in Chapter 2 Part II and IV and in Chapter 6 Part III. 
65 See in particular the discussion in Chapter 3 Part III B and Part V. The research that I conducted 
for my thesis is current as of April 15, 2013. 
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jurisdictions have provided guidance in the past to our federal and provincial governments, 
legislative bodies, and courts i.e., the US, the EU, the UK, and France. The framework of 
property law and theory that I apply here is based on the common law tradition of property 
with linkages to the civil law tradition, and refers to dominant philosophical and economic 
theory movements to support the existence and scope of copyright and of copy ownership. I 
occasionally refer to political theory to explain certain trends of copyright legal reform in 
Canada and worldwide,66 and to behavioural law and economic theories in the consumer 
(contract) law analysis portion of my thesis. I develop legal and normative arguments 
toward substantiating copyright consumers' rights to commercial copies of copyright work. 
In defining copyright consumers' rights, I do not provide a detailed analysis of competition 
or antitrust law. I refer to this body of law occasionally to contextualize a copyright or 
consumer (contract) law doctrine, to justify at the normative level the scope of copyright 
and copy ownership, or to situate exigencies that are specific to the EU single market.67 I 
also do not specifically look at consumers' rights under privacy law but I discuss privacy 
issues, including in my property theory analysis of various justifications to support the 
scope of copy ownership. 68 Research from other disciplines, including anthropological and 
sociological studies on copyright consumers, could enrich the arguments that I present here 
and inform the law even further. For instance, they could provide additional insights and 
understanding into consumers' reasonable expectations with respect to commercial copies 
of copyright works. For reasons of scope, I do not include this area of research in my thesis. 
Throughout my thesis I refer to copyright works as those works that are protected by 
copyright under the CCA or similar statutes in other jurisdictions, as the context may 
dictate.69 My research focuses on specific works protected by copyright: e-books, musical 
66 Ibid. 
67 See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part III A, in Chapter 7 Part lII A (ii) and Chapter 8 Part III and 
IV. 
68 See in particular the discussion in Chapter 6 Part III. 
69 CCA, supra note 1, s 5(1) provides: "copyright shall subsist in Canada, for the term hereinafter 
mentioned, in every original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic work." "Every original literary, 
dramatic, musical and artistic work" is defined as including: "every original production in the 
literary, scientific or artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its expression, such as 
compilations, books, pamphlets and other writings, lectures, dramatic or dramatico-musical works, 
musical works, translations, illustrations, sketches and plastic works relative to geography, 
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recordings, and films distributed online. I often refer to such works distributed in the form 
of CDs, DVDs, or books as material objects so as to make important parallels and 
distinctions.70 I focus my research on those specific copyright works to look at the various 
issues that revolve around the transformation of the media through which they are 
distributed, from a tangible physical object to an immaterial copy.71 The analysis and 
arguments that I make throughout my thesis also apply to commercial copies of video 
games and of computer programs and could apply to other forms of commercial copies of 
copyright works in consumer transactions.72 In particular, the commercialization of 
computer programs has given rise to an important body of case law and commentaries as an 
earlier form of mass-market commercialization of copyright works with non-negotiated 
standard end-user agreements.73 
The concept of commercial copies of copyright works refers to those products that are the 
object of a legal transaction between consumers and copyright holders (or their 
distributors), as a means to distinguish such products from copies of copyright works made 
by persons in possession of copyright works (which may or may not be lawful 
reproductions of the copyright works). Copy ownership emphasizes the legal relationship 
that consumers have with commercial copies of copyright works. 
topography, architecture or science": ibid, s 2, which also defines "Literary work", "dramatic work'', 
"musical work" and "artistic work." 
70 Books are protected as "literary works"; musical recordings typically embed "musical works", 
"sound recordings" "performers' performance", all of which are subject matter protected by 
copyright; films, or "cinematographic works" are protected as "dramatic works": CCA, supra note 1, 
s 2. See my survey of online non-negotiated standard end-user agreements in Chapter 3, Part III C 
which covers e-books, musical recordings and films distributed online. 
71 This transformation raises multiple issues around the capacity to own immaterial copies, whether 
they can qualify as "goods" under sale of goods and consumer law and whether the copyright 
exhaustion or first sale doctrine applies to commercial copies distributed online with no physical 
supporting media: see in particular the discussion in Chapter 3 Part II F, Chapter 7 Part III A (ii) and 
Chapter 8 Part III and IV. 
72 Computer programs are protected as "literary works": CCA, supra note 1, s 2; video games can 
include various subject matter protected by copyright works, e.g., "artistic works", "cinematographic 
works", "literary works": ibid. 
73 See in particular the discussion on the case law looking at the nature of computer programs as 
goods or services, applying sale of goods implied conditions or warranties of quality, fitness for 
purpose, etc. to computer programs, as well as the application of the exhaustion or first sale doctrine 
to computer programs in Chapter 7 Part IV and Chapter 8. 
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Throughout my thesis I refer predominantly to copyright holders as opposed to authors. 
Copyright holders refers to persons who hold the exclusive rights conferred by copyright 
under the CCA (or similar statutes in other jurisdictions as the context may dictate). 74 This 
includes authors, i.e., the physical persons who created the copyright works. Given the 
focus of my thesis on commercial copies of copyright works, copyright holders other than 
the authors will generally hold copyrights (e.g., publishers, music recording producers and 
distributors, film producers, software and video games companies, etc.). My decision to 
refer to copyright holders rather than to authors does not imply that the interests of 
copyright holders (who are not the authors) and authors are the same. Often, their interests 
are not aligned.75 My selection of terminology is driven by the identity of the right holders 
in the mass-market commercialization environment focus of my research. It is beyond the 
scope of my thesis to discuss in detail the divergence of interests between copyright holders 
(who are not authors) and authors. Finally, copyright holders' rights refers to the bundle of 
exclusive rights or copyright conferred to copyright holders under the CCA, more 
specifically, those rights that impact the uses that consumers can make of commercial 
copies of copyright works.76 This includes exclusive rights commonly referred to as related 
rights or neighbouring rights. 77 
74 The CCA, supra note 1, refers throughout the Act to "the owner of the copyright" or "copyright 
owner". 
75 For a discussion on the protection of freelance authors in copyright law, see Giuseppina 
D' Agostino, Copyright, Contracts, Creators, New Media, New Rules (Cheltenham, UK: Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2010) and in particular, with respect to the misalignments between the interests of 
authors and copyright holders and how the rights and interests of authors can be better protected, see 
pp 201-289. See also Giuseppina D' Agostino, "Healing Fair Dealing? A Comparative Copyright 
Analysis of Canadian Fair Dealing to UK Fair Dealing and US Fair Use" (2008) 53 McGill L.J. 309 
at 327-329. In my thesis, I make specific references to authors as opposed to copyright holders when 
legal doctrines or theoretical justifications of copyright specifically apply to the physical person who 
creates a work,protected by copyright. See for example, the discussion in Chapter 6 Part III. 
76 The CCA, supra note 1, s 2 defines "copyright" as "the rights described in (a) section 3, in the 
case of a work, (b) sections 15 and 26, in the case of a performer's performance, (c) section 18, in 
the case of a sound recording, or (d) section 21, in the case of a communication signal." 
77 Ibid. Neighbouring rights refers to the exclusive rights in other subject matter of copyright than 
works i.e., performer's performances, sound recordings, communication signals: CCA, supra note 1, 
s 2 "Copyright", SS 15, 18, 21, 26. 
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IV. Contents and Structure 
My thesis is divided into four Parts. In the First Part, I present the current landscape of 
Canadian copyright law confronting consumers in a global context, with reference to the 
other jurisdictions examined here. 78 I start by situating the place of users and among those 
users, consumers in copyright law. 79 I then take a look at the so-called users' rights that 
copyright consumers have pursuant to the CCA, and review those acts that copyright 
consumers can perform on copyright works without the authorization of copyright . 
holders.80 I probe into the nature of copyright users' rights and question whether they are 
mandatory, while also situating them in the context of Canada's international obligations.81 
I look at the complex interaction between the CCA, the contracts and TPMs through which 
copies of copyright works are commercialized, and present a sample review of non-
negotiated standard end-user agreements of e-books, music, and films distributed online. 82 I 
point to the many areas of uncertainty around copyright consumers' rights that call for a 
better understanding of the nature of commercial copies of copyright works and of 
consumers' rights therein. 
In the Second Part of my thesis, I apply property law and theory as a legal and normative 
framework to better understand the nature and scope of rights in commercial copies of 
copyright works and the theoretical justifications that underpin those rights. 83 I start by 
defining important concepts, including ownership and property limitations.84 Because of the 
interdependence between consumers' rights and copyright holders' exclusive rights in 
copyright works, I then look at the nature of copyright through the traditional attributes of 
property.85 I move on to describe the distinct nature of commercial copies of copyright 
works as a unique form of personal property that is heavily constrained by the exclusive 
78 In particular, see the discussion on the influence of international copyright law and the laws of 
Canada's major trading partners in Chapter 3 Part III Band V. The jurisdictions that I focus on 
outside of Canada are the US, the EU, the UK, and France. 
79 See Chapter 2: "Copyright Users and Consumers in the Copyright House." 
80 See Chapter 3: "The So-Called Users' Rights." 
81 Ibid, Part IV and Part V. 
82 Ibid, Part III. 
83 Second Part: "The Application of Property Law and Theory to Copyright and Commercial Copies 
of Copyright Works." 
84 See Chapter 4: "Laying the Framework: Property, Ownership, and Property Limitations." 
85 See Chapter 5: "The Nature of Copyright." 
17 
rights of copyright holders in the work.86 I look at the theoretical justifications that 
withstand ownership in commercial copies of copyright works as a means to develop a 
normative framework to define what copyright consumers' rights in commercial copies of 
copyright works should be. 87 As a result, I observe how copyright consumers may be 
getting less and less of what they should expect through copy ownership and how this can 
undermine the credibility and coherence of copyright and, over time, its legitimacy.88 I 
complete the Second Part of my thesis by demonstrating how the framework of property 
law and theory helps to mediate between the competing property rights of copyright 
consumers and copyright holders in the work through the concept of "property-limitation 
rules."89 Through the standardization of property or the numerus clausus principle, I look at 
how the property law and theory framework can help mediate between the property regime 
created by copyright and its underlying objectives on the one hand, and contract terms that 
alter this property regime and underlying objectives on the other.90 I end the Second Part of 
my thesis by offering a clearer view of the nature of commercial copies of copyright works 
and of what the scope of copy ownership should entail, as well as of the mediating tools 
within property that can help balance competing property rights and legal regimes.91 
In the Third Part of my thesis, I look at how consumer (contract) law and theory can further 
help to ascertain copyright consumers' rights in commercial copies of copyright works as a 
mean to resolve the asymmetry between copyright consumers and copyright holders under 
copyright law.92 I begin with assessing the nature of commercial copies of copyright, i.e., 
whether they are goods, services, or of a sui generis nature, by applying three dichotomies: 
tangible v. intangible, goods v. services, and sale v. licence.93 I then move on to describe the 
nature and theoretical justifications of the relevant consumer protection obligations that can 
be invoked against copyright-based use restrictions on commercial copies of copyright 
86 See Chapter 6: "The Nature and Justifications of Ownership in Commercial Copies of Copyright 
Works'', Part II. 
87 Ibid, Part III. 
88 Ibid, Part IV. 
89 See the discussion in Chapter 7: "The Solutions within Property Law and Theory to Mediate 
between Competing Property Rights and Competing Legal Regimes." 
90 Ibid, Part IV. 
91 Ibid, Part V. 
92 Third Part: "The Application of Consumer Law and Theory to Commercial Copies of Copyright 
Works." 
93 See Chapter 8: "Commercial Copies of Copyright Works: Unfit to be Goods?" 
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works (i.e., implied obligations of quality, fitness for purpose beyond general quality issues 
of bugs or manufacturing defects, title and quiet possession, prohibitions against unfair 
commercial practices, and information disclosure requirements).94 This allows me to 
conclude the Third Part of my thesis by contemplating four distinct scenarios and by 
analyzing how use restrictions applied to commercial copies of copyright works may 
constitute a breach of the relevant consumer law obligations and enable copyright 
consumers to assert their rights. 95 
The Fourth Part of my thesis builds on the insights gained from the First Part through the 
Third Part. I observe that copyright consumers' rights need to be solidified at the level of 
the CCA; otherwise, deficiencies in the scope of rights allocation have rippling effects on 
the effective application of consumer law and other areas of the law. I make other 
recommendations about the implementation of more robust consumers' rights to 
commercial copies of copyright works.96 The recommendations include clarifying the 
nature of exceptions to copyright infringement in the CCA, a renewed application of the 
concept of tangibility in copyright law and in sale of goods and consumer law, and legal 
tools to steer freedom of contract toward the objectives of copyright and property. For now, 
let us begin the analysis of the copyright consumers' bargain by looking at the place of 
copyright users and copyright consumers in the copyright house, which is the purpose of the 
next chapter. 
94 See Chapter 9: "Paving the Way: The Application of Consumer Law Obligations to Use 
Restrictions on Commercial Copies of Copyright Works" and Chapter I 0: "Justifications and Role of 
Consumer Law Obligations." 
95 See Chapter I I: "Restrictions of Uses of Copyright Works as a Breach of Consumer Law 
Obligations." 
96 See Chapter I 2: "The Renovation Project: A Hospitable Home for Copyright Consumers." 
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Chapter 2 
Users and Consumers in the Copyright House 
I. Introduction 
Until recently, the place of users in copyright law and the nature of their rights were an under-theorized 
area of copyright law and policy. The combination of technological developments and copyright reform 
that I described in Chapter 1, as well as recent Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence, 1 engendered a 
growing interest for copyright users in Canada and worldwide. Despite a growing attention on copyright 
users, a cohesive view and understanding of copyright users are lacking. Their place within the copyright 
framework, predominantly centred on defining copyright holders' exclusive rights and remedies, is 
somewhat precarious, almost accidental. Understanding the locus of copyright users within and outside the 
copyright system is the preliminary step that I take in my research to substantiate their rights and interests. 
In this chapter, I look at the place of copyright users through an analysis of Canada's Copyright Act 
[CCA],2 case law, policy papers, and doctrinal works. In Part II, I start my investigation into the place of 
users in copyright law by pointing out their relative absence from copyright law and discourse. I then 
review the significance of the Supreme Court of Canada's characterization of exceptions to copyright 
infringement as users' rights in CCH Canadian Ltd. v Law Society of Upper Canada [ CCH], 3 and the 
location of users within the concept of balance in Canadian copyright law. In Part III, I consider the 
harmful effects of the lack of attention to copyright users, not only to this group but also to the viability of 
the copyright law system in the digital environment, as a springboard for the need to develop a theoretical 
framework around copyright users. In Part IV, I take a closer look at copyright users by distinguishing 
different subgroups and by focusing on copyright consumers in the larger group of copyright users. I 
describe the benefits and limitations of focusing my analysis on consumers as they are currently defined in 
consumer protection law,4 and how this can inform the treatment in copyright law of the rights and 
interests of copyright consumers. In Part V, I pursue the investigation of the place of consumers in 
1In particular Theberge v Gallerie d'art du petit Champlain Inc., 2002 SCC 34 [Theberge] and CCH Canadian 
Ltd. v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 SCC 13, and also Alberta (Education) v Canadian Copyright Licensing 
Agency (Access Copyright), 2012 SCC 37 [Alberta]; Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of 
Canada v Bell Canada, 2012 SCC 36 [Bell Canada] and Reference re Broadcasting Regulatory Policy CRTC 
2010-167 and Broadcasting Order CRTC 2010-168, 2012 SCC 68 [CRTC]. 
2 Copyright Act, RSC 1985, c. C-42. 
3 Supra note 1 at para 48. 
4 See infra note 127 and note 128, and more generally the discussion in Part V of this chapter. 
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copyright law through the goals and aspirations they pursue with respect to copyright works, and ask 
which of those goals copyright law should promote. I conclude in Part VI by describing how the copyright 
consumers of my study are taking shape and how I started carving out a place for them within the 
copyright law framework. 
II. The place of users in copyright law 
If one is looking for the place of users in Canadian copyright law, one will be first led to the recent 
Supreme Court jurisprudence on copyright. The Supreme Court's characterization of exceptions to 
copyright infringement as "users' rights" in CCH, as recently reaffirmed and further elaborated in three 
judgments by the same Court in 2012, are among the most significant recent legal pronouncements on the 
place of users in copyright law.5 While users' rights to commercial copies of copyright works are not 
solely defined through exceptions to copyright infringement, exceptions are increasingly important to 
understand the scope of users' rights to commercial copies of copyright works.6 The Supreme Court 
jurisprudence affirming that exceptions to copyright infringement are users' rights contrasts sharply with 
the. treatment of copyright users in other jurisdictions that have specifically rejected the concept that 
exceptions qualified as users' rights.7 From that perspective, Canada may be viewed as the champion of 
users' rights in contemporary copyright law.8 
In CCH, the Supreme Court had to determine whether the custom photocopy service offered by the Great 
Library to its patrons upon request (including lawyers, law students and members of the judiciary) 
regarding photocopies of extracts from legal texts fell under the fair dealing exception under section 29 of 
the CCA "for the purpose of research or private study. "9 In a unanimous judgment, Chief Justice 
McLachlin qualified fair dealing to be "perhaps more properly understood as an integral part of the 
5 CCH, supra note 1 at para 48; Alberta, supra note 1; Bell Canada, supra note 1; CRTC, supra note 1. 
6 See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part II. The CCA, supra note 2 was amended in 2012 by Canada's Copyright 
Modernization Act, SC 2012, c 20 [CC.MA] which added new exceptions to copyright infringement and broadened 
the scope of existing ones. 
7 See the discussion on the nature of exceptions to copyright infringement in Chapter 3 Part IV A. 
8 Giuseppina D' Agostino, "Healing Fair Dealing? A Comparative Copyright Analysis of Canadian Fair Dealing to 
UK Fair Dealing and US Fair Use" (2008) 53 McGill L.J. 309 at 357. See also the analysis of CCH and how it is 
situated in recent debates on the scope of copyright holders' rights in an international copyright context in Myra J. 
Tawfik, "International Copyright Law and Fair Dealing as a User Right" (2005) UNESCO Copyright Bulletin, 
online: http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/ev.php-
URL 1D=27422&URL DO=DO TOPIC&URL SECTl0N=201.htm1. 
9 CCH, supra note I at para 4 7. 
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Copyright Act than simply a defence," adding that fair dealing and other exceptions to copyright 
infringement were users' rights. 10 Applying the two-step analysis of fair dealing to the practice by the Law 
Society, the Supreme Court held that its custom photocopying service was provided for the purpose of 
research, review and private study and that the Law Society dealings with the copyright works were fair. 11 
As significant as CCH and subsequent judgments by the Supreme Court may be in giving a more 
prominent place to users in copyright law, one needs to pause. First, the future of the legal principle 
enunciated in CCH remains unclear in light of recent amendments to the CCA. 12 Second, users remain a 
largely undefined group under current Canadian copyright law and in the other jurisdictions examined 
here. 13 This is consistent with the copyright-holder-centric framework upon which copyright law is 
construed. The CCA centres on defining the myriad works protected by copyright, on the exclusive rights 
that copyright confers, on providing remedies for copyright infringement, and on setting the rules 
regarding the collective administration of copyright. 14 
Fragmented clues to the identity and treatment of users in Canadian and other copyright laws can be found 
in the exceptions to copyright infringement or uses that are permitted without copyright holders' consent. 15 
Court decisions that enlighten us on the place of users in copyright law most often involve the 
interpretation of one of those exceptions to copyright infringement. 16 As I discuss below in this chapter, the 
10 Ibid at para 48. 
1 1 Ibid, at paras 61 ff. 
12 CCMA, supra note 6. For a discussion on the recent amendments of the CCA, see Chapter 3 Part II, III and IV. 
13 Except for "Educational Institutions," defined in CCA, supra note 2, s 2, the CCA contains no definition relevant 
to users or consumers of copyright works. In the US Copyright Act, 17 USC§ 101, the only definitions relevant to 
users of copyrighted works are "food service or drinking establishment" and "proprietor" (which is related to a 
"food service and drinking establishment"). The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (UK), c. 48 [UKCDPA], 
contains no definition pertaining to users, nor does the French Code de Propritete Intellectuel/e [CPI]. 
14 CCA, supra note 2, s 2 contains over 50 definitions, two of which relate to a copyright user (definitions of 
"educational institution" and of "perceptual disabilities"), Part I and Part II define copyright holders' exclusive 
rights, Part III defines copyright infringement and lists exceptions to copyright infringement, Part IV lists remedies 
available to copyright holders, Part VI and Part VII deal with miscellaneous provisions and the collective 
administration of copyright, and Part VIII deals with the private copying regime. 
15 CCA, supra note 2, ss 3 (j), 15 (I.I) (e), I8 (1.1) (b), 29- 32.2, 79-86; US Copyright Act, supra note 13, §107 -
§I I2, §I 17, §I I9, §I2I-§I22; EC, European Parliament and Council Directive 2001129/EC of 22 May 2001 on 
the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, [200I] OJ, LI 67/I 0 
[Directive 2001129/EC], art 4 (2), 5; EC, Parliament and Council Directive 2009124/EC of 23 April 2009 on the 
legal protection of computer programs, [2009] OJ, L I 11 at I 6. [Directive 2009124/EC], art. 4 (2), 5-6; UKCDPA, 
supra note 13, Chapter III (ss I8(3), 28-76); CPI, supra note 13, art L I22-3-l, L122-5, Ll22-6-l. 
16 In Canada, this is the case in CCH, supra note 1, where the Supreme Court had to interpret the scope of the 
application of the fair dealing provisions in the CCA. In the US, the Supreme Court judgment Sony Corp. v 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454-55 (1984) (US Supreme Court) on permitted uses by consumers 
(i.e., home video recording of broadcasts for later viewings) was also based on the application of the fair use 
22 
fair dealing provisions in the CCA do not refer to users. 17 Acts can be performed for specific purposes, 
which suggests that they apply a priori to a broad range of users. 18 The majority of the other exceptions 
apply to specific groups of users, including educational institutions and libraries, archives and museums. 19 
The additional exceptions to copyright infringement that were recently introduced in the CCA refer to 
. d" "d l 20 zn zvz ua s or persons. 
Until recently, the interests of users, and more particularly those of consumers, were not specifically 
considered in Canadian policy papers and reports produced in the context of copyright reform. 21 By 
provisions in the US Copyright Act, supra note 13, § 107. See also the discussion on the nature of exceptions to 
copyright infringement in Chapter 3 Part IV A. 
17 CCA, supra note 2, ss 29 to 29.2. See the discussion in Part IV of this chapter. 
18 Ibid. 
19 CCA, supra note 2, ss 29-32.2. For its part, the private copying regime applies to a "person" making 
reproductions under limited conditions for private use: CCA, ibid, ss 79-86, in particulars 80. See the discussion in 
Part IV of this chapter. 
2
° CCA, supra note 2, ss. 29.21-29.24, introduced in 2012 with the entry into force of the CCMA, supra note 6. 
Sections 29 .21 to 29 .23 refer to individuals while section 29 .24 refers to persons. For a discussion of these new 
exceptions to copyright infringement, see Chapter 3 Part II D. 
21 Consumers as a group were rarely if at all mentioned in earlier Canadian policy papers on copyright reform, for 
example see: Economic Council of Canada, Report on Intellectual and Industrial Property, Information Canada by 
B.V. Hindley (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, 1971); Canada, Depaitment of Consumer and Corporate 
Affairs, Copyright in Canada - Proposals for a Revision of the Law by A.A Kayes & C. Brunet (Ottawa: 
Government of Canada, 1977) at 235, referred more generally to the public interest while acknowledging the 
greater need to take into account the interests of users. Canada, Departments of Consumer and Corporate Affairs 
and Communications, From Gutenberg to Telidon: A White Paper on Copyright: Proposals for the Revision of the 
Canadian Copyright Act (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1984), referred to users broadly in the context of 
striking a balance between various interests. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Communications and 
Culture, "A Charter of Rights for Creators - Report of the Subcommittee on the Revision of Copyright" (Ottawa: 
Supply and Services Canada, 1985), the Minutes of Proceedings and evidence of the Sub-Committee of the 
Standing Committee on Communications and Culture on the Revision of Copyright: response to From Gutenberg 
to Telidon, at 3, emphasized the need for stronger protection of creators' rights with little consideration for users; 
Canada, Culture and Communications, Standing Committee on Communications and Culture, The ties that bind 
(Ottawa: The Committee, 1992) (Chair: Bud Bird) at 66, briefly refers to users in the context of the need to 
provide an equitable balance between the interests of artists and users of their works; NGL Nordicity Group Ltd 
for Industry Canada, New Media, Information Technologies Industry Branch, Study on New media and Copyright 
Final Report by P. Lyman, T. Rajan, L. Rocca, L. E. Harris & T. Scapillati, Appendix A, listed the stakeholders 
interviewed, none of which (with the possible exception of one group, incidentally) represented consumer 
interests. Similarly, the survey on which the report was based included no reference to user considerations and was 
instead geared toward how to control better user access; Canada, Intellectual Property Policy Directorate Industry 
Canada, Copyright Policy Branch, Canadian Heritage, Consultation Paper on Digital Copyright Issues (June 21, 
2001), online: http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/crp-prda.nsf/eng/h rpOl 102.html, concerns for consumers as a group 
were implicit though out much of the discussion that placed a particular emphasis on the need to balance interests 
of copyright holders with users' interests, and Canada's long standing tradition in that regard. However, there was 
rarely a specific mention of consumers. See also Canada, Minister of Canadian Heritage and Minister of Industry, 
Status Report on Copyright Reform submitted to the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, March 2004, 
online: http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/crp-prda.nsf/eng/rpO 1133.html; House of Commons, Standing Committee on 
Canadian Heritage, Interim Report on Copyright Reform (May 2004) (Chair: Sarmite D. Bulte, M.P.), online: 
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contrast, references to copyright consumers' interests and concerns were part of the Government of 
Canada's consultations with the public and communications in the latest copyright reform initiatives.22 
Copyright International conventions' primary purpose centres on the promotion and protection of the 
exclusive rights of copyright holders, both substantively and at a procedural level, through the 
establishment of minimum standard obligations.23 Not surprisingly, this source of law offers little insight 
into the identity and interests of copyright users and reinforces the copyright-holder-centric nature of 
copyright law. In Chapter 1, I described how technological means of production, dissemination, access, 
and enjoyment of copies of copyright works have irreversibly changed the dynamics between authors, 
copyright holders, distributors, users, and consumers. 24 While the digital agenda that led to the adoption of 
the World Intellectual Property Organization Internet Treaties in 199625 sought to address the effects of 
these profound technological changes on the commercial exploitation of copyright holders' works, 26 the 
treaties have failed to adequately take into consideration how the equation would be altered for users and 
consumers alike. This is particularly apparent in the adoption of the technological protection measure 
[TPMs] provisions. 27 The WIPO Internet Treaties impose no counterbalancing obligation on member states 
to preserve permitted acts on copyright works without the permission of the copyright holders, such as 
through fair use, fair dealing, and other long-established exceptions to copyright infringement. 28 In recent 
years, initiatives have been undertaken with the primary objective being to rectify the absence of 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublicationsfPublication.aspx?Docld= I 350628&Language=E&Mode= 1 &Par1=37 &S 
es=3. In G. Bruce Doem & Markus Sharaput, Canadian Intellectual Proper(v, The Politics of Innovating 
Institutions and Interests (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000) at 111-116, the authors point to an 
increased participation of user interest groups in the political debate of copyright, using Bill C-32 (introduced in 
1996 and enacted in 1997) as a case study. Among those groups, they refer to broadcasters, educational 
institutions, public libraries, and museums, but no consumer interests group is mentioned. 
22 See Government of Canada official website archives on Bill C-32, An Act to amend the Copyright Act, 3rd 
Session, 40th Parl., 2010 (lsr reading June 2, 2010): "Copyright Modernization Act Backgrounder," online: 
http:/fbalancedcopyright.gc.ca/eic/site/crp-prda.nsf/eng/h rpO 115 I .html. See also Government of Canada official 
website on the adoption of Bill C-11, An Act to Amend the Copyright Act, 1st Sess, 41th Parl, 2011 (assented to 
June 29, 2012): "Copyright Modernization Act Backgrounder," online: http://halancedcopyright.gc.ca/eic/site/crp-
prda.nsf/eng/h rpOl 237.html . 
23 See the discussion on Canada's international copyright obligations in Chapter 3 Part V. 
24 See the discussion in Chapter 1 Part I. 
25 The WIPO Internet Treaties refer to the WIPO Copyright Treary, 20 December 1996, W0033EN, online: 
http://www.wipo.int/tre.aties/en/ip/wct/trtdocs wo033.html#P8 l 89 [WCTJ and the WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treary, 20 December 1996, W0034EN, online: 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt/tltdocs wo034.htrnl [WPPTJ. 
26 The digital agenda sought to address "the profound impact of the development and convergence of information 
and communication technologies on the creation and use of literary and artistic works": WCT, supra note 25, 
Preamble. 
27 See the discussion on TPMs in Chapter 3 Part III B. 
28 Ibid. 
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consideration of copyright users' rights in international conventions. These initiatives include proposals for 
international instruments that would substantiate the limitations or exceptions to copyright holders' 
exclusive rights. 29 The work programs and official declarations of the World Trade Organization [WTO] 
and WIPO show a noticeable trend toward the recognition of a need to balance the interests of intellectual 
property right holders, users, and the public. 3° Commentators point to the flexibility that international 
instruments offer as to how member states can achieve a better balance between the interests of copyright 
holders, users, and the public. 31 Pressure is building on legislatures and the judiciary around the world, as 
well as on international organizations, to better take into account the rights and interests of copyright users 
and consumers. 32 
Prior to CCH, copyright users received little attention from Canadian commentators, with notable 
exceptions.33 David Vaver situated users in copyright law as follows: 
[t]he policy of copyright law has always been to balance competing owner and user interests according to 
both contemporary exigencies and transcendental imperatives such as free speech and free trade. Without a 
corresponding user benefit, an owner's right may never have been enacted or retained in that form. User 
rights are not just loopholes. Both owner rights and user rights should therefore be given the fair and 
balanced reading that befits remedial legislation. 34 
In CCH, the Supreme Court referred to Vaver' s localization of users within copyright law when it held that 
fair dealing, and other exceptions to copyright infringement, are users' rights. 35 This characterization of the 
29 See the discussion on Canada's international obligations in Chapter 3 Part V. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. See also the discussion in Chapter I Part II on the events that surrounded the signature of the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, October I, 2011, online: http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-
accords-commerciaux/fo/intellect property.aspx?view=d and on the events that followed the introduction in the 
US of US, Bill HR 3261, Stop Online Piracy Act, 11th Cong, 2011, and of US Bill S 968, Preventing Real Online 
Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act of 2011, l l 2th Cong. 
33 David Vaver, Copyright Law (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc., 2000) [Vaver 2000] devotes Chapter 7 of his book to "Users' 
Rights". See also, Sunny Handa, Copyright Law in Canada, (Markham, Ontario: Butterworth Canada, 2002) at 24, 463-
66, where the author discussed briefly the place of users in Canadian copyright law and how, in the context of digital 
technologies, we needed to shift from a copy-base regime to a use-base regime. Handa also noted the need to address 
personal uses of copyright works (as opposed to commercial uses) more broadly than was the case in Canadian 
copyright law at the time. Post CCH, supra note 1, there has been more literature on copyright users in Canada, as I 
discuss further below in Part II of this chapter. I also discuss the academic literature on copyright users worldwide in 
Part II of this section. 
34 Vaver, 2000, supra note 28, at 171. 
35 CCH, supra note 1 at para 48. See also David Vaver, Intellectual Property Law Copyright, Patents, Trade-
Marks, 2d ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2011) [Vaver 2011] at 215. 
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boundaries of copyright in CCH is consistent with how the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada had 
previously emphasized the need to place limits on copyright holder rights in Theberge v Galerie d'Art du 
Petit Champlain inc. [Theberge]. 36 In that case, Binnie J. for the majority held that the lawful owner of 
reproductions of a painting by artist Claude Theberge was not infringing the artist's copyright when it 
transposed the reproduction from a paper copy onto a canvas. Addressing the inherent tension that subsists 
between the copyright holder rights in copies of their works and the property rights of the purchaser of the 
physical copy, Binnie J. stated: 
In crassly economic terms it would be as inefficient to overcompensate artists and authors for the right of 
reproduction as it would be self-defeating to undercompensate them. Once an authorized copy of a work is 
sold to a member of the public, it is generally for the purchaser, not the author, to determine what happens 
to it. 37 
The Supreme Court of Canada recently reaffirmed CCH in three judgments by holding that copyright users 
have rights, and in two of the three judgments, brought further clarification to the scope of fair dealing in 
the CCA.38 
CCH has been widely commented upon by Canadian scholars with the result that copyright users are 
receiving more attention in the literature.39 Generally, Canadian scholars salute CCH's emphasis on the 
place of copyright users in Canadian copyright law. For Giuseppina D' Agostino, CCH makes Canada the 
36 Supra note 1. 
371bid at para 31. 
38 Alberta, supra note 1; Bell Canada, supra note 1, where the Court further clarified the scope of fair dealing. I 
discuss the scope and application of the fair dealing provisions of the CCA, supra note 2, in Chapter 3 Part II C. 
The Supreme Court reaffirmed that exceptions to copyright infringement are user rights in CRTC, supra note 1. 
39 D' Agostino, supra note 8; Abraham Drassinower "Taking User Rights Seriously", in Michael Geist, ed., In the 
Public Interest: The Future of Canadian Copyright Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005) 462 [Drassinower 2005]; 
Daniel Gervais, "Canadian Copyright Law Post-CCH" (2004) 18 I.P.J. 131; Myra J. Tawfik, "International 
Copyright Law and Fair Dealing as a User Right" (2005) UNESCO Copyright Bulletin, online: 
http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/ev.php-URL TD=27422&URL DO=DO TOPJC&URL SECTION=20 I .html 
[Tawfik, UNESCO Bulletin]; Myra J. Tawfik, "International Copyright Law: W[h]ither User Rights?", in Michael 
Geist, ed., In the Public Interest: The Future of Canadian Copyright Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005) 66 [Tawfik 
2005]; Theresa Scassa, "Users' Rights in the Balance: Recent Developments in Copyright law at the Supreme 
Court of Canada" (2005) 22 CIPJ 133; Carys J. Craig, "The Changing Face of Fair Dealing in Canadian Copyright 
Law: A Proposal for Legislative Reform", in Michael Geist, ed., In the Public Interest: The Future of Canadian 
Copyright Law, (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005) [Craig 2005]; Abraham Drassinower, "Exceptions properly so-called" 
in Soled Gendered & Abraham Drassinower, Langues et droit d'auteur/Language and Copyright (Cowansville, 
QC: Yvon Blais, 2009) 217 [Drassinower 2009]; Carys Craig, Copyright, Communication and Culture, Torwards 
a Relational Theory of Copyright Law (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2011) [Craig 2011] at 155-202, in 
particular at 168, 170-17 4, 179. 
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champion of the "rights of users to balance copyright,''4° thus making Canada the most user-centric 
jurisdiction of the three jurisdictions compared in her analysis of fair dealing and fair use.41 Abraham 
Drassinower describes the significance of CCH's characterization of "user rights," as well as the Court's 
underlying concern for the need to maintain a balance in copyright law, as redefining the author's 
copyright by limiting its scope ab initio.42 The characterization of user rights shifts "exceptions properly 
so-called" from the periphery of author's exclusive rights to the core of copyright law.43 Daniel Gervais 
and Elizabeth Judge present a similar idea about the effects of CCH.44 Myra Tawfik situates the 
significance of the characterization of user rights in CCH in a broader international context. 45 She argues 
that CCH' s emphasis on copyright users' rights is consonant with works undertaken by international 
organizations, such as WIPO's initiatives on intellectual property and development.46 
Discussions on the place of users in copyright law arise as part of broader considerations of the need to 
preserve a balance between competing interests.47 The need to balance the interests of copyright holders 
and of users has often been mentioned as one of Canada's copyright policy objectives, as evidenced by a 
40 D' Agostino, supra note 8 at 357. 
41 The three jurisdictions compared are Canada, the UK and, the US: D' Agostino, supra note 8 at 358. 
42 Drassinower 2009, supra note 39 at 217. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Daniel Gervais & Elizabeth Judge, Intellectual Property, the Law in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 2005) at 88, 
where the authors describe how CCH, supra note I places the fair dealing provisions of the CCA at a higher 
normative level than the other copyright infringement exceptions," possibly on an equal footing with authors' 
exclusive rights". They limit the effects of CCH of "user rights" to the fair dealing provisions, as opposed to all 
copyright infringement exceptions under the CCA: Ibid, at 81 ff. While the Court pronounced judgment on the 
application of the fair dealing provisions alone, on at least two occasions, in obiter dicta, the Court did not limit its 
qualification of copyright infringement exceptions as "user rights" to the fair dealing provisions. Rather, it 
explicitly referred to all exceptions to copyright infringement as being user rights: CCH, supra note 1 at paras 12, 
48. 
45 Tawfik 2005, supra note 39 at 66; Tawfik UNESCO Bulletin, supra note 39. 
46 Tawfik UNESCO Bulletin, supra note 39. Reacting to a government policy report published at the time (i.e., the 
Report by the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage published in May 2004) argues that nothing in those 
international conventions requires Canada policy-makers "to eviscerate user rights": Tawfik 2005, supra note 39 at 
85. In Chapter 3 Part V, I discuss Canada's international copyright law obligations. 
47 Supra note 39. See also Thomas Dreier, "Balancing Proprietary and Public Domain Interests: Inside or Outside 
of Proprietary Rights?" in Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Diane Leenheer Zimmerman & Harry First, eds, Expanding 
the Boundaries of Intellectual Property: Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Society (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001) 295; Reto Hilty & Sylvie Nerisson, "Overview of National Reports About 'Balancing Copyright'" 
(2012), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2040607 which is their contribution to Reno Hilty & Sylvie 
Nerisson, Balancing Copyright -A Survey of National Approaches (Verlag: Springer, 2012) 1-78. The report 
surveys reports submitted by scholars with respect to 40 countries worldwide (including Canada, the US, the UK, 
and France) about how each jurisdiction approaches the concept of balancing competing interests in copyright law. 
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review of the federal policy papers and reports of the last decades.48 The Supreme Court articulated the 
concept of balance in Canadian copyright law in Theberge and the concept has since become an important 
interpretative tool in its jurisprudence on copyright. In Theberge, the majority of the Supreme Court 
presented the CCA as: 
a balance between promoting the public interest in the encouragement and dissemination of works of the 
arts and intellect and obtaining a just reward for the creator (or, more accurately, to prevent someone other 
than the creator from appropriating whatever benefits may be generated).49 
In CCH, the Supreme Court relied on the balance objective of the CCA as enunciated in Theberge in 
interpreting fair dealing and other exceptions to copyright infringement as users' rights, as well as the 
concept of originality in Canadian copyright law. 50 The Supreme Court frequently reaffirmed the need to 
preserve a balance in the CCA between different objectives as stated by Theberge. 51 In Bell Canada, Abella 
J. in a unanimous judgment, described how Theberge "reflected a move away from an earlier, author-
centric view which focused on the exclusive right of authors and copyright owners to control how their 
works were used in the marketplace. "52 While CCH and the more recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on 
48 Keyes and Brunet, supra note 21 at 144: "probably the most difficult and sensitive issue of copyright law 
revision is that of striking a balance between the interests of creators of copyright material and the users of such 
material. The issue is most apparent when users seek increased and new derogations from the rights of authors," 
and at 235, the authors acknowledged the need to balance the interests of copyright holders and users and made 
recommendations to that effect, including the establishment of a copyright tribunal to regulate the collective 
management of copyright. From Gutenberg to Telidon: A White Paper on Copyright: Proposals for the Revision of 
the Canadian Copyright Act, supra note 21 at 1, posited the objective of a balance between competing interests 
while favouring market laissez faire: "Technological change has fundamentally altered the relationship between 
creators and users of their works. Consequently, throughout the revision process, the government has given 
particular consideration to producing a revised Act that strikes a fair balance between creators and users. In 
general, given strong and competitive markets, the new Act will achieve this balance by setting out clear 
definitions of the property rights of creators. There should then be no need for the government to intervene in 
individual transactions in determining how much remuneration creators should receive, or how their works should 
be made available to the public," and at 87. In Culture and communications: the ties that bind, supra note 21 at 66, 
the standing committee on communication and culture recommended that "in recognition of the rights of artists to 
be fairly compensated for the use of their creative works, the Government of Canada introduces measures, 
including amendments to the copyright act that provide an equitable balance between the interests of artists and the 
users of their works." In Consultation Paper on Digital Copyright Issues, supra note 21at6-7, 22-24, great 
emphasis was placed on the need to balance the interests of copyright holders with users' interests. 
49 Theberge, supra note 1 at para 30. 
5° CCH, supra note 1 at paras 10, 14-36 (in particular 23-24), 48. 
51 Supra note 1; Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Canadian Assn. of Internet 
Providers, 2004 SCC 45 at para 40; Euro-Excellence Inc. v Kraft Canada Inc., 2007 SCC 37 at para 76; Bell 
Canada, supra note 1 at para 9; Entertainment Software Association v Society of Composers, Authors and Music 
Publishers of Canada, 2012 SCC 34 at para 7; Rogers Communications Inc. v Society of Composers, Authors and 
Music Publishers of Canada, 2012 SCC 35 at para 40; CRTC, supra note 1 at para 64. 
52 Supra note 34 at para 9, citing Bishop v Stevens, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 467, at 478-79. 
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copyright tend to support that view,53 what does that "move away from an earlier author-centric view" of 
copyright represent for copyright users? Where do copyright users come in the balance between different 
objectives as they are described in Theberge? 
The need to preserve a balance within the CCA between different objectives, as stated by Theberge, can 
lead to the hasty conclusion that "promoting the public interest in the encouragement and dissemination of 
works of the arts and intellect" benefits the public and copyright users, and "obtaining a just reward for the 
creator" benefits authors and creators.54 A closer look reveals that such a view misrepresents whose 
interests are at stake under each objective.55 On each side of the balance described by Binnie J. in 
Theberge, both users and copyright holders' interests are present. On one side of the balance: "the 
encouragement and dissemination of works" are both to the benefit: of copyright holders, users and the 
public interest. On the other side of the balance: "obtaining a just reward for the creator" benefits authors 
and copyright holders but can also be in the interest of copyright users to the extent that it incentivizes the 
creation of more works.56 While it is fair to say that Theberge's enunciation of the balance in the CCA has 
been interpreted in CCH, and more recently in Alberta, Bell Canada and CRTC, in a manner that gives 
more space to copyright users in the CCA,57 a closer look at Theberge reveals that copyright users are a bit 
lost in the balance, amidst the public interest and the interests of creators and right holders. 58 
53 Supra note 50 and note 5 I. I discuss CCH and more recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on fair dealing as a 
users' right in Chapter 3 Part II C. 
54 For a discussion on how the balance of different objectives in the CCA (as enunciated in Theberge, supra note I 
at para 30) has been interpreted and applied, and in particular, how it is misleading to assimilate the interests of 
copyright holders to the ones of authors, and place them in opposition to the public interest and copyright users, 
see D'agostino, supra note 8 at 327-329. See also Canadian Heritage, Copyright Policy Branch."Fair Dealing after 
CCH" by Giuseppina D' Agostino (Ottawa, Canadian Heritage, 2007) online: http://www.pch.gc.ca/pc-
ch/org/sectr/ac-ca/pda-cpb/publctn/cch-2007 /index-eng.cfm, at 15-17. 
55 Ibid. 
56 For a discussion on the incentive theory in copyright law see Chapter 6 Part III B. 
57 CCH, supra note 1 at paras 10, 14-36 (in particular 23-24 ), 48; Alberta supra note 1; Bell Canada, supra note I; 
CRTC, supra note 1. 
58 Supra note 54. The same can be said with respect to the place of authors in the balancing act: ibid. See also 
Scassa, supra note 39 at 135: "The Supreme Court of Canada's balancing approach is, in general, a positive 
development from a copyright user's perspective. However, its significance should not be overstated .... [E]ven 
the Supreme Court of Canada is not entirely clear as to whose interests are to be balanced." For a discussion on the 
difficulties around the application of the concept of balance in copyright law, see also: Abraham Drassinower, 
"From Distribution to Dialogue: Remarks on the Concept of Balance in Copyright Law" (2009) 34 The Journal of 
Corporation Law, 991. For a survey of the concept of balance in the copyright law of 40 countries see Hilty & 
Nerisson, supra note 43, in particular at 90 where the authors conclude, based on the countries surveyed, that 
copyright law is still predominantly focused on the exclusive rights of copyright holders and hence that the 
29 
To situate users' and more particularly consumers' interests within the broader public interest fails to take 
into account the dynamics at play for this group within the copyright law framework. In a report prepared 
for the European Parliament on the interaction between copyright law and consumers' rights, Severine 
Dusollier summarizes the complexity of the interaction between copyright holders, the public interest, and 
the consumers as one where interests are partly in opposition and partly in juxtaposition: 
... the public has a twofold interest in copyright law. First, the public is the natural recipient of copyrighted 
works and is hence concerned by an adequate protection of copyright, ensuring creation and dissemination 
thereof in the public sphere. In that sense, the public interest rejoices that of the copyright owners. On the 
second hand, the public also wish [sic] for a limited copyright, as its access to culture, knowledge and 
information can be granted by the necessary boundaries of literary and artistic property .... However, the 
interests of consumers cannot be equated anymore solely with that of the public in copyright law. With the 
digital advent, the consumer has taken a more central role in copyright, as the mere use of a work has now 
entered into the copyright realm. 59 
Dusollier notes that consumers have distinct interests that are not well served in a public interest 
discourse.60 In fact, just as it is the case with copyright holders' exclusive rights, the rights of copyright 
consumers involve the promotion of private interests that can be aligned with the broader public interest 
but are nevertheless distinct.61 Copyright consumers enjoy copyright works for purposes distinguishable 
from those of other users and enter into commercial transactions that often include non-negotiated standard 
end-user agreements, raising specific issues about the interaction between copyright and contracts. 62 
The trend toward a growing interest in the place of users in Canadian copyright law is consistent with what 
took place in other parts of the world, including the US and Europe. Until recently, work focusing on the 
discussion around a balance in copyright law may be more rhetorical than a substantive interpretation tool. For a 
critique on the difficulty of applying the concept of balance in copyright law see: Normand Siebrasse, "A property 
rights theory of the limits of copyright" (2001) 51 U. Toronto L.J. 1, at 5-13. 
59 European Parliament, DG for Internal Policies, Policies Department: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs, 
"The Relations Between Copyright Law And Consumers' Rights From A European Perspective" by Severine 
Dusollier (2010) [Dusollier 201 O] at 8-9. 
60 Ibid. 
61 See Jeremy de Beer and Robert Tomkowicz "Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights in Canada" (2009) 25 
C.I.P.R. 3 at 22-23 who argue that "public" considerations must take into account the private property rights of 
individual users: " ... the public is nothing more than a great number or individuals who become owners of the 
tangible property embedding in intellectual property. Thus the attempts to balance the rights of intellectual 
property owners with the rights of the public must include consideration of the classic property rights exercised by 
individual users of copyrighted works and patented inventions." 
62 See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part III. I apply consumer protection law to commercial copies of copyright 
works in the Third Part of my thesis (Chapter 8 to Chapter 11 ). 
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place of users in copyright law was scarce; the earlier work of Ray Patterson & Stanley Lindberg, The 
Nature of Copyright: A Law of Users Rights,63 being one notable exception. Thankfully, with authors such 
as Patterson & Lindberg,64 Jessica Litman,65 Julie E. Cohen,66 Joseph P. Liu,67 Niva Elkin-Koren,68 Lucie 
Guibault,69 Natali Helberger,70 Bernt Hugenholtz,71 Deborah Tussey,72 and others,73 a doctrine on the 
identity and place of the copyright user is emerging. 
In the earlier book by Patterson and Lindbergh, The Nature of Copyright: A Law of Users Rights,74 the 
authors argued, on the basis of an historical review of US copyright law, that the purpose of the protection 
of copyright under the US Constitution is to promote learning, not to provide incentives to creators.75 The 
exclusive right of authors to publish their writings presupposes the right of users to make personal use of 
copyrighted works.76 For Patterson and Lindbergh, the place of users (the public) is central to the 
understanding of copyright law and yet is perhaps its least understood component. 77 The personal use 
right,78 grounded in the US Constitution, is limited to the act of learning and is distinct from any use that is 
63 L. Ray Patterson, & Stanley W. Lindberg, The Nature of Copyright: A Law of Users Rights (University of 
Georgia Press: Athens, Georgia, 1991). 
64 Ibid. 
65 Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (Amherst: Prometheus Books 2001) [Litman 2001 ]; see also Jessica Litman, 
"Lawful Personal Use" (2007) 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1871 [Litman 2007]. 
66 Julie E. Cohen, "The place of the User in Copyright Law" (2005) 74 Fordham Law Review 347 [Cohen 2005]. 
67 Joseph P. Liu, "Copyright Law's Theory of the Consumer" (2003) 44 B. C. L. Rev. 397 [Liu 2003]; see also 
Joseph P. Liu, "Enabling Copyright Consumers" (2007) 22 BTU 1099 [Liu 2007]. 
68 Niva Elkin-Koren, "Making Room for Consumers Under the DMCA" (2007) 22 Berkley Technology Law 
Journal, 1119. 
69 Lucie Guibault & Natali Heiberger, "Copyright law and Consumer Protection" (2005) study carried out for the 
European Consumer Law Group, ECLG/035/05. 
70 Ibid; Natali Heiberger & P.Bernt Hugenholtz, "No place like home for making a copy, private copying in 
European copyright law and consumer law" (2007) 22 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1061. 
71 Heiberger & Hugenholtz, supra note 70. 
72 Deborah Tussey, "From Fan Sites to File Sharing: Personal Use in Cyberspace" (2001) 35 Ga. L. Rev. 1129. 
73 In particular, works that focus on copyright consumers: Antonina Bakardjieva Engelbrekt, "Accomodating the 
interests of the copyright consumer: New institutional dynamics in the wake of the infosoc directive" in Antonina 
Bakardjieva Engelbrekt, Ulf Bernitz, Bengt Domeij, Annette Kur & Jonas Nordell, eds, Sii.rtryck ur Festskrift till 
Marianne Levin (Norstedts Juridik: 2008); Jens Schovsbo, "Integrating Consumer Rights into Copyright law: 
From the European Perspective" (2008) 31 J Cons Policy 393; Peter Rott, "Download of Copyright-Protected 
Internet Content and the Role of (Consumer) Contract Law" (2008) 31 J. Consum. Policy 441; Dusollier 2010, 
supra note 59. 
74 Patterson & Lindberg, supra note 63. 
75 Ibid at 191. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid at 193, where the authors define personal use as a use "for one's own learning, enjoyment, or sharing with a 
colleague or friend - without any motive for profit." 
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permitted under the doctrine of fair use.79 Patterson and Lindbergh took a provocative stance on the place 
of users in what they viewed at the time as an increasingly copyright-holder-centric system. 80 They neither 
articulated the nature of those users' rights nor did they attempt to reconcile that view with what copyright 
law had become, regardless of its historical origins.81 
More recently, scholars who seek to define the place of users in copyright law almost invariably decry the 
lack of a cohesive theory around users.82 I next will explore the detrimental effects of the lack of attention 
to users within the framework of copyright law83 before describing the distinctiveness of copyright 
consumers among the broader category of copyright users84 and how theories about copyright consumers' 
aspirations are taking shape for the better understanding of the place and importance of consumers within 
the framework of copyright. 85 
III. The place of users outside copyright law 
The relative absence of users from copyright law and discourse is detrimental to copyright users and to the 
solidity of the copyright house. In Digital Copyright, Litman describes from a US perspective how a lack 
of attention to users' rights and interests results from users' limited representation in copyright reform 
processes, and is one of the causes for the progressive expansion of copyright holders' exclusive rights that 
I described in Chapter 1.86 As a result, the sphere of permissible uses of copyright works by users is 
increasingly at the mercy of copyright holders' control with justifications that are not always apparent to 
users. 
87 Copyright law is increasingly removed from its primary intended beneficiaries, and is 
incomprehensible and even counterintuitive to most copyright users.88 A central theme of Litman's work is 
that the copyright legal framework, with its primary focus on the exclusive reproduction right of copyright 
79 Ibid. 
80 Supra note 63. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Litman 2001, supra note 65 at 70ff.; Liu 2003, supra note 67 at 398; Cohen 2005, supra note 66 at 347; Elkin-
Koren, supra note 68 at 1137; Heiberger & Hugenholtz, supra note 70 at 1066; Schovsbo, supra note 73. 
83 See the discussion in Part III of this chapter. 
84 See the discussion in Part IV of this chapter. 
85 See the discussion in Part V of this chapter. 
86 Litman 2001, supra note 65 at 22ff. See my introductory comments on the progressive expansion of copyright 
holders' exclusive rights at the international level and in Canada in Chapter 5 Part II. 
87 Litman 2007, supra note 65 at I 872. 
88 Litman 2001, supra note 65 at 29, 85-86. 
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holders, is less and less palatable for the end-user in the digital age.89 Cohen voices the same concerns and 
describes how the copyright users' absence is reflected in the design of the US Copyright Act, in judicial 
decisions, and in the practice of copyright holders,90 emphasizing the importance of developing a theory of 
copyright users "to define the appropriate relationship between design and liability in the networked digital 
age."91 Laws that are not understood are less likely to be obeyed.92 In response to Litman, Jane Ginsburg 
acknowledges that "the copyright system cannot infinitely absorb cognitive dissonance," but at the same 
time she is skeptical that a better understanding of the law will make copyright users more compliant. 93 
The digital environment poses a formidable and unprecedented regulatory challenge to the sustainability of 
the copyright law framework. On the one hand, new technologies make copyright users' relationship with 
copyright works more diverse, interactive, and intimate than ever before, but also augment the possibility 
of copyright infringement as defined under current laws. 94 On the other hand, new technologies empower 
copyright holders to control access and use of and to monitor the copies of copyright works they make 
commercially available. As I will discuss in Chapter 3, copyright law in Canada and worldwide has 
embraced this technological empowerment by granting additional protection to copyright holders by the 
adoption of TPMs.95 
The answers to the regulatory challenge brought on by the digital environment as it continues to evolve 
oppose two views in the midst of two extreme scenarios. From the first view, the scope of copyright 
holders' exclusive rights can be legitimately expanded as new technologies allow copyright protection to 
be actualized in a manner that could not be achieved before. The shift "from having copies to experiencing 
89 Ibid at 29, 85-86. 
9° Cohen 2005, supra note 66 at 373: " ... the user's absence from copyright doctrine is a self-perpetuating 
phenomenon. Systemic failure to consider the user both legitimates judicially driven elision and encourages right 
holders and technology developers to ignore the user as a matter of practice." 
91 Cohen 2005, supra note 66 at 362. 
92 Tussey, supra note 72 at 1182-1183: "Current regimes are far too arcane to be comprehensible, and that which is 
not comprehensible is unlikely to be obeyed." See also David Vaver, "Canada's IP Laws, Amiss and A Mess", 
October 15, 2008, IP Osgoode, online: http://www.iposgoode.ca/2008/l O/canada%e2%80%99s-ip-laws-
%e2%80%93-amiss-and-a-mess/ commenting on intellectual property statutes in Canada: "They are not user 
friendly for lawyers or for those whose conduct is supposed to be regulated by them - inventors, authors, business, 
and the general public. Laws like these are a costly dead weight on the economy." 
93 Jane C. Ginsburg, "Can Copyright become User-Friendly? Review: Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright" (2001) 
25 Colum. J.L. & Arts 71[Ginsburg2001], at 82, 88-89. In Ginsburg's view, users will respect copyright law 
when they have no choice "as most users will be technologically and legally disabled from impeding the 
exclusivity of copyright": ibid at 82. 
94 See the discussion in Chapter 1 Part I on how new technologies in the digital environment empower copyright 
users in unprecedented ways; CCA, supra note 2, Part III (ss 27ff). 
95 See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part III B. 
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works"96 confers on copyright holders the ability and right to control access at every step of the use of the 
works that they make commercially available.97 This is essential for adequate protection of copyright 
holders in the creation and dissemination of copyright works in the digital environment.98 Copyright law is 
concerned about the users only in so far as it encourages authors to create works for the consumption of 
their intended beneficiaries.99 As I explained in Chapter l, recent developments in copyright law, in 
Canada and worldwide, lean toward this view to varying degrees. 100 
From the second view, and primarily in response to the first view, new technologies force us to question 
the rights and position of users within copyright law in a way that was not so pressing before. 101 Copyright 
was never intended solely to protect copyright holders' interests, but rather reflects a bargain between 
copyright holders and the public. 102 Refusing to take into account the interests of copyright users poses the 
96 Jane C. Ginsburg, "Essay: from having copies to experiencing works: the development of an access right in U.S. 
copyright law" (2003) 50 J. Copyright Soc'y U.S.A. 113 [Ginsburg 2003]. 
97 Ibid at 120-121: "the right to control the manner in which members of the public apprehend the work. The 
concept is distinct from reproduction or communica~ion to the public to the extent that I may communicate a copy 
of my work to the user's hard drive, or the user may purchase a digital copy such as a CD ROM, but the user may 
not 'open' the work to apprehend (listen to, view) its contents, unless the user acquires the 'key' to the work. And 
the key may vary with the nature and extent of enjoyment of the work." 
98 Ginsburg 2003, supra note 96. 
99 Jane C. Ginsburg, "Authors and Users in Copyright" (1997) 45 J. Copyright Soc'y U.S.A. I [Ginsburg 1997] at 
20: "End-users are indeed the ultimate beneficiaries, but they benefit because copyright is a law that seeks to 
promote authorship by ensuring authors a financial return from and reasonable control over the exploitation of 
their works. Copyright is a law about creativity; it is not, and should not become, merely a law for the facilitation 
of consumption." However, in later works Ginsburg acknowledges that while access controls are essential to 
copyright holder, consumer rights should be respected. See Ginsburg 2003, supra note 96 at 123. 
100 See the discussion on the progressive expansion of copyright holders' exclusive rights at the international 
copyright level, in Canada and other national jurisdictions in Chapter 5 Part II, in particular the recent wave of 
intellectual property regulation (e.g., ACTA, HADOPI, and SOPA), that seeks to confer greater enforcement 
powers to copyright holders against Internet intermediaries and individual users. See, however, the discussion in 
Canada about balancing competing interests, including the rights of users, in Part II of this chapter. 
101 See the discussion in Chapter I Part I about the multiplicity of acts that users can now perform on copyright 
works and how their interaction with them is more intimate than ever before. 
102 Patterson & Lindburg, supra note 63 at 191, where the authors argue that the constitutional parameters and 
foundation of copyright are to promote learning by granting authors exclusive right to publish their writings. This 
presupposes right of other citizens to make personal use of copyright works. See also Patterson & Lindburg, ibid at 
208, 209, 211; Litman 2001, supra note 65 at 80-81 where the author notes how in a strict economic analysis of 
copyright we lose sight of this bargain, as well as with the recent legal developments conferring more control to 
copyright holders over their works; see also: Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., "The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, 
Private Copying and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act" (2001) 87 Va. L. Rev. 813; Litman 2007, supra note 
60 at 1879, where the author refers to "copyright liberties" as being an integral part of what the copyright system 
always sought to protect and promote, i.e., the fact that "copyright law was designed to maximize the opportunities 
for non exploitative enjoyment of copyrighted works in order to encourage reading, listening, watching, and their 
cousins." The author argues that they are "both deeply embedded in copyright's design and crucial to its promotion 
of the 'Progress of Science."' 
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threat of undermining the fundamental values that underlie the copyright system. 103 Although this view is 
receiving more attention in the copyright doctrine and, as I discussed above in this chapter, is getting more 
support through recent judicial and legislative developments in Canada and elsewhere, 104 those changes 
progressively secure more protection for copyright holders without much accountability for how they 
affect the rights and interests of copyright users. 105 The two opposing views on how to address the 
regulatory challenge brought on by the digital environment are at the heart of the debate in the US on the 
raison d'etre of fair use. 106 They are also at the centre of the issue of the legitimacy of TPMs. 107 
Technological developments and how the law, copyright holders, users, and the public respond to them can 
in theory lead to extreme scenarios. One is an Orwellian drift in which copyright holders and states are 
aligned to deploy all resources and to take all actions that are necessary to eradicate copyright infringement 
(the scope of which continued to expand). The opposition movement that led to the postponement of the 
bill presented by the US House of Representatives: Stop Online Piracy Act [SOPA] 108 and to the 
endorsement of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement in 2011 [ACTA] 109 in Europe in 2012 invoked 
these powerful images of increased state control and surveillance for the benefit of selected private 
103 Litman 2007, supra note 60 at 1098: "Insisting that personal uses deserve no special treatment under copyright 
law, in contrast, poses huge risks of undermining copyright's historic liberties, and with them the architecture 
implicit in the copyright system." 
104 See the discussion in Part II of this chapter. 
105 See the discussion in Chapter 3, in particular Part III and Part IV. As Helberger and Hugenholtz, supra note 70 
at 1096-1097 describe it, the relative absence of users from copyright law and its discourse makes any attempt to 
~ut their interests forward an "up hill struggle." 
06 More specifically, the debate revolves around the fate of consumptive uses (as opposed to transformative or 
creative uses) that have traditionally been permitted through the application of fair use in the US and whether 
allowing such uses is still justified in an environment where copyright holders have the ability to control each and 
every step of the uses of their works. In other words, the debate centres around the justifications behind allowable 
consumptive uses under the fair use doctrine as resulting from a market failure that is progressively vanishing in 
the digital environment or as something that seeks to preserve other interests as part of the copyright system. See: 
Wendy J. Gordon, "Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its 
Predecessors," ( 1982) 82 Columbia Law Review 1600; Tom W. Bell, "Fair use vs. Fared use: the Impact of 
Automated Rights Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine"(l 998) 76 N.C. L. Rev. 557; Glynn S. Lunney, 
Jr., "Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited" (2002) 82 B.U. L. Rev. 975; Wendy J. Gordon, "Market Failure 
and Intellectual Property: A Response to Professor Lunney" (2002) 82 B.U.L. Rev. 1031 1043; Raymond Shih 
Ray Ku, "Consumers and Creative Destruction: Fair Use Beyond Market Failure" ( 2003) 18 BTU. 539; Wendy J. 
Gordon & Daniel Bahls, "The Public's Right to Fair Use: Amending Section 107 to avoid the 'Fared Use' Fallacy" 
(2007) Utah L. Rev. 619. I discuss the fair dealing/fair use exception to copyright infringement in Chapter 3 Part II 
c. 
107 For a discussion on the scope and effects of TPMs, see Chapter 3 Part III B. 
108 Supra note 32. See the discussion on SOPA in Chapter 1 Part II. 
109 Supra note 32. ACTA signatory members include Canada, the EU and its Member States, the US, Japan, and 
Australia. See the discussion on ACTA in Chapter 1 Part II. 
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interests. The opposition movement also raised important questions on prioritizing resources. 110 The other 
extreme scenario is one by which technological developments and how we respond to them call upon a 
tabula rasa, leading even to the eradication of copyright. This drift would result from a combination of 
factors that could include a renewed understanding of authorship and creation in the digital environment 
and how previous justifications for the protection of copyright progressively became obsolete, coupled 
with obstacles to the efficient tackling of copyright infringement. 111 For reasons that may be obvious, and 
others that I discuss in the Second Part of my thesis, neither extreme is likely to occur in the near future. 112 
Thinking about the gloomy prospect of the two opposite drifts that I described above on the future of 
copyright (i.e., absolute state enforcement of stronger copyright and copyright extinction) leads to the need 
to look under a different light at the place of users as an integral part of the copyright house. Rather than 
being in opposition to copyright holders' rights, defining copyright users' rights and interests is about 
increasing copyright's legitimacy and ultimately its subsistence. It is also about better understanding the 
boundaries and legitimacy of users' rights to copyright works. While it may have been possible in the past, 
thinking about copyright holders' rights without due consideration of copyright users' rights is no longer 
sustainable in a digital environment. As a basic premise, the increased threat of copyright infringement 
brought on by the digital environment does not only serve the argument for greater copyright protection, it 
should also serve the argument for seeking more adherence and buy-in from its primary intended 
beneficiaries, the copyright users. Copyright holders and regulators have focused their attention so far on 
increased copyright protection at the expense of greater copyright cohesion and adherence. Paradoxically, 
the quest for greater copyright protection is not likely to make the copyright house stronger; it could make 
it crumble. 113 Bringing copyright users inside copyright law is the step that I propose to reverse that trend. 
110 See for example the comments of IP Justice (an international civil liberties organization) by Robin Gross, 
"ACTA's Misguided Effort to Increase Govt Spying and Ratchet-Up IPR Enforcement at Public Expense," 21 
March 2008, online: http://ipjustice.org/wp/2008/03/2 l/acta-ipj-comments-ustr-2008march/ delivered to the 
Office of the United States Trade Representative on the proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA): 
"IP Justice firmly believes that ACTA's costs to the public far outweigh any public benefit it might provide. The 
financial expense to tax-payers to fund ACT A would be enormous and steal scarce resources away from programs 
that deal with genuine public needs like providing education and eliminating hunger. ACT A would burden the 
judicial system and divert badly needed law enforcement and customs resources away from public security and 
towards private profit." See also Charles Arthur, "Anti-piracy agreement rejected by European Parliament, but 
Acta could be revived by European Commission" 4 July 2012, The Guardian, online: 
http://www.guardian.co. uk/technology/2012/j ul/04/acta-european-parl iament-votes-against. 
111 I discuss the theoretical justifications of copyright and of copy ownership in Chapter 6 Part III. 
112 I.e., Chapter 4 to Chapter 7, and in particular in Chapter 6 Part III. 
113 See the discussion on the strong opposition to ACTA, SOPA, and other similar legislation in Chapter I Part II 
and in Part III of this chapter. This strong opposition may illustrate that trend. 
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Giving shape and place to copyright users begins with an understanding of the various subgroups of 
users. 
114 It also requires a comprehension of their aspirations and uses of copyright works and how these 
fall within the nature and objectives pursued by copyright. 115 Next, I will explain the justifications and 
benefits of concentrating my research on the subgroup of consumers in the broader category of copyright 
users and underscore the distinctiveness of copyright consumers as a field of study, as well as what they 
share in common with other copyright users. 
IV. Copyright users and copyright consumers 
While copyright users share common interests that include having access to the greatest volume of 
copyright works, with flexibility for their possible uses, and under advantageous terms, all users are not 
equal. Broadcasters, film production companies, libraries, and educational institutions are important users 
of copyright works. Yet, they have little in common with individual users who download an e-book or a 
digital musical recording for their personal use. Institutional users have a different bargaining power with 
copyright holders, different access to information, resources, and representation through associations 
promoting their interests that vary significantly from the reality of the individual user. Institutional users 
may or may not have the ability to negotiate the conditions under which they access copyright works, 
while individual users almost invariably access copyright works through non-negotiated agreements. 116 
Institutional users may want to use copyright works for commercial purposes, while individual users 
typically use copyright works for their personal use. All these differences are highly relevant to a better 
understanding of the place of users within copyright law. 
Singling out individual users, and more particularly consumers as I do in my research, from the larger 
group of copyright users brings important benefits and fills a lacuna in the emerging body of literature on 
copyright users where the distinctions among the various groups of users are not always set out clearly. 117 
114 See the discussion in Part IV of this chapter. 
115 See the discussion in Part V of this chapter. 
116 See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part III C. 
117 While some work on the place of users in copyright law focuses explicitly on copyright consumers: Liu 2003, 
supra note 67; Guibault &Heiberger, supra note 69; Elkin-Koren, supra note 68, Heiberger & Hugenholtz, supra 
note 70; Dusollier 2010, supra note 59, or that it can be inferred by the substantive arguments being developed that 
the scope of focus is on individual users: Tussey, supra note 72; Litman 2007, supra note 60, focus on individual 
users in those works does not necessarily consider the consumer's main characteristics as defined in statutory 
consumer protection law. Other works addresses users more generally, sometimes with a focus on individual users: 
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While it may be sometimes inferred by the substantive arguments being developed that a particular group 
of users, at times consumers are the main scope of investigation, the terminology of copyright users can be 
misleading. 118 In addition to the divergence of interests between institutional users and consumers that I 
just enumerated, it leaves out addressing boundaries that are fundamental in the context of the subject 
matter of copyright works. How did the users access the works: through a commercial transaction or by 
browsing the Internet? What is the purpose of the uses: is it for non-commercial or personal purposes or is 
it for commercial purposes (and among that group, are they uses that impact the economic rights of 
copyright holders)? 119 A specific focus on copyright consumers within the broader group of users requires 
a look at four features that distinguish copyright consumers and their environment from the broader group 
of users. First, it forces us to look at those specific values and behaviours that we want to promote and the 
resulting legal protection that we want to give to individual citizens who access copyright works. 120 
Second, given how consumers are generally defined, it requires a close look at the various purposes and 
effects of uses of copyright works on the exclusive rights of copyright holders. 121 Third, it requires an 
investigation of the effects of non-negotiated agreements on the copyright framework and on individual 
consumers, which is almost invariably how they access copyright works. 122 Fourth, the commercial 
transactions that take place between consumers and copyright holders (or their distributors) enable an 
investigation of the relatively little explored interaction between consumer protection law and copyright 
law. I will look at the first element, i.e., the aspfrations of consumers, below in this chapter, 123 after 
focusing next on the second distinguishing factor of consumers, i.e., the purposes for which they use 
copyright works. This will clarify legal issues of scope around the identity of copyright consumers that will 
Litman 2001, supra note 65. See Cohen 2005, supra note 66 at 347, where the author refers to the literature 
criticizing the normative adequateness of referring to consumers for the passive connotation that it has, in the 
context of how individuals experience information goods (citing Yockai Benkler, "From Consumers to Users: 
Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access" (2000) 52 Fed. 
Comm.L.J. 561). 
i 1s Ibid. 
119 Litman emphasizes those distinctions when defining a right of "lawful personal use" in Litman 2007, supra 
note 60, in particular at 1911-1912, where four broad categories of personal uses are defined based on their 
enhancement of "copyright holders" and based on their possible effects on copyright holders' incentives to create. 
120 I discuss the theoretical justifications of copy ownership and of copyright in Chapter 6 Part III. 
121 I.e., personal uses v. uses performed in a commercial setting, and in both cases, the likely effects of such uses 
on the exclusive rights of copyright holders. 
122 The contract terms are typically not negotiated and may or may not be accompanied by explicit terms or end-
user agreements: see the discussion in Chapter 3 Part III C. 
123 See the discussion in Part V of this chapter. 
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set the base to examine the third and fourth distinguishing factors of copyright consumers respectively in 
Chapter 3124 and in the Third Part of my thesis. 125 
The consumer protection law analysis to commercial copies of copyright works in the Third Part of my 
thesis constrains the scope of individuals by how they are defined under the relevant statutory consumer 
protection laws. 126 Rather than being a limitation, there are several positive upshots to referring to 
consumers as they are defined in consumer protection law. The key attributes of consumers under statutory 
consumer law call upon relevant distinctions to the application of copyright law. These distinctions enable 
a more refined understanding of how copyright law needs to address the specificity of consumers. 
Consumers in Canadian provincial (or territorial) statutory consumer protection laws generally refer to 
individuals acting for personal family or household purposes and exclude business purposes. 127 The 
definition of consumers is similar in scope in the other jurisdictions examined here. 128 The function of the 
definition of consumer in consumer protection law is to determine whether a commercial transaction 
deserves specific legal protection on the basis of an increased vulnerability that results from various forms 
of asymmetry between the consumer buyer and the supplier seller. 129 
124 In particular Chapter 3 Part III. 
125 I.e., Chapter 8 to Chapter 11. 
126 1.e., in the Canadian provincial and territory consumer protection statutes, and in the other jurisdictions 
examined here, i.e., the US, EU, UK, and France: see the discussion below in Part IV of this chapter. 
127 I.e., Canadian provincial consumer protection laws share similar definitions of consumers: Consumer 
Protection Act, S.O. 2002, c C-30, Schedule A, s 1, [OCPA]: "consumer" means an individual acting for 
personal, family, or household purposes and does not include a person who is acting for business 
purposes; Consumer Protection Act, R.S.Q., c P-40.1, [QCPA] s 1 (e): "consumer" means a natural 
person, except a merchant who obtains goods or services for the purposes of his business." This 
definition covers purchases that are primarily or accessorily related to the merchant's business: Nicole 
L'Heureux, Droit de la consommation, 5e edition (Cowansville, Que: Yvon Blais, 2000) at 34. 
128 US UCC § 2-103 c) (2004); the various European directives regulating consumer transactions define 
"consumer" as "any natural person who, in contracts covered by this Directive, is acting for purposes which are 
outside his trade, business, craft or profession,'' with some minor variances: EC, Council Directive 93113/EEC of 5 
April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, [1993] OJ L 95/04 at 29 [Directive 93113/EEC], at art. 2(b); EC, 
Parliament and Council Directiye 9717 /EC of 20 May 1997 on the protection of consumers in respect of distance 
contracts, [1997] OJ. Ll44/19, art. 2 (2) (which will be repealed by EU, Directive 2011/83/EU, as of June 13, 
20 I 4 ); EC, Parliament and Council Directive 1999144/EC of 25 May 1999 on certain aspects of the sale of 
consumer goods and associated guarantees, [I 999] 0 J L I 71, art 1, 2. (a); EC, Council and Parliament Directive 
2011183/EU of 22 November 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93113/EEC and Directive 
1999144/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 8515 77 /EEC and 
Directive 9717/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, [2011] OJ L 304/64 [Directive 2011183/EUJ, 
art. 2 (1) which applies to contracts concluded after June 13, 2014 (art. 28 (2)). In the UK, see the Unfair Contract 
Terms Act 1977 (UK), C 50, s. 12, definition of "dealing as a consumer." 
129 I discuss the theoretical justifications of consumer protection law in Chapter 10. 
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The statutory definitions of consumers that focus on individuals acting for personal purposes and not for 
business purposes have been criticized for failing to adequately address the changing landscape of 
consumption and commercial practices as it has evolved over the last decades. For example, Y ochai 
Benkler and other commentators question the relevancy of this definition of consumers in the information 
age, given their more active role and the shrinking gap between traditional "passive" consumers and 
producers. 130 These criticisms echo observations on how copyright law currently addresses consumers' 
uses of copyright works. 131 Also, it may no longer be justifiable to differentiate individuals who enter into 
commercial transactions for personal purposes from other individuals given the information product 
industry practices that treat individual consumers and small businesses on the same basis in mass-market 
transactions, the staple of information products. 132 
The criticisms of the narrow definition of consumers in consumer protection laws 133 raise important 
questions. What are the proper criteria that should justify special protection of commercial transactions? Is 
it not the non-negotiated aspect of the transaction that should give rise to protection regardless of the 
commercial purpose of the buyer? As I indicated above, the consumer protection law analysis to 
commercial copies of copyright works in the Third Part of my thesis constrains the scope of individuals by 
how they are defined under the relevant statutory consumer protection laws 134 Also, individual buyers who 
do not fall within the statutory definitions of consumers and who purchase copies of copyright works 
130 Yochai Benkler, "From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation Toward Sustainable 
Commons and User Access" (2000) 52 Fed. Comm. L.J. 561 at 564 where the author warns regulators, as they 
design an information policy, to focus on the dichotomy of consumers v. producers in the information economy as 
it fails to recognize the active role that consumers now play in the Internet economy. See also Jane Winn, 
"Introduction: Is Consumer Protection an Anachronism in the 21st Century?", in Consumer Protection in the Age 
of the "Information Economy" (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2006) at I; Cohen 2005, supra note 66 at 347. For 
a discussion on the active consumers, also described as "prosumers," see Marco B.M. Loos, Natali Heiberger, 
Lucie Guibault, Chantal Mak, Lodewijk Pessers, Katalin J. Cseres, Bart van der Sloot & Ronan Tigner, Analysis of 
the applicable legal frameworks and suggestions for the contours of a model system of consumer protection in 
relation to digital content contracts (2011) University of Amsterdam, Centre for the Study of European Contract 
Law (CSECL), Institute for Information Law (IViR), Amsterdam Centre for Law and Economics (ACLE), online: 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/consurner-rnarketing/events/digital conf en.html at 41 ff. 
131 See the discussion in Part V of this chapter. 
132 Winn, supra note 130. 
133 I.e., focusing on individuals performing transactions in a personal capacity and not for business purposes. 
134 1.e., as a result of the portion of my thesis that applies consumer protection laws to copies of copyright works: 
the Third Part: The Application of Consumer Law and Theory to Commercial Copies of Copyright Works 
(Chapter 8 to Chapter 11 ). 
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subject to non-negotiated standard terms can still benefit from other forms of legal protection. 135 Moreover, 
although one can think of many uses of copies of copyright works purchased by individuals in the context 
of a business undertaking that are no different to uses of individuals for personal non-commercial 
purposes, and have the same effect on copyright holders' economic rights, purchases made by individuals 
in a business context can give rise to different levels of interference with copyright holders' exclusive 
rights than those of purchases made for personal non-commercial purposes. 136 Finally, while the statutory 
definition of consumer in consumer protection laws may cover a narrower group of individuals that may 
unjustifiably leave out many others, the analysis that I undertake here to define consumers' rights to copies 
of copyright works can serve as the basis to define copyright users' rights for a broader range of 
individuals, at least to the extent that they are supported by similar theoretical justifications and have 
similar impacts on copyright holders' exclusive rights. 
Starting from the premise that consumer protection law confers an additional layer of legal protection on 
consumers as they are defined, how does the individual acting for personal or household purposes and not 
for business purposes137 hold up in a copyright law analysis? Until recently, the CCA did not refer to 
individuals (or natural persons) in the context of permitted uses of copyright, with a few exceptions. 138 The 
amendments to the CCA in 20li 39 introduced three new permitted uses without the authorization of 
copyright holders that only apply to individuals, 140 and a fourth that applies to a person. 141 While the 
majority of limitations on copyright holders' exclusive rights or users' rights either apply to all categories 
of users, as in the case of fair dealing, 142 or specifically apply to institutional users, 143 the recent 
135 For example, the doctrine of unconscionability in the common law or the rules applying to contracts of 
adhesion in the civil law: e.g., art 1379, 1435-1437 CCQ, offers a particular regime of protection to protect the 
weaker party in a non-negotiated contract. 
136 For example, playing music in a business environment that involves patrons may amount to a communication to 
the public that would require the payment of fees to the designated collective society for the administration of such 
ri9hts: CCA, supra note 2, ss. 67ff. 
13 See the statutory definitions of "consumer" under Canadian provincial and territory statutes and in the other 
jurisdictions examined here: supra note 127 and 128. 
138 Under the private copying regime, the CCA, supra note 2, s 79 definition of "audio recording medium" refers to 
"individual consumers." However, s 80 refers to the "private use of the person who makes the copy." 
139 CCMA, supra note 6. See also CCA, supra note 2, s 32(1) (persons with perceptual disabilities) ands 45(1) (a) 
(import of two copies by a person for that person's own use which includes physical persons). 
14° CCA, supra note 2, s 29.21: "Non-commercial user-generated content," s 29.22: "Reproduction for private 
purposes," s 29.23: "Fixing signals and recording programs for later listening or viewing," ands 29.24 "Backup 
Copies." 
141 CCA, supra note 2, s 29.24: "Backup copies." 
142 CCA, supra note 2, ss 29-29.2. See the discussion on fair dealing in Chapter 3 Part II C. 
143 Or person acting under their authority, such as "educational institutions": CCA, supra note 2, ss. 29.4ff or 
"libraries, archives and museums," CCA, ibid, ss 30.1 ff. 
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amendments to the CCA confirm an acknowledgement of the specificity of individual users (or natural 
persons) in the CCA more than ever before. 144 
With respect to the second distinctive feature of consumers, i.e., acting for personal, non-commercial 
purposes as opposed to business or commercial purposes, 14s until recently, the commercial v. non-
commercial purpose distinction was present only to a limited extent in the CCA. 146 With the amendments 
to the CCA in 2012, 147 the non-commercial v. commercial distinction became more prominent in copyright 
law to delineate permitted uses of copyright works 148 or to determine the scope of remedies and damages 
that are available to copyright holders. 149 The 2012 amendments to the CCA also introduced permitted acts 
on copyright works for "private purposes," which suggests a narrower sphere within the non-commercial 
purpose arena that does not involve performances in or communications to the public. 1so The same idea is 
present in the permitted acts of fair dealing for the purpose of "research or private study," although there 
the commercial purpose of the act is not necessarily a bar to the application of this exception to copyright 
infringement. 1s 1 Increasingly the non-commercial purpose of the act performed on copyright works (or 
private purpose or private use) becomes relevant in the CCA to distinguish between permitted uses of 
copyright works and infringement. 
144 Supra note 135. 
145 As defined by statutory consumer protection laws or codes: supra note 127 and 128. 
146 This is the case with respect to limitations on copyright holders' exclusive rights. For example, certain 
exceptions to copyright infringement in the CCA, supra note 2, only apply to actions that are carried out "without 
motive of gain": CCA, ibid, s 29.3. 
147 CCMA, supra note 6. 
148 CCA, supra note 2, s. 29.21 "Non-commercial user-generated content." 
149 CCA, supra note 2, ss 32.2 (1), 38.1 (1) (b), 38.1 (1.12), 38.1 (1.2), s. 38.1 (5) (d). 
15
° CCA, supra note 2, s 29.22 "Reproduction for Private Purposes" ands 29.23 "Fixing Signals and Recording 
Programs for Later Listening or Viewing" limit the acts that can be performed on copyright works without 
authorization to reproduction and fixing communication signals and do not involve communication to the public or 
performance in public. Contrast these new provisions with the new provision "non-commercial user-generated 
content'', CCA, ibid, s 29.21, which permits the reserved acts of performance in public and communication to the 
public by telecommunication. The fact that permitted acts for "private purposes" apply to individuals only and not 
persons, as is the case under other permitted acts (e.g., CCA, ibid, s 29.24 "Backup Copies"; CCA, ibid, s 30.6, the 
permitted acts with respect to computer programs) may suggest that it precludes that the act be performed within 
commercial settings. It would certainly exclude making reproductions for commercial distribution. See the 
discussion in Chapter 3 Part II D (i), (ii) and (iii). 
151 While fair dealing for the purpose of research can occur in the context of a commercial or non-commercial 
setting: CCH, supra note 1 at para 51, it is not clear that this is also the case for the purpose of private study 
because of the word "private'', although under the wide and liberal interpretation of fair dealing in CCH, ibid, the 
purpose of "private study" could also extend to commercial ventures. The Supreme Court of Canada recently 
confirmed that fair dealing for the purpose of private study can occur in a classroom and need not take place in 
"splendid isolation": Alberta, supra note 1 at para 27. This broadens the concept of private study beyond a solo act 
in the privacy of one's home or other venue that offers a similar environment. 
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While the distinction between non-commercial or personal and commercial purposes is increasingly 
present in the CCA to distinguish between permitted and infringing acts, copyright law is still 
predominantly based on the exclusive right to authorize the performance of certain acts, regardless of their 
commercial purpose. 152 Consumers who perform acts for non-commercial purposes on copies of copyright 
works are not necessarily authorized to do so under copyright law, unless copyright holders grant them 
authorization or they fall under one of the permitted uses. 153 The special carving out of protection for 
individuals acting for personal purposes under consumer protection laws is mirrored only to some extent 
in copyright law. 
An act-based framework (e.g., reproduction, communication to the public) as opposed to a purposive and 
use-based framework (e.g., non-commercial, personal purposes) presents increasing normative challenges 
in the determination of copyright users' rights and copyright infringement in a digital environment. 154 Acts 
traditionally reserved to the domain of copyright holders, such as reproduction and communication to the 
public of a copyright work, are intrinsically part of how users experience copyright works in a digital 
environment. 155 Such acts do not necessarily interfere with the exclusive economic rights of copyright 
holders. 156 As a result, the purpose of the use, i.e., commercial v. non-commercial or personal, and its 
effect on the exclusive economic rights of copyright holders offer a base to determine infringement that is 
more attuned to the new environment of dissemination and uses of copyright works than a strict focus on 
the occurrence of an act reserved to copyright holders. 157 Litman emphasizes the consonance that the 
commercial v. non-commercial dichotomy generally has for consumers in distinguishing acts that may 
infringe copyright from permissible ones. 158 Her proposal for the redesign of copyright in the digital age, 
which reframes copyright as an "exclusive dissemination right of commercial exploitation" as opposed to a 
152 I.e., the exclusive rights of copyright holders as they are enumerated in CCA, supra note 2, ss 3, 15, 18, 21, 26. 
153 Ibid; CCA, supra note 2, ss 29ff. 
154 The increasing inadequacy of an act-based framework to determine the exclusive rights of copyright holders in 
the digital environment has been widely commented upon. In a Canadian context, see for example Handa, supra 
note 33 at 463-466. In a US context, see Litman 2001, supra note 65. 
155 Downloading copies of copyright works from the Internet always involves an act of reproduction which is an 
act exclusively reserved to copyright holders: CCA, supra note 2, ss 3, 15, 18, 21, 26. Also, technologies allow 
reproductions of works for convenience of later playing, viewing, or reading of the work on multiple devices: see 
the discussion in Chapter 1 Part I. 
156 See the discussion in Chapter 7 Part III. 
157 Jessica Litman, "Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age" (1996) 75 Or. L. Rev. 19, 40-41. See also 
Tussey, supra note 72 at 1183-1184 
158 Ibid. 
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bundle of act-based exclusive rights, touches upon that dichotomy. 159 While the recent amendments to the 
CCA increasingly reflect a purpose-based approach rather than an act-based approach to distinguish 
permitted acts from copyright infringement, 160 the non-commercial or personal purpose of the act by the 
consumer does not necessarily make it lawful. 161 
The non-commercial purpose or capacity, as one distinctive feature of consumers v. other persons entering 
into commercial transactions, is a point of departure in carving out the space of consumers and the scope of 
their rights in the copyright law framework. While the non-commercial v. commercial dichotomy serves a 
different and arguably more prevalent purpose in consumer law than in copyright law, 162 it is becoming 
increasingly relevant within copyright law to distinguish permitted acts from infringing acts. 163 The non-
commercial v. commercial purpose is also a distinction that consumers can reasonably well understand, a 
factor that should not be underestimated given the perils, which I highlighted above in this chapter, of a 
copyright system that becomes too dissonant and removed from the uses of copyright works that actually 
take place for a large segment of consumers. 164 True, the non-commercial v. commercial dichotomy does 
not sit perfectly in the copyright framework as a mean to define consumers' or other users' rights to 
commercial copies of copyright works. Some uses can and should likely be considered as infringement 
even if they have no commercial purpose. 165 Similarly, not all uses of copyright works that are performed 
in a commercial environment should, at a normative level, necessarily be considered as an infringement of 
159 Litman 2001, supra note 65 at Chapter 12. See also Litman 2007, supra note 65 at 1911-1912 where the author 
develops a spectrum of personal uses that centre around the effects of the use on the incentive to create (related to 
the commercial exploitation sphere of copyright holders) and the copyright liberties that the uses enhance. 
160 See supra note 140. Prior to the 2012 amendments to the CCA, supra note 2, the CCA allowed and still allows 
certain uses that would otherwise constitute copyright infringement, based on the purpose and effect of the use, for 
example, the fair dealing provisions (CCA, supra note 2, ss 29-29.2) and the exceptions to copyright infringement 
that apply to certain uses of computer programs (CCA, supra note 2, s 30.6). 
161The exclusive rights of copyright holders are still based on the exclusive right to authorize certain acts: CCA, 
sufra note 2, ss 3, 15, 18, 21, 26. 
16 I.e., given that the non-commercial purpose of a transaction is the starting point from which to determine 
whether an individual's transaction falls within the scope of consumer protection law. In the context of copyright, 
the distinction between non-commercial and commercial purpose of acts performed on copyright works is present 
to some extent to determine copyright infringement, but is not necessarily a determining factor, as discussed above 
in Part IV of this chapter. 
163 Whether the use is commercial or not also has important ramifications on the theoretical justifications that 
support copy ownership, as I discuss below in Chapter 6 Part III. 
164 See the discussion above in Part III of this chapter. 
165 For example, a consumer who on a website makes available for download, for free, entire copies of copyright 
works without the authorization of copyright holders. File sharing would also fall in that category. 
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copyright. 166 Yet, the non-commercial purpose that distinguishes consumers in consumer protection law 
from other individuals is a starting point to locate their rights and interests within the framework of 
copyright law. 
Having presented the motivations and advantages of focusing my research on copyright consumers' rights 
within the larger group of copyright users, I have applied consumers' key characteristics as defined in 
consumer protection law statutes to the copyright law framework as a first step to carve out a space for 
consumers within copyright law. Consumers' key characteristics, i.e., individuals acting in a personal 
capacity and not for business purposes, are factors that are increasingly relevant to distinguish permitted 
acts from infringing acts in copyright law and should serve as a starting point to define consumers' rights 
and permitted uses of copyright works. The next step is to refine the understanding of the place of 
consumers within the copyright law framework by looking at copyright consumers in all comers, through 
the goals and aspirations they pursue with copyright works, asking which of those goals copyright law 
should promote. 
V. Copyright consumers in all corners 
A greater attention to consumers within the copyright law design requires an understanding of their 
aspirations and interactions with copyright works. Commentators, including Liu, Cohen, and Elkin-Koren, 
each reflect upon various types of copyright users and consumers in an attempt to situate their role and 
participation within the copyright framework. 167 They also define those users' needs and aspirations in the 
digital environment to which the judiciary and lawmakers should devote their attention. 168 
166 For example, a representative of a company may purchase copyright works to be used in a commercial context 
without such use necessarily interfering with the exclusive economic rights of copyright holders. 
167 Supra notes 61-63. See also Matthew Rimmer, Digital Copyright and the Consumer Revolution -Hands off My 
iPod, (Cheltenham, Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2007) "Introduction," where the author 
describes three main categories of copyright consumers: (i) citizens, commoners, gleaners; (ii) bricoleurs, 
parodists, and amateurs, and (iii) consumers as user addicts (i.e., the law and technology movement). 
168 Ibid. 
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At one end of the spectrum, Liu, Cohen, and Elkin-Koren all refer to the passive consumers who treat 
copyright works as any other commodity. 169 They read books, watch movies, listen to a CD. Liu argues 
that copyright law responds to this type of consumer "by ensuring that conditions exist for a functioning 
market in copyrighted works, i.e., by making sure there are works for them to consume."170 Beyond that, 
there is little interest in the types of uses the passive consumer makes, 171 which explains the relative little 
interest in those consumers on the copyright law radar screen. 172 
At the other end of the spectrum, Liu and Elkin-Koren describe the "consumer-author" as the most active 
type of user. 173 Given that the primary focus of copyright law is to protect the creation of works, consumer-
authors have traditionally received more attention than other copyright users. Copyright law has long 
recognized, to varying degrees, the legitimacy of the reuse of existing copyright works by other creators, 
through, inter alia, the doctrine of fair dealing and fair use, 174 the idea/expression dichotomy, 175 and the 
"non-substantial part" doctrine with respect to copyright works. 176 Recent amendments to the CCA give an 
even greater place than ever before to user-authors. 177 As Elkin-Koren points out, the recognition of user-
authors is of only a small part of users within the broader range of possible experiences of copyright 
works. 178 
169 Liu 2003, supra note 67, refers to the "passive consumer"; Cohen 2005, supra note 66 at 348, refers to the 
"economic user", i.e., "the one who enters the market with given set of tastes in search of the best deal"; Elkin-
Koren, supra note 68 at 1138 refers to the "consumer-shopper." 
170 Liu 2003, supra note 67 at 402-403. 
171 Ibid. 
172 Elkin-Koren, supra note 68 at 338. 
173 Liu 2003, supra note 67 at 404-405; Elkin-Koren, supra note 68 at 1139; Cohen 2005, supra note 66 at 348, 
refers to the more active user as the "romantic user." The user-author is the one that Drassinower focuses on in 
"Taking User Rights Seriously", Drassinower 2005, supra note 39 at 479, where the author associates "user rights" 
with the dignity of authorship itself, and links the fair dealing provisions or "user rights" analyzed in CCH to the 
threshold of originality. He argues that they are continuous, and emphasizes the "intertextuality of creation": ibid 
at 472. 
174 I discuss fair dealing and fair use in Chapter 3 Part II C. 
175 I.e., the fact that copyright protects the expression of ideas in a work, not the ideas as such. See: Liu 2003, 
sufra note 67 at 405; Elkin-Koren, supra note 68 at 1138. 
17 See the discussion on the non-substantial-part right in Chapter 3 Part II A. 
177 CCA, supra note 2, s 29, where education, parody, or satire were added as allowable purposes under the fair 
dealing provisions, with the entry into force of the CCMA, supra note 6. See the discussion on fair dealing and fair 
use in Chapter 3 Part II B. Also the introduction in the CCA, ibid, in 2012 of the non-commercial user-generated 
content exception to copyright infringement also gives more rights to user-authors: see the discussion in Chapter 3 
Part II D (i) 
178 Elkin-Koren, supra note 68 at 1139. 
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In Bell Canada, the Supreme Court recently held that allowing consumers to preview excerpts of music 
online was a fair dealing for the purpose of research. 179 In doing so, the Court emphasized that research did 
not have to be for creative purposes to fall under the fair dealing provisions. 180 While fair dealing 
facilitated the use of pre-existing works for the creation of new works of authorship, the Court emphasized 
that one of the objectives of the CCA was also to encourage the dissemination of works and that it was in 
the public interest to encourage research with or without creative acts. 181 
In the same vein as the Supreme Court's recognition in Bell Canada that uses of copyright works without 
immediate creative output were also an integral part of the objectives promoted by the CCA, commentators 
seeking to define the place of users in copyright law point to the need to promote the significance of non-
creative uses within the copyright framework. The type of users that Liu, Cohen, and Elkin-Koren believe 
deserve more attention by the judiciary and by lawmakers is somewhere in between the "consumer-author" 
and the passive user. For Liu, the "active consumer" encompasses a broad range of interests that have been 
overlooked by traditional copyright law: autonomy, the need to create and share, and creative self-
expression.182 Cohen refers for her part to the "situated user" as one: 
who appropriates cultural goods found within her immediate environment for four primary purposes: 
consumption, communication, self-development, and creative play. The cumulative result of this behaviour 
by situated users, and of both planned and fortuitous interactions among them, produces what the copyright 
system names, and values, as "progress."183 
Cohen reviews each of the four aspirations of the "situated user" and the extent to which current copyright 
laws fail to address them. 184 In doing so, Cohen reveals a more complex understanding of the process of 
"progress," the constitutional protection objective behind copyright in the US. 185 For Cohen, the situated 
user plays a role as important to the engine of progress as the incentive to authors to create: 
179 Bell Canada, supra note 1 at paras 11-49. As a result, it did not require the authorization of the copyright 
holders and hence did not trigger the payment of a royalty fee to SOCAN, the entity responsible for the collective 
administration of copyright in that case. 
180 Ibid at para 21. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Liu 2003, supra note 67 at 406ff. 
183 Cohen 2005, supra note 66 at 370. 
184 Cohen 2005, supra note 66 at 370ff. 
185 US Const art I,§ 8: "The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries." 
47 
Scholars and judges confidently speak of inducing creativity and discouraging slavish imitation, as if the 
two could be neatly separated. But if these practices are understood not only as related but as together 
comprising the very stuff of "progress," it becomes harder to envision the former without the latter. 186 
The idea of the central place of personal uses of copyright to the engine of progress is also present in the 
works of Tussey, 187 Litman, 188 Elkin-Koren, 189 and others. 19° For Elkin-Koren, consumers do not need to be 
"user-creators" to be integral participants of progress. 191 Elkin-Koren refers to them as "consumer-as-
participants," the ones who make uses of works for their personal benefit alone, but who through this self-
consumption also take part in creative process through "meaning-making" processes. 192 
The view that copyright users are as much a part of innovation and progress as creators is not shared by 
all. 193 This may be attributable to a narrower view of consumers and of their uses and aspirations with 
respect to copyright works, i.e., the consumptive type of uses that "concem(s) convenience, rather than 
creativity; access to works of authorship, rather than incentives to produce them." 194 It reflects the tension 
between different perspectives about the objectives of copyright law and, as a result, about the place of 
copyright users within the copyright house. 195 As I argued above in this chapter, to ignore the rights and 
interests of copyright users in the current digital environment, as it continues to evolve, is done at the 
expense of a robust, coherent, and credible copyright system, leading to more fundamental questions about 
its legitimacy. 196 
As I define copyright consumers' rights to copyright works, I will take into considerations all consumers 
on the spectrum in all comers, from the more passive consumers to the more active ones, i.e., the 
186 Cohen 2005, supra note 66 at 373. 
187 Tussey, supra note 72 at 1175-1177. 
188 See Litman 2007, supra note 60 at 1879: "copyright law was designed to maximize the opportunities for non-
exploitative enjoyment of copyrighted works in order to encourage reading, listening, watching, and their cousins." 
The author argues that these acts are "both deeply embedded in copyright's design and crucial to its promotion of 
the 'Progress of Science'." 
189 Elkin-Koren, supra note 68 at 1139. 
190 Mark S. Nadel, "How Current Copyright Law Discourages Creative Output: The Overlooked Impact of 
Marketing" (2004) 19 BTLJ 785. 
191 Elkin-Koren, supra note 68 at 1139, referring to the US Constitution, art 1 s 8, which confers to Congress the 
power "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 
192 Ibid. 
193 See, for example, Ginsburg 1997, supra note 99 at 3-4. 
194 Ibid. 
195 See the discussion in Part III of this chapter. See also the discussion in Chapter 6 Part III on the theoretical 
justifications of copyright and the rights to commercial copies of copyright works. 
196 See the discussion in Part III of this chapter. 
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consumer-authors. Greater attention needs to be given to consumers in the middle, described by Elkin-
Koren as consumers-as-participants and similarly by other commentators, because in my view they 
describe more adequately the interaction and aspirations that broad range of copyright consumers 
increasingly have with respect to copyright works in a digital environment. 197 The discussion on the 
theoretical justifications of copyright and copy ownership in Chapter 6 is essential to further understand 
the place that users should have within the copyright design and why particular attention to the consumer-
• . . 198 
as-partzczpant 1s necessary. 
At a more fundamental level, all copyright consumers, from the more passive to the consumer-author, 
share a vulnerability that needs to be of particular concern to the copyright law design and underlying 
objectives. Elkin-Koren argues in the context of copyright, that consumers of "cultural artefacts" may 
require even more attention than the consumer of mundane commodities: 
Cultural artefacts are not simply useful commodities. While they often have an entertainment value that 
could be quantified, they also possess a communicative value and a symbolic significance. They engage 
our minds in a more direct and intimate way than do mundane commodities and, therefore, expose 
consumers to a higher risk of deeper and more intrusive restrictions of freedom. This particular 
vulnerability of information consumers is often overlooked. 199 
From this perspective, copyright consumers share vulnerabilities that are distinct from other copyright 
users and even greater than consumers in general. This particular vulnerability of copyright consumers 
indicates the need for attention over and above the one that is already given under consumer protection 
law.200 It points toward the need for a particular attention to consumers within the design of copyright law 
itself. 
VI. Conclusion 
While Canada may be the champion of copyright users as a result of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on 
the need to balance competing interests in the CCA beyond the exclusive rights of copyright holders, and 
its affirmation that exceptions to copyright infringement are users' rights, copyright law in Canada and 
197 See the discussion in Chapter I Part I. 
198 See the discussion in Chapter 6 Part III. 
199 Elkin-Koren, supra note 68 at 1136-1137. 
200 See the discussion above in Part IV of this chapter on the differences between copyright consumers and 
copyright users. See also the theoretical justifications for the protection of consumers under consumer protection 
law in Chapter 10. 
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worldwide still offers a fragmented view of copyright users. A lack of attention to copyright users or, even 
worse, keeping them outside the framework of copyright law is increasingly damaging to this group and to 
the viability of the copyright system given the pressures brought on by the digital environment. There is a 
discemable movement in Canada and worldwide, through recent legislative and judicial developments, 
toward a greater attention to users. In that thread, I argued that there is merit in looking at various 
subgroups of copyright users and, in particular, at copyright consumers. Consumers as they are defined in 
consumer protection. law present distinctive characteristics that are highly relevant to how copyright law 
should apply to them. While the amendments to the CCA brought a greater recognition to the specificity of 
individuals performing acts for personal purposes when distinguishing permitted acts from infringing acts, 
the CCA is still predominantly structured on an act-based framework to determine copyright infringement. 
This act-based framework to determine copyright infringement increasingly sits uncomfortably in the 
digital environment and with the rights and interests of copyright consumers. Emerging theories of 
copyright users in doctrinal work help to better situate consumers in copyright law through understanding 
their goals and aspirations, and which of those goals copyright law should promote, from passive 
consumers to consumer-authors. While my research looks at all consumers on the spectrum, specific 
attention will be given to the ones in the middle201 because of the relatively limited attention that they have 
been receiving in copyright law, and because they increasingly represent a large segment of consumers in 
the digital environment. While these consumers may less prominently fall under the objectives of 
copyright to promote and protect the creation of new works than consumer-authors do, they form no less 
part of the broader objectives of copyright law and policy to promote the progress of science and 
knowledge.202 
Copyright consumers and their place within copyright law are starting to take form. They purchase copies 
of copyright works for personal purposes and not for commercial purposes. They are moderately active and 
their interactions with copyright works vary from ones that do not generate immediate creative outputs but 
are no less deserving of promotion and protection than the ones that engender more concrete creative 
outputs. How does copyright law treat these consumers? What acts can they perform on copies of 
copyright works without the authorization of copyright holders? This is what I explore in the next chapter. 
201 I.e., "consumers-as-participant," "active consumers," or "situated users" as defined in doctrinal works on 
copyright users: see the discussion above in Part V of this chapter. 
202 See the discussion in Part V of this chapter. See also the discussion on the theoretical justifications of copyright 
and copy ownership in Chapter 6 Part III. 
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Chapter 3 
The So-Called Users' Rights 
I. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I described how copyright users and consumers have traditionally been 
absent from copyright discourse. While the changing dynamics within copyright law in Canada 
and elsewhere are progressively altering this course, and copyright users are receiving more 
attention, they are still largely undefined in Canada's Copyright Act [CCA] 1 and similar copyright 
laws worldwide. In this chapter, I investigate the state of copyright consumers through the 
relevant users' rights that are conferred on them through the CCA, with reference to other 
jurisdictions.2 What is the nature and scope of those rights and how do they relate to one another? 
How can they be altered through the commercialization of copies of copyright works, e.g., 
through contracts and technological protection measures [TPMs]? More fundamentally, are they 
rights at all? Through this exercise, I draw a sharper image of the contemporary state of copyright 
consumers by laying out what the CCA as supplemented by contracts allow them to perform on 
copies of copyright works they lawfully acquire and how they constrain copyright consumers. 
The consumers of my study access copyright works that are outside the public domain: they 
perform commercial transactions with respect to works of authorship (e.g., musical works, books, 
computer programs, or films) that benefit from the term of protection granted by the CCA. 3 At this 
point, I do not discuss the suitability of the term of copyright as :it is set out in :international 
conventions and in the CCA.4 Moreover, the underlying assumption is that the copyright works 
relevant to consumer transactions comply with the originality requirements for protection under 
I RSC 1985, c. C-42. 
2 I.e., the US, EU, UK, and France. 
3 The relevant works of this study are works of authorship that benefit from protection under the CCA, 
supra note 1, i.e., "original literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works" that are protected by the applicable 
terms of copyright at the time the consumer gains access to the works: ibid, ss 5-6. 
4 Discussions on the suitable term of copyright require an analysis of the nature and theoretical justifications 
of copyright: see Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 Part III. I refer to recommendations for copyright reform that 
include shorter terms of protection of copyright works in Chapter 12 Part IV A. 
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the CCA.5 The term of copyright and originality requirements are part of broader copyright 
framework issues that involve assessing the appropriate level of protection and the scope of the 
public domain that we should preserve.6 The public domain/interest arguments that withstand the 
exceptions to copyright infringement that I examine here may assist in understanding the nature 
and scope of the exceptions. 7 As I discussed in Chapter 2, public interest arguments are not 
always well suited for addressing the specificity of copyright consumers. 8 In the same vein, 
specific copyright consumers' issues, i.e., the ones that concern a commercial transaction between 
consumers and copyright holders and the competing rights and interests of each party with respect 
to the same-objects, i.e., the copyright works, are likely to be addressed only incidentally or to get 
lost in broader public domain/interest discussions.9 
In Part II, I present the CCA's user rights that may be relevant to copyright consumers in addition 
to the traditional unlimited powers and privileges to read, play, and view the copies that users 
own: the non-substantial part, the private copying regime, fair dealing, the four new user 
provisions recently introduced in the CCA, the exhaustion or first sale doctrine and permitted acts 
relating to computer programs, and other permitted acts. In Part III, I analyze the interplay 
between these rights and the possibility of their alteration or eradication by non-negotiated 
standard end-user agreements and TPMs. To this end, I refer to selected non-negotiated standard 
5 CCA, supra note 1, s 5; For the test of originality under Canadian copyright law, see: CCH Canadian Ltd. 
v Law Society of Upper Canada 2004 SCC 13 at paras 14ff.; see also David Vaver, Intellectual Property 
Law Copyright, Patents, Trade-Marks, 2d ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2011) [Vaver, Intellectual Property 
Law 2011] at IOOff. 
6 The doctrines and chore principles within copyright law that are frequently invoked in relation to the 
preservation of the public domain include the subject matter of copyright and the concept of originality, the 
scope of the exclusive rights conferred, the term of protection and copyright exceptions and limitations, 
including the non-substantial-part doctrine. See Thomas Dreier, "Balancing Proprietary and Public Domain 
Interests: Inside or Outside of Proprietary Rights?" in Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Diane Leenheer 
Zimmerman & Harry First, eds, Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property: Innovation Policy for 
the Knowledge Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 295 at 303-309. See also Giuseppina 
D' Agostino, "Copyright Exceptions and Limitations and Copyright Board of Canada" in ALAI Canada, ed, 
The Copyright Board of Canada; Bridging Law and Economics for Twenty Years (Cowansville, Que: Yvon 
Blais, 2011) 195 [D' Agostino, "Copyright Exceptions and Copyright Board"] at 197-198. For a discussion 
on the concept of public domain and copyright in a Canadian context see Carys J. Craig, "The Canadian 
Public Domain: What, Where, and to What End?" 7 Canadian Journal of Law & Technology, 221. 
7 For example with respect to the non-substantive part exception to copyright infringement. See also the 
discussion in Part II A of this chapter. 
8 See the discussion in Chapter 2 Part II. 
9 Ibid. 
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end-user agreements for the online distribution of books, musical recordings, and films. 10 The 
analysis that I present in Part II and Part III lead me to question their nature as rights in Part IV. 
To localize consumers' rights further, I examine the relevant international copyright obligations in 
Part V and how they may influence present and future users' rights. I conclude that most users' 
rights are not particularly relevant to consumers and that they were not designed with consumers 
in mind. 11 Even for those rights that are more specifically geared toward copyright consumers, 
they tend to be narrow in scope and their applicability is sometimes subject to TPMs. 12 Overall, 
the nature as rights of the user provisions examined here is questionable and their mandatory 
nature is uncertain for some and unlikely for others. 
II. What acts can copyright consumers perform without the authorization of copyright 
holders? 
Copyright consumers and other users cannot perform acts that are exclusively reserved to 
copyright holders on protected works, 13 unless they obtain their authorization or unless the CCA 
explicitly permits copyright users to perform those acts. In Canada, copyright means the·sole right 
to produce or reproduce the work in any material form, to perform the work in public, to publish 
the work, and other exclusive rights with respect to performers' performance, sound recordings 
and communication signals. 14 Copyright also includes a non-exhaustive list of specific acts such 
as the exclusive right to communicate a dramatic or musical work to the public, or to rent a 
computer program or a sound recording embedding a musical work. 15 Outside the acts exclusively 
reserved to copyright holders, ownership in copies of copyright works has been traditionally 
viewed as conferring unlimited powers and privileges to use the copy in any other manner, 
including the unlimited right to play, view, read, and listen to the work. 16 Through the 
10 See my review of selected non-negotiated standard end-user agreements in Part III C of this chapter. 
11 This is particularly the case of the non-substantial-part right and fair dealing: see the discussion in Part II 
A and C of this chapter. 
12 See the discussion in Part II D of this chapter. 
13 Copyright protects "every original literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works" for a specific term: CCA, 
supra note I, ss 5-6. 
14 CCA,supranote l,ss2,3, 15, 16, 18,21,26. 
15 CCA, supra note I, s 3. 
16 Theberge v Galerie d'Art du Petit Champlain inc., 2002 SCC 34 [Theberge] at para 31, as Binnie J. 
stated for the majority: "Once an authorized copy of a work is sold to a member of the public, it is generally 
for the purchaser, not the author, to determine what happens to it." Joseph P. Liu, "Owning Digital Copies: 
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combination of various factors, the traditional unlimited privilege and power to play, view, listen, 
to or read commercial copies of copyright works distributed online with no physical supporting 
medium is under increased pressure. 17 I will address this specific issue in Chapter 7. 18 
In this part, I investigate the scope of the exceptions to copyright infringement enumerated in the 
CCA and how they affect copyright consumers' rights to commercial copies of copyright works. 
Exceptions to copyright infringement apply either to a specific category of users, 19 based on the 
purpose of the acts to be performed by users20 or based on the nature of copyright works. 21 I look 
at those permitted acts that are a priori relevant to copyright consumers in contrast with other 
users,
22 
starting with permitted acts with respect to non-substantial parts of copyright works. 
A. Non-substantial part 
Since the enactment of Canada's first copyright act, the Copyright Act, 19 21, 23 copyright has been 
delineated by the exclusive right to produce or reproduce, perform in public or publish24 the 
whole or a substantial part of the copyright work. 25 As a result, consumers can make any 
reproduction, performance in public, or publication of a non-substantial part of copyright works 
without the authorization of the copyright holders. Acts performed on non-substantial parts of 
copyright works are outside the realm of copyright holders' exclusive rights and can be performed 
Copyright Law and the Incidents of Copy Ownership" (2001) 42 William and Mary Law Review 1245 at 
1287. 
17 Those factors include the scope of the exclusive right to authorize the reproduction of a work, the effect 
of technological protection measures and of non-negotiated standard end-user agreements for commercial 
copies of copyright works. See the discussion in Part III B and III C of this chapter, and the uncertainty 
around the characterization of those transactions as sales, licences, or service contracts: see the discussion 
in Chapter 8 Part II. 
18 See the discussion in Chapter 7 Part III A (iii). 
19 For example, educational institutions (CCA, supra note 1, ss 29.4 -30.04) or library, archives, and 
museums (ss 30.1-30.5). 
2° For example, under the fair dealing provisions (CCA, supra note 1, ss 29-29.2) or private copying (ss 79-
88). 
21 For example, permitted acts relating to computer programs (CCA, supra note 1, ss 30.6-30.61). 
22 Such as educational institutions, library, archives, and museums: CCA, supra note 1, ss 29.4-30.04, 30.1-
30.5. 
23 S.C. 1921, c. 24, s 3(1). 
24 If the work is unpublished: CCA, supra note 1, s 3( 1 ). 
25 CCA, supra note 1, s 3(1 ). 
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without compensation to copyright holders and without infringing copyright.26 Similar language 
exists in the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 [UKCDPA],27 while the French Code 
de la Propriete intellectuelle [CPI] refers to infringement occurring upon the complete or partial 
reproduction of the work.28 In the US, the substantial similarity test to establish copyright 
infringement and the application of the de minim is principle to the doctrine of fair use embed 
similar concepts to that of the non-substantial part doctrine in Canadian copyright law.29 
The scope of the non-substantial part doctrine can be derived from a case-by-case judicial 
analysis. In its current form and scope, the non-substantial part doctrine is not likely to be of 
much assistance to copyright consumers for the reasons that I detail below. However, it provides 
important insights into the scope of copyright holders' exclusive rights and enlightens the 
understanding of other relevant exceptions to copyright infringement. 3° Commentators put 
forward suggestions to broaden the scope of the non-substantial part doctrine, suggestions that 
merit further consideration in a normative assessment of copyright and its effects on the 
community of copyright consumers and other users.31 There are also incidental instances where 
the non-substantial part doctrine may be relevant to copyright consumers. For these reasons, I will 
restrict my analysis of the non-substantial part doctrine by providing an overview of its main 
features and limitations for copyright consumers and of scholars' suggestions for improvement, as 
opposed to a detailed account of this doctrine. 
26 See David Vaver, Copyright Law (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc., 2000) [Vaver, Copyright Law 2000] at 143ff; 
McKeown, Fox on Canadian Law of Copyright and Industrial Designs, 4th ed. (Thomson, Carswell: 
Toronto, 2003) ch. 21 at 14ff. 
27 c. 48, s 16 (3) (a). 
28 Art. Ll22-4 CPI. 
29 17 USC§ 106, which lists the exclusive rights of copyright holders, does not refer to the exclusive right 
to reproduce (and other acts) the work or a substantial part. For a review of the case law on these two 
applications of the de minimis principle in US copyright law, see Andrew Inesi, "A Theory of De Minirnis 
and a Proposal for its Application in Copyright" (2006) 21 Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 945 at 960-
969. The author describes that in the case of fair use, the de minimis principle applies principally to the 
fourth factor considered to establish fair use, i.e., "the effect of the use on the market for, or value of, the 
original work." 
3° For example, the application of the theory of property limitation rules to the non-substantial-part doctrine, 
by contrast to the fair dealing provisions, helps provide a better understanding of the nature of copyright 
and of copyright users' rights: see the discussion in Chapter 7 Part III. 
31 For example see Alan L. Durham, "Consumer Modification of Copyrighted Works" (2006) 81 Ind. L.J. 
85 I, at 875-878, and the discussion further below in Part II A of this chapter. 
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There are at least three reasons why the non-substantial part doctrine, in its current scope, is of 
limited assistance to consumers who lawfully acquire copies of copyright works. The first one 
relates to the legal nature of the permitted use of a non-substantial part of a copyright work. As 
the CCA is silent on what may or may not constitute the substantial part of a work, the scope of a 
substantial part of a work is essentially determined by judicial interpretation. Timothy Endicott 
and Michael Spence consider this legal design as generally desirable for the functioning of the 
substantial part of a work when defining the scope of copyright, because, inter alia, precision may 
not be possible and lead to arbitrariness, while vagueness gives leeway to parties to negotiate 
licensing terms acceptable to both parties. 32 This legal design is less desirable in a consumer 
context where there is typically no negotiation on terms of use. The legal protection of consumers 
tends to favour the codification of legal doctrines over the common law for more legal certainty, 
perhaps at the expense of flexibility. 33 
Second, the current scope of the permitted use is fairly restrictive in its application. The judicial 
test to determine substantiality tends to be more qualitative than quantitative, although both 
aspects are considered. 34 The reproduction of even a small portion of the work can amount to a 
substantial part. In the earlier landmark judgment Hawkes v. Paramount Film Services,35 the 
reproduction of a portion of the plaintiffs musical work i.e., March Colonel Bogey, 36 in a film by 
the defendant at the opening of a school in the presence of the Prince of Wales, was held to 
amount to a substantial part of the plaintiffs work. 37 Ringtones have been considered to be a 
32 Timothy Endicott & Michael Spence, "Vagueness in the Scope of Copyright" (2005) 121 Law Quarterly 
Review 657 at 661, 663-664. 
33 I discuss the scope and application of consumer protection law to copies of copyright work in Canada 
with reference to other jurisdictions (i.e., US, EU, UK, and France) in the Third Part of my thesis (Chapter 
8 to 11 ). See in particular the discussion in Chapter 9 and 10. 
34 Edutile Inc. v Automobile Protection Assn., [2000] 4 F.C. 195 (FCA), paras 22-23, where the Federal 
Court of Appeal stated: "To determine whether a 'substantial part' of a protected work has been 
reproduced, it is not the quantity which was reproduced that matters as much as the quality and nature of 
what was reproduced ... "; U & R Tax Services Ltd v H & R Block Canada Inc (1995) 62 C.P.R. (3d) 257 at 
268.; Cie generate des etablissements Michelin-Michelin & Cie v C.A. W. - Canada (1996), 71 C.P.R. (3d) 
348, 124 F.T.R. 192, [1997] 2 F.C. 306 (T.D.) at para 343; Century21 Canada Ltd. Partnership v Rogers 
Communications Inc., 2011 BCSC 1196 at paras 184,194,199,201,203; Warman v Fournier, 2012 FC 803 
at paras 23-28. 
35 (1934) 1 CH. 593 (C.A.). 
36 More precisely: 28 bars or 50 seconds: Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
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substantial part of musical or dramatico-musical works and have been subject to tariffs in the 
past.38 
Given the current restrictive interpretation of what is a non-substantial part of a copyright work, 
the uses that the non-substantial-part doctrine could permit are, for practical reasons, of limited 
assistance to consumers who lawfully acquire copies of copyright works. Consumers' uses of the 
copies of copyright works they acquire generally pertain to the works as a whole rather than 
portions of it. The non-substantial part doctrine, as an exception to copyright infringement, could 
be relevant to some consumer uses of lawfully acquired copyright works. For instance, consumers 
who create new copyright works and who integrate a portion of a pre-existing copyright work 
they lawfully acquired into their newly created work could invoke the non-substantial part 
exception to copyright infringement. However, the recent introduction in the CCA of the 
permitted use of copyright works without copyright holders' consent for non-commercial user-
generated content is likely to cover that scenario to a large extent. 39 The new non-commercial 
user-generated content exception to copyright infringement minimizes the practical appeal of the 
non-substantial-part doctrine for consumers with respect to the reuse of pre-existing works in the 
creation of new works because it sets out more clearly the acts that consumers can perform on 
pre-existing works than does the non-substantial-part doctrine.40 
Third, the language of the CCA links the determination of a substantial part to the work itself 
rather than to the nature, scope, and purpose of copyright holders' rights, although such elements 
are also considered in the factual analysis to determine whether an act has been performed with 
38 Socan Tariff 24 (Ringtones) 2003-2005, (Copyright Board of Canada 18 August 2006), online: 
http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/decisions/2006/20060818-m-f.pdf. The Federal Court of Appeal deferred to the 
interpretation of the Copyright Board of what constitutes a "substantial part" in Canadian Wireless 
Telecommunications Assn. v Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada 2008 FCA 6. 
The tariff applicable to ringtones and ringbacks for the period between 2006-2013: Tariff No. 24 Ringtones 
and Ringbacks (2006 to 2013), Supplement Canada Gazette, Part I, June 30, 2012, is presently under review 
by the Copyright Board for its application for the period subsequent to November 7, 2013: Public 
Performance of Musical Works Re, Copyright Board (2013), online: http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/home-
accueil-e.html, para 17. In light of two judgments by the Supreme Comt: Entertainment Software 
Association v Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, 2012 SCC 34, and Rogers 
Communications Inc. v Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, 2012 SCC 35 and 
the coming into force of Canada's Copyright Modernization Act, S.C. 2012, c. 20, the issue is whether 
ringtones still involve communications to the public by telecommunication on which Tariff 24 is based. 
39 I discuss this exception to copyright infringement in Part II D (i) of this chapter. 
40 Ibid. 
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respect to a substantial part of a work.41 The reference to a substantial part of the work in the CCA 
may be more constraining in application and less conducive than other exceptions to copyright 
infringement to maintaining the balance between competing interests with respect to the scope of 
protection of copyright works.42 It falls under the act-based approach to copyright holders' 
exclusive rights and copyright infringement that is reflected in the CCA' s enumeration of the 
exclusive rights of copyright holders,43 as opposed to the more purpose-based approach that is 
reflected in fair dealing and other exceptions to copyright infringement.44 
Commentators argue in favour of an interpretation of the substantial part that looks more directly 
at the purpose of copyright and at the effects of the acts performed on the work on the exclusive 
rights of copyright holders.45 In the US context, one argument is that the de minimis exception to 
copyright infringement should apply to private uses made by consumers in cases where the act is 
performed on the entirety of the work but the effect on copyright holders' rights is trivial.46 In 
other words, the de mininis or non-substantial-part analysis would shift from the quantity and 
quality of the work used to the effects on copyright holders' exclusive rights. Such an 
interpretation is more promising to consumers than the current scope of the non-substantial-part 
41 CCA, supra note 1, s 3(1). In U & R Tax Services Ltd. v H & R Block Canada Inc., supra note 34, 
Richard J. listed the factors to consider to assess whether acts were performed on a substantial part of a 
copyright work, which included, in addition to the quality and quantity of the material taken, "(b) the extent 
to which the defendant's use adversely affects the plaintiff's activities and diminishes the value of the 
plaintiffs copyright; and (d) whether the defendant intentionally appropriated the plaintiffs work to save 
time effort; ... ".The same factors were applied by Reed J. in Hager v ECW Press Ltd. (1998) 85 C.P.R. 
(3d) 289 (Fed. T.D.). See also Endicott & Spence, supra note 32 at 671, who propose four factors to 
consider to determine whether a substantial part of a work was used in the case of literal copying that 
should focus on the effects of the use on the exclusive rights of copyright holders as well as on the 
expressive acts and other objectives pursued by the users. 
42 The need for the CCA, supra note 1 to preserve a balance between competing interests was stated by the 
Supreme Court of Canada on numerous occasions: Theberge, supra note 16 at para. 30 and reiterated in 
CCH, supra note 5 at para 10; Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Canadian 
Assn. of Internet Providers, 2004 SCC 45 at para 40; Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers 
of Canada v Bell Canada, 2012 SCC 36 at para 9; Entertainment Software Association v Society of 
Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, supra note 38 at para 7; Rogers Communications 
Inc. v Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, supra note 38 at para 40; Reference 
re Broadcasting Regulatory Policy CRTC 2010-167 and Broadcasting Order CRTC 2010-168, 2012 SCC 
68 at para 64. For a discussion on the concept of balance in Canadian copyright law, see Chapter 2 Part II. 
43 I.e., CCA, supra note 1, ss 3(1), 15, 18, 21, 26. 
44 CCA, supra note 1, ss 29-29.2; see also the discussion on the four new user provisions in Part II D of this 
chapter. 
45 For example see Durham, supra note 31 at 875-878. 
46 Ibid. 
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doctrine under Canadian copyright law.47 For such permitted uses, consumers need to tum to the 
other exceptions to copyright holders' exclusive rights that I explore below in this chapter.48 
The non-substantial part doctrine ties in to the broader discussion on the application of the 
generally accepted interpretative principle de minimis non curat lex (i.e., "the law does not 
concern itself with trifles")49 in copyright and intellectual property law. David Vaver points to the 
need to develop criteria for its application similar to those used in other areas of the law.50 In a US 
context, arguments are put forward to expand the doctrine of de minimis beyond its traditional 
uses in the application of the fair use and substantial similarity doctrines, to counter increasing 
controls that copyright holders have on their works as a result of technological innovations.51 
The role that the non-substantial part doctrine can play with respect to copyright consumers is 
fairly limited given the current state of Canadian copyright law. Commentators' pleas for its 
expansion from a qualitative or quantitative analysis, toward a purpose-based and effects of the 
use analysis, reflect the increasing malaise that arises from the current act-based structure of 
copyright holders' exclusive rights in an era where copyright consumers are increasingly 
technologically enticed to perform multiple acts on copyright works that will enhance their 
overall experience.52 Until the non-substantial-part doctrine moves away from the current 
quantitative and qualitative analysis toward the purpose and effects of the use, its application 
remains of limited interest to copyright consumers. 
Acts by consumers that involve substantial parts of the copyright work may still be performed 
without the authorization of copyright holders if they fall under permitted uses or pertain to 
47 See the discussion above in Part II A of this chapter. 
48 I.e., the private copying regime, the fair dealing provisions, the four new user provisions, and the 
computer program permitted uses: see Part II B to E of this chapter. 
49 Ontario v Canadian Pacific Ltd., [ 1995] 2 S.C.R. 1031 (SCC) at para 65, where the Court analogized this 
maxim with interpretation principles that seek to rule out absurdity. 
50 Vaver, Intellectual Property Law 2011, supra note 5 at 687, where the author points to the criteria that 
are applied in criminal cases: "One would look at the specific purpose of the statutory provision in question, 
the interests they incurred, how far a decision either way would encourage desirable or undesirable 
behaviour, and generally how the public interest is affected." 
51 Andrew Inesi, supra note 29. See also Christopher M. Newman, "Transformation in Property and 
Copyright" (2011) 56 Villanova Law Review 251 at 299-300 where the author criticizes the effects of a 
narrow application of de minimis in the substantive similarity doctrine. 
52 I discuss the limitations of the act-based approach to determine copyright infringement, as opposed to a 
purpose- and effect-based approach in Chapter 2 Part IV. 
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specific forms of copyright works. The private copying regime and its significance to copyright 
consumers is the exception to copyright infringement that I explore next. 
B. Private copying regime 
The private copying regime in the CCA is an exception to copyright infringement that allows 
consumers to reproduce sound recordings and certain copyright works embodied in sound 
recordings53 onto an "audio recording medium"54 for the private use of the person who makes the 
copy. 55 This permitted use applies to one specific type of copyright works purchased by 
consumers, i.e., sound recordings of musical works (including performers' performance of 
musical works),56 and does not apply to other works protected by copyright, such as films or 
books. There is no limit imposed on the number of copies made, nor does the CCA limit 
reproduction solely for the copier's use.57 A similar regime exists in the US.58 In France, the right 
to make private copies is not limited to audio works and applies to most forms of copyright 
works. 59 There is no specific private copying regime or right to make copies for private purposes 
in the UK.60 
53 More precisely: a musical work embodied in a sound recording, a performer performance of a musical 
work embodied in sound recording, or a sound recording in which a musical work, or a performer's 
performance of a musical work is embodied: CCA, supra note 1, s 80(1). 
54 
"Audio recording medium" is defined in the CCA, supra note 1, s 79. The approved tariff for private 
copying for the year 2011: Private Copying Tariff, 2011 (Copyright Board of Canada, December 18, 2010), 
online: http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/tariffs-tarifs/certified-homologues/copying-copie-e.html, s 2, defines 
"blank audio recording medium" as "(a) a recording medium, regardless of its material form, onto which a 
sound recording may be reproduced, that is of a kind ordinarily used by individual consumers for that 
purpose and on which no sounds have ever been fixed, including recordable compact discs (CD-R, CD-RW, 
CD-R Audio, CD-RW Audio); and (b) any medium prescribed by regulations pursuant to sections79 and 87 
of the Act; (support audio vierge)." 
55 CCA, supra note l, s 80(1). The CCA does not define "person" or "private use," but this obviously 
includes consumers who perform those acts for non-commercial purposes: sees 80(2). 
56 More precisely: a musical work embodied in a sound recording, a performer performance of a musical 
work embodied in sound recording, or a sound recording in which a musical work, or a performer's 
performance of a musical work is embodied: CCA, supra note 1, s 80(1 ). 
57 CCA, supra note l, s 80. See Vaver, Intellectual Property Law 2011, supra note 5 at 261. 
58 17 USC,§§ 1001-1010. TheAudioHomeRecordingAct, Pub. L. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (1992), which 
amended 17 USC in 1992. 
59 CPI, art Ll22-5 2° permits the making of copies of published copyright works strictly for private use and 
not collective use, with some exceptions applying to artistic works, computer programs, and electronic 
databases: "Les copies OU reproductions strictement reservees a l'usage prive du copiste et non destinees a 
une utilisation collective, a I' exception des copies des oeuvres d'art destinees a etre utilisees pour des fins 
identiques a celles pour lesquelles }'oeuvre originale a ete creee et des copies d'un logiciel autres que la 
60 
The permitted acts of consumers under the private copying regime are restricted. They do not 
extend to a reproduction for the purpose of sale or rental, to distribution of the musical recording, 
whether or not for the purpose of trade, communicating to the public by telecommunication, 61 or 
to performing or causing to be performed in public. 62 For example, as per subsection 80(2) of the 
CCA, uploading a musical recording from a CD to make it available on a file-sharing network 
would amount to a telecommunication to the public and hence not fall under the private copying 
exception to copyright infringement. 63 Moreover, the Federal Court of Appeal held in Canadian 
Private Copying Collective v. Canadian Storage Media Alliance that a permanently embedded or 
non-removable memory, incorporated into a digital audio recorder (MP3 player) was not an 
copie de sauvegarde etablie dans les conditions prevues au II de l'article L. 122-6-1 ainsi que des copies ou 
des reproductions d'une base de donnees electronique." 
60 The Hargreaves Report, which was commissioned by UK Prime Minister in 2010: Ian Hargreaves, 
"Digital Opportunity, a Review of Intellectual Property and Growth" 2011, at 49 (para 5.31) recommended 
the introduction of a private copying regime that would apply to a broad range of copyright works: "The 
Government should introduce an exception to allow individuals to make copies for their own and 
immediate family's use on different media. Rights holders will be free to pursue whatever compensation the 
market will provide by taking account of consumers' freedom to act in this way and by setting prices 
accordingly." See also, a Martin Kretschmer, "Private Copying and Fair Compensation: An Empirical 
Study of Copyright Levies in Europe, A report of the UK Intellectual Property Office" (2011 ), online: 
www.wipo.intJ .. ./wipo ip econ ge I 12 ref kretschmer.pdf. For a review of the private copying 
exception to copyright infringement in various jurisdictions in Europe, see Marco B.M. Loos, Natali 
Heiberger, Lucie Guibault, Chantal Mak, Lodewijk Pessers, Katalin J. Cseres, Bart van der Sloot & Ronan 
Tigner, "Analysis of the applicable legal frameworks and suggestions for the contours of a model system of 
consumer protection in relation to digital content contracts" (2011) University of Amsterdam, Centre for the 
Study of European Contract Law (CSECL), Institute for Information Law (IViR),Amsterdam Centre for 
Law and Economics (ACLE), online: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/consumer-
markcting/evcnts/digital conf en.htm at 112-115. 
61 In Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Canadian Association of Internet 
Providers, supra note 42 at para 30, the Supreme Court confirmed the Copyright Board assessment of a 
"communication to the public", i.e., when it is "made available on the Internet openly and without 
concealment, with the knowledge and intent that they be conveyed to a11 who might access the Internet[ ... ] 
a communication may be to the public when it is made to individual members of the public at different 
times, whether chosen by them (as is the case on the Internet) or by the person responsible for sending the 
work (as is the case with facsimile transmissions)." 
62 CCA, supra note 1, s 80(2). 
63 CCA, supra note I, s 2.4 (1.1 ), which came into force on November 7, 2012. The scope of the exclusive 
right to communicate to the public by telecommunication on the internet raises several questions since the 
judgment by the Supreme Court Entertainment Software Association v Society of Composers, Authors and 
Music Publishers of Canada, 2012 SCC 34 at paras 5ff., where the Court held in a 5 to 4 decision that the 
download of video games purchased on the Internet was not a communication to the public by 
telecommunication. The judgement was rendered prior to the entry force of CCA, ibid, s. 2.4 (1.1 ). 
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"audio recording medium" and therefore did not fall under the private copying exemption of the 
CCA.64 This considerably limits the scope of the allowable private copying.65 
The definition of "audio recording medium" in the CCA requires that the recording medium66 be 
"of a kind ordinarily used by individual consumers" for the purpose of reproduction.67 In other 
words, consumer trends in relation to reproduction technologies are central to any determination 
of whether a recording medium can be the object of the levy. 68 Even though it acknowledged the 
evidence of the strong consumer trend of copying music on MP3, this was however not sufficient 
for the Federal Court of Appeal in the Canadian Private Copying Collective case to allow the 
private copying exception to copyright infringement to apply, on the basis of a technical 
interpretation of the relevant provisions of the CCA. 69 To remedy the void that this created, a new 
user provision was recently introduced in the CCA, i.e., the reproduction for private purposes, 
which I discuss below in this chapter.70 
The justification of the limited right granted to consumers to make copies of musical works for 
their own private use has been traditionally viewed as a mechanism to address an identified 
market failure. 71 The private copying regime assumes that the ability to make copies for private 
purposes forms an integral part of the exclusive economic rights of copyright holders, but that 
they are unable to efficiently enforce their rights against private copying. In exchange for the 
64 2004 FCA 424, [2004] F.C.J. No. 2115, [2005] 2 F.C.R. 654. 
65 Ibid, more specifically, the analysis in paras 133ff. In that case, the Court had to review the legality of a 
levy that the Canadian Private Copying Collective sought to impose on, among others, MP3 players. The 
Federal Court of Appeal overturned the decision of the Copyright Board by holding that devices such as 
MP3 players, where the recording memory was embedded in the apparatus and was not separable there 
from, did not fall under the definition of a "audio recording medium" and hence could not be the object of a 
levy under the CCA, supra note 1. 
66 I.e., one on which levies can be applied and hence the prescribed use of which by private parties is 
excluded from copyright infringement. 
67 CCA, supra note 1, s 79. 
68 On this basis, the Copyright Board has specifically excluded certain recording media from the scope of 
application of the levy system. For instance, it denied the Canadian Private Copying Collective the ability to 
establish a levy on recordable or rewritable DVDs, removable memory cards, and removable micro hard 
drives, on the basis that these media were not ordinarily used by individuals for the purpose of copying: 
Copyright Board Decision, December 12, 2003, at 42- 43, referred to in Canadian Private Copying 
Collective v Canadian Storage Media Alliance, supra note 64. 
69 Supra note 64. 
70 See Part II D (ii) of this chapter. 
71 For example, see Sunny Handa, Copyright Law in Canada (Markham, Ontario: Butterworth Canada, 
2002) at 466. 
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limited right given to consumers to make private copies, a levy is imposed on blank audio-
recording media manufactured or imported in Canada. There is also a right of remuneration for 
various copyright holders.72 Copyright holders' inability and related inefficiencies to go after 
individual consumer infringers73 is solved in part by the copyright levy created by the private 
copying regime. 
The fundamental underlying assumption that supports the levy- remuneration-based Canadian 
private copying regime - is increasingly under attack at a normative level and as a result of recent 
legislative developments in Canada. At a normative level, the acts of reproduction for private use 
ought not necessarily form part of the exclusive economic rights of copyright holders, 
consequently, need not give rise to compensation. In the digital environment, the right to make 
copies for private purposes is increasingly justified on the basis of various interests that impose 
outer limits on the reach that copyright holders have to control uses of their copyright works by 
consumers. 74 The four new user provisions brought in by the recent amendments to the CCA 
confirm that approach. 75 Contrary to the compensation model that prevails under the current 
private copying regime, the four new user provisions allow individual users to perform certain 
acts without the authorization of copyright holders and do not give rise to remuneration to 
copyright holders. 76 These amendments signal an important shift in the treatment of uses of copies 
of copyright works by individuals for non-commercial or private purposes.77 
In essence, the private copying regime is limited to the reproduction of a musical recording on a 
blank CD or similar medium for private use. From the perspective of consumers of digital 
copyright works, the benefits of the private copying regime remain highly fragmented and of less 
and less relevance in the digital environment that includes the growth of multiple playing devices 
such as iPods and other forms of MP3 players. The recent amendments of the CCA and, in 
particular, the introduction of the four new user provisions allowing the reproduction for private 
72 CCA, supra note 1, ss 81-82. 
74 See the discussion on the theoretical justifications for copy ownership in Chapter 6 Part III and on how 
copy ownership can limit the rights of copyright holders in Chapter 7 Part III. 
75 Canada's Copyright Modernization Act, S.C. 2012, c. 20 [CC.MA] amended the CCA, supra note 1, by 
introducing s 29.21 (Non-commercial user-generated content), s 29.22 (Reproduction of private purposes), s 
29.23 (Fixing signals and recording programs for later listening or viewing), s 2.23 (Backup copies). 
76 Ibid. 
77 I discuss each of the four new user provisions in Part II D (i) to (iv) of this chapter. 
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purposes of any type of work on any device owned by the individuals, will progressively 
supersede the application of the private copying regime in the CCA, even though for now the 
application of the private copying regime still prevails over the application of the reproduction for 
private purpose right.78 
C. Fair dealing 
Fair dealing is an exception to copyright infringement under which users can perform acts with 
copyright works without the authorization of copyright holders for enumerated purposes, provided 
that the dealing is fair. 79 In the leading case CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada 
[CCH],80 the Supreme Court qualified fair dealing to be "perhaps more properly understood as an 
integral part of the Copyright Act than simply a defence," adding that fair dealing and other 
exceptions to copyright infringement were users' rights.81 The CCA lists the purposes for which 
copyright works may be used without the authorization of the copyright holder under the fair 
dealing exception. They are: research, private study,82 criticism, review,83 news reporting,84 and 
the recently introduced purposes of education, parody, or satire. 85 As an exception to copyright 
infringement, fair dealing applies when reserved acts are perfonned on a substantial part of a 
copyright work that may otherwise infringe copyright. 86 Acts that amount to fair dealing can be 
performed without compensation to copyright holders. Copyright users can invoke fair dealing 
even for acts that would be normally covered by one of the other exceptions of the CCA, 
including the private copying regime. 87 Other jurisdictions, including the UK, have similar fair 
dealing provisions in their laws, 88 while the US applies the doctrine of fair use, which as I discuss 
below in this Part, shares a resemblance with fair dealing but with important distinctions. 89 
78 CCA, supra note 1, s 29.22 (3). 
79 CCA, supra note 1, ss 29-29.2. 
80 Supra note 5. 
81 Ibid at para 48. 
82 CCA, supra note 1, s 29. 
83 CCA, supra note 1, s 29.1. 
84 CCA, supra note 1, s 29.2. 
85 CCA, supra note 1, s 29. 
86 I.e., a non-substantial part does not give rise to copyright infringement: see the discussion above in Part II 
A of this chapter. 
87 CCH, supra note 5 at para 49. I discuss consumers' rights under the private copying regime in Part II B 
of this chapter. 
88 UKCDPA, supra note 27, ss 29-30. 
89 17 USC§ 107. 
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Fair dealing/fair use captures the imagination by its mere appellation. It has entered common 
parlance: lay people who have a limited knowledge of copyright will often invoke the concept of 
fair use and fair dealing, and will assume that it allows them to perform a wide variety of acts 
with copies of copyright works without the authorization of copyright holders. To what extent is 
fair dealing (and, at a different level, fair use) helpful and relevant for consumers who lawfully 
access copies of copyright works, in strengthening the permitted scope of their use? As I argue in 
this part, a closer look at fair dealing and to some extent fair use reveals a much less promising 
legal tool to assert consumers' rights to copies of copyright works than one may have hoped 
initially. 
Fair dealing together with its relative in US copyright law, fair use, trigger much interest and 
debate in the legal literature, including in Canada in the aftermath of the CCH judgment.90 The 
uncertainty of the contours of fair dealing and fair use or subsistence in light of TPMs and other 
technological developments is also widely commented upon.91 The UKCDPA 92 contains fair 
dealing provisions for the allowable purposes of research, private study, criticism, review, and 
9° CCH, supra note 5 at para 48. The recent judgments by the Supreme Court are also likely to continue to 
animate the debate on fair dealing: Bell Canada, supra note 42 and Alberta (Education) v Canadian 
Copyright Licensing Agency (Access Copyright) 2012 SCC 37. In Canada, this includes: Daniel Gervais, 
"Canadian Copyright Law Post-CCH" (2004) 18 l.P.J. 131; Carys Craig, "The Changing Face of Fair 
Dealing in Canadian Copyright Law: A Proposal for Legislative Reform'', in In the Public Interest: The 
Future of Canadian Copyright Law, Michael Geist, ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005); Abraham Drassinower, 
"Taking User Rights Seriously", in M. Geist, ed., In the Public Interest: The Future of Canadian Copyright 
Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005) 462; Mira J. Tawfik, "International Copyright Law and Fair Dealing as a 
User Right" (2005) UNESCO Copyright Bulletin, online: http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/c.v.php-; 
Giuseppina D' Agostino, "Healing Fair Dealing? A Comparative Copyright Analysis of Canadian Fair 
Dealing to UK Fair Dealing and US Fair Use" (2008) 53 McGill L.J. 309 [Healing Fair Dealing]; 
D' Agostino, "Copyright Exceptions and Copyright Board", supra note 6 at 209-221; Carys Craig, 
Copyright, Communication and Culture, Torwards a Relational Theory of Copyright Law (Cheltenham, 
UK: Edward Elgar, 2011) [Copyright, Communication and Culture] at 155-202. 
91 Ibid. In the US this includes: Wendy J. Gordon "Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic 
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors," (1982) 82 Columbia Law Review 1600; Tom W. Bell, 
"Fair use vs. Fared use: the Impact of Automated Rights Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine" 
(1998) 76 N.C. L. Rev. 557; Ruth Okediji, "Givers, Takers, and Other Kinds of Users: A Fair Use Doctrine 
for Cyberspace", (2001) 53 Fla. L. Rev. 107; Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., "Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony 
Revisited" (2002) 82 B.U. L. Rev. 975; Wendy J. Gordon, "Market Failure and Intellectual Property: A 
Response to Professor Lunney" (2002) 82 B.U.L. Rev. 1031 1043; Raymond Shih Ray Ku, "Consumers 
and Creative Destruction: Fair Use Beyond Market Failure" (2003) 18 BTU. 539; Wendy J. Gordon & 
Daniel Bahls, "The Public's Right to Fair Use: Amending Section 107 to avoid the 'Fared Use' Fallacy" 
(2007) Utah L. Rev. 619; Joseph P. Liu, "Two-Factor Fair Use? (2008) 31 Colum. J.L. & Arts 571; Edward 
Lee, "Technological Fair Use" (2010) 83 S. Cal. L. Rev. 797. 
92 Supra note 27. 
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news reporting,93 some of which are more restrictive in interpretation than in Canada.94 In France, 
the CPI enumerates acts that do not infringe copyright under specific conditions and so long as 
they do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the author.95 
In the US, section 107 of the Copyright Act of 19 7 6 codified the doctrine of fair use. 96 In contrast 
with fair dealing in Canada and in the UK, and the exceptions to copyright infringement in 
France, the fair use list of allowable purposes is not exhaustive.97 A broad range of uses have been 
held to constitute fair use, from home video recording of broadcasts for later viewings98 to 
parody,99 and fair use gives rise to litigation with respect to very diverse acts, including the use of 
designer eye wear protected by copyright in a retailer's advertisement without the designer's 
consent. 100 
In CCH, the Supreme Court had to determine whether the custom photocopy service offered by 
the Great Library to its patrons upon request (including lawyers, law students, and members of the 
judiciary) of photocopies of extracts from legal texts fell under the fair dealing exception in 
section 29 of the CCA "for the purpose of research or private study." 101 In a unanimous judgment, 
Chief Justice McLachlin called for a broad interpretation of fair dealing: "In order to maintain the 
proper balance between the rights of a copyright owner and users' interests, it must not be 
93 Ibid, SS 29-30. 
94 Ibid, s 29(1 ), which limits the purpose of research to non-commercial research. In Canada, research can 
be for commercial or non-commercial purposes: CCH, supra note 5 at para 51. For a comparative analysis 
between fair dealing in Canada and the UK and fair use in the US, see D' Agostino, "Healing Fair Dealing," 
supra note 90. 
95 Art Ll22-5 3°-9° CPI. The purposes include: criticism, news reporting, parody, and caricature. 
96 An Act for the general revision of the Copyright Law, title 17 of the United States Code, and for other 
purposes, Pub. L. 94-553 (19 October 1976). 
97 17 USC § 107 lists the following non-exhaustive purposes: "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching 
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research." It lists the factors that shall be 
considered to assess fair use, although they are not exhaustive. The factors that shall be considered include 
"( 1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of 
the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and ( 4) the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work." 
98 Sony Corp. v Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454-55 ( 1984) (US Supreme Court). 
99 Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (US Supreme Court). 
100 On Davis v The Gap, Inc 246 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2001). In that case, the use of eyewear protected by 
copyright in an advertisement by retailer The Gap was held not to be fair use. 
101 CCH, supra note 5 at para 47. 
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interpreted restrictively."102 In doing so, the Supreme Court, in line with the Court of Appeal, 
departed from earlier prevailing narrow interpretations of fair dealing that reflected a more 
author-centric application of copyright. 103 To show that a dealing is fair under section 29 of the 
CCA, a defendant must prove that the dealing was made for one of the purposes104 and that the 
dealing was fair. 105 In the case of criticism, review, and news reporting, there is an additional 
requirement to reference the source of the copyright work. 106 On the first requirement, i.e., that the 
dealing of the Law Society (through the Great Library) fell under the purpose of research or 
private study, the Court stated that '"Research' must be given a large and liberal interpretation in 
order to ensure that users' rights are not unduly constrained."107 The Supreme Court added that 
"research" can apply in a commercial context, namely lawyers performing legal research on 
behalf of their clients for commercial gain. 108 On the second requirement, the Supreme Court 
enumerated a non-exhaustive list of six factors that should guide courts and adjudicators on the 
factual assessment of whether the dealing with a copyright work was fair. 109 The six factors are: 
(1) the purpose of the dealing, i.e., making "an objective assessment of the user/defendant's real 
purpose or motive in using the copyrighted work;"110 (2) the character of the dealing, i.e., how the 
work is dealt with (e.g., widespread distribution v. limited copies for private use; 111 (3) the 
amount of the dealing, i.e., both the amount of the work taken and the importance of the work; 112 
102 CCH, supra note 5 at paras 48, 51, where the Court held (para 51 ), that a fair dealing for the purpose of 
"research," under section 29 of the CCA, supra, note I "must be given a large and liberal interpretation in 
order to ensure that users' rights are not unduly constrained." 
103 Craig, "Copyright, Communication and Culture," supra note 90 at 162, 166-168 & 179, where the author 
summarizes the effects of CCH on fair dealing in Canada as follows: "The Supreme Court in CCH 
established a vision of fair dealing that differed from anything previously se~n in the Canadian Courts. As 
the case progressed from Trial Division to the highest court in the land, fair dealing was transformed from a 
limited exception to an integral part of the copyright system; from a controversial privilege to a recognized 
right; from anomaly in an owner-oriented system to an instantiation of the public-owner balance." See also 
Giuseppina D' Agostino, (2007) "Fair Dealing after CCH" online: http://www.pch.gc.ca/pc-ch/org/sectr/ac-
ca/pda-cpb/puhlctn/cch-2007 /index-eng.cfm. at I 3-17 where the author describes the approach adopted in 
CCH as being "user-centric." 
104 The purposes enumerated in the CCA, supra note 1, s 29 are: research, private study, education, parody, 
or satire. 
105 CCH, supra note 5 at para 50. 
106 CCA, supra note I, ss 29.1-29.2. 
107 CCH, supra note 5 at para 5 I. 
io8 Ibid. 
109 Ibid, at para 53ff. The six factors were the ones proposed by the Federal Court of Appeal, Linden J.A.: 
CCH Canadian Ltd. v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2002 FCA I 87. 
11
° CCH, supra note 5 at para 54. 
111 Ibid, at para 55. The Court indicated that the custom of a particular trade can be helpful in assessing the 
fairness of the dealing. 
112 Ibid, at para 56. 
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(4) alternatives to the dealing, e.g., the existence of a non-copyright work and whether the dealing 
was reasonably necessary to achieve the ultimate purpose; 113 (5) the nature of the work, e.g., 
whether the work was published or not or whether it was confidential; 114 and (6) the effect of the 
dealing on the work, i.e., "if the reproduced work is likely to compete with the market of the 
original work," an important but not the most important factor to consider. 115 
Applying the two-step analysis of fair dealing to the practice by the Law Society, the Supreme 
Court held that its custom photocopying service was provided for the purpose of research, review, 
and private study. 116 The Court also held that the Law Society's dealings with the copyright works 
were fair, relying in part on the Access Policy of the Great Library and the safeguards that were in 
place to ensure that the dealings with the copyright works were fair. 117 
The Supreme Court had to interpret fair dealing on two other recent occasions, when it referred to 
CCH and brought further clarifications to the scope of fair dealing. In Bell Canada, the Supreme 
Court had to determine whether the practice by some commercial Internet sites to let consumers 
preview music before making a purchase was fair dealing. 118 The issue arose with respect to 
SOCAN' s proposed tariffs for the determination of royalties to be paid by users when musical 
works are communicated to the public over the Internet. 119 In a unanimous judgment delivered by 
Abella J., the Court held that the practice of music preview was fair dealing. 120 With respect to the 
first of the two steps of the factual analysis of fair dealing, the Court applied a liberal 
113 Ibid, at para 57. 
114 Ibid, at para 58 
115 Ibid, at para 59. 
116 Ibid, at para 64, where the Court held: "The reproduction of legal works is for the purpose of research in 
that it is an essential element of the legal research process. There is no other purpose for the copying; the 
Law Society does not profit from this service. Put simply, its custom photocopy service helps to ensure that 
legal professionals in Ontario can access the materials necessary to conduct the research required to carry 
on the practice of law." 
117 Ibid, at paras 61 ff. In particular the Court assessed the effects of the Access Policy as follows: "The 
Access Policy places appropriate limits on the type of copying that the Law Society will do. It states that 
not all requests will be honoured. If a request does not appear to be for the purpose of research, criticism, 
review or private study, the copy will not be made. If a question arises as to whether the stated purpose is 
legitimate, the Reference Librarian will review the matter. The Access Policy limits the amount of work 
that will be copied, and the Reference Librarian reviews requests that exceed what might typically be 
considered reasonable and has the right to refuse to fulfill a request.": ibid, at para 78. 
118 Bell Canada, supra note 42. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Ibid, at para 49. 
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interpretation to the purpose of research, consistent with the approach taken in CCH. 121 Such 
activity need not have a creative component, as per the ordinary meaning of research. One of the 
objectives of the CCA being to encourage the dissemination of works does not necessarily entail 
a creativity component. 122 Abella J. confirmed that the purpose had to be assessed from the 
perspective of the user and that this was consistent with the qualification of exceptions to 
copyright infringement as users' rights. 123 
Turning to the second step of the factual analysis of fair dealing, Abella J. applied the six factors 
enumerated in CCH that can help determine the fairness of the dealing. 124 The Court confirmed 
the reasoning of the Copyright Board in applying each of the six factors. 125 Consistent with the 
first step of the fair dealing analysis (i.e., whether it falls under one of the enumerated purposes), 
the Court applied the third factor, i.e., the amount or quantity of the dealing from the perspective 
of each individual user, not from the perspective of the online music service provider in the 
aggregate. 126 In applying the sixth factor, i.e., the effect of the dealing on the copyright work and 
whether the dealing adversely affects or competes with the copyright work, the Court considered 
the poor quality of the preview and the fact that the preview increased sales and dissemination of 
musical recordings and concluded that previews do not negatively interfere with the work. 127 As a 
result, online music providers who offer music previews to their customers do not infringe 
copyright. 128 
In Alberta (Education) v. Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access Copyright) [Alberta], 129 
the Supreme Court reviewed the Copyright Board's assessment of whether certain practices 
performed by educational institutions constituted fair dealing and were therefore outside the scope 
121 Supra note 5, ibid, at paras 15-30. 
122 Bell Canada, supra note 42 at paras 21-22. 
123 Ibid, at paras 29-30. 
124 The six factors enunciated in CCH, supra note 5, and applied in Bell Canada, supra note 42 at paras 31-
43 are: (1) the purpose of the dealing; (2) the character of the dealing; (3) the amount of the dealing; ( 4) 
alternatives to the dealing; (5) the nature of the work; and (6) the effect of the dealing on the work. 
125 Bell Canada, supra note 42 at paras 31-43. 
126 Ibid, at paras 39-43. 
127 Ibid, at para 48. 
128 Ibid, at para 49. 
129 Supra note 90. 
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of the tariff proposed by Access Copyright130 for the reproduction of its repertoire for use in 
elementary and secondary schools in Canada. 131 In particular, the Court had to review the practice 
by which teachers made photocopies of short excerpts of copyright works on their own initiative 
and instructed students to read them as a complement to the main relevant textbook(s). The 
Copyright Board had found that although such practice fell in the category of research or private 
study, it was not fair. 132 On judicial review, the Federal Court of Appeal held that the Copyright 
Board's assessment of fair dealing was reasonable. 133 In a five to four judgment, the Supreme 
Court allowed the appeal by the Coalition (i.e., Ministers of Education and school boards across 
Canada) and remitted the matter to the Copyright Board for reconsideration based on the reasons 
it provided on the interpretation of fair dealing, 134 more particularly, the interpretation of four of 
the six factors to consider in the second step of the fair dealing analysis. 135 
While the first step of the fair dealing analysis, i.e., the fact that the photocopying by the teachers 
fell under the purpose of research or private study was not in dispute, the Copyright Board had 
found that the purpose of the dealing was not fair because the photocopying of excerpts was not 
made at the students' request but by teachers and that the photocopied excerpts were reviewed by 
the students in the classroom. 136 Abella J., for the majority, reiterated the interpretation given in 
Bell Canada that as a user's right, the purpose of the dealing needed to be assessed from the 
perspective of the user. 137 The purpose of the copier was relevant at the fairness stage of the 
analysis only to the extent that there was a purpose separate from the allowable purpose of the 
user, e.g., research or private study, which was not the situation in the case of teachers and their 
130 Access Copyright administers the reproduction of published literary and artistic works on behalf of 
authors and publishers by negotiating licences with institutional users or by applying to the Copyright 
Board to certify a royalty through a tariff. See Alberta, supra note 90 at para 2. 
131 The province of Quebec excluded. 
132 Collective Administration in relation to rights under sections 3, 15, 18 and 21, Re, [2009] C.B.D. No. 6. 
133 Alberta (Minister of Education) v Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency, 2010 FCA 198, [2011] 3 
F.C.R. 223. 
134 Alberta, supra note 90 at para 38. 
135 The first step of the fair dealing analysis, i.e., whether the photocopies were for the allowable purpose of 
research or private study was not in dispute. The factors that the Supreme Court reviewed were: the purpose 
of the dealing, the amount of the dealing, alternatives to the dealing, and the effects of the dealing on the 
work: Alberta, supra note 90 at paras 14-37. In accordance with Alberta, ibid, The Copyright Board 
rendered its decision in January 2013: Reprographic Reproduction 2005-2009, Re, 2013 CarswellNat 58 
(Copyright Board). 
136 Alberta, supra note 90 at paras 15, 26. 
137 Ibid, at para 22. 
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students. 138 Abella J. interpreted the meaning of "private" in the allowable purpose of private 
study as not being confined to "splendid isolation" and including study performed in a classroom 
setting: "Studying and learning are essentially personal endeavours, whether they are engaged in 
with others or in solitude."139 
In the interpretation of the sixth factor to assess whether the dealing was fair, i.e., the effect of the 
dealing on the copyright work, Abella J. found the evidence submitted by Access Copyright that 
textbook sales had decreased by over 30 per cent in the last 20 years to be inconclusive because 
there was no evidence that this decline was linked to the photocopying by the teachers. 140 Abella 
J. found it difficult to believe that the teachers' practice of photocopying small excerpts would 
compete with copyright holders. Were they not allowed to photocopy them, the alternative would 
more likely be not to use the excerpts or have the students refer to the one book available for 
reference. 141 On the basis of these reasons, the matter of certifying Access Copyright's tariff was 
remitted to the Copyright Board for reconsideration. 142 
In light of the judgments of the Supreme Court in CCH, Bell Canada, and Alberta, to what extent 
is fair dealing helpful and relevant for consumers who lawfully access copies of copyright works 
to determine the permitted scope of their use? The answer is somewhat paradoxical. On the one 
hand, as noted by the Supreme Court in CCH, the fair dealing exception is an integral part of the 
CCA and has been the springboard to elevate exceptions to copyright infringement to users' 
rights. 143 On the other hand, the nature of the fair dealing provisions in the CCA and the factual 
138 Ibid, at paras 22-23. Abella J. responded to the respondents' arguments that were based on various cases 
including University of London Press, Ltd. v University Tutorial Press, Ltd., [1916] 2 Ch. 601 and 
Copyright Licensing Ltd. v University of Auckland, [2002] 3 N.Z.L.R. 76 (HC) where the copier had a 
purpose separate of the one of the users (e.g., commercial v. educational) 
139 Alberta, supra note 90 at para 27. 
140 Ibid at para 33. In doing so, Abella J. for the majority, applied a similar reasoning to the one in CCH, 
supra note 5 (ibid, at para 35). 
141 Ibid, at para 36. 
142 Ibid, at para 38. The Copyright Board rendered its decision in January 2013: Reprographic Reproduction 
2005-2009, Re, 2013 CarswellNat 58 (Copyright Board). 
143 CCH, supra note 5 at para 48. In addition to Bell Canada, supra note 42 and Alberta, supra note 90, the 
Supreme Court reiterated that exceptions to copyright infringement are user rights in Reference re 
Broadcasting Regulatory Policy CRTC 2010-167 and Broadcasting Order CRTC 2010-168, supra note 42 
at paras 56ff, where the Court held that the market-based value for signal regulatory regime introduced by 
the CRTC was ultra vires of its powers. The regime would allow private local television stations to 
negotiate direct compensation for the retransmission of their signals by broadcasting distribution 
undertakings. As such, the Court held that the regime would override the balance set in the CCA, supra note 
1, between users' rights (in this case CCA, ibid, ss 31 (1) (2)) and copyright holders' rights. 
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analysis required to assess whether a dealing is fair, under the guidance of the Supreme Court in 
CCH, Bell Canada, and Alberta, is an unlikely vehicle to help consumers assert their rights to 
copies of copyright works. At the same time, the analysis required to assess the fairness of a 
dealing may provide useful guidance for the interpretation of other exceptions to copyright 
infringement to the extent that it embeds the objectives of the CCA and the need to balance the 
interests of copyright holders, authors, users, and the public. 144 
With respect to the first step to assess fair dealing, i.e., whether it falls under one of the allowable 
purposes, while the Supreme Court called for a large and liberal interpretation, the list of the 
allowable purposes is finite, unlike fair use in the US. 145 The broad interpretation of research in 
Bell Canada as not being limited to creative acts or "the establishment of new facts or 
conclusions" with the potential of being "piecemeal, informal, exploratory, or confirmatory" or 
conducted for no other purpose except for personal interest, is significant for copyright consumers 
for its recognition of the merit and value of seemingly more passive uses of copyright works. 146 
The holding in Bell Canada that making available music previews to consumers is fair dealing is 
a positive step for consumers in a broader sense. 147 The interpretation in Alberta that private study 
need not take place in solo but can occur as part of a group also broadens the scope of possible 
uses by copyright consumers that constitute a fair dealing. 148 The recent addition of parody or 
satire as allowable purposes for fair dealing is beneficial to consumers in bringing further clarity, 
in a YouTube and the like era with the creativity, communication, and sharing culture that it 
epitomizes. 149 These wide and liberal interpretations of the allowable purposes of fair dealing are 
significant to copyright consumers and their ramifications have yet to be fully appreciated. 
Outside consumers' transformative uses of existing copyright works that could fall under parody 
or satire, or even criticism or review, it remains uncertain that fair dealing (in particular the other 
144 See: Reference re Broadcasting Regulatory Policy CRTC 2010-167 and Broadcasting Order CRTC 
2010-168, supra note 42. This includes the interpretation of the four new user provisions recently 
introduced CCA, supra note I, which I discuss in Part II D of this chapter. 
145 17 USC§ 107. 
146 Bell Canada, supra note 42 at para 22. 
147 Ibid, at para 49. 
148 Alberta, supra note 90 at para 27. 
149 CCA, supra note 1, s 29 "education, parody or satire" are now part of the allowable purposes of fair 
dealing. It can be argued that a broad interpretation of the purpose of "criticism" further to the large and 
liberal interpretation of fair dealing by the Supreme Court in CCH, supra note 5, already included parody or 
satire. See Carys Craig, "Locking Out Lawful Users: Fair Dealing and Anti-Circumvention in Bill C-32" in 
From Radical Extremism to Balanced Copyright: Canadian Copyright and the Digital Agenda, Michael 
Geist, ed, ( Irwin Law: Toronto, 2010) 177 at 188-189. 
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allowable purposes of research or private study) would cover a large portion of consumers' non-
transformative entertainment, instructional, or enjoyment uses of copies of copyright works. As I 
discussed in Chapter 2 and will further argue in Chapter 6, these less active consumer uses are a 
no less important and an integral part of the copyright framework's objectives than creative output 
uses. 1so 
With respect to the second step to assess fair dealing, the six factors that the Supreme Court relied 
on as an analytical framework are non-exhaustive and their relevancy may vary on a case-by-case 
basis to assess fairness. 1s1 As the Court pointed out in CCH, the six factors are interrelated: the 
assessment of one factor, e.g., the purpose of the dealing influences the assessment of the other(s), 
e.g., the amount of the dealing. 1s2 This approach allows flexibility, but leads to legal uncertainty, 
which is less than ideal and workable for consumers who seek to understand and assert their rights 
to copies of copyright works. As a factual analysis on a case-by-case basis, its application requires 
a level of sophistication and understanding of copyright law that poses challenges even to 
experienced lawyers. 
It is not clear how the non-exhaustive list of six factors enumerated by the Supreme Court in CCH 
to determine the fairness of a dealing will play out with respect to consumers' uses of copyright 
works for personal purposes. The onus to establish that the dealing is fair rests with consumers. 
The purpose of the dealing, which is here non-commercial and as such more favourable to a 
finding of fairness, will counterbalance the amount of the dealing which will generally comprise 
the entirety of the work, a less favourable factual element. 1s3 The application by the Supreme 
Court of the sixth factor, i.e., the effect of the dealing on the work and its potential competition 
with the economic (and moral) rights of copyright holders offers promise for the ascertainment of 
consumers' rights to copies of copyright works. First, the Supreme Court's indication in CCH that 
it is not the most important factor in the analysis signals a departure from a copyright-holder-
centric application of copyright law. 1s4 Second, and in the same vein, the relatively high threshold 
150 See the discussion in Chapter 2 Part V. See also the discussion on the theoretical justifications of copy 
ownership in Chapter 6 Part III. 
151 CCH, supra note 5 at para 60. 
152 Ibid at para 56. 
153 Ibid. 
is4 As noted by the Supreme Court In Bell Canada, supra note 42 at para 9, this departure was initiated in 
Theberge, supra note 16, in contrast to earlier judgments (citing Bishop v Stevens, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 467, at 
pp. 478-79). 
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on the evidence needed to establish a link between the dealing and the detrimental effects to 
copyright holders is significant. It rejects the common assumption that the performance of 
reserved acts without compensation inevitably leads to a weakening of copyright holders' 
economic rights. In the absence of a judicial pronouncement on the issue of fair dealing 
encompassing a large portion of consumers' uses of commercial copies of copyright works for 
personal purposes, the appeal of fair dealing to assert copyright consumers' rights to copies of 
copyright works remains uncertain. 
While CCH, Bell Canada, and Alberta open up a new realm of possibilities155 for what could 
constitute fair dealing that may supplement the limited scope of permitted uses of digital 
copyright works without the authorization of the copyright holder, fair dealing remains limited to 
specific purposes. 156 By design, fair dealing and the two-step factual analysis proposed in CCH 
cannot do much in the way of alleviating the ambiguity that subsists for consumers of what 
constitutes lawful v. infringing uses. A US fair use model, which does not restrict the allowable 
purposes for its application, may be more desirable for its coverage of broader uses relevant to 
consumers than the Canadian fair dealing model, as was illustrated in the past in the landmark 
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. judgment. 157 At the same time, the open-ended 
purposes and factors for the application of fair use require a case-by-case analysis that remains 
heavily dependent on judicial interpretation. The ability of the fair use doctrine to adequately 
address consumers' rights to use commercial copies of copyright works for personal purposes 
remains questionable. 158 The interaction of fair dealing and fair use with other provisions, 
155 In the US, a significant body of literature looks at the flexibility that the equivalent fair use provision can 
provide in favour of users and in the context of developing technologies. See for example: Okediji, supra 
note 91; Lunney, supra note 91; Joseph P. Liu, "Enabling Copyright Consumers" (2007) 22 BTU 1099 
[Liu, "Enabling Copyright Consumers"]. 
156 On the limits that this imposes on fair dealing, in spite of the developments brought by CCH, supra note 
5, see Craig, "Copyright, Communication and Culture," supra note 90 at 170-174, in particular at 172. 
157 Sony Corp. v Universal City Studios, Inc., supra note 98, where the US Supreme Court recognized that 
home video recording of broadcasts for later viewings fell under the fair use exception to copyright 
infringement. 
158Let alone the prohibitive costs that consumers would need to incur to assert their claims. See Jessica 
Litman, "Lawful Personal Use" (2007) 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1871 [Litman, "Lawful Personal Use"] at 1898-
1903 where the author describes how it is not always clear that personal uses would constitute fair use and 
how fair use as a judge-made doctrine applying a case-by-case analysis is ill adapted to individual users; in 
a broader context, see also Craig, "Copyright, Communication and Culture," supra note 90 at 17 4-192, in 
particular at 180-181. The author recommends that Canada move from a fair dealing approach to a fair use 
approach, with caution and reservations on the effectiveness of fair use at balancing copyright holders' 
rights with the public interest. She notes: "the introduction of such a defence should not, therefore, be 
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including TPMs, is another factor to consider when assessing the efficacy of these exceptions to 
copyright infringement to adequately address copyright consumers' rights and interests. 159 The 
next step is to explore whether the four recently introduced user provisions in the CCA are more 
likely to achieve that goal. 
D. The four new user provisions 
Recent amendments to the CCA added four new exceptions to copyright infringement that allow 
individual users 160 to perform certain acts for defined purposes without copyright holders' 
authorization. 161 Prior to reviewing each exception, the following introductory remarks will 
highlight their commonality while providing some context. 
The four new user provisions allow acts to be performed on substantial parts of copyright 
works. 162 They co-exist with the fair dealing provisions and may be invoked with these 
provisions, to the extent that they are applicable. 163 The scope of the four new user provisions 
permits acts that fall within and beyond the allowable purposes of fair dealing. 164 Each of the 
permitted acts thereunder would likely fulfill the requirement of fairness under the second step of 
the fair dealing analysis, although it does not need to be established. The acts need to fall within 
specific purposes and uses and fulfill other conditions. 165 The user provision that pertains to 
reproduction for private purposes166 is subject to the application of the private copying regime. 167 
viewed as a panacea; what is really needed is a continuation and development of the kind of attitudinal shift 
that is discemable in recent Canadian Supreme Court jurisprudence .... The US experience reveals the 
weight of this warning, first through the limits that have been placed on fair use by US courts to constrain 
its application, and second, through the effective evisceration of fair use in the face of technical control, 
supported by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998." 
159 See the discussion in Part III B of this chapter. 
160 Three of the four new user provisions apply to "individuals": CCA, supra note 1, ss 29.21- 29.23, while 
one applies to persons, which includes natural and physical persons: ibid, s 29.24. 
161 CCA, supra note I, ss 29.21-29.24. 
162 I.e., users who perform acts on non-substantial parts do not infringe copyright and do not need to invoke 
an exception to copyright infringement: see the discussion in Part II A of this chapter. 
163 CCH, supra note 5 at para 49. 
164 For example the acts authorized under the non-commercial user-generated content: CCA, supra note 1, s 
29.21, may or may not fall under the purpose of parody or satire under the fair dealing provisions (ibid, s 
29). The reproduction for private purposes (ibid, s 29.22) or the later viewing or listening exception (ibid, s 
29.23) may or may not fall under the purpose of research or private study in the fair dealing provision (ibid, 
s 29). 
165 CCA, supra note 1, ss 29.21-29.24. 
166 CCA, supra note 1, s. 29.22. 
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The four new user provisions do not require remunerating copyright holders, similar to acts 
performed on a non-substantial part or acts that are fair dealing, and unlike the private copying 
regime. 168 
Most consumers would be surprised to find out that prior to the entry into force of the 
amendments to the CCA in 2012 and the addition of the new user provisions, they were either not 
allowed to or it was unclear whether they could upload their own performance of the latest hit on 
YouTube, could copy their favourite musical recordings on their iPods, or record broadcasts for 
later viewing. 169 These mundane acts have formed part of the everyday life of most copyright 
consumers for some time now. With multiple technological tools that enhance the overall 
experience and convenience of the use of copyright works, lawful consumers can reasonably 
expect that they are allowed to apply these capabilities through the acts they perform on copies of 
copyright works. 
By adding the four new user provisions, Parliament took steps toward a formal recognition of the 
place and interests of individual copyright users more than it had ever done before. 170 Up until 
then, the CCA's sparse references to users were mainly to institutional users. 171 The extent to 
which the four new user provisions can aptly be called users' rights is another matter, and so is 
the extent to which they fulfill copyright consumers' needs and expectations within the objectives 
of copyright law. I explore these questions below in this chapter172 and throughout my thesis. 173 
167 Ibid, at para (3). 
168 CCA, supra note 1, ss 3, 29-29.2, 79-87. 
169 CCMA, supra note 75, amended the CCA, supra note 1, by introducing ss 29.21-29.24. 
17
° CCMA, supra note 75, Preamble, states, with respect to the exclusive rights of copyright holders, that 
"some limitations on those rights exist to further enhance users' access to copyright works or other subject-
matter." For a great part of the lengthy copyright legislative reform that has led to the entry into force of the 
CCMA, ibid, more specifically Bill C-32, An Act to amend the Copyright Act, 3rc1 Session, 40th Parl., 2010 
(1st reading June 2, 20 I 0) and Bill C-11 An Act to amend the Copyright Act, I st session, 41 st Parl, 20 I I 
(which became the CCMA, ibid) the Government of Canada labeled the initiative "Balanced Copyright." 
The Government website address where it communicated recent developments on copyright law around the 
entry into force of the CCMA, ibid, was labelled: "balancedcopyright.gc.ca." 
171 Such as educational institutions, libraries, museums, and archives: CCA, supra note 1, ss 29.4ff. 
172 See further below in Part II D and in Part III and Part IV of this chapter. 
173 In particular, in the Second Part (Chapter 4 to Chapter 7) and Fourth Part (Chapter 12) of my thesis. 
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I have already discussed the reference to "individuals" or to "persons" in the four new user 
provisions and how this illustrates an unprecedented shift in the CCA. 174 The CCA singles out 
more than ever before175 a group of individuals that are to be likened to consumers as defined in 
consumer protection laws. 176 I have also discussed how the commercial v. non-commercial 
dichotomy, a defining factor by which to determine the identity of consumers in consumer 
protection law, is present to only a limited extent in the four new user provisions and the CCA. 177 
While this gives rise to confusion about the group of users targeted by the four new user 
provisions (i.e., that it may extend to users performing acts beyond non-commercial purposes), 
this is not of primary concern here. As I discussed in Chapter 2, my thesis focuses on consumers 
as defined by consumer protection laws: i.e., individuals (natural persons) who perform acts for 
non-commercial purposes. 178 They fall within the scope of each of the four new user provisions. 179 
With these general considerations in mind, I will briefly introduce the distinguishing features of 
each of the four new user provisions. 
174 See the discussion in Chapter 2 Part IV. 
175 Prior to the entry into force of the CCMA, supra note 75, there was one reference to "consumers" under 
the private copying regime provisions: CCA, supra note 1, ss 79ff. 
176 See the discussion in Chapter 2 Part IV. Not all the acts under the four new user provisions involve a 
consumer transaction (for example, the non-commercial user-generated content exception, CCA, supra note 
1, s 29 .21, does not necessarily imply the purchase of the pre-existing copyright work from which the new 
work is created), but the individuals that fall under their scope would generally also be consumers under 
consumer protection laws: ibid. 
177 Ibid. 
178 See in particular Chapter 2 Part IV. 
179 This is under the working premise that reference to private use and private purposes could include uses 
performed by consumers as defined in consumer protection laws: ibid. 
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(i) Non-commercial user-generated content 
The non-commercial user-generated content exception to copyright infringement (familiarly 
referred to as the "YouTube exception") 180 allows individuals to perform on any form of 
published copyright works, 181 for the creation of new copyright works, all acts (but for one) 
otherwise reserved to copyright holders (i.e., the exclusive right to produce, reproduce, and to 
perform substantial parts of the works in public). 182 The individuals have rights with respect to 
these newly created works that are limited to: authorizing other household members to use the 
works and authorizing an intermediary to disseminate the newly created works, 183 for non-
commercial purposes, with proper reference to the pre-existing work. Such use or dissemination 
must ·not "have a substantial adverse effect, ... on the exploitation ... of the existing [copyright] 
work or on an existing or potential market for it, including that the new [copyright] work is not a 
substitute for the existing one."184 The individual must also have reasonable grounds to believe 
that the pre-existing copyright work or copy of it was not infringing copyright. 185 
The non-commercial user-generated content exception to copyright infringement is the broadest 
of the four new user provisions in two respects: the wide range of permitted acts that can be 
performed with respect to pre-existing copyright works and the fact that it is not specifically 
subjected to the non-circumvention of any TPMs. 186 It confers a special standing to the creation of 
new copyright works that takes place through the use of pre-existing works (often referred to as 
transformative acts or uses). 187 The premise is that if the objective of copyright is to promote the 
creation of works, the use of a pre-existing work to create a new work should be desirable and 
180 See: Government of Canada, Balanced Copyright, Copyright Modernization Act - Backgrounder, What 
will the Bill do - Users and Consumers, available at http://balancedcopyright.gc.ca/eic/site/crp-
prda.nsf/eng/h rpO 1237 .html. 
181 Or otherwise made available to the public: CCA, supra note 1, s 29.21(1). 
182 CCA, supra note 1, ss 3, 15, 18, 21 26. It does not permit individuals to publish unpublished works: 
CCA, supra note 1, s 29.21. Also, for the exception to copyright infringement to apply the new creation 
must meet the requirement of originality for works to be protected: see supra note 5. 
183 Or authorize members of their household to do so: ibid. 
184 CCA, supra note 1, s 29.2l(l)d. 
185 Ibid, s 29.21 (1) c. 
186 CCA, supra note 1, s 29.21. 
187 Under US copyright law, whether a transformation occurred, i.e., the creation of a new work when using 
a pre-existing copyright work, is a favourable element for a finding a fair use in applying the first factor of 
the fair use provision i.e., the purpose and character of the use ( 17 USC § I 07): Campbell v Acuff-Rose 
Music, supra note 99. 
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should be promoted to balance the interests of the pre-existing copyright holder with the ones of 
the would-be copyright holder. 188 Among the broader group of consumers and users, it favours 
individuals who generate new creations. 189 I have questioned in Chapter 2 the greater emphasis 
that is placed on creative consumers, the extent to which this differential treatment is justified 
within copyright's design and objectives, and the potential detrimental effects that this has on less 
laborious users. 190 The sharp contrast between the non-commercial user-generated content 
provision and the other new user provisions introduced in the CCA that I look at next illustrate 
that gap. 
(ii) Reproduction for private purposes 
The reproduction for private purposes exception to copyright infringement (colloquially referred 
to as the "MP3 exception") 191 allows individuals to perform one of the acts (i.e., reproduction) 
otherwise reserved to copyright holders on any form of copyright works, subject to a list of strict 
conditions. 192 This user provision applies to a broad range of methods of reproductions, 193 subject 
to the application of the private copying regime that continues to apply to sound recordings and 
certain copyright works embodied in sound recordings 194 and that fall under its purview. 195 
This user provision does not set any limits on the number of reproductions that can be made, 196 
but does require that they be made for private purposes. 197 Because the permitted act is limited to 
188 I discuss the theoretical justifications of copyright and copy ownership in Chapter 6 Part III. 
189 I discuss the different categories of users and their current place in copyright law in Chapter 2 and make 
recommendations on copyright consumers' rights in Chapter 12 Part IV and, in particular, IV C. 
190 See the discussion in Chapter 2 Part V. 
191 See: Government of Canada, Balanced Copyright, Copyright Modernization Act - Backgrounder, supra 
note 180. 
192 CCA, supra note 1, s 29.22. 
193 Ibid, at s 29.22 (2) which defines medium or device as including "digital memory in 
which a work or subject-matter may be stored for the purpose of allowing the telecommunication 
of the work or other subject matter through the Internet or other digital network." 
194 More precisely: a musical work embodied in a sound recording, a performer performance of a musical 
work embodied in sound recording, or a sound recording in which a musical work, or a performer's 
performance of a musical work is embodied CCA, supra note 1, s 80(1 ). 
195 I.e., if the reproduction is made onto an audio recording medium as defined in CCA, supra note 1, s 79: 
CCA, supra note 1, s 29.22 (3). I discuss the scope of the private copying regime exception to copyright 
infringement in Part II B of this chapter. 
196 Ibid, s 29.22(4) reference to the destruction of any reproductions made from the copy confirms that 
multiple reproductions are permitted. 
197 Ibid, s 29.22 (I) (e). 
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reproduction, this exception to copyright infringement would not permit the user to e.g., 
communicate copies of the work to the public by telecommunication through the internet. 198 The 
private purpose required for the exception to apply could also be an obstacle although the scope of 
use that it allows has yet to be defined. The reproduction(s) need(s) to be made from a non-
infringing copy that the individual lawfully acquired (other than through loan or rental) on a 
medium or device that the individual is authorized to use. 199 Other conditions apply to the 
handling of the reproduction(s) and the copy from which the reproduction was made.200 Last but 
not least, this user provision is subject to the individual not circumventing any access control or 
copy control TPM in place.201 
By its dual requirement of ownership of the copy from which reproductions are made and that 
reproductions are confined to private purposes, the reproduction for private purposes exception 
applies more specifically to copyright consumers than any of the other user provisions, although 
its application could extend beyond that group.202 It also supplements the private copying regime 
that only applies to sound recordings and certain copyright works embedded in sound recordings, 
and does not cover reproduction on devices such as MP3 players.203 The fact that it is explicitly 
subject to TPMs may significantly reduce its scope of application in practice and raises questions 
about the exact nature of that exception. 204 
(iii) Later listening or viewing exception 
This user provision allows individuals to fix a communication signal or to reproduce a work or 
sound recording or fix or reproduce a performer's performance that is being broadcast, and to 
198 CCA, supra note I s 2.4 (I.I). 
199 CCA, supra note I, s 29.22. 
200 The individual cannot give the reproduction away: ibid, s 29.22 (I) (d). If the individual sells, rents, or 
gives away the copy from which the reproduction was made, she needs to destroy any reproduction made 
from that copy: ibid, s 29.22 (4). 
201 CCA, supra note 1, s 29.22 (I) (c). CCA, ibid, s 41 defines "circumvent" as performing acts either with 
respect to access controls or controls that restrict the doing of any reserved acts. 
202 By contrast, lawful acquisition of the copy is not required for the non-commercial user-generated 
exception and the purpose is broadened to include non-commercial purposes. The later listening or viewing 
exception would also typically apply to consumers in their use of a service (i.e., broadcasting), but could 
apply to a broader circle as well, beyond consumers as understood in consumer law, depending on the 
interpretation to be given to "private purposes." 
203 See the discussion on the private copying regime in Part II B of this chapter. 
204 See the discussion in Part III and Part IV of this chapter. 
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record a program for later listening or viewing. 205 This exception is subject to a list of strict 
conditions similar to the ones found in the reproduction for private purposes exception examined 
earlier.206 This exception to copyright infringement applies only if the individual received the 
program legally207 and does not include work, performer's pe1formance, or sound recordings 
received through an on-demand service.208 The individual can only make one recording, cannot 
give the recording away, and cannot keep it longer than is reasonably necessary to view it at a 
convenient time.209 The individual can only use the recording for her private purposes.210 Last but 
not least, this user provision is subject to the individual not circumventing any access control or 
copy control TPM in place. 211 
The acts authorized in this user provision have been allowed for some time in the US further to 
the landmark Supreme Court judgment Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, lnc.,212 where the 
Court held that manufacturers' sale of home video equipment was not contributory infringement 
of the copyrights in television programs.213 The US Supreme Court arrived at that conclusion, 
inter alia, on the basis that recording a televised copyrighted audiovisual work for time-shifting 
purposes and for private home use was a fair use214 of the work and did not infringe copyright. 215 
In Canada, recording programs for later viewing did not always fall under the allowable purposes 
of fair dealing,216 which explains in part the introduction of this new user provision. 
The later listening or viewing exception to copyright infringement legitimizes mundane acts on 
programs that have been mainstream in many households for decades. It fills a lacuna in the CCA 
where Canada was lagging behind compared to other jurisdictions. Unlike the reproduction for 
private purposes exception, it does not deal with copyright consumers and their permitted uses of 
205 CCA, supra note 1, s. 29.23. 
206 See Part II D (ii) of this chapter. 
207 CCA, supra note I, s 29.23 (l)(a). 
208 CCA, supra note I, s 29.23 (3) defines "on-demand service" as "a service that allows a person to receive 
works, performer's performances and sound recordings at times of their choosing." 
209 Ibid, s 29.23 (1) (c),(d),(e). 
21
° CCA, supra note 1, s 29.23(1) (f). 
211 CCA, supra note 1, s 29.23(1) (b). CCA, ibid, s 41, defines "circumvent" as performing acts either with 
respect to access controls or controls that restrict the doing of any reserved acts. 
212 Supra note 98 at 454-55. 
213 Ibid. 
214 In US copyright law, fair use is one of the exceptions to copyright infringement: 17 USC § 107. 
215 Sony Corp. v Universal City Studios, Inc, supra note 98 at 455. 
216 I discuss the fair dealing exception to copyright infringement in Part II C of this chapter. 
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copies of copyright works lawfully acquired. It covers a broad range of users who have, at one 
point in time, the ability to record programs protected by copyrights and do so for private 
purposes. The fact that it is subject to TPMs raises questions around its exact scope and nature.217 
(iv) Backup copies 
The fourth user provision allows persons (which would include natural and moral persons) to 
make one of the acts otherwise reserved to copyright holders (i.e., reproduction) with any form of 
copyright work for backup purposes, so long as the following conditions are respected: the person 
owns or has a licence to use a copy of the copyright work that is being reproduced; it is not an 
infringing copy; the person does not give any of the reproductions away.218 The application of the 
backup copy exception to copyright infringement is also subject to not circumventing any existing 
access control or copy control TPMs.219 With its recent introduction to the CCA, the backup 
copies provision extends to all copyright works a similar exception to copyright infringement that 
already applied to computer programs.220 
The four new user provisions recognize the interests of copyright users in an unprecedented way 
and validate acts that were previously an infringement of copyright, or the status of which was 
unclear. A more sobering account of these amendments is that they have been keeping us waiting. 
The acts that are now permitted are so much part of the everyday life of an increasingly large 
segment of consumers, with no apparent harm to copyright holders, that Parliament had little 
choice but to recognize their lawfulness to maintain the credibility of copyright. Does the 
predominantly narrow scope and piecemeal approach of the four new user provisions address 
lawful consumers' reasonable expectations and does it reflect the main objectives of copyright? 
Or, does it instead reflect a copyright-holder-centric approach that is mainly preoccupied with 
preserving the strength of the copyright holders' exclusive rights with little compromise? The co-
existence of some of the four new user provisions with TPMs and the uncertainty of their 
217 See the discussion in Part III and Part IV of this chapter. 
218 CCA, supra note I, s 29.24. 
219 CCA, supra note 1, s 29.24 (1) (c). CCA, ibids 41 defines "circumvent" as performing acts either with 
respect to access controls or controls that restrict the doing of any reserved acts. 
22
° CCA, supra note 1, s 30.6 b. 
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mandatory nature bring an important perspective to the discussion further below in this chapter.221 
First, however, I will look into another copyright user right that pertains specifically to computer 
programs and refer to other permitted acts in the CCA. 
E. Computer programs and other permitted acts 
Computer programs form an important part of the copyright works that are commercialized to 
consumers. I cannot omit referring to user rights pertaining to computer programs, but due to the 
specificity and narrow scope of these rights, I will limit my comments to a brief description of 
their nature. In addition to the user rights explored so far, copyright consumers and other users 
can perform certain acts on the copies of computer programs they lawfully own or that are 
licensed to them, without the authorization of copyright holders.222 The permitted acts revolve 
around technical issues that are specific to computer programs and to uses that are deemed 
essential to their proper enjoyment: conversion from one computer language to another and 
adaptation of the computer program to address interoperability issues, so long as such acts are 
performed for the consumer or user's own purposes.223 Unlike some of the other user rights 
examined so far, these permitted acts are not subject to the non-circumvention of TPMs. 
In the same vein of addressing technical issues pertaining to the use and enjoyment of copyright 
works, the recent amendments to the CCA introduced another exception to copyright infringement 
which allows copyright users to reproduce any works, only to the extent that the reproduction is 
temporary and essential to a "technological process" and that it facilitates a use that does not 
infringe copyright.224 The meaning of technological process is not entirely clear but this user right 
would likely cover practices similar to "cache," which was held to be part of the acts that fall 
within the carrier exception to copyright infringement in Society of Composers, Authors and 
Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Assn. of Internet Providers. 225 
221 See the discussion in Part III and Part IV of this chapter. 
222 CCA, supra note 1, ss 30.6, 30.61. 
223 Ibid. In the EU, the exceptions to copyright infringement related to computer programs are set out in: 
EC, Council and Parliament Directive 2009124/EC of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of computer 
programs, [2009] OJ L 111/16 [Directive 2009124/EC]. 
224 CCA, supra note 1, s.30.71. 
225 Supra note 42 at paras 113-119, where the Supreme Court held that the practice of cache by Internet 
service providers fell within the exception to copyright infringement under CCA, supra note 1, s 2.4(l)(b) 
(restoring the Copyright Board's decision on that issue). "Cache" is the technological process (used by, 
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I will now turn to an important power of lawful owners of copies of copyright works that can be 
exercised without the authorization of copyright holders: i.e., the right to transfer the ownership 
rights in the copy pursuant to the exhaustion of the distribution right or first sale doctrine. 
F. Exhaustion or first sale doctrine 
A review of acts that copyright consumers can perform without the authorization of copyright 
holders would be incomplete without a discussion of the exhaustion or first sale doctrine. 226 This 
is the rule by which once the first sale of physical objects embodying copyright works (such as a 
book, DVD, or a music CD) has occurred with the authorization of the copyright holder, they 
cannot dictate the fate of subsequent transfers of that object.227 The exhaustion or first sale 
doctrine can be invoked only by lawful owners of copies of copyright works and not by licensees, 
borrowers or people who otherwise access copies of copyright works. 228 It restricts copyright 
holders' exclusive distribution rights and does not apply to other exclusive rights, e.g., the right to 
reproduce the work or to communicate the work to the public by telecommunication.229 In 
essence, the exhaustion or first sale doctrine allows copyright consumers who own copies of 
copyright works to exercise one of the basic powers and privileges of ownership, i.e., to transfer 
their rights in the copies to another party. 
Copyright holders' right of distribution is the exclusive right to authorize the transfer of 
among others, Internet service providers) of temporarily reproducing Internet content to accelerate and 
improve its access and use: ibid, at para 23. 
226 The doctrine is known as the first sale doctrine in the US and as the principle of exhaustion in other 
jurisdictions. 
227 At the copyright international law level, see the WJPO Copyright Treaty, 20 December 1996, 
W0033EN, online: http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/t1tdocs wo033.html#P8 189 [WCT], art 6; and 
the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, 20 December 1996, W0034EN, online: 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt/trtdocs_wo034.html [WPPT], art 8. WCTand WPPTare commonly 
referred to as the WJPO Internet Treaties. In Canada, the exclusive dist1ibution right and its exhaustion 
were introduced in 2012 by the CCMA, supra note 75, which amended the CCA, supra note 1, ss 3, 15 and 
18. In the US, see 17 U .S.C. § 109 (a). See also US Copyright Office, A Report of the Register of Copyrights 
pursuant to section 104 of the DMCA (2001) 
online :http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/dmca study.html [DMCA 2001 Report] at 22-23. 
228 Ibid. 
229Jbid. DMCA 2001 Report, supra note 227 at 79-80. 
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ownership of the original or copies of a work, independently of any act of reproduction. It has 
been traditionally associated with other rights pertaining to the physical copies, including the droit 
de suite and rental right, for its specific control and effects on the tangible property of the copy 
owner in which the work is embedded.230 Arguably, the distinction between these rights and other 
copyright exclusive rights is disappearing when works are embedded in digital copies. Because of 
the ease with which other copyright reserved acts can be performed on digital copies of copyright 
works, restrictions on the right to reproduce or communicate to the public are becoming as 
intrusive in the property rights of the digital copy owner as restrictions on the right to transfer or 
rent the digital copy. 
While the distribution right and the first sale doctrine have been well established in US copyright 
law with the codification of the early 20th century Supreme Court judgment Bobbs-Merrill 
Company v. Isidor Straus,231 until recently it was not part of the domestic law of several 
jurisdictions including Canada. 232 It started to change when the exclusive right of distribution 
made its official entry in international copyright law with the adoption of the WJPO Internet 
Treaties in 1996. 233 Prior to the amendments of the CCA in 2012, there was no reference to the 
exclusive distribution right, except as a secondary infringement, or to the exhaustion or first sale 
doctrine.234 Until then, a copyright holders' exclusive right was limited to their right to authorize 
the first publication of their work, which has been described as a right of first distribution that 
230 See for example Sam Ricketson & Jane C. Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, 
The Berne Convention and Beyond, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) vol 1, para 11.38, who 
discuss the distribution right as part of "Rights pertaining to physical copies"; Pierre-Emmanuel Moyse, Le 
droit de distribution: Analyse historique et comparative en droit d'auteur (Cowansville, Quebec: Les 
Editions Yvon Blais, 2007) 358 describes the right of rental and the right of destination under French law as 
forms of rights of distribution. 
231 210 U.S. 339, 28 S.Ct. 722 (1908). First sale doctrine was codified in the year following this judgment: 
17 U.S.C. § 27 and was carried forward in section 109(a) of the An Act for the general revision of the 
Copyright Law (1976) supra note 96. It is now found in 17 U.S.C. §109 (a). 
232 Paul Goldstein & Bernt Hugenholtz, International Copyright Principles, Law, and Practice, 2nd ed, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), at 303-305. In continental Europe, the German scholar Joseph 
Kohler developed this principle at the end of the 19th century, a principle which was later followed by the 
German Supreme Court for trademarks, patents, and copyright: Herman Cohen Jehoram, "Prohibition of 
Parallel Imports Through Intellectual Property Rights" (1999) 30 International Review of Intellectual 
Property and Competition Law 495 at 498. For a comparative law analysis of the right of distribution see: 
Moyse, supra note 230. In Canada, the exclusive distribution right and its exhaustion were introduced in 
2012 by the CCMA, supra note 75, which amended the CCA, supra note 1, ss 3, 15 and 18. 
233 Supra note 227. WCT, supra note 227, art. 6 and WPPT, supra note 227, art. 8. 
234 CCA, supra note 1, s 27(2). The CCMA, supra note 75, amended the CCA, ibid, ss 3, 15 and 18, by 
introducing the concept of the exclusive right to sell and of exhaustion. 
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does not extend to each subsequent copies put on the market for sale.235 Consequently, there was 
also a recognition that the doctrine of first sale applied in Canada. 236 The exclusive right of 
distribution has been implemented in EU secondary law and is part of the national laws of its 
Member States, including the UK and France. 237 
The prevailing view is that the exclusive right of distribution and its exhaustion only apply with 
respect to copyright works embedded in physical tangible objects and does not apply to digital 
copies of copyright works made available to consumers with no supporting physical medium 
exchanged from hand to hand. This is a corollary of the limitation of the exhaustion or first sale 
doctrine to the distribution right. 238 In that view, the exhaustion or first sale doctrine does not 
extend to the act of reproduction of the copy or other exclusive rights that are implicated in a 
digital transmission, unless such acts of reproduction or other reserved acts would be allowed as 
ancillary to the application of the exhaustion of copyright holders' distribution right. 239 The view 
that the exclusive distribution right and its exhaustion only apply with respect to copyright works 
embedded in physical tangible objects also questions whether a transfer of ownership and a sale 
can effectively occur with respect to digital copies downloaded online with no supporting 
physical media. 240 I discuss in Chapter 8 the application of the legal concept of ownership and of 
sale to digital copies distributed online. 
235 CCA, supra note I, s 3(1); Vaver, Intellectual Property Law 2011, supra note 5 at I 55-157. For his part, 
Moyse, supra note 230 at 384 assimilates the right of publication to a 1ight of divulgation. 
236 Theberge, supra note 16 at para 31, Binnie J. for the majority: "Once an authorized copy of a work is 
sold to a member of the public, it is generally for the purchaser, not the author, to determine what happens 
to it." For a discussion on the application of the doctrine of exhaustion in Canadian, US, and European 
patent, copyright and trademark law, see Jeremy de Beer & Robert Tomkowicz "Exhaustion of Intellectual 
Property Rights in Canada" (2009) 25 C.l.P.R. 3. 
237 EC, Directive 2001129/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, [2001] OJ, 
L167/10 [Directive 2001129/EC], art. 4; Directive 2009124/EC, supra note 223, art. 4 I (c); see also: 
UKCDPA, supra note 27, s. 18(3); art L122-3-l CPI. 
238 See DMCA 2001 Report, supra note 227 at 79-80; Capitol Records, LLC v ReDigi Inc., 2013 WL 
1286134 (S.D.N.Y.) at 9-11. 
239 This is in effect what the Court of Justice of the EU did in UsedSoft GmbH v Oracle International Corp, 
C-128/11, [2012] OJ C 287 at 10 [UsedSofi] para 52, with respect to the exclusive right to communicate to 
the public by holding that the distribution of the work effectively transformed the communication to the 
public into such distribution: I discuss this judgment in Chapter 8 Part III. 
240 See DMCA 2001 Report, supra note 227 at 86-87, where the US Register of Copyright qualifies the 
presence of a physical object embedding the copyright work as a defining element for the application of the 
first sale doctrine. 
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Article 6 of WCT and article 8 of WPPTimpose on their member states the substantive minima to 
confer an exclusive distribution right to copyright holders for their literary and artistic works (or 
of their performances fixed in phonograms in the case of WPPI), i.e., to authorize "the making 
available to the public of the original and copies of their works through sale or other transfer of 
ownership."241 They leave it up to member states to determine the application of exhaustion "after 
the first sale or other transfer of ownership of the 01iginal or a copy of the work with the 
authorization of the author."242 The agreed statement concerning these articles specifies that the 
copies that are subject to the right of distribution refer exclusively to "fixed copies that can be put 
into circulation as tangible objects." 243 On that basis, commentators argue that the effect of the 
WIPO Internet Treaties is to exclude the application of the exhaustion of the distribution right to 
digital copies of copyright works distributed online.244 The implementation of the WIPO Internet 
Treaties or existing law of member states, including the US, 245 the EU,246 and recently Canada,247 
tends to confirm that interpretation. 248 
241 WCT, supra note 227, art 6. See also WPPT, supra note 227, art 8. 
242 Ibid. 
243 WCT, supra note 227, Agreed statement concerning arts 6 and 7. 
244 See Andre Lucas, "International exhaustion", in Lionel Bently, Uma Suthersanen & Paul Torremans, 
eds, Global Copyright Three Hundred Years Since the Statute of Anne, From 1709 to Cyberspace 
(Cheltenham: Edward Edgar Publishing, 2010) 304, at 309ff. The author argues WCT, supra note 227, art 6, 
read in conjunction with art 8, closed the path to the application of an immaterial exhaustion principle. See 
also Moyse, supra note 230 at 559-562. 
245 Marybeth Peters, "The Legal perspective on exhaustion in the borderless era: consideration of a digital 
fist sale doctrine for online transmissions of digital works in the United States" in Lionel Bently, Uma 
Suthersanen & Paul Torremans, eds, Global Copyright Three Hundred Years Since the Statute of Anne, 
From 1709 to Cyberspace (Cheltenham: Edward Edgar Publishing, 2010) 329, at 331, citing the DMCA 
2001 Report, supra note 227 at 80, 97. See also Capitol Records, LLC v ReDigi Inc., 2013 WL 1286134 
(SDNY) at 9-11. 
246 Directive 2001129/EC, supra note 237. The conclusion is made from the application of art 4.2 in 
conjunction with recitals 28 and 29 to the Preamble. See Lucas, supra note 244 at 309ff.; Tomasz Targosz, 
"Exhaustion in digital products and the 'accidental' impact on the balance of interests in copyright law' in 
Lionel Bently, Uma Suthersanen & Paul Torremans, eds, Global Copyright Three Hundred Years Since the 
Statute of Anne, From 1709 to Cyberspace (Cheltenham: Edward Edgar Publishing, 2010) 337; European 
Parliament, DG for Internal Policies, Policies Department: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs, "The 
Relations Between Copyright Law And Consumers' Rights From A European Perspective" by Severine 
Dusollier (2010) [Dusollier 2010] at 26-27. However, see EU, Opinion Advocate General Bot, Case C-
128/11, Axel W. Bierbach, administrator of UsedSoft GmbHv Oracle International Corp., 24 April 2012 at 
paras 75-76, where the Advocate General raises doubts as to whether Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 
237, limits the distribution right and its exhaustion to copyright works embodied in physical objects. See 
also the discussion in Chapter 8 on UsedSoft, supra note 239, where the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (Grand Chamber) held that exhaustion applied to digital copies of computer programs that are not 
embedded in a physical object. 
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The non-application of the exhaustion or first sale doctrine to digital copies of copyright works 
distributed online would limit its application significantly in light of this increasingly prevalent 
method of distribution of copies of copyright works. The limited scope of application of the 
exhaustion or first sale doctrine raises the following questions: what is the rationale for the 
requirement that a physical object be exchanged from hand to hand for the exclusive distribution 
right and its exhaustion and is it justifiable? The answer to these questions has many ramifications 
that I discuss in subsequent chapters. They include: looking at the first sale or exhaustion doctrine 
through the lens of property law and theory,249 evaluating the distinction between tangible and 
intangible and between goods and services under sale of goods and consumer law,250 and 
understanding the various exclusive rights that are involved in the commercialization of copies of 
copyright works distributed online.251 
The application of the exhaustion or first sale doctrine to commercial copies of copyright works is 
limited by another factor. As it only applies to lawful owners of copies of copyright works, there 
is a well-documented practice by which copyright holders have circumvented and continue to 
circumvent the application of the doctrine by licensing the copy of the work and not selling it. 252 
247 CCMA, supra note 75, introduced the exclusive distribution right and the principle of exhaustion in the 
CCA, supra note 1, ss 3, 15 and 18 refer to work (or other subject matter of copyright) "that is in the form 
of 
a tangible object". 
248 In particular, the implementation by the EU goes one step further than the WJPO Internet Treaties in 
emphasizing the need for the transfer of a tangible object embedding the copyright work for the rule of 
exhaustion to apply: Directive 2001129/EC, supra note 237. The conclusion is made from the application of 
art 4.2 in conjunction with Preamble, recitals 28 and 29 that respectively provide: "4.2. The distribution 
right shall not be exhausted within the Community in respect of the original or copies of the work, except 
where the first sale or other transfer of ownership in the Community of that object is made by the right 
holder or with his consent," "(28) Copyright protection under this Directive includes the exclusive right to 
control distribution of the work incorporated in a tangible article. The first sale in the Community of the 
original of a work or copies thereof by the right holder or with his consent exhausts the right to control 
resale of that object in the Community ... " and "(29) The question of exhaustion does not arise in the case of 
services and on-line services in particular. This also applies with regard to a material copy of a work or 
other subject-matter made by a user of such a service with the consent of the right holder." 
249 See the discussion in Chapter 7 Part III A (ii) and Part III B. 
250 See the discussion in Chapter 8 Part II. 
251 See the discussion in Chapter 8 Part III. 
252 Jean Braucher, "Contracting out of Article 2 Using a 'License' Label: a Strategy that should not Work 
for Software Products" (2007) 40 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 261, at 271-272; Glen. 0. Robinson, "Personal 
Property Servitudes", 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1449, at 1473-1474. 
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This practice has been established for some time with respect to copies of computer programs253 
and is increasingly present for copies of copyright works that are distributed online.254 
Licences are the vehicle of intellectual property right holders to grant authorizations by contract to 
perform certain acts (as it is often the case for software) that would otherwise not be permitted by 
the application of the property regime created by the CCA or other relevant laws. 255 Licences are 
not required and have not been traditionally present in a multitude of commercial transactions 
involving the transfer hand to hand of copies of copyright works, such as the sale of a book, film 
DVD, or music CD. In those cases, copyright holders rely primarily on the default property 
regime instituted by the CCA. 
Should copyright holders' privileges and powers extend to controlling subsequent transfers of 
copies of copyright works lawfully acquired by consumers and if so on what basis? The uncertain 
contours of the application of exhaustion or first sale to digital copies of copyright works, coupled 
with how copyright holders can avoid its application altogether by contract, raise important 
questions at the heart of copyright's operation and design. What is the purpose and main function 
of exhaustion in copyright law?256 Can its application be subject to copyright holders' commercial 
practices or is there a need to preserve the exhaustion or first sale doctrine for the benefit of 
copyright consumers, as well as to maintain the coherence of property and copyright law?257 
The exhaustion or first sale doctrine is probably one of the most misunderstood of all copyright 
consumers' rights and one with a most uncertain future. It extinguishes the application of the 
exclusive right of distribution, a lesser-known copyright than the exclusive right to reproduce or 
to perform a work in public. It confronts the expanding scope of copyright in recent years to 
traditional principles of property, by touching upon a sensitive nerve of copy ownership, i.e., the 
253 Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v Wyse Technology, 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir.1991); Softman Products 
Company v Adobe Systems Inc., 171 F.Supp.2d 1075, 45 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 945 (C.D. California 2001) both 
refer to the historical background of computer software licensing practices in the US; Robinson, supra note 
252, discusses the history of software licensing commercial practices going back to the 1960s. 
254 See the discussion on non-negotiated standard end-user agreements for copies of copyright works sold 
online in Part III C of this chapter. 
255 Such as under the Patent Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. P-4, the Trade-marks Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. T-13 or 
Industrial Design Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 1-9. 
256 I discuss the theoretical justifications of the exhaustion or first sale doctrine in Chapter 7 Part III A (ii). 
257 See the discussion on the standardization of property as applied to commercial copies of copyright works 
in Chapter 7 Part IV. 
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basic right to transfer freely one's copy to another party without any duty to account to anyone. 
That right is now potentially in peril, either because it does not apply to copies distributed online 
with no supporting physical media, or because of copyright holders' commercial practices that 
seek to circumvent the application of the exhaustion or first sale doctrine. 258 
Understanding the magnitude of copyright holders' ability to shape the user rights discussed so far 
in this chapter through contract is critical for a clearer view of the acts that consumers can 
actually perform on copyright works and the dilemmas they face. Copyright holders' contracts 
with end-users also raises broader policy design questions on the effects of copyright holders' 
commercial practices, including the use of TPMs on the primary objectives of copyright law. This 
is what I tum to next. 
III. The nebulous interaction between copyright, contracts, and Technological Protection 
Meassures (TPMs) 
A. Copyright public policy meets copyright holders' private rights 
The interaction between copyright, contracts, and TPMs raises the most complex and pressing 
issues in contemporary copyright law. The interaction between copyright, contracts, and TPMs 
puts in question the desirable scope of the private rights created by copyright law and the public 
policy goals that it promotes, as well as the proper level of flexibility that needs to be granted for 
the commercial exploitation of copyright. In Canada, copyright has been described as a pure 
creation of statute259 that is a matter of federal jurisdiction. 260 The CCA sets the default rules of 
copyright holders' exclusive rights in their works that are opposable to all.261 This includes the 
exclusive right of copyright holders to authorize any of the acts specifically reserved to them by 
the CCA.262 Copyright holders control the exploitation of their exclusive rights and 
258 See the discussion in Chapter 7 Part IV. 
259 Compo Co. v Blue Crest Music Inc, [1980] I SCR 357 (SCC), subsequently applied in numerous 
Supreme Court judgements: see Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v 
Canadian Assn. of Internet Providers, supra note 42 at para 82. I discuss the nature of copyright in Chapter 
5. 
26° Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31Viet.,c3, reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No 5, s. 91(23). 
261 CCA, supra note 1, ss 27ff. 
262 Ibid, ss 3, 15, 18, 21, 26. 
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commercialization of their works by granting authorizations including through contracts. In the 
absence of explicit contract terms, the default rules of the CCA will apply and some terms may be 
implied between the parties based on the relevant circumstances. 263 In consumer transactions, 
copyright holders resort increasingly to non-negotiated standard end-user agreements.264 
Copyright holders can also control the commercialization of their works by applying TPMs that, 
in their effect, are comparable to contract terms and raise distinct issues and debates within and 
outside copyright law.265 
As much as the CCA confers exclusive rights on copyright holders, it is by its own design and 
purpose an incomplete code: more often than not, copyright holders resort to contracts as a 
vehicle to tailor their copyright to the particular needs of the transaction. 266 This occurs at two 
levels. First, authors conclude contracts for the exploitation of their economic intangible rights 
with publishers, music producers, film-makers, etc. They can assign or license their copyright, in 
whole or in part, including with respect to the list of their exclusive rights, territory, or the 
duration of their copyright. The CCA explicitly contemplates this panoply of scenarios.267 These 
agreements address the exploitation of the intangible exclusive rights of authors/copyright 
holders. Second, authors, but most frequently copyright holders, conclude contracts for the 
263 With respect to implied licences see: Vaver, Intellectual Property Law 2011, supra note 5 at 137-141; 
Robert Bradgate, "Consumer rights in digital products" 2010, online: 
http://www.google.ca/search ?sourceicl=na vc li ent&ie=UTF-
8&rl z= 1 T4ADBF enCA275CA275&g=Bradgate%>2c+Consumer+rights+in+cligital+proclucts+2010 at 37. 
264 I discuss the nature and content of non-negotiated standard end-user agreements through which copies of 
copyright works are commercialised in Part III C of this chapter. 
265 TPMs are comparable to contracts in effect because the physical restrictions they impose on copyright 
works can be analogised to a contractual restriction on the copyright work. They are different from 
contractual limitations in that they do not only affect the parties to the contract. They affect all users of the 
copyright work including subsequent assignees of the copy of a copyright work to which a TPMs apply. See 
the discussion on the nature and effects of TPMs in Part III B of this chapter. 
266 See CCA, supra note 1, s 13(4); Theberge, supra note 16 at para 12; As the Supreme Court of Canada 
noted in Robertson v Thomson Corp., 2006 SCC 43, at paragraph 58: "parties are, have been, and will 
continue to be, free to alter by contract the rights established by the Copyright Act. "In Kraft Canada Inc. v 
Euro Excellence Inc., 2007 SCC 37 at paral 17, per Abella J. (to which Chief Justice Mac Lachlin 
concurred, as well as Bastarache, Lebel and Charron JJ. on this particular issue): "Other cases illustrate that 
a copyright holder's ability to alienate its interest either through licensing or assignment is perfectly 
consistent with the statutory scheme. Vertical and horizontal divisibility is, arguably, a hallmark of 
copyright: see Bouchet v. Kyriacopoulos (1964, 45 C.PR. 265 (Can. Ex. CT)." In a US context, see David 
Nimmer, Elliot Brown & Gary N. Frischling, "The Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand" in David 
Nimmer, in Copyright, Sacred Text, Technology and the DMCA (The Hague, Netherlands: Kluwer Law 
International, 2003) 267 at 274 (reproducing an article by the same title initially published in (1999) 87 Cal. 
L. R. 17). 
267 CCA, supra note 1, s 13(4). 
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commercialization of copies of the copyright works that generally dictate what users are allowed 
to do with the copies. These contracts are commonly referred to as "shrink wrap," "browse wrap," 
"click wrap," or end-user licence agreements.268 In a consumer context, they are typically non-
negotiated standard end-user agreements. This second category of contract is the one that is 
relevant when defining consumers' rights to copies of copyright works. It is one specific 
application of the exploitation of the intangible rights conferred by copyright that addresses the 
enjoyment of copies of copyright works. This is the area where the incompleteness of the 
copyright code is most apparent, leading to uncertainty about the effects and proper treatment of 
the interaction between the CCA and the contracts for the commercialization of copies of 
copyright works. It concerns the exclusive distribution right that was only added recently in 
Canada to copyright holders' exclusive rights.269 
In Canada, the CCA has been described by the Supreme Court in Theberge as the balance between 
"promoting the public interest in the encouragement and dissemination of works of the arts and 
intellect and obtaining a just reward for the creator."270 How does (should) the law treat contracts 
for the commercialization of copyright works that expand the exclusive rights and powers of 
copyright holders or go against the objectives of the CCA or similar constitutive acts? How do we 
make that assessment? To what extent is an expansion through contract the normal exercise of 
freedom of contract and of privileges and powers of copyright holders and to what extent is it 
outside their prerogative or need to be constrained? Should we make a distinction between non-
negotiated and negotiated agreements, mass-market commercialization and isolated occurrences? 
The proliferation of the commercialization of copies of copyright works through non-negotiated 
standard end-user agreements, combined with the use of TPMs, has been widely commented upon 
by authors, including Margaret Jane Radin, Niva Elkin-Koren, and Jacques De Werra, as 
occasioning the "privatization of copyright" or as the techno-governance phenomenon.271 The fear 
268 For a description of the various types of standard form agreements of digital products, see: Loos & al., 
supra note 60 at 65-66. For a summary of the various scenarios under which digital products are distributed 
see: Bradgate, supra note 263 at 32. 
269 See the discussion on the exhaustion or first sale doctrine and distribution right in Part II F of this 
chapter. 
270 Theberge, supra note 16 at para 30. 
271 Marc A. Lemley, "Beyond Preemption: The Law And Policy Of Intellectual Property Licensing" (1999) 
87 Cal. L. Rev. 111; Charles R. McManis, "The Privatization ("Shrink-Wrapping") of American Copyright 
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is that through non-negotiated standard end-user agreements or TPMs, copyright holders 
supersede the pre-existing copyright regime and expand their privileges and powers.272 These 
concerns fit in the broader discussion of the perception by users that standard form agreements 
exemplify the norm, as illustrated by behavioural law and economics research.273 Superseding the 
copyright regime can occur through restrictive terms that also apply to works that are in the public 
domain, or that make exceptions to copyright holders' exclusive rights no longer effective. For 
example, contract terms or TPMs can limit users' ability to make a fair dealing or fair use of a 
work that allow users to, inter alia, exercise their freedom of expression through criticism, 
review, or parody.274 Its effects on the balance objectives of copyright law become significant in a 
standardized environment where the commercial practice is widespread. 
The commercialization of copyright works through non-negotiated standard end-user agreements 
is not a new phenomenon. It became prevalent with respect to the commercialization of computer 
Law" (1999) 87 CALR 173; See for example, Niva Elkin-Koren, "A Public-Regarding Approach to 
Contracting over Copyrights", in R. Cooper-Dreyfuss, D. Leenheer Zimmerman & H. First eds., Expanding 
the Boundaries of Intellectual Property: Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Society (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001) 191 at 195; Margaret Jane Radin, "Regime Change in Intellectual Property: 
Superseding the Law of the State with the "Law" of the Firm" (2003-2004) U. Ottawa L. & Tech. J. 173; 
Jacques De Werra, "Moving Beyond The Conflict Between Freedom Of Contract And Copyright Policies: 
In Search Of A New Global Policy For On-Line Information Licensing Transactions" (2003) 25 Colum. 
J.L. & Arts 239. For an analysis of the complex interplay between copyright law, contract and technology, 
see generally Daniel.Gervais,"The Price of Social Norms: Towards a Liability Regime for File-
Sharing"(2004) 12 J. Intell. Prop. L. 39. This interaction is addressed in the context of authors rights in: 
Giuseppina D' Agostino, Copyright, Contracts, Creators, New Media, New Rules (Cheltenham, UK: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010) in particular, chapters 6 to 9 (112-200); Nicola Lucchi, "The Supremacy of 
Techno-Governance: Privatization of Digital Content and Consumer Protection in the Globalized 
Information Society" (2007) 15 International Journal of Law and Information 192 at 194; Jens Schovsbo, 
Integrating Consumer rights into Copyright law: From the European Perspective (2008) 31 J Cons Policy 
393 at 398; Eduardo Moises Penalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws (New Haven:Yale University 
Press, 2010) at 46-51. 
272 Natali Heiberger et al., "Digital Rights Management and Consumer Acceptability: A Multi-Disciplinary 
Discussion of Consumer Concerns and Expectations" (2004), online: http://www.indicare.org/tiki-
download_ file.php?fileld=l 11, at 117. 
273 In particular, how default rules (and in the present case standard end-user agreements) both respond and 
construct social norms and have a normative effect: On Amir & Orly Lobel, "Stumble, predict, nudge: how 
behavioral economics informs law and policy", Book Review of Nudge: improving decisions about health, 
wealth, and happiness, by R.H. Thaler and C.R. Sunstein & Predictably irrational: the hidden forces that 
shape our decisions, by D. Ariely, (2008) 108 Colum. L. Rev. 2098, at 2121-2122. I discuss some 
ramifications of behavrioral law and economics theory as part of the justifications of selected consumer 
~rotection obligations in Chapter 10. 
74 Elkin-Koren, supra note 271 at 197, where the author notes that the public interest or public domain is 
an absent consideration in individualized market transactions and that the promotion of these interests can 
not be left to the will of market forces alone. I discuss the fair dealing, fair use exceptions to copyright 
infringement in Part II C of this chapter. 
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programs in the sixties at a time when their legal protection through copyright was not yet 
certain. 275 In that context, it was deemed necessary to seek additional protection through 
contract.276 Until recently, books, music, and films were commercialized without exhaustive terms 
and conditions. The landscape is changing with the commercialization of these works through 
online means of distribution,277 which can also include TPMs.278 Given the current protection of 
books, music, and films under copyright law and the fact that they have been traditionally 
commercialized without terms and conditions, one would assume that contract clauses that 
dictated permitted uses of copies would be superfluous, unless copyright holders authorize 
consumers to perform more acts on their work than the CCA allows. Conversely, it would be 
suspicious if they constrain consumers to perform fewer acts on their works than the CCA allows. 
The potential detrimental effects of the proliferation of non-negotiated standard end-user 
agreements and TPMs on the statutory rights created by the CCA and similar statutes worldwide 
give rise to various fields of inquiry. One is the extent to which existing doctrines in copyright, 
contract, or competition/antitrust law provide mechanisms that can effectively respond to the 
expansionism of copyright through standardized contracts. 279 A second one, which I discuss in 
Part IV of this chapter, questions the nature of exceptions to copyright infringement and whether 
they are mandatory, in which case contract terms to the contrary are unenforceable.280 A third one 
is the extent to which terms and conditions delineate the exclusive rights of copyright holders or 
are contractual terms distinct from copyright holders' exclusive rights. 281 
275 See: Robinson, supra note 252 at 1473-1474. 
276 Ibid. 
277 I discuss the nature and scope of online non-negotiated standard end-user agreements in Part III C of this 
chapter. 
278 See the discussion in Part III B of this chapter.. 
279 Lemley, supra note 271; Elkin-Koren, supra note 271; Lucie Guibault, Copyright Limitations and 
Contracts, An analysis of the Contractual Overridability of Limitations on Copyright (The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 2002) at 241-289; see also de Werra, supra note 271, who presents a comparative 
overview between the US and Europe of looks at how legal doctrines within and outside copyright law 
respond to the alteration by contract of copyright as conferred by statute. On the limits of doctrines outside 
copyright law to address the balancing act of competing interests around copyright see Dreier, supra note 6 
at 309-312. 
280 Guibault, supra note 279; Estelle Derclaye, "Copyright Contracts, Public Policy and Antitrust, in 
Christopher Heath and Kung-Chung Liu (eds.), Copyright Law and the Information Society in Asia, IIC 
Studies (Hart Publishing:Oxford, 2006) 167-226; UK, Strategic Advisory Board for Intellectual Property, 
The relationship between copyright and contract law, by Martin Kretschmer, Estelle Derclaye, Marcella 
Favale & Richard Watt, 2010, online:http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipresearch-relation-201007.pdf. 
281 I.e. contract terms that are the exercise of copyright holders' exclusive right to authorize reserved acts as 
opposed to contract terms that are distinct from copyright holders' exclusive rights. 
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Commentators have looked at how various doctrines, within and outside copyright law, provide 
remedies to copyright users and consumers in the case of contracts (in particular, non-negotiated 
standard end-user agreements) that tend to expand copyright's exclusive powers and privileges 
beyond the statute that creates them. 282 They include the application of the US doctrine of 
preemption,283 and more generally of constitutional fundamental rights,284 of copyright rnisuse,285 
public policy,286 unconscionability,287 competition and antitrust law,288 and the doctrine of abus de 
droit in the civil law jurisdictions.289 While these doctrines may provide a legal basis for copyright 
users' claims in specific cases, they are either too broad or too narrow to address the specific 
issues and effects of copyright end-user agreements.290 They provide little guidance and support to 
copyright users.291 The detailed analyses of the application of these legal doctrines to the 
commercialization of copyright works underscore the distorting pressures that private ordering 
can exercise on the copyright house. They illustrate the power that the sphere of private ordering 
enables for copyright holders, with little countervailing force to integrate public interest 
considerations and with that, the ability of lawful users to perform certain acts on copyright 
works. In Chapters 8 through 11, I address the application of similar doctrines as they exist in 
consumer protection law and whether they are likely to offer more support to copyright 
consumers in the context of defining consumers' rights and permitted uses of copies of copyright 
works. 
To sum up, the interaction between the copyright regime and contracts raises complex issues 
because it questions the purpose and objectives of copyright, what its proper scope should be, and 
how much flexibility is desirable in how copyright is exploited and commercialized. The CCA 
282 In particular, Elkin- Koren, supra note 271; Lucchi, supra note 271; de Werra, supra note 271. 
283 I.e. the US based federal doctrine of statutory preemption: 17 USC, § 301, supremacy clause preemption 
or constitutional preemption: see de Werra, supra note 271, at 263-273, and the doctrine of contractual 
preemption: see DMCA 2001 Report, supra note 227 at 162-164; see also David Nimmer, Elliot Brown & 
Gary N Frischling, The Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand" (1999) 87 Cal. L. R. 17 at 40-68; Elkin-
Koren, supra note 271 at 215. 
284 Guibault, supra note 279 at 263-277. 
285 Ibid, at 284-289; De Werra, supra note 271 at 273-279. 
286 Ibid, at 279-282. 
287 Ibid, at 282-286; Lucchi, supra note 271 at 22lff. 
288 Guibault, supra note 279 at 242-251; De Werra, supra note 271at286-291. 
289 Guibault, supra note 279 at 278-283; De Werra, supra note 271 at 338-339. On the application of the 
doctrine of abus de droit to copyright, see also: Pierre-Emmanuel Moyse, "Kraft Canada c. Euro-Excellence 
: l'insoutenable legerete du droit" (2008) 53 RD McGill 741, at 784-791. 
290 De Werra, supra note 271 at 263-294, 338-339, 345-346. 
291 Ibid. 
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and similar copyright laws in other jurisdictions say little about this interaction if it is not to 
endorse an unrestricted freedom of exploitation. The fear is that through non-negotiated standard 
end-user agreements or TPMs, copyright holders supersede the pre-existing copyright regime to 
their advantage to expand their privileges and powers to the detriment of other competing 
interests that are addressed in the CCA and similar statutes in other jurisdictions. 292 The use of 
TPMs by copyright holders is a manifestation of the possible extension of copyright through 
private ordering. The legal protection of TPMs recently introduced in the CCA raises specific 
issues that I explore next. 293 
B. Technological Protection Measures (TPMs) 
One of the greatest controversies in contemporary copyright law is around how the 
implementation of provisions to protect technological measures as required by the WIPO Internet 
Treaties of 1996 disturbs (or not) the fragile balance that needs to subsist between copyright 
holders' exclusive rights and the rights of copyright users to copyright works. 294 The WIPO 
Internet Treaties require member states295 to provide "adequate legal protection and effective 
legal remedies against the circumvention of effective technological measures" used by copyright 
holders with respect to digital works. 296 Similar earlier forms of protection existed in the US and 
292 Marc A. Lemley, supra note 271; McManis, supra note 271; See for example, Elkin-Koren, supra note 
271 at 195; Radin, supra note 271; De Werra, supra note 27 I. For an analysis of the complex interplay 
between copyright law, contract and technology, see generally Gervais, supra note 271. This interaction is 
addressed in the context of authors rights in: D' Agostino, Copyright, Contracts, Creators, supra note 271, 
in particular, chapters 6 to 9 (112-200); Lucchi, supra note 27 I at I 94; Schovsbo, supra note 27 I at 398; 
Penalver & Katyal, supra note 271 at 46-51. 
293 CCMA, supra note 75, which amended the CCA, supra note I by adding ss 41ff. 
294 For a Canadian perspective on the digital agenda of the WIPO Internet Treaties, and particularly the 
TPMs provisions, see Michael Geist, ed., From "Radical Extremism" to "Balanced Copyright": Canadian 
Copyright and the Digital Agenda (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010) in particular chapter 7: Carys Craig, 
"Locking out lawful users: Fair Dealing and anti-circumvention in Bill C-32" and chapter 8: Michael Geist, 
"The Case for Flexibility in Implementing the WIPO Internet Treaties: An Examination of the Anti-
Circumvention Requirements." 
295 WCT, supra note 227 and WPPT, supra note 227 had respectively 90 and 91 member states as per the 
WIPO official website reporting of contracting parties:http://www.wipo.intltreaties/en/ (last visited April 7, 
2013). Canada was a signatory but was not yet listed as a ratifying party. Member states include the US, the 
EU and Member States of the EU, China, Japan, Australia, and The Russian Federation. 
296 WCT, supra note 227, art 11; WPPT, supra note 227, art 18. 
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in the EU with respect to specific uses and types of copyright works.297 The WIPO Internet 
Treaties impose no counterbalancing obligation on member states to preserve users' exercise of 
permitted acts on copyright works without the permission of the copyright holders, such as 
through fair use, fair dealing, and other long-established exceptions to copyright infringement.298 
The WIPO Internet Treaties' obligations to protect technological measures fall within the broader 
digital agenda initiated by the World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO] that seeks to 
address "the profound impact of the development and convergence of information and 
communication technologies on the creation and use of literary and artistic works. "299 More than 
15 years after the adoption of TPMs in the WIPO Internet Treaties, the earlier passions ignited by 
their introduction are still alive, as illustrated by Canada's various attempts at copyright 
legislative reform that finally led to the entry into force of the CCMA in 2012.300 
The controversy around TPMs forms part of the broader debate on the proper balance that needs 
to exist between the exclusive rights of copyright holders and the public interest, including the 
297 EC, Council Directive 911250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer programs, OJ L 
122, 1710511991 P. 0042, art 7 (1) (c); 17 USC,§ 1002 with the entry into force of the The Audio Home 
Recording Act, Pub. L. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (1992), which amended 17 USC in 1992. 
298 On how this topic and how this void do not allow a balance to subsist between copyright holders and 
users, see David Vaver, "Copyright and the Internet: From Owner Rights and User Duties to User Rights 
and Owner Duties?" (2007) Case Western L. Rev. 731 [Vaver, "From Owner Rights to User Rights"]. 
299 WCT, supra note 227, Preamble. For a discussion of the new international obligations brought on in the 
WIPO Internet Treaties with the TPMs and digital rights management provisions, and of the drafting 
process leading up to their adoption, see Mihaly Ficsor, The Law of Copyright and the Internet, The 1996 
WIPO Treaties, Their Interpretation and Implementation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) Part III; 
Ricketson & Ginsburg, supra note 230 at 964ff. 
300 In Canada, TPMs occupied the larger part of the debates throughout the recent copyright legislative 
reform that led to the entry into force in 2012 of the CCMA, supra note 75: See IP Osgoode 
(www.iposgoode.ca) a Canadian Copyright Reform resource Guide, on.line at 
http://researchguides.library.vorku.ca/content.php?pid= I 97824&sid= 1657041 assembling references to 
commentaries that were made during the discussions on Bill C-32, a large portion of which concerned 
digital locks and TPMs. Carys Craig, "Locking Out Lawful Users: Fair Dealing and Anti-Circumvention in 
Bill C-32" in From Radical Extremism to Balanced Copyright: Canadian Copyright and the Digital 
Agenda, Michael Geist, ed.,( Irwin Law: Toronto, 2010) 177 ["Locking Out Lawful Users"]; Michael Geist, 
"The Case for Flexibility in Implementing the WIPO Internet Treaties: An Examination of the Anti-
Circumvention Requirements" in From "Radical Extremism" to "Balanced Copyright": Canadian 
Copyright and the Digital Agenda (Irwin Law: Toronto, 2010) 222; Mihaly Ficsor, "TPMs and Flexibility 
("The Ability of Bending without Breaking") - Why Should the TPM Provisions of Bill C-32 Protect 
Access Controls and Prohibit "Preparatory Acts" Online at http://www.iposgoode.ca/2010/11 /digital-locks-
circum vention-and-the-copyri ght-reforms-proposed-by-bi 11-c-3 2/ . 
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rights of copyright users. 301 It includes conflicting views on the scope of the international 
obligations that the WJPO Internet Treaties impose on member states. 302 Proponents of strong 
TPMs argue that the additional clout to control access to and use of digital copyright works is 
essential to counter piracy and is the mere recognition of the principle that copyright holders have 
the right to control access to their copyright works. 303 For supporters of TPMs, the proper balance 
lies in providing sufficient protection that will promote the future creation of digital copyright 
works to be disseminated for the benefit of users and the public. Critics argue that access controls 
were never part of the exclusive rights of copyright holders. 304 They raise concerns about the 
effect of the legal protection of technological measures on access to copies of copyright works 
(which may include materials that are in the public domain) and exceptions to copyright 
infringement, such as fair dealing or fair use.305 At the wider level of digital rights management,306 
critics fear that TPMs, as protected by law, allow copyright holders to control uses of copyright 
works (amount of reading, viewing, and listening) that were traditionally outside the scope of 
301 For a summary of the policy and legal debate around TPMs from the perspective of copyright holders 
and copyright users and the public interest, and about where the proper balance should be struck, see Peter 
K. Yu "Anticircumvention and Anti-Anticircumvention" (2006) 84 Denv. U. L. Rev. 13, in particular at 17-
19. 
302 In the context of Canada recent copyright reform, see for example Geist, supra note 300, and Ficsor, 
sufra note 300. 
30 Jane C. Ginsburg, "Can Copyright become User-Friendly? Review: Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright" 
(2001) 25 Colum. J.L. & Arts 71 at 75 -76.; Jane C. Ginsburg, "From Having Copies to Experiencing 
Works: The Development of an Access Right in U.S. Copyright Law" (2003) 50 J. Copyright Soc'y U.S.A. 
113 at 123. The author acknowledges troubling aspects of the implementation of the WIPO Internet 
Treaties in the US through the DMCA: J. Ginsburg, "Copyright Legislation for the Digital Millennium" 
(1999) 23 Colum.J.L. & Arts 137 at 152-153. 
304 Vaver, Intellectual Property Law 2011, supra note 5 at 199; Craig, "Locking Out Lawful Users", supra 
note 300 at 197. Severine Dusollier, Droit d'auteur et protection des oeuvres dans l 'univers numerique, 2d 
ed. (Bruxelles: Larcier, 2007) [Dusollier 2007] at 384-385, 394-395, argues that the right to contol access to 
the work resides with the owners of the physical embodiment of the work, not copyright holders. 
305 David.Nimmer, "A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act" (2000) 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
673, at 739-740, observes: "The lengthy analysis of how section 1201 works in practice leads to the 
conclusion that its entire edifice of user exemptions is of doubtful puissance. The user safeguards so 
proudly heralded as securing balance between owner and user interests, on inspection, largely fail to 
achieve their stated goals. If the courts apply section 1201 as written, the only use.rs whose interests are 
truly safeguarded are those few who personally possess sufficient expertise to counteract whatever 
technological measures are placed in their path."; Craig, "Locking Out Lawful Users," supra note 300, in 
particular at 195. 
306 Digital rights management is a broader concept than TPMs that encompasses tracking uses made by 
copyright holders and identification codes and copyright holders's signatures of copies of copyright works. 
In addition to obligations imposed on TPMs, the WIPO Internet Treaties impose obligations concerning 
rights management information (WCT, supra note 227, art 12; WPPT, supra note 227, art 19). 
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copyright holders' exclusive rights.307 I explore these concerns about controls and user limitations 
later on through the lens of expectations of powers and privileges relating to copy ownership of 
copyright works. 308 
With the entry into force of the CCMA in 2012,309 Canada opted for a higher level of protection of 
TPMs, similar to the highly contentious regime adopted in the US with the entry into force of the 
DMCA more than a decade earlier.31° Countries offering a lower level of protection of TPMs 
include Japan, Switzerland, and New Zealand.311 The European Union set a framework of 
implementation for its member states that sits somewhere in the middle. 312 
The recent amendments to the CCA introduced a new infringement with respect to the 
circumvention of access-controls but not for usage-controls.313 The TPMs provisions provide a list 
of specific exceptions to this new infringement.314 The Governor in Council may make regulations 
prescribing circumstances additional to the ones already listed in the CCA, in which infringement 
by circumventing access controls does not occur.315 The premise behind punishing circumvention 
of access-controls but not usage-controls is that copyright holders should legitimately control the 
lawful access to their works. Once this lawful access is granted, users should be able to make any 
307 Litman, "Lawful Personal Use" supra note 158 at 1872, where Litman states that lawful personal use of 
copyright works is progressively shrinking in the U.S. She attributes it to successive copyright reform of the 
last decades and the tracking powers of copyright holders with digital technologies; Niva Elkin-Koren, 
"Making Room for Consumers Under the DMCA" (2007) 22 Berkley Technology Law Journal, 1119, at 
1143-1144, where the author describes the effect of digital rights management used by copyright holders as 
redefining the relationship between consumers and copyright holders in a way that is not always transparent 
to the consumer. It also has the potential of compromising intellectual freedoms. 
308 In particular in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 and through the application of consumer protection law to 
copies of copyright works in Chapters 8 to Chapter 11. 
309 CCMA, supra note 75. 
310 Digital Millenium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998), amending 17 USC, 
including the introduction of§§ 1201-1205 [DMCA]. 
311 For a summary of the main features of the national implementation of TPMs in Japan, Switzerland and 
New Zealand, see Geist, supra note 300 at 233-236. 
312 Directive 2001129/EC, supra note 237 is the secondary law that sets the minimum requirements for EU 
Member States regarding the implementation of the WJPO Internet Treaties, supra note 227, and the 
harmonization of certain aspects of copyright Jaw. Article 6.4 imposes an obligation on Member States to 
require copyright holders to make available to beneficiaries of certain exceptions or limitations to 
copyright, the means of benefiting from those exceptions and limitations. 
313 CCA, supra note 1, s 41.1(1). 
314 CCA, supra note 1, ss 41.11-41.18. The exceptions include law enforcement and interoperability issues. 
315 CCA, supra note 1, s 41.21 (2) (a). The factors that the Governor in Council would need to consider 
include the extent to which TPMs effectively affects the exercise of fair dealing und the CCA, ibid. 
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lawful use of the copyright work, including uses that do not require the consent of copyright 
holders (such as private copying, fair dealing, and the four new user provisions).316 Users should 
not be liable for infringement if they circumvent usage-controls to achieve that goal. 
At first sight, the creation of a new infringement in the CCA with respect to the circumvention of 
access-controls, but not ·for usage-controls, seems to strike a balance between the interests of 
copyright holders and copyright users by restricting infringement to the circumvention of access-
controls. 317 While copyright law may not have granted access--controls to copyright holders in the 
past, it did not allow users to access copies unlawfully either. This latter issue was addressed in 
another legal sphere: the criminal theft of a chattel (e.g., copy of a book, music CD), bypassing 
library loan privileges, henceforth. Because it was not clear that acts of circumvention (including 
circumventing access-controls of copyright works) would be an actionable wrong -
circumvention can take place without any taking or stealing - a new infringement of 
circumvention of access-controls was introduced.318 By conferring this new legal protection for 
access-controls on copyright holders, the two spheres of control (i.e., rights to the physical copy 
and exclusive copyright) are now merged under the helm of copyright holders. The expansion of 
the scope of application of the CCA has made commentators question the constitutionality of 
TPMs in a copyright framework. 319 
The appeal of the balance that TPMs seek to strike between di verging interests by distinguishing 
circumvention of access-controls from usage-controls for the purpose of infringement is short 
lived. While there is no infringement for circumventing usage-controls for lawful uses, as I 
discuss below in this chapter, the onus is entirely placed on the users' ability to circumvent the 
TPMs with no counterpart obligation to facilitate such uses by copyright holders. 320 Makers of 
circumventing devices, distributors, service providers, and others are also liable for 
infringement,321 which diminishes consumers' ability to circumvent usage-controls even more, in 
316 See Part II of this chapter. 
317 CCA, supra note 1, s 41.1(1). 
318 Vaver, Intellectual Property Law 2011, supra note 5 at 197-198; Jeremy F. de Beer, "Locks & Levies" 
(2006) 84 Denver University Law Review, 143 at 152-155. 
319 Jeremy F. de Beer, "Constitutional Jurisdiction over Paracopyright Laws" in Michael Geist, ed. In the 
Public Interest: The Future of Canadian Copyright Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005) chapter 4; Vaver, 
Intellectual Property Law 2011, supra note 5 at 200. 
320 See Part IV B of this chapter. 
321 CCA, supra note 1, s 41.l (1) (b),(c). 
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spite of the lawfulness of their intended uses. Also, the infringement of access-controls under the 
CCA can occur independently of an infringement of copyright. 322 As Carys Craig note&, the legal 
protection of TPMs, as they now form part of the CCA, is blind to the lawfulness of the use.323 
TPMs do not parallel the existing exclusive rights of copyright holders, but rather endorse an 
indiscriminate lockout approach. 324 
While advocates of TPMs will argue that this is the only effective means to counterbalance digital 
piracy, a legal framework that allows the combination of unfettered powers of access-controls 
with exclusive copyright, and that does not place the onus on copyright holders to allow lawful 
uses of their works by "lifting" usage-controls, tilts the balance toward copyright holders even 
further and imposes the burden of countering piracy on lawful copyright users. In contrast, 
countries granting a lower level of protection to TPMs typically link the infringement of 
circumvention to an infringement of copyright. 325 This link was made in an effort to address the 
changes brought on by digital technologies, while preserving the balance between incenting 
innovation and promoting access and lawful uses of copyright works. 
The adoption of a higher level of protection of TPMs in a Canadian context raises a slew of new 
questions, even 15 years after the adoption of the WIPO Internet Treaties and their national 
implementations worldwide; not the least of which is: what is the effect of the newly implemented 
TPMs on Canada's copyright users' rights, as proclaimed in CLli and recently confirmed by Bell 
Canada and Alberta? The legal protection of TPMs creates confusion around copyright holders' 
obligations with respect to acts that users can perform without their authorization, such as fair 
dealing, under the private copying regime, and the newly introduced four user provisions.326 The 
confusion increases with the application of other laws to copies of copyright works, including 
322 The CCA, supra note 1 makes a distinction between acts of circumvention of access controls which are 
an infringement of copyright holders rights and acts of circumvention of copy controls which are not per se 
an act of infringement: s. 41.1 (I) (a). The effects of anti-circumvention measures make acts of 
circumvention of TPMs an infringement of copyright holders' rights, independently of an act of copyright 
infringement. This is the model adopted by the U.S.: DMCA, supra note 310. 
323 Craig, "Locking Out Lawful Users", supra note 300 at 192. 
324 Ibid. 
325 Those jurisdictions include Japan, New Zealand and Switzerland: see Geist, supra note 300. Bill C-60, 
An Act to Amend the Copyright Act, I st Sess, 38th Parl, 2005 (first reading 20 June 2005) cl 27, s 34.02 ( 1) 
(one of the earlier attempts to amend the CCA, supra note I to comply with the WIPO Internet Treaties, 
suf.ra note 227) linked the infringement of circumvention to the infringement of copyright. 
32 See the discussion in Part IV of this chapter. 
101 
consumer law, as I discuss subsequently in my thesis. 327 Can these uncertainties be remedied 
through non-negotiated standard end-user agreements? How do these terms address TPMs and 
users' rights? This is what I explore next. 
C. Contractual terms of use of commercial copies of copyright works 
Copies of copyright works are made available commercially to consumers with no contractual 
terms attached to them328 or, increasingly, with a lengthy list of non-negotiated standard terms of 
use.329 In the former case, consumers' permitted uses of copies of copyright works are dictated 
predominantly by the application of the CCA.330 In the latter case, the effect of these terms of use 
varies depending on their enforceability,331 on their interaction with copyright law,332 and on their 
treatment by the relevant consumer protection laws. 333 
When consumers lawfully access copies of copyright works online, the terms of use and the 
general description appearing on the copyright work providers' website do not always provide 
327 In particular, see Chapter 11 where I apply consumer protection law to consumer transactions of copies 
of copyright works through various scenarios. 
328 This is the case for copies of copyright works sold with a physical supporting medium exchanged hand 
to hand such as books, music CDs, film DVDs and occasionally, with respect to movie streaming services 
online. See for example www.moviefather.com, www.moviesdatacentre.com, www.moviesister.com, 
www. mvmovies.corn. 
329 This is the case fore-books, digital films and digital musical recordings made accessible online with no 
supporting physical medium exchanged hand to hand: see the Apple iTunes store terms of services for 
music downloads, film rentals and iBooks, online: 
http://www.apple.com/legal/itunes/us/terms.html#SERVlCE; Netflix terms of use for audio-visual 
entertainment streaming services: online at https://signup.netflix.comffermsofUse Amazon.com Kindle 
License Agreement and Terms of Use, online: 
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/ref=help_search_l-
1 ?ie=UTF8&nodeid=200506200&qid=l336750645&sr=l-l; and KOBO INC. CANADA TERMS OF 
USE for the purchase of e-books, online: http://www.kobobooks.com/termsofuse. 
330 See Part II of this chapter. 
331 The case Jaw on the enforceability of terms of use varies significantly. The question to be determined 
inter alia is whether, based on the manner in which they were made available to users, it can be inferred 
that they were agreed to by them. For a review of the enforceability of non-negotiated terms and conditions, 
Loos & al., supra note 60 at 65-66. 
332 More specifical1y, whether there are provisions in copyright law that are mandatory and cannot be 
overridden by contract: see the discussion in Part IV of this chapter (in particular Part IV C). 
333 The applicability and binding nature of terms of use varies depending on the applicable consumer 
protection laws and on the specific consumer protection obligation that is being invoked. For instance, in 
some jurisdictions in Canada, a consumer transaction contract has a relative value in that it is one of the 
factors to consider to determine whether an implied obligation of quality or fitness for use was breached: 
see the discussion on the nature and scope of consumer law obligations in Chapter 9. 
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much guidance as to whether consumers are using a service or whether they are purchasing or 
renting a copy of the copyright work. The line between goods and services is indeed blurrier than 
it ever was before because of the nature of the environment of digital copies distributed online.334 
In some cases, the information that suppliers provide contradicts itself: the terms of use can refer 
to a service, while mentioning that consumers are "purchasing" the copy of the copyright work 
with no right to transfer the copy. 335 Or, distributors invite consumers to "buy" a copy of a 
copyright work, only for consumers to find out that they are "renting" the copy.336 Terms of use 
generally warn consumers that the copy of the copyright work is licensed to them, without always 
making a distinction between the intellectual property rights that are embedded in the copy of the 
copyright work and the copy itself. 337 The characterization of consumer transactions as 
transactions implicating services or goods has important ramifications on the regulation of 
information products.338 The qualification of consumer transactions as "licences," including with 
respect to the copies of copyright works, has important implications on consumers' rights to 
copies of copyright works. 339 It underscores the complexity that results from the interaction 
between copyright, private property, and contract.340 
There are common denominators and noticeable variances between what suppliers permit and 
forbid consumers to do with copies of copyright works lawfully accessed. The permitted purpose 
of the uses is most often defined as "personal" and "non-commercial" uses.341 Consumers are 
usually forbidden to produce derivative or transformative uses with the copies of copyright works 
that they lawfully accessed. 342 Also, they have no right to transfer the copy of the copyright work 
that they lawfully acquired.343 Consumers are typically not notified of their rights or of copyright 
exceptions under copyright laws or on how they can exercise such rights. 344 There are indications 
that copyright holders often disregard those users' rights or exceptions to copyright 
334 See the discussion in Chapter 8. 
335 See for example the Kobo book terms of use fore-books, supra note 329. 
336 See for example the Apple itunes terms of use for musical recordings, supra note 329. 
337 This is the case of major suppliers of online audio, audio-visual and e-books products, see supra note 
329. 
338 See the discussion in Chapter 8. 
339 Ibid. 
340 See the discussion in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8. 
341 This is the case of major suppliers of online audio, audio-visual and e-books products, see supra note 
329. 
342 Ibid. 
343 Ibid. 
344 Ibid. 
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infringement. 345 The right to make copies of the copy for personal non-commercial uses varies 
greatly from no right to make copies346 to the right to make an unlimited number of copies. 347 
There is also a noticeable variance in the uses of TPMs from none348 to ones restricting access, 
ones restricting uses once access is granted, and the ones restricting both the access to and the 
uses of copyright works. Some suppliers inform consumers of the existence of TPMs on the 
copies of copyright work they provide to consumers, 349 while others make no reference to their 
existence. 350 
Non-negotiated standard end-user agreements tend to overlook exceptions to copyright 
infringement or user rights as they are set out in the CCA and similar statutes in other 
jurisdictions.351 To understand the effect of non-negotiated standard end-user agreements on the 
copyright design, in particular the extent to which they can take precedence over exceptions to 
copyright infringement or users' rights,352 requires the investigation of two related questions. 
What is the exact nature and scope of these permitted uses or exceptions to copyright 
infringement? Are they mandatory? This is what I explore next. 
IV. Exceptions to copyright infringement: rights or privileges? Are they mandatory? 
Whether the exceptions to copyright infringement examined above353 can qualify as rights or mere 
defences to copyright infringement is an important component of the broader task of defining 
345 Hargreaves, supra note 60 at 51, where the author refers to a study that analysed 100 contracts referred 
to the British Library (i.e. submission by Libraries and Archives Copyright Alliance (LACA)) and that 
demonstrated that contracts and licences often override the exceptions and limitations allowed in copyright 
law. 
346 See the Kobo books terms of use fore-books, supra note 329. 
347 See the terms of use of the Apple iTunes store products, supra note 329, where no limits to copy apply to 
iTunes Plus Products, and users may make as many copies "as reasonably necessary for personal, non-
commercial use." 
348 See the terms of use of the Apple iTunes store products, supra note 329, where it is specified that a 
particular product, "iTunes Plus Products do not contain security technology that limits your usage of such 
products." 
349 Apple iTunes store terms of use for audio, audio-visual works and e-books, supra note 329, make a 
general reference to TPMs being applied to certain of the iTune store services. 
350 See the Kobo books terms of use fore-books, supra note 329. 
351 See the overview of selected non-negotiated standard end-user agreements in Part III C of this chapter. 
352 I.e. as they are set out in the CCA, supra note I and similar statutes in other jurisdictions: see Part II of 
this chapter. 
353 I.e. in Part II of this chapter. 
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consumers' rights to copies of copyright works. 354 This question is gaining more importance for 
consumers as the recent amendments to the CCA expand the instances under which copyright 
users can perform acts without the authorization of copyright holders. 355 Whether exceptions to 
copyright infringement are mandatory is of equal importance in an environment where copies of 
copyright works are increasingly commercialized through non-negotiated standard end-user 
agreements. I look at these two questions sequentially. 
A. The nature of exceptions to copyright infringement 
The qualification of exceptions to copyright infringement as rights or as a mere defence has 
important legal ramifications for consumers. Based on Wesley Hohfeld' s theory of jural 
correlatives,356 lawful consumers have a legal claim against copyright holders to exercise 
exceptions to copyright infringement357 if they are rights, 358 but not if they are mere defences to 
copyright infringement.359 This is particularly relevant when TPMs restrict the exercise of an 
otherwise permitted act. 360 The right does not grant access to the work. It presupposes a lawful 
access. By contrast, an exception to copyright infringement that is not a right even if mandatory 
will, in Hohfeldian terms, be a privilege, albeit a strong one as any attempt by copyright holders 
to set it aside is not enforceable. 361 It is a privilege to the extent that it does not impose any duty 
on copyright holders, such as to facilitate the performance of a permitted act. At the same time, it 
leaves consumers free to make the permitted use as they please. A right that is not mandatory is 
354 It is relevant to the nature of copies of copyright works discussed through property theory in the Second 
Part of my thesis and also in a consumer law analysis to copyright and copies of copyright work in the 
Third Part of my thesis. 
355 See Part II B and D of this chapter. 
3561 .e. that someone's right implies that someone has a duty towards it. A privilege is the ability to do 
something with no correlation from anyone obligated towards it (no right). For example, a defence to 
copyright infringement would qualify as a privilege to the extent that it allows a user to perform certain acts 
without authorization but does not require copyright holders to facilitate the exercise of these acts. See: 
Wesley N. Hohfeld, "Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning", (1917) 26 Yale 
L.J. 710; Wesley N. Hohfeld, "Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning", 
(1913) 23 Yale L.J. 16. 
357 E.g., the right to make private copies or fair dealing. 
358 Unless they are not mandatory and have been restricted by the copyright holder. 
359 See the discussion further below in Part IV of this chapter on the French cases Warner Music and 
Mullholland Drive. 
360 I discuss the nature and effects of TPMs in Part III B of this chapter. 
361 Hohfeld, supra note 356. On the distinction between mandatory exceptions and mandatory rights see 
Dusollier 2007, supra note 304 at 483-484. 
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necessarily weaker and becomes non-existent in non-negotiated standard end-user agreements to 
the extent that it is subject to contract terms that negate it.362 
While the Supreme Court of Canada stated unanimously in CCH that exceptions to copyright 
infringement were users' rights, courts in France have held the contrary.363 The UKCDPA 364 
suggests that exceptions to copyright infringement are not rights. 365 The view that exceptions to 
copyright infringement do not constitute rights in the sense that they implicate duties on the part 
of copyright holders is also shared by copyright scholars. 366 
The consequences of the distinction between rights and mere defences to copyright infringement 
are illustrated in the French case Warner Music. 367 The Tribunal of first instance had ordered the 
rescission of the sale of CDs for digital music on the basis that the CD, which contained TPMs, 
could not be used on a specific kind of laptop. The CD contained a notification of the TPMs and 
stated that it could be read on most CD players and computers. The Tribunal held that this 
incompatibility with some computers constituted a latent defect under the French Code Civil. 368 
The Tribunal also ordered Warner Music France to remove TPMs from the CDs it distributed as 
TPMs prevented consumers from making private copies of the digital music. The Tribunal held 
that this annulled de facto the limit set by the legislator on the exclusive right of authors, which 
allowed individuals to make private copies. 369 The Court of Appeal reversed the two orders of the 
362 For a discussion on the legal nature of exceptions to copyright infringement and on their mandatory 
nature see Dusollier 2007, supra note 304 at 4 77-511. 
363 See the discussion below in Part IV A of this chapter on the French cases Warner Music and Mulholland 
Drive. See also: Severine Dusollier, "Copie privee v. mesures techniques de protection: l'exception est-elle 
un droit ?"note sous Pres. Bruxelles (cess.), 25 mai (2004) 4 Auteurs & Media, 338, at 342-344 where the 
author argues in a Belgian context that exceptions to copyright infringement are not rights. 
364 Supra note 27. 
365 Ibid, s 28 (I) which states with respect to acts permitted in relation to copyright works: "The provisions 
of this Chapter specify acts which may be done in relation to copyright works notwithstanding the 
subsistence of copyright; they relate only to the question of infringement of copyright and do not affect any 
other right or obligation restricting the doing of any of the specified acts." (Emphasis added). 
366 For a review of the literature and case law on the legal nature of exceptions to copyright infringement 
see Dusollier 2007, supra note 304 at 4 77-494, in particular at 481-485 regarding the arguments against 
qualifying exceptions to copyright infringements as rights. See also David Vaver, "Copyright Defenses as 
User Rights" (2013) Jo Pat Off Soc'y (forthcoming) at 14 who hesitates to qualify exceptions to copyright 
infringement as rights with correlative duties in Hohfeld terms, or that can be transferred, but 
acknowledging that they give rise to entitlements. 
367 Trib. gr. inst. 5e Paris, IO January 2006, Christophe R., UFC Que Choisir I Warner Music France, Fnac 
(2006) JurisData: 2006-292685. 
368 Art 1641 CcF. 
369 As per art L 122-5, L 211-3 CPI. 
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Tribunal outlined above. 370 It reversed the first order on the ground of deficient evidence of the 
existence of a latent defect.371 It reversed the second order on the basis that the private copying 
exception to authors' rights was not a right but a defence. 372 Hence it could not be the basis for the 
initiation of a claim.373 The same approach was adopted by the French Court of Appeal and the 
Cour de Cassation in the Mulholland Drive case. 374 
The French Courts' qualification of private copying as a defence to copyright infringement 
contrasts sharply with the Supreme Court of Canada's characterization of exceptions to copyright 
infringement as "users' rights" in CCH.375 Yet, the scope of those "users' rights" is less certain 
than ever with the recent amendments to the CCA. 376 Although there is nothing to suggest that the 
intent of those amendments to the CCA was to override per se CCH' s qualification of exceptions 
to copyright infringement as users' rights, at best it undermines their exercise significantly when 
copyright holders commercialize copies of copyright works with TPMs. The recent amendments 
to the CCA raise questions about the scope of users' rights that vary between the various 
permitted uses that the CCA confers to copyright users. I explore next the scope of exceptions to 
copyright infringement as they are currently set out in the CCA by distinguishing between those 
exceptions that are not subject to the non-circumvention of TPMs and those exceptions that are. 
B. The scope of users' rights under the CCA 
As I discussed above in this chapter, recent amendments to the CCA introduced the legal 
protection of TPMs. 377 The amendments created various new infringements, including the 
circumvention of access-controls to copies of copyright works.378 No exception applies to acts of 
circumvention to perform acts that are specifically authorized by the CCA, such as fair dealing, 
37° CA Paris, 20 June 2007, Fnac Paris I UFC Que Choisir et autres, (2007) Juris Data 2007-337236. 
371 Ibid. 
372 Ibid. 
373 Ibid. Confirmed by the Cour de cassation, Cass, civ. lere, 27 November 2008, UFC Que Choisir I Fnac, 
Warner music France (2008) JurisData 2008-046005. 
374 CA, Paris, 4 April 2007, Studio Canal et al. v S. Perquin and Union federate des consommateurs Que 
choisir, Gaz. Pal. 18/07/2007 N° 199, 23; confirmed by the Cour de Cassation: Cass civ 1st, 19 juin 2008 
(2008) Bull civ, I, N° 177. 
375 Supra note 5 at para 48. 
376 CCMA, supra note 75. 
377 See the discussion in Part III B of this chapter. 
378 CCA, supra note 1, s 41.l(l) (a). 
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private copying, and the four newly introduced user provisions.379 By contrast, acts of 
circumvention of usage-control TPMs do not constitute a separate copyright infringement. 380 
The introduction of the legal protection of TPMs in the CCA raises additional areas of uncertainty 
regarding the scope of users' rights as described in CCH, at least when copyright holders 
distribute their works commercially with TPMs. Do the exceptions to copyright infringement or 
users' rights subsist in all cases when copyright holders make their copyright works available with 
TPMs or are they superseded by TPMs as they are now legally endorsed by the CCA? The 
following analysis does not apply to copies of copyright works that are made available without 
TPMs. I explore the scope of exceptions to copyright infringement as they are currently set out in 
the CCA by distinguishing between those exceptions that are not subjected to the non-
circumvention of TPMs and those exceptions that are. 
(i) Exceptions to copyright infringement not subject to the non-circumvention of 
technological protection measures (TPMs) 
The legal status of fair dealing, the non-substantial part doctrine, the private copying regime, 
computer program exceptions, exhaustion or first sale doctrine, and the newly introduced non-
commercial user-generated content rights are affected peripherally by the introduction of the legal 
protection of TPMs in the CCA.381 On the one hand, consumers who circumvent access-control 
technologies and then perform an act that is a users' right, such as a fair dealing with the work, 
would be liable for the separate infringement of circumventing access-control technologies 
regardless of their subsequent lawful use of the copyright work. 382 This infringement would have 
no bearing on the legality of the fair dealing, private copying, non-substantial part, exercise of 
computer program exception, exhaustion, first sale doctrine, or non-commercial user-generated 
content, which would be assessed on their own merits. On the other hand, consumers are not 
379 As discussed in Part IV D of this chapter. 
38° CCA, supra note 1, s 41.1 (1) (a). See alsoDMCA, supra note 310, § 1201. 
381 CCA, supra note 1, ss. 41 to 41.21. 
382 CCA, supra note 1, s 41.1(1) (a). 
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forbidden to circumvent user-control technologies to perform those users' rights.383 In other 
words, consumers are not infringing copyright holders' rights if they circumvent usage-control 
technologies if their use of the copyright work is otherwise lawful, including if their dealing of the 
work is fair, or if they wish to exercise the newly introduced non-commercial user-generated 
content right. 
I have argued above in this chapter that the new infringement of access-controls, but not of usage-
controls, was an imperfect attempt to preserve the balance between encouraging the creation of 
works and their dissemination and lawful uses (i.e., the exercise of users' rights or copyright 
exceptions to copyright infringement). 384 In particular, the CCA does not explicitly impose a 
positive obligation on copyright holders who apply usage-control TPMs to accommodate users' 
requests to make specific lawful uses. It only allows users to circumvent usage-controls.385 
The introduction of the legal protection of TPMs makes the nature of users' rights as 
characterized in CCH even more unclear than it was before. Assuming for the intents of our 
discussion that the Supreme Court judgment imposes positive obligations on copyright holders to 
allow the permissible uses (as per the Hohfeldian model of jural correlatives of rights and duties), 
the introduction of the legal protection of TPMs adds a new layer of complexity. One 
interpretation is that TPMs effectively allow copyright holders who apply usage-control TPMs to 
override users' rights (in the sense of imposing obligations on copyright holders to allow 
permitted acts) and convert them to exceptions to copyright infringement. In essence, this 
amounts to a "halfway house" overriding effect. Another interpretation is that they leave users' 
rights as characterized by CCH (and as understood in Hohfeldian terms) more or less intact. 
While they confer more protection on copyright holders by creating additional hurdles against 
would-be unlawful users, they still require copyright holders to facilitate permitted uses by lawful 
users at their request. Even if the second interpretation on the effect of the TPMs introduced in the 
CCA preserves the effects of CCH better than the first interpretation, this illustrates how these 
provisions weaken users' rights. The provisions do so by imposing an additional hurdle for 
consumers (who do not have the ability to circumvent the usage-controls) to ask permission when 
383 Ibid. the circumvention act is an infringement only if it relates to access-control TPMs, not usage-control 
ones. 
384 See the discussion in Part III B of this chapter. 
385 Ibid. 
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the essence of their right is that they do not need copyright holders' authorization in the first 
place, let alone the disincentive to exercise those rights and the additional legal uncertainty that 
the newly introduced legal protection of TPMs creates around the existence and scope of such 
users' rights. 386 This is unprecedented in Canadian copyright Jaw. 
(ii) Exceptions to copyright infringement subject to the non-circumvention of technological 
protection measures (TPMs) 
The newly introduced legal protection of TPMs have more drastic effects on the scope of the 
users' rights examined here than the ones I analyzed earlier,387 for copyright works that are made 
commercially available with TPMs. In that case, the CCA makes the existence of those rights 
explicitly subject to not circumventing access-control and usage-control technologies.388 
Consumers and other users can, without the authorization of copyright holders, perform 
reproduction for private purposes, fix signals, record programs for later listening or viewing, and 
create backup copies subject to not circumventing access-control or usage-control technologies 
that restrict them from doing so. 389 If they do, the acts they perform no longer fall under these user 
rights provisions and can infringe copyright, unless they are authorized under other provisions of 
the CCA. 390 They may also be liable for the separate act of infringement for the circumvention of 
access-control technologies. 391 
Through the effect of TPMs on the user rights examined in the present section, the CCA 
effectively creates a hierarchy of users' rights: unlike the users' rights examined earlier,392 the 
newly introduced reproduction for private purposes, fixing signals, recording programs for later 
listening or viewing, and backup copies users' rights are "default rights" that exist subject to 
386 Hargreaves, supra note 60 at 51 who discusses the detrimental effects that contract terms that restrict 
users' rights have on legal certainty about the very existence of those rights which makes him conclude that 
users' rights should be made mandatory. 
387 I.e., fair dealing, the non-substantial part doctrine, the private copying regime, computer program 
exceptions, exhaustion or first sale doctrine and the newly introduced non-commercial user-generated 
content rights as discussed in Part II of this chapter. 
388 CCA, supra note 1, ss 29.22 (I) (c), 29.23 (I) (b), 29.24 (I) (c). 
389 Ibid. 
390 Such as under the fair dealing provisions of the CCA, supra note 1, ss 29 to 29.2. 
391 CCA, supra note I, s 41.1(1) (a). 
392 E.g., fair dealing, the non-substantial part doctrine, the private copying regime, computer program 
exceptions, exhaustion or first sale doctrine and the newly introduced non-commercial user-generated 
content rights examined earlier in Part IV B (i) of this chapter. 
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existing copyright holders' access-control or usage-control TPMs. The CCA explicitly allows 
copyright holders to override these rights through the use of TPMs. That is, even after consumers 
gain lawful access to the copyright work, the copyright holder can forbid consumers from 
circumventing usage-control technologies and exercising their right. This leads to another 
important question on the interaction between the CCA and contracts: are copyright exceptions or 
users' rights mandatory? Should a difference be made between negotiated and non-negotiated 
contracts? 
C. Are exceptions to copyright infringement mandatory? 
The mandatory nature of exceptions to copyright holders' exclusive rights is an unsettled area of 
the law. There is a revived interest in this question among copyright scholars, especially with the 
recent introduction of the legal protection of TPMs worldwide. 393 The absence of explicit 
reference to the mandatory nature of exceptions to copyright infringement, as is the case in some 
jurisdictions,394 gives rise to diverging opinions.395 Determining the mandatory nature of 
exceptions to copyright infringement involves an investigation into the justifications that 
withstand each exception to copyright infringement, copyright law, and other laws and legal 
doctrines, including contract, consumer law, and constitutional law, and how they may constrain 
copyright holders' ability to override exceptions to copyright infringement in specific instances.396 
While Lucie Guibault comes to no definitive conclusion in her book devoted to the mandatory 
nature of exceptions to copyright infringement,397 De Werra takes the position that exceptions to 
3931 discuss TPMs in Part III B of this chapter. An entire book examines the question of the mandatory 
nature of limitations to copyright holders' exclusive rights: see Guibault, supra note 279; see also De 
Werra, supra note 271; Dusollier 2007, supra note 304 at 495-511; Derclaye, supra note 280; Kretschmer, 
Derclaye, Favale & Watt, supra note 280. 
394 For example, this is the case of Belgium under which most limitations of copyright are mandatory with 
an exception in the case of on-demand services: Loi du 30juin 1994 relative au droit d'auteur et aux droits 
voisins, online: http://www.sacd.be/Legislation-beh!:e-du-droit-d?lang=fr, art. 23bis. See also Directive 
2009124/EC, supra note 223, where some exceptions to copyright infringement related to computer 
programs cannot be limited by contract: art 5 (2) and (3). 
395 See Guibault, supra note 279 at 214-240, 263-277; 291, 296-302: based on her analysis of EU and US 
copyright and other laws, she concluded that there is no definite mean to determine whether limitations to 
copyright are mandatory or not, unless the relevant copyright laws state explicitly so. De Werra, supra note 
271 at 336-336 takes the position in a European context, that copyright limitations that are grounded in 
fundamental rights (e.g. freedom of expression) cannot be overridden by contract but that most other 
limitations can. 
396 See the discussion in Part III A of this chapter. 
397Guibault, supra note 279. 
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copyright infringement that are justified by fundamental rights cannot be overridden by contract, 
while the ones that are justified on other grounds, e.g., public policy considerations can.398 The 
same reasoning applies to exceptions to copyright infringement that are justified by market 
failures, i.e., they can be overridden by contract to the extent that the market failure disappears 
with new technologies. 399 The debate about what are the proper justifications of exceptions to 
copyright infringement adds on to the complex multilayered application of different laws to 
determine the extent to which exceptions to copyright infringement are mandatory.400 In a 
nutshell, there is no definitive answer to whether exceptions to copyright infringement are 
mandatory, although commentators seem to be slightly more inclined to conclude that most if not 
all exceptions to copyright infringement are not mandatory and can be overridden by contract. 
The mandatory nature of exceptions to copyright infringement is as much a determining factor for 
consumers as is the issue of whether exceptions to copyright infringement are rights or defences 
to copyright infringement.401 While users' rights are in theory stronger than exceptions to 
copyright infringement,402 they are significantly weakened if they are not mandatory, especially 
with respect to consumer transactions subject to non-negotiated standard end-user agreements. A 
mandatory exception makes a contract term to the contrary unenforceable, while a non-mandatory 
user right can be the basis of a legal claim only to the extent that it has not been overridden by 
enforceable contract terms.403 
398 De Werra, supra note 271 at 335-336. See also Dusollier 2007, supra note 304 at 507-509. 
399 De Werra, supra note 271 at 336-337. 
400 See the discussion on the various theoretical justifications of copy ownership and users' rights in 
Chapter 6 Part III. See also De Werra, supra note 271 at 333-335 on the debate on the theoretical 
justifications that withstand the right to make private copies, i.e. the extent to which it is based on the right 
to privacy. 
401 See the discussion in Part IV A of this chapter on the nature of copyright limitations and the distinction 
between rights (which presuppose a correlative duty or obligation, v. a defence, exception or privilege 
which does not presuppose such duty or obligation but allows one to perform an act. 
402 Ibid. 
403 The significance of the mandatory nature of exceptions to copyright infringement is illustrated by the 
French case Studio Canal where the Court of Appeal had ruled that the private copying was an exception to 
copyright infringement (not a right) but that it was nonetheless mandatory; any attempts by Studio Canal to 
limit its exercise was non enforceable. The Cour de cassation, (Cass civ. 1st, 28 February 2006, (2006) Bull 
civ 05-15.824) overturned the Court of Appeal judgment (CA Paris, 22 April 2005 (2005) JurisData 2005-
268600) which had forbidden Les Films Alain Sarde and Studio Canal to apply TPMs that were 
incompatible with private copying as an exception to copyright infringement, and held that the private 
copying exception was not mandatory. 
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There is no explicit reference to the mandatory nature of the users' rights conferred by the CCA. 
The inquiry into whether they are mandatory requires a different analysis of two distinct 
categories of users' rights. In the first category of the users' rights examined above, i.e., fair 
dealing, non-substantial part, private copying regime, and non-commercial user-generated content 
rights, there is a reasonable (but not conclusive) argument to be made that those rights cannot be 
set aside by copyright holders through non-negotiated standard form contracts. The 
characterization by the Supreme Court of Canada in CCH of the exception to copyright holders' 
exclusive rights as being users' rights, and not mere loop holes in the CCA, supports that view.404 
Whether such provisions can be set aside upon mutually agreed terms in a negotiated agreement is 
a separate issue that is beyond the scope of non-negotiated standard terms that prevail in 
consumer transactions.405 The Supreme Court could have referred to exceptions to copyright 
holders' exclusive rights,406 but instead it explicitly referred to them as "rights." To allow 
copyright holders to unilaterally discard the application of these provisions would empty the word 
"right," as used by the Supreme Court, of its substance. 
The interaction of these users' rights with the legal protection of TPMs introduced in the CCA 
also suggests that there is recognition of the special status for these rights. While their exercise 
may be impaired by the presence of TPMs, the existence of these users' rights is not subject to the 
respect of TPMs. It is true that the CCA does not specifically require copyright holders to "lift" 
their usage-control technologies to allow consumers and other users to perform those acts that are 
usually permitted without the authorization of copyright holders. At the same time, consumers are 
allowed to circumvent usage-control technologies without infringing copyright by doing so.407 
404 CCH, supra note 5 at para 48. 
405 The public policy aspects and balancing act between competing interests that these provisions embed 
could support the argument that these provisions are mandatory and that clauses that would seek to limit 
them, even if mutually agreed to would be of no force and effect. See Guibault, supra note 279 at 220. In 
the case of the private copying regime of the CCA, supra note 1, copyright holders who are compensated 
under the scope defined by the private copying regime cannot at the same time restrict copying contrary to 
that regime, while being compensated. In that case, the application of the private copying regime clauses 
are of a mandatory nature with respect to such copyright holders. 
406 The title preceding CCA, supra note I ss 29ff, refers to "Exceptions." Exceptions or defences to 
copyright infringement is how these limitations of copyright holders exclusive rights are commonly referred 
to: see Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, 
September 9, 1886; rev. in Berlin November 13, 1908, art. 11, 13, 14; rev. in Rome June 2, 1928, art. 1 lbis 
[Berne Convention] at art 9; The WCT, supra note 227, art 10 and the WPPT, supra note 227, art 16, also 
refer to "exceptions" and "limitations" of the exclusive rights of copyright holders. 
407 See the discussion in Part IV B (i) of this chapter. 
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These "accommodations" between the legal protection of TPMs and users' rights, albeit 
imperfect, signal Parliament's intent to make room for the exercise of users' rights. As I discussed 
above, at worst the interaction between the TPMs and the users' rights in question408 converts 
them de facto into mandatory exceptions to copyright infringement. 
The strong public policy underpinnings that withstand the fair dealing and the non-commercial 
user-generated content provisions in incentivizing the creation of new works and the automatic 
levy that is built into the private copying regime could support the argument that these exceptions 
to copyright infringement cannot be overridden at the will of copyright holders. The mandatory 
nature of these users' rights, at least with respect to non-negotiated standard end-user agreements, 
would be more consistent with the CCA's objectives to preserve a balance between competing 
interests. 409 
The mandatory nature of the second category of the other users' rights examined above410 is less 
probable although there is no clear answer to that question either. As I discussed above, the CCA 
explicitly subjects the existence of those rights to the non-circumvention of access-control and 
usage-control TPMs.411 The second category of users' rights examined here being explicitly 
subject to TPMs effectively allows copyright holders to override these rights when they 
commercialize their works with TPMs. By virtue of an interpretation by extension, copyright 
holders could also override these users' rights by restrictive contract terms because Parliament 
already signalled the non-obligatory nature of these users' rights. In a more restrictive 
interpretation, these users' rights can only be restricted by TPMs: if Parliament intended that they 
could be restricted, it would explicitly have stated so. 
To sum up on the nature of users' rights or exceptions to copyright infringement, in Canada, while 
the nature of exceptions to copyright holders' exclusive rights has been characterized as "rights" 
by CCH, their scope remains uncertain, even more so with the recent amendments to the CCA that 
408 I.e. the users' rights examined in Part IV B (i) of this chapter: fair dealing, non-substantial part, private 
copying regime and non-commercial user-generated content. 
409 Theberge, supra note 16 at para 30; CCMA, supra note 75, Preamble, 6th paragraph. See the discussion 
on the CCA's objective to maintain a balance between competing interests in Chapter 2 Part II. 
410 I.e., the newly introduced reproduction for private purposes, fixing signals and recording programs for 
later listening or viewing and backup copies users' rights: see the discussion in Part IV B (ii) of this chapter. 
411 See the discussion in Part II D (ii) to (iv). 
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introduced the legal protection of TPMs. As I argued above, the legal protection of TPMs 
effectively institutes a hierarchy of users' rights. The mandatory nature of those rights is also 
uncertain, but it is reasonable to argue that they are mandatory in some cases, at least with respect 
to one of the two categories of users' rights explored here and when the contract that interferes 
with those rights is a non-negotiated standard end-user agreement.412 
The closer examination of the nature, scope, and mandatory nature of copyright users' rights in 
Canada reveals an overly complex web of interactions between the CCA, TPMs, and contracts 
that undermines the very existence of users' rights as we have come to describe exceptions to 
copyright infringement in Canada since CCH.413 The less than certain nature of copyright users' 
rights in the CCA is a somewhat desolate situation in light of the recent wave of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence that displays a greater attentiveness to interests competing with the exclusive rights 
of copyright holders, including the interests of users and the public.414 The unclear nature of 
users' rights brought on by the loose ends of their interactions with TPMs and consumer contracts 
provides a less cheerful perspective on the recent major amendments to the CCA that give place 
more than ever before to individual users and consumers.415 
The constraints that are permitted or not disallowed on users' rights in the CCA, leading to 
questions about their true nature and scope, are not mere academic questions. In addition to 
leaving consumers in an undesirable state of legal uncertainty and exposing them to increased risk 
of litigation,416 the permitted constraints on their rights dictate to a large extent how copyright 
holders and intermediaries develop their business models and their offerings to consumers.417 The 
unsettled nature of exceptions to copyright infringement, or the so-called users' rights, has 
412 E.g. under the fair dealing, the non-substantial part doctrine, the private copying regime, computer 
program exceptions, exhaustion or first sale doctrine and the newly introduced non-commercial user-
generated content rights, as they are discussed in Part II and in Part IV B (i) and C of this chapter. 
413 Supra note 5. 
414 See the discussion on the CCA, supra note 1 objective to preserve a balance between competing interests 
in Chapter 2 Part II and the discussion on recent developments on fair dealing in Part II C of this chapter. 
415 See the discussion in Chapter 2 Part V and in Part II C and D of this chapter. 
416 See Hargreaves, supra note 60 at 51. See also my discussion in Chapter 1 Part I and II about claims of 
copyright infringement brought directly against consumers and on the regulatory trend towards the 
expansion of enforcement tools and remedies. See also the discussion on the progressive expansion of 
copyright in Chapter 5 Part II. 
417 On a related idea, see Liu, "Enabling Copyright Consumers", supra note 155, where the author describes 
how clearer affirmation of users' rights would support the lawfulness of copyright content intermediaries' 
act which in turn enable and offer greater support to copyright consumers'. 
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rippling effects on the scope of copyright consumers rights to commercial copies of copyright 
works as a whole. As an important legal basis to delineate copyright consumers' rights, the CCA' s 
uncertain rendering of users' rights can also have a rippling effect on the effective support that 
property and consumer law offers with respect to copyright consumers' claims to commercial 
copies of copyright works. I explore these two themes in the Second Part and in the Third Part of 
my thesis. Before that, the current status of copyright users' rights in Canada and elsewhere needs 
to be understood in the context of Canada's international copyright obligations, to which I will 
now turn. 
V. Canada's international copyright obligations 
The overview of acts that copyright consumers can perform on lawfully acquired copies would be 
incomplete without contextualizing them within the international conventions to which Canada is 
a party: the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works [Berne 
Convention],418 the North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA],419 the Agreement on the 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Law [TRIPS].420 With the entry into force of the 
CCMA in 2012, Canada's ratification of the WIPO Internet Treaties421 is imminent.422 
International intellectual property conventions have shaped and will likely continue to shape 
Canadian copyright law to a large extent.423 Their harmonization objectives for the protection of 
418 Supra note 406, art 9(2). 
419North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of Canada, the Government of the 
United Mexican States and the Government of the United States of America (1992), Can T.S. 1994 No. 2 
(entered into force January 1, 1994), section 1705(5). 
420 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 29, 33 1.L.M. 1197 
(1994) [TRIPS], art 13. 
421 I.e., the WCT, supra note 227 and the WPPT, supra note 227. 
422 CCMA, supra note 75, Preamble, refers to Canada's need to align to copyright norms recognized 
internationally as reflected in the WIPO Internet treaties; Canada is a signatory to the WIPO Internet 
Treaties, supra note 227, since 1997 but as of April I, 2013 there was no record on the WIPO registry of 
member states that Canada had ratified the WIPO Internet Treaties: WIPO official website: 
http://www. wipo.i nt/treaties/en/i p/wct/ . 
423 For example: the following acts amended the CCA, supra note l, in order to comply with Canada's 
international copyright obligations: Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, S.C. 
1988, c. 65; World Trade Organization Agreement Implementation Act, S.C. 1994 c. 47, to ensure inter alia 
Canada's compliance with its international obligations under TRIPS, supra note 420, and more recently, the 
CCMA, supra note 75, to ensure Canada's compliance with the WIPO Internet Treaties, supra note 227. 
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intellectual property, together with their high level of state membership (among which, Canada's 
main international trading partners), create internal and external political pressures for Canada to 
harmonize its laws with the international norms that are embedded in the international 
conventions.424 The debates leading up to, and the recent entry into force of the CCMA illustrate 
that phenomenon.425 Whether the justifications for invoking international conventions to change 
copyright law are always founded upon genuine international legal obligations rather than 
political grounds is sometimes debatable, as commentators have argued amidst the recent waves 
of Canadian copyright legislative reform initiatives.426 
With the Berne Convention in the lead (together with the WIPO Internet Treaties, as special 
agreements to the Berne Convention )427 intellectual property international conventions' primary 
purposes are to promote, protect, and enforce right holders' exclusive rights.428 In order to achieve 
See also the discussion in Chapter 5 Part II on the progressive expansion of copyright in Canada including 
through Canada's membership to international copyright and intellectual property conventions. 
424 The US has placed Canada on its special watch list of countries which allegedly do not enforce 
intellectual property rights (including copyright) adequately since 1995. The Embassy of the US in Canada 
summarizes the situation as follows: "Canada's relatively weak protection and enforcement of intellectual 
property rights (copyrights, trademarks, patents, and trade secrets) has attracted domestic and international 
attention. Since 1995, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) has placed Canada on the U.S. 
Government's Special 301 "Watch List", which designates U.S. trading partners that have particular 
problems with respect to IPR protection.": Embassy of the United States, Ottawa, Canada, Special 301 
Report (Intellectual Property Rights), online: http://canada.usembassy.gov/kev-reports/special-301-repon-
intellectual-property-rights.htmJ. Under US laws, economic sanctions can be imposed against countries that 
are on that list. The manner by which international forums leading to international conventions are utilized 
by national governments and non governmental organizations to advance their interests nationally and 
internationally is discussed in Laurence Helfer, "Regime Shifting: The Trips Agreement An.d New 
Dynamics Of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking" (2004) 29 Yale J. Int'l L. 1. 
425 In particular, arguments on the manner by which the CCA, supra note I needed to be amended for 
Canada to comply with its international obligations to implement effective TPMs under the WIPO Internet 
Treaties, supra note 227, have been the object of heated debate. See for example: Geist, supra note 300, 
and in direct response to this article: Ficsor, supra note 300. See also CCMA, supra note 75, Preamble, 
which specifically refers to the need for Canada to coordinate its approach with other countries through the 
adoption of internationally recognized copyright norms and to amend the CCA, supra note 1, to comply 
with the WIPO Internet Treaties, supra note 227. 
426 Ibid. 
427 The WIPO Internet Treaties, supra note 227, are special agreements to the Berne Convention, supra note 
406, art 20. Special agreements need to grant to copyright holders more protection than under the Berne 
Convention or at least contain provisions that are not contrary to the Berne Convention. 
428 Berne Convention, supra note 406, art 1 provides for the creation of a Union "for the protection of the 
rights of authors in their literary and artistic works."; TRIPS, supra note 420, Preamble; WCT, supra note 
227, Preamble, WPPT, supra note 227, Preamble. 
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these goals, the international conventions set substantive minima,429 including the subject matter, 
scope of copyright protection, and enforcement that member states need to provide to other 
member states' nationals. The conventions generally operate under the principle of national 
treatment by virtue of which member states cannot offer a lower level of copyright protection than 
the one they offer to their own nationals.430 Member states are free to offer greater levels of 
copyright protection and enforcement than are required under the international conventions.431 
These international conventions do not set substantive maxima on copyright holders' rights except 
in very rare instances.432 The voices that are expressing the need for the clearer elaboration of 
limitations and exceptions to copyright infringement in international instruments are increasingly 
receiving attention.433 
Of particular relevance to copyright consumers' rights, these international conventions also 
establish the conditions under which member states may limit copyright holders' exclusive 
429 The principle of substantive minima or minimum standard is stated as follows in TRIPS, supra note 420, 
art 1 (1 ): "Members shall give effect to the provisions of this Agreement. Members may, but shall not be 
obliged to, implement in their law more extensive protection than is required by this Agreement, provided 
that such protection does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement. Members shall be free to 
determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal 
s~stem and practice." 
4 0 TRIPS, supra note 420, art 3 (1) imposes a national treatment obligation to the member states, with some 
exceptions including as they are already stated in the Paris Convention (1967) the Berne Convention (1971) 
and the Rome Convention: ibid. 
431 This flows from the principle of minimum standards or substantive minima. 
432 One limitation to copyright holders' exclusive rights is mandatory in the Berne Convention, supra note 
406, i.e. art 10(1) which deals with the right to "make quotations from a work which has already been 
lawfully made available to the public": ibid. As Vaver, "From Owner Rights to User Rights", supra note 
298 at 736 observes, referring to the three-step test (see discussion in this section, infra) that applies to any 
exception to copyright infringement: "If user rights were truly to be balanced against owner rights, one 
would expect to find a provision that owner rights should be enacted or enforced only in (1) certain special 
cases that (2) demonstrably encourage the production of the work, and that (3) do not unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of users. That feature of balance does not yet appear on any WIPO or 
TRIPS agenda. It should." For a response to critiques of the lack of a substantive balance at the 
international copyright level and the need to look at the distinct nature of international conventions and 
flexibility that they confer to national member states, see: Graeme Dinwoodie, "The International 
Intellectual Property System: Treaties, Norms, National Courts and Private Ordering" in D. Gervais (ed.) 
Intellectual Property, Trade and Development: Strategies to Optimize Economic Development in a TRIPS 
Plus Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 61 at 88-89. 
433 See P.Bernt Hugenholtz and Ruth L. Okediji, Conceiving an International Instrument on Limitations and 
Exceptions to Copyright, sponsored by Open Society Institute (OSI), Final Report (6 March 2008). See also 
Dinwoodie, supra note 432 at 87, where the author discusses movements at the international level to 
develop positive users' rights. 
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rights.434 The Berne Convention, TRIPS, and WIPO Internet Treaties each contain a provision 
commonly referred to as the "three-step test" that sets the conditions that need to be met when 
member states impose restrictions on or exceptions to copyright holders' exclusive rights. 435 The 
three-step test provides that member states shall confine limitations or exceptions to copyright 
holders' exclusive rights to: (i) special cases, (ii) which do not conflict with a normal exploitation 
of the work, and which (iii) do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of copyright 
holders.436 
In theory, the three-step test establishes a framework for how national member states should 
address exceptions to copyright infringement in their laws. In practice, it is questionable that the 
broad and vague wording of the three-step test can provide much guidance to national 
legislatures.437 The interpretations of the three-step step vary widely, from a balanced 
interpretation granting flexibility to implementation by national jurisdictions,438 to interpretations 
narrowly construing the permitted exceptions to copyrights.439 This is generally the trend in the 
jurisprudence on TRIPS that emanates from the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement 
434 Ricketson & Ginsburg, supra note 230 at 755-878, analyse the exceptions to copyright holders' 
exclusive rights under the Berne Convention, supra note 406, TRIPS, supra note 420 and the WIPO Internet 
treaties, supra note 227. 
435 Berne Convention, supra note 406, art 9(2); TRIPS, supra note 420, art 13; WCT, supra note 227, art 10; 
WP PT, supra note 227, art 16. The three-step test is limited to reproduction rights in the case of the Berne 
Convention, ibid, and applies to all exclusive rights in the case of TRIPS, WCT and WPPT, ibid. 
436 Ibid. The language varies between the three conventions but the substance of each of the three 
requirements is similar, except for the Berne Convention, supra note 406, art 9(2) which applies only to the 
exclusive reproduction rights of copyright holders. 
437 Unlike other international intellectual property norms. For example, the obligation pursuant to TRIPS, 
supra note 420, to protect computer programs as literary works, or the obligation to secure exclusive rental 
rights on computer programs and optionally, on cinematographic works (Ibid, arts 10-1 I). See Giuseppina 
D' Agostino, "Opening Remarks to the Legislative Committee on Bill C-32" made on December I, 2010, 
online: http://www.iposgoode.ca/2010/12/my-opening-remarks-to-the-legislative-committee-on-bill-c-32/, 
[D' Agostino, "Opening Remarks to the Legislative Committee"] arguing against the incorporation of the 
three-step test in the CCA, supra note I: "This would be inviting more ambiguity to an already ambiguous 
framework in defining, for Canada, what is meant by normal exploitation, what is unreasonable prejudice, 
what are the legitimate interests of the author and so on." 
438 Government of Canada, Balanced Copyright, Copyright Modernization Act - Backgrounder, supra 
note 180. See also For example see: Christopher Geiger, "The three-step test, a threat to a balanced 
copyright law" (2006) 37 International Review for Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 683 [Geiger 
2006]; Andrew F. Christie, "Maximising Permissible Exceptions to Intellectual Property Rights" in Annette 
Kur & Vytautas Mizaras, eds, The Structure of Intellectual Property Law: Can One Size Fit All? 
(Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2011) 121. 
439 See infra note 440. The application of the three-step test to copyright has been largely commented upon, 
including in Canada. See for example: Daniel Gervais, "Making Copyright Whole: A Principled Approach 
to Copyright Exceptions and Limitations" (2008) 5 University of Ottawa Law & Technology Journal 1. 
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Body.440 Although the reports issued by the panels set up by this body only bind the parties to the 
dispute, they are often referred to as authoritative sources on the interpretation of TRIPS and other 
international agreements. 
One corollary of the vague language of the three-step test is that this should give member states 
the flexibility they need to create the proper level of exceptions and limitations to copyrights to 
meet the needs of their specific domestic exigencies. This is what a group of international 
copyright scholars advocated through The Declaration - A balanced interpretation of the three-
step test in copyright Law that was signed in 2008.441 This initiative falls within broader 
movements that press the need to give way to the flexibilities that international intellectual 
property conventions such as TRIPS contain so as to allow member states to adequately balance a 
broad range of competing interests with those of exclusive right holders.442 
440 The Three-step test has been applied by the Panels constituted by the World Trade Intellectual Property 
Dispute Settlement Body with respect to various intellectual property 1ights. With respect to TRIPS, supra 
note 420, art 13 (three-step test for copyright) see: United States- Section 110(5) Copyright Act (Complaint 
by the European Communities) (2000) WTO Doc WT/DSl60/R, at 31-68 (Panel Report). See also on the 
interpretation of TRIPS, supra note 420, art 30 (three-step test regarding patents): Canada-Patent protection 
of pharmaceutical products (Complaint by the European Communities) (2000) WTO Doc WT/DS/114/R, at 
paras 7 .20ff (Panel Report); The panel reports are not binding except as between the parties to the dispute. 
They are frequently referred to as authoritative sources of interpretation of TRIPS, supra note 420, and 
other international conventions. For a review of the interpretations of the tests applied in Panel reports, see: 
Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, "Designing a Global Intellectual Property System 
Responsive to Change: the WTO, WIPO, and Beyond" (2009) 46 Hous. L. Rev. 1187 at 1206ff. 
441 Declaration (2008) A balanced interpretation of the three-step test in copyright (from the Max Planck 
Institute), Online: http://www.ip-watch.org/2008/07 /24/i p-experts-si gn-declaration-against-unbalanced-
copyri ght-three-step-test/. The initiators and coordinators of the Declaration are: Christophe Geiger, Reto 
M. Hilty, Jonathan Griffiths & Uma Suthersanen. The group of experts contributing to the drafting of the 
Declaration and first signatories are: Valerie Laure Benabou, Lionel Bently, Thomas Dreier, Severine 
Dusollier, Gustavo Ghidini, Henning GroBe Ruse-Khan, Bernt Hugenholtz, Dionysia Kallinikou, Kamiel 
Koelman, Annette Kur, Makeen Makeen, Vytautas Mizaras, Hector MacQueen, Giil Okutan Nilsson, 
Alexander Peukert, Jerome Reichman, Jan Rosen, Jens Schovsbo, Martin Senftleben, Fabrice Siiriainen, 
Paul L.C. Torremans, Elzbieta Traple, Michel Vivant, Rolf Weber, Guido Westkamp & Raquel Xalabarder. 
442 The international movement towards an interpretation of TRIPS, supra note 420 that gives more 
flexibility to its member states has been prevalent in the area of patents and public health issues, as reflected 
in the Declaration on the TRIPS agreement and public health, Doha, 14 November 2001, 
WT/MIN(Ol )/DEC/2. See also: Christopher Geiger, "Exploring the Flexibilities of the TRIPS Agreement's 
provisions on limitations and exceptions" in Annette Kur & Vytautas Mizaras, eds, The Structure of 
Intellectual Property Law: Can One Size Fit All? (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2011) 287. 
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The three-step test has been specifically incorporated in EU secondary law443 and in national 
copyright legislation, including in France.444 The inclusion of the three-step test in the CCA was 
proposed in the parliamentary hearings on Bill C-32,445 but the three-step test was not included in 
the amendments to the CCA in 2012. 446 In light of the vague and broad language of the test, it is 
not surprising that such incorporation has been received with skepticism in the jurisdictions that 
have incorporated the three-step test in their regional or national laws. In particular, commentators 
fear that the manner by which the EU incorporated the three-step test in its secondary law gives a 
tool to the judiciary to further shape (i.e., generally constrain) existing copyright limitations or 
exceptions as they currently exist within their domestic laws, thus adding more legal uncertainty 
to existing legal concepts.447 Other commentators take the contrary position, viewing the 
incorporation of the three-step test into domestic laws more positively, and arguing that it can 
maximize the effect of the flexibilities that the test confers in the treatment of exceptions to 
copyrights. 448 
There is confusion about the effect of international conventions on domestic law and courts. In 
Canada and other jurisdictions, international conventions to which Canada is a party, are not the 
law per se in Canada. An enabling act of Parliament is needed, the intent of which being to give 
effect to the international convention through the application of the transformation doctrine.449 
When the enabling act is in place, the international convention serves as an aid to interpret and 
contextualize the national law that gives effect to it (in the present instance, the CCA) to clarify 
443 See Directive 2001129/EC, supra note 237, art 5(5) imposes the three conditions as they are set in the 
three-step test to the scope of limitations or exceptions copyright holders' exclusive rights that European 
Member States may impose. 
444 Art LI 22-5 CPI, in fine, submits Ii mitations to copyright holders' ex.clusi ve rights to the three-step test. 
445 Bill C-32, An Act to amend the Copyright Act, 3rd Session, 401h Parl., 2010 (lsr reading June 2, 2010); 
See D' Agostino, "Opening Remarks to the Legislative Committee," supra note 437. 
446 CCA, supra note 1, amended by the CCMA, supra note 75. 
447 See Geiger 2006, supra note 438, Dusollier 2007, supra note 304 at 435-447; Dusollier 2010, supra note 
246 at para 2.1.3. In the Canadian context see D' Agostino, "Opening Remarks to the Legislative 
Committee" supra note 437, arguing against the introduction of the three-step step in the CCA, supra note 
1. 
448 See for example Christie, supra note 438. On a related idea, see Daniel Gervais, "Towards a new core 
international copyright norm: the reverse three-step test" (2005) 9 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 1. 
449 See Capital Cities Communications Inc. v Canadian Radio-Television Commission, (1978] 2 S.C.R. 141 
at 171-176. International conventions are negotiated and signed by the Government and as such do not 
create laws. The enabling act of Parliament must fall within Parliament's subject-matter powers. 
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any uncertainty.450 As the Supreme Court stated in National Corn Growers Assn. v. Canada 
(Import Tribunal),451 "where the text of the domestic law lends itself to it, one should also strive to 
expound an interpretation which is consonant with the relevant international obligations."452 
International treaties provide a contextual interpretation tool for the Canadian enabling act.453 
In Canada, there is little doubt that international intellectual property conventions influence court 
decisions. The manner by which they do is not always clear and consistent with the legal sphere in 
which international conventions operate vis-a-vis our domestic laws. International conventions 
are invoked by our courts in varied circumstances and legal bases. In some cases, including in 
cases involving copyright issues, the Supreme Court and lower courts have resorted to 
international conventions to give a historical interpretation of the CCA or to interpret the scope of 
its provisions when unclear.454 In other cases, courts have been silent on the existence of 
international norms deriving from intellectual property conventions to which Canada is a party. It 
is noteworthy that the Supreme Court did not refer to the three-step test in three recent judgments 
where it had to interpret the scope of fair dealing in Canada, i.e., CCH, Bell Canada, and 
Alberta.455 Canada needs to comply with the three-step test by virtue of its copyright international 
obligations.456 The compliance of fair dealing, as interpreted by the Supreme Court with the three-
step test is unclear.457 Finally, Canadian courts have referred to international conventions to 
450 National Corn Growers Assn. v Canada (Import Tribunal), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1324, Part IV B) a) 
(Gonthier J. for the majority). 
451 Ibid. 
452 Ibid. See also Re: Sound v Motion Picture Theatre Associations of Canada, 2012 SCC 38 at para 51. 
453 Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 4th ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 
2002) at 422. 
454 Theberge, supra note 16 at paras 6, 71, 114; Entertainment Software Association v Society of 
Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, supra note 38 at paras 16-20, 24, 87-97. Rogers 
Communications Inc. v Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, supra note 38 at 
paras 25, 36-43; Re: Sound v Motion Picture Theatre Associations of Canada, 2012 SCC 38, at para 7. 
455 In Reprographic Reproduction 2005-2009, Re, 2009 CarswellNat 1930 (Copyright Board), at para 114 
the Copyright Board referred to the three-step test of the Berne Convention, supra note 406, art 9(2) and 
TRIPS, supra note 420, art 13, concluding that "copies made on a teacher's initiative for his or her students 
either conflict with the normal exploitation of the work or unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of 
the rights holders". 
456 As it is set out in the Berne Convention, supra note 406, art 9(2); TRIPS, supra note 420, art 13, and 
upon Canada's ratification of the WIPO Internet Treaties, in WCT, supra note 227, art 10 and WPPT, supra 
note 227, art 16. 
457The question includes whether the application of the analytical framework that the Supreme Court 
applied in CCH, supra note 5 and recently in Bell Canada, supra note 42 and Alberta, supra note 90, to 
assess whether the dealing in a work is fair, would meet the requirements of the three-step test. See Gervais, 
"Canadian Copyright Law Post-CCH" (2004)18 I.P.J. 131 at 164ff.; Daniel Gervais, "The Purpose of 
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interpret domestic law, even if there is no enabling act of Parliament in place giving effect to the 
obligations of the international conventions.458 The Supreme Court referred to the WIPO Internet 
Treaties on occasion, even when Canada was only a signatory to these conventions and had not 
yet ratified and given effect to their provisions by amending its national laws.459 
One of the overarching goals of international intellectual property conventions is the 
harmonization of national copyright laws worldwide to promote the global trade of intellectual 
property intensive products.460 The Supreme Court and lower courts have invoked international 
conventions to support an interpretation to harmonize Canada's laws to international norms and as 
a means to refer to the national laws of "like-minded jurisdictions."461 The legislative reform 
debates that led to the entry into force of the CCMA in 2012 confirm that the harmonization of 
Canadian laws with copyright international law is part of Canada's policy objectives. 462 
Copyright Law in Canada" (2005) 2 U. Ottawa L. & Tech. J. 315, in particular at 322. On the compliance of 
the fair use doctrine with the three-step test in a US context, see Haochen Sun, "Overcoming the Achilles 
Heel of Copyright Law" (2007) 5 Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 265. 
458 Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [ 1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 (SCC). 
459 For example in Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Canadian Assn. of 
Internet Providers, supra note 27, paras 65, 73, 97, 108, 149-151 the Supreme Court (both in reasons of 
majority and Lebel J. reasons) referred to WCT, supra note 227, art 8 (making available right) to interpret 
the CCA, supra, note I, s. 2.4(1) (b): Communication to the public by telecommunication, at a time where 
Canada was only a signatory to WCT, supra note 227. See also Rogers Communications Inc. v Society of 
Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, supra note 38 at paras 44-49 where the Supreme 
Court referred to WCT, supra note 227, art 8 in support of its interpretation of CCA, supra note 1, s 3( 1 )(f), 
noting that: "The WCT is only cited to demonstrate that the broad interpretation of s. 3(1)(fJ of the Act, 
recognizing that a communication "to the public" subject to copyright protection may occur through point-
to-point transmissions at the user's request, is not out of step with art 8 of the WCT and international 
thinking on the issue.": ibid, at par 49. For a discussion on how Canadian Courts refer to international 
conventions in intellectual property law, see Daniel J. Gervais, "The Role oflnternational Treaties in the 
Interpretation of Canadian Intellectual Property Statutes" in Oonagh Fitzgerald, ed., The Globalized Rule of 
Law: Relationships Between International and Domestic Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006) 549 [Gervais, 
"The Role of International Treaties"]; see also Mira J. Tawfik, "No Longer Living in Splendid Isolation: 
The Globalization of National Courts and the Internationalization of Intellectual Property Law" (2007) 32 
Queen's L.J. 573. 
460 See the discussion above in Part V of this chapter. 
461 Theberge, supra note 16 at para 6 where Binnie, J. for the majority observed: "In light of the 
globalization of the so-called "cultural industries", it is desirable, within the limits permitted by our own 
legislation, to harmonize our interpretation of copyright protection with other like-minded 
jurisdictions." See also Gervais, "The Role of International Treaties", supra note 459, in particular at 567-
568, where the author describes the shift in the Supreme Court intellectual jurisprudence in how it invokes 
international intellectual property conventions beyond the classical rule of interpretation in case of 
uncertainty, but more to support broader policy arguments including trade-related justifications that 
withstand an instrumentalist view of intellectual property. 
462 CCMA, supra note 75, Preamble: "Whereas in the current digital era copyright protection is enhanced 
when countries adopt coordinated approaches, based on internationally recognized norms" and states that 
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International copyright conventions have shaped, and will likely continue to shape, the CCA, 
Canadian copyright policy, and court decisions to a large extent. Their political and normative 
force in the lead up to ongoing amendments of the CCA is undeniable. While Parliament is bound 
to incorporate the international norms they create when implementing new laws to give effect to 
them, their applicability before our courts is a different matter. They are not the law but can at 
times provide context to it when it is unclear. This distinction is particularly important in the 
context of the three-step test, which by its language is unlikely to be of much assistance to the 
judiciary when clarifying exceptions to copyright infringement. This may explain why the 
Supreme Court did not refer to the test on the three recent occasions when it had to interpret the 
scope of fair dealing.463 
To sum up, any argument based on international conventions to which Canada is a member state 
needs to be approached with caution. While the influence of international copyright and 
intellectual property conventions on the evolution of Canadian copyright law is undeniable, 
international copyright conventions remain distinct from Canadian copyright law. International 
copyright and intellectual property conventions provide a source of interpretation of the CCA in 
specific cases. When referring to international conventions, either in the context of legal reform or 
as an aid to interpretation of the CCA, law- and policy-makers, as well as the judiciary, should 
bear in mind the flexibility that international copyright and intellectual property conventions 
generally confer on member states as to how they are implemented. The same rule of 
interpretation should guide reference to the three-step test as an international copyright norm 
regarding exceptions to copyright holders' exclusive rights. 
VI. Conclusion 
Copyright law has little regard for copyright consumers. Many of the permitted uses of copyright 
works without copyright holders' consent are not of particular relevance to consumers. Recent 
amendments to the CCA, adding education, parody, or satire to the purposes of fair dealing, and 
introducing the four new user provisions do not improve matters much for consumers. While the 
one of the objectives of the CCMA, ibid, is to amend the CCA, supra note 1, in order to comply with 
international norms as they are reflected in the WIPO Internet Treaties, supra note 227. 
463 1.e. in CCH, supra note 5; Bell Canada, supra note 42 and Alberta, supra note 90. 
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recent amendments to the fair dealing provisions and Supreme Court jurisprudence on fair dealing 
indicate a greater recognition of the interests (e.g., users, the public) competing with the exclusive 
rights of copyright holders, the fair dealing doctrine is ill adapted to address the needs of 
copyright consumers.464 With respect to the introduction of the four new user provisions, while 
they show an unprecedented attempt to address specific needs of copyright consumers, they are 
piecemeal and are subject to many caveats.465 In addition, the status of freedoms and privileges 
that have been traditionally considered outside the purview of the exclusive rights of copyright 
holders, i.e., the unlimited right to read, listen, and play copies of copyright works is threatened in 
the digital environment. 466 
The legal landscape of copyright consumers is a maze: the paths of users' rights include many 
dead ends. What Parliament created and gave to consumers, it also gave explicit allowance to 
copyright holders to take back from them, or turned its head away from copyright holders' ability 
to do so. Of the four new user provisions, three can be explicitly overridden by TPMs. This 
significantly compromises their status as rights and makes their mandatory nature unlikely. As to 
other exceptions to copyright infringement, their nature and scope as rights are debatable and so is 
their mandatory nature. With all these questions in mind, the so-called copyright users' rights, 
even when they apply, do not provide much solace to copyright consumers because of all the 
instances when they may not apply and the legal uncertainty that results therefrom. 
The constraints that are permitted or not disallowed on users' rights in the CCA, leading to 
questions about their true nature and scope are not mere academic questions. In addition to 
leaving consumers in an undesirable state of legal uncertainty and exposing them to increased risk 
of litigation, the permitted constraints on users' rights dictate to a large extent how copyright 
holders and intermediaries develop their business models and their offerings to consumers.467 The 
unsettled nature of exceptions to copyright infringement or the so-called users' rights have 
rippling effects on the scope of consumers' rights to commercial copies of copyright works as a 
whole. As one important legal base to delineate copyright consumers' rights, the CCA 's uncertain 
464 See the discussion in Part II C of this chapter. 
465 See the discussion in Part II D of this chapter. 
466 See the introductory comments in Part II of this chapter. 
467 See the concluding remarks in Part IV of this chapter. 
125 
rendering of users' rights can also undermine the effective support that property and consumer 
law offers with respect to copyright consumers' claims to commercial copies of copyright works. 
Can we provide a simpler floor plan to copyright consumers and, if so, on what legal and 
normative base? The place of copyright consumers and what the law allows them to do with 
copyright works can be better understood by looking at what consumers have in their possession: 
the copy of a copyright work. To understand this peculiar fom1 of personal property, in constant 
interaction with copyright holders' exclusive rights, and losing its traditional shape in the world of 
online distribution, the next chapter introduces basic principles of property law and theory. This 
will set the foundation for the analysis of the interaction between copyright and commercial 
copies of copyright works on what I hope is a more level playing field. 
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Chapter 4 
Laying the Framework: Property, Ownership, and Property Limitations 
I. Introduction 
In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, I described the unsettled place of copyright users and consumers within the 
framework of copyright, as well as the unclear status and limited appeal for consumers of so-called 
users' rights, as they are set out in Canada's Copyright Act [CCA]. 1 To be able to define copyright 
consumers' rights, a broader understanding of their rights to commercial copies of copyright works 
beyond the framework of copyright law is required. 
In this chapter, I present the key concepts of property law and theory, in particular, private property, that 
I will apply to apprehend the peculiar nature of commercial copies of copyright works. To that end, I 
rely to a large extent on James Harris' s theory of property in Property and Justice. 2 Harris' s detailed 
articulation of the heterogeneous nature of property, the ownership spectrum, the operation of property 
limitations, as well as his characterization of intellectual property motivate this choice in great part. 
Lawfully acquired copies of copyright works are a unique form of personal property that is heavily 
subject to the exclusive rights of copyright holders. A better understanding of each set of ownership 
entitlements as they pertain to copyright works and of the operation of property limitations are critical to 
the definition of copyright consumers' rights. 
In Part II, I summarize the main features of Harris' s conception of property and, in particular, his 
description of the "ownership spectrum." In Part III, I present the main features and significance of the 
standardization of property through the numerus clausus principle. In Part IV, I briefly introduce the 
controversies around property and theoretical justifications of (intellectual) property that I develop 
further in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. 3 In Part V, I discuss Harris' theory on the various forms of property 
limitations and their central function within the property institution. In particular, the justifications for 
property limitations and their operation provide important insights for understanding the peculiar nature 
of copy ownership and how it interacts with the exclusive rights of copyright holders in copyright 
I RSC 1985, c C-42. 
2 James W. Harris, Property and Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996). 
3 In particular, see Chapter 5 Part III, Part IV and Part V and Chapter 6 Part III. 
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works. In Part VI, I offer concluding remarks on the concepts of property and ownership that I present 
in this chapter and how they will be applied in subsequent chapters. 
IL Property and ownership 
In Property and Justice, Harris presents the essence of the property institution as the twin manifestation 
of trespassory rules4 and the existence of an ownership spectrum.5 These various forms of ownership 
share in common: (i) a juridical relation between a person and a resource, which implies the ability to 
identify each and a separateness between the two,6 (ii) privileges and powers that are open ended7 and 
(iii) that authorize self-seekingness by the owner. 8 Self-seekingness refers to this intimate relationship 
between the owner and the resource as to how she chooses to dispose of the resource, with primafacie 
no duty to account to any one for the merit or rationality of that preference. 9 The self-seekingness trait 
on the ownership spectrum of property is an important differentiator to distinguish private property from 
public property. 10 I will discuss in more detail each of the three components that are common on the 
ownership spectrum as I apply them to describe the nature of copyright and of commercial copies of 
copyright works. 11 While "full-blooded ownership" 12 is the strongest illustration of all three 
characteristics on the ownership spectrum, at the other end, mere property embraces "some open-ended 
set of use-privileges and some open-ended set of powers of control over uses made by others."13 For 
4 Harris, supra note 2 at 25, 86 defines trespassory rules as "all rules which, by reference to a resource, 
impose obligations (negative or positive) upon an open-ended range of persons," with the exception of 
some privileged individual, group, or agency (i.e. the owner(s)). They are open-ended, and give rise to 
various civil or criminal remedies such as damages, possessory recovery, injunction or restitution. The 
power to exclude is generally recognized at varying degrees of intensity by property theory scholars as an 
important feature to describe property: see the discussion further below in Part II of this chapter. 
5 Harris, supra note 2 at 5, 27-30. The variances on the ownership spectrum are theoretically open-ended 
and infinite, ibid at 275. 
6 Harris, supra note 2 at 332; James E Penner, The Idea of Property in Law (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997) at 
105-128. 
7 For example, art 947 CCQ defines the right of ownership as "the right to use, enjoy and dispose of 
property fully and freely, subject to the limits and conditions for doing so determined by law." 
8 Harris, supra note 2 at 5. 
9 Ibid at 65. 
10Jbid at 108. 
11 See the discussion in Chapter 5 Part IV A and in Chapter 6 Part II B. 
12 Harris, supra note 2 at 30, defines "Full-blooded ownership" as "the relationship between a person (or 
persons) and a thing such that he (or they) have primafacie unlimited privileges of use or abuse over the 
thing and prima facie unlimited powers of control and transmission, so far as such use or exercise of power 
does not infringe some property independent prohibition". I discuss the nature of "property independent 
prohibitions" and other property limitations in Part V of this Chapter. 
13 Harris, supra note 2 at 29. 
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instance, full powers of transmission may not be present in the case of mere property, while it is prima 
facie the case of full-blooded ownership. 14 An element of scarcity triggers the need to set up property 
institutions. 15 In addition to the presence of trespassory rules and the ownership spectrum, every 
property institution must include: property-limitation rules and expropriation rules, which I discuss 
below in this chapter. 16 
Property is by no means a homogeneous concept. 17 It has evolved since the beginning of time and will 
likely continue to do so, as an enduring institution to regulate human behaviour and aspirations. 18 Yet, 
there are important points of commonality that bring together ownership interests, along side quasi-
ownership interests and non-ownership proprietary interests, under the umbrella of property and allow 
important distinctions within and outside the property institution. 19 Property plays a vital role in shaping 
human beings' identities and how they interact with one and other in all spheres of human and cultural 
life with respect to both tangible and intangible resources.20 Intellectual property is one relatively recent 
example of the evolution of the property institution,21 and its legitimacy within the property family 
ignites passionate debates that I will discuss in Chapter 5. 22 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid, at 24 & fol. 
16 Harris, supra note 2 at 34. See the discussion on property limitations in Part IV of this chapter. 
17 Harris, supra note 2 at 4. See also Jeremy Waldron, The right to private property (Clarendon Press: 
Oxford, 1988) at 26ff; Mary Jane. Mossman & William F. Flanagan, Property Law Cases and Commentary, 
2d ed. (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications, 2004) at 2. 
18 Harris, supra note 2 at 4; Eduardo M. Penalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 2010) at 27. 
19 Harris, supra note 2 at 141: the three groups of interests "build upon the twinned and mutually irreducible 
notions of trespassory rules and the ownership spectrum." and at 139, property comprises "(l) ownership 
and quasi-ownership interests in things (tangible or ideational); (2) other rights over such things which are 
enforceable against all-comers (non-ownership proprietary interests); (3) money; and (4) cashable rights." I 
will define further ownership interests and non-ownership proprietary interests as I apply them to define the 
nature of copyright in Chapter 5 and the nature of commercial copies of copyright works in Chapter 6. 
Harris, ibid at 139-142, acknowledges the difficulty of arriving at one unifying and complete definition of 
property, focusing rather on underscoring its salient features. 
20 Ibid. Tony Honore, "Ownership" in Tony Honore Making Law Bind, Essays Legal and Philosophical, 
(Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1987) 161 at 161. The original version of this essay was published in A.G. 
Guest, ed., Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence ( 1961 ). 
21 Ibid. 
22 See the discussion in Chapter 5 Part III, Part IV and Part V. 
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Harris offers one account (among numerous accounts) of the main attributes of property and of the 
nature of ownership. 23 The "twin-manifestation" framework that Harris proposes to define the property 
institution emphasizes the "bundle of rights" characteristic that is often ascribed to property, as well as 
supported by the power to exclude, opposable to all.24 Commentators define the distinctive nature of 
property in different ways: e.g., as being the power to exclude more than the bundle or rights and vice 
versa,
25 
or both,26 or neither.27 Conceptions of property include the "thing"28 or a relation; either person-
to-person,29 person-to-things,30 or person-to-person through things.31 The emphasis on certain 
23 On the concept of ownership, see Honore, supra note 20, in particular at 165-179 where he provides a 
detailed account of the incidents of ownership which include: the right to possess, the right to use, the right 
to manage, the right to the income and capital of the thing, the right to security and the duty to prevent 
harm. James 0. Grunebaum, Private Ownership (London, New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987), 
developed a theory of "autonomous ownership" that is divided in three main categories based on the nature 
of the resource that is owned, i.e., domains of land and resources, domains of self and labour and the 
domain of "mixed ownables": ibid at 3 and 182. 
24 Harris, supra note 2 at 5, i.e. through describing property institutions as encompassing the twin 
manifestation of trespassory rules and the presence of an ownership spectrum which comprises powers and 
~rivileges between a person and a resource that are primafacie open-ended. 
5 For example, for Waldron, supra note 17 at 294, the essential characteristics of property are: the right to 
exclude others from the use of a resource, the exclusive right to determine what shall be done with a 
resource and the power to alienate one's rights over a resource on whatever terms one thinks appropriate. 
He emphasizes how the freedom of choice in the economic sphere is of paramount importance. See Honore, 
supra note 20; see also Stephen R. Munzer A Theory of Property (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990) at 22-27, where the author builds upon the works of Hohfeld and Honore and emphasizes the bundle 
of incidents of property as they relate to objects. 
26 Harris, supra note 2, would likely fall in that category. 
27 Hanoch Dagan, Property Values and Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) at 40-41. 
28 Munzer, supra note 25 at 16-17 describes this definition of property as the laymen's view as opposed to a 
more sophisticated view of property which defines it through relationships between persons and objects. 
See also Henry E. Smith, "Property as the law of things" (2012) 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1691, who criticizes the 
bundle of stick or bundle of rights theories of property and argues that we need to replace the "thing" at the 
centre of property as a "law of modular things" as supported or explained through information costs 
justifications. 
29 Wesley N. Hohfeld: Wesley N. Hohfeld, "Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning" (1917) 26 Yale L.J. 710; Wesley N. Hohfeld, "Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as 
Applied in Judicial Reasoning" (1913) 23 Yale L.J. 16. Harris, supra note 2 at 121-124 reviews Hohfeld' s 
theory of property interests to conclude that Hohfeld' s account of property interests that focuses on 
relationships is incomplete and explains why we cannot dispense of the person-thing relationship. See also 
the analysis and critique of Hohfeld's contribution to defining the dynamics within property in Munzer, 
supra note 25 at 17-22. 
30 Harris, supra note 2 at 142 views property as "interests in things". For a discussion on the theories 
emphasizing the "person to person" and "person to thing" essential characteristics of property: see Lisa 
Austin "Person, Place, Or Thing? Property And The Structuring Of Social Relations" (2010) 60 University 
OfToronto Law Journal 445. 
31 David Lametti, "Concept of Property: Relations through Objects of Social Wealth" (2003) 53 U. Toronto 
L.J. 325 [Lametti 2003] at 355 defines private property in part as: "a social institution that comprises a 
variety of contextual relationships among individuals through objects of social wealth and is meant to serve 
a variety of individual and collective purposes." For an overview of different conceptions on the nature of 
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characteristics over others involves selecting and discriminating among complex concepts that reflect 
values and lead to different interpretations. 32 One should guard against attempts to impose too much 
uniformity when describing property, as uniformity can limit its ability to adapt and evolve.33 Rather, 
each form of property right needs to be contextualized in accordance with its underlying objectives and 
the nature of the resource to which it pertains. 34 According to Harris, we need to understand the 
underlying "property-specific justice reasons" that withstand each form of property to determine its 
proper scope. 35 
Harris' s influential conception of property36 has been criticized for the central place of the "ownership 
spectrum" in his theory and its too strong emphasis on property rights with little to no account of 
corresponding owner duties and obligations.37 More specifically, Harris's reference to "full-blooded 
ownership" may not exist in theory and even less in practice.38 The "ownership spectrum" (including 
"full-blooded ownership") that Harris meticulously unfolds needs to be qualified by the fact that no 
ownership freedoms are ever immune to challenge.39 The property institution includes expropriation 
rules and property-limitation rules,40 as well as limitations external to property, i.e., "property-
independent rules."41 These constraints on ownership and property can be translated into rights and 
duties of property owners and play a central role in Harris's theory on the main attributes and 
justifications of property. 
property see Munzer, supra note 25 at 16-17. For a recent review of the various theories and ongoing 
debates on the nature and main characteristics of property see: Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, "A 
theory of Property" (2005) 90 Cornell L. Rev. 531 at 541-551, where the authors divide theories of property 
in two main camps: the "instrumentalists", who view property as the result of default contract rules and 
"conceptualists" who place a large emphasis on the fact that the rights are opposable to all, as well as 
f:rivileged rights including the right to exclude, to use, and to transfer. 
2 For example, see Dagan, supra note 27 at 44 who explains how an over emphasis on the power to 
exclude as the rule and the limitations as exceptions evacuates the notion of social responsibility embedded 
in property. See also Lametti 2003, supra note 31 at 377. 
33 For Dagan, supra note 27 at 43, too much uniformity "would undermine the freedom-enhancing 
pluralism and the individuality-enhancing multiplicity so crucial to the liberal ideal of justice." 
34 Dagan, supra note 27 at 42. 
35 Harris, supra note 2 at 168. 
36 See Timothy Endicott, Joshua Getzler & Edwin Peel, eds, Properties of Law: Essays in Honour of Jim 
Harris (Oxford: OUP, 2006). 
37 For example, see Lametti 2003, supra note 31, in particular at 356 -360 where the author offers a detailed 
analysis and critique of Harris' s theory. 
38 Ibid at 364. 
39 Harris, supra note 2 at 275. 
40 Harris, supra note 2 at 34. 
41 Ibid at 32-33. See also the discussion on property limitations in Part V of this chapter. 
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As I will demonstrate throughout the Second Part of my thesis and beyond, Harris's framework on the 
key attributes of property is particularly valuable in defining consumers' rights to commercial copies of 
copyright works. The trespassory rules or opposability to all emphasize important distinctions and 
considerations between the statutory regime of copyright and how copyright exclusive rights can be 
extended by contract. The ownership spectrum and the gradation of rights it describes help decorticate 
the powers and privileges of copyright holders over their incorporeal resource, copyright, as well as the 
powers and privileges of the personal property owners of the corporeal resource (the commercial copy) 
embedding the copyright work. Here, two separate forms of property (corporeal and incorporeal) owned 
by different owners pertain to the same object, the copyright work. To what extent do the powers and 
privileges of one owner limit the powers and privileges of the other simultaneous owner, and to what 
extent do they co-exist? To what extent does each bundle of rights impact, shape, or define one's own 
resource and the resource of the other?42 Harris's property theory framework, including the operation of 
property limitations, provides compelling analytical tools to mediate between consumers and copyright 
holders' rights in relation to copyright works. 43 
To sum up on the key concepts of private property and ownership that I will apply when defining the 
nature of and rights pertaining to commercial copies of copyright works, Harris' s twin manifestation of 
trespassory rules and the ownership spectrum emphasize the opposability to all feature of property and 
the primafacie open-ended feature between a person and a resource.44 At the same time, the open-ended 
texture of ownership interests does not preclude the existence of various forms of limitations, which, as 
I discuss below in this chapter, are an integral part of property and how it is regulated.45 Prior to that, I 
will tum to another important aspect of the property institution that is commonly referred to as the 
numerus clausus or standardization of property, and is needed for the proper understanding of copyright 
and copy ownership. 
42 I apply Harris, supra note 2, framework of ownership spectrum to describe the nature of copyright in 
Chapter 5 and the nature of copy ownership in Chapter 6. 
43 I discuss Harris, supra note 2, theory of property limitations in Part V of this chapter. I apply the concept 
of property limitations to copyright and copy ownership in Chapter 7. 
44 Harris, supra note 2 at 5, 25, 29-30. 
45 See the discussion on property limitations in this Part V of this chapter. 
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III. The standardization of property: the numerus clausus principle 
Numerus clausus is the principle in which there is a fixed and closed list of property rights recognized 
by law and, as one corollary, limitations on how owners can alter the nature of their property rights.46 
This concept is generally understood to be part of the civil law tradition, although it is not immune from 
inconsistencies in its application.47 The civil law typically enumerates the entitlements of ownership48 
and its possible dismemberments.49 The restriction on "the exercise of the right to dispose of property" 
is explicitly prohibited except in limited circumstances,50 and is subject to specific conditions.51 There is 
a growing recognition that a similar principle exists in the common law of property.52 Thomas Merrill 
and Henry Smith conducted a survey on the common law of property to demonstrate that the same 
principle exists in this legal tradition, although not uniformly and without bearing any specific 
appellation. 53 For Merrill and Smith, numerus clausus is best described as a "norm of judicial self-
governance" rather than as a statutory or constitutional tool of interpretation.54 It is "an extremely 
important qualification of the freedom of contract."55 Through the application of numerus clausus, 
courts will generally be reluctant to enforce contracts that are meant to alter the bundle of rights that 
apply to a resource in a form other than known property rights. 
According to Merrill and Smith, the numerus clausus principle flows from the opposability to all feature 
46 Harris, supra note 2 at 58. 
47 Lametti 2003, supra note 31 at 360-361, on how numerus clausus applies in the Quebec civil law system. 
48 Art. 947 CCQ enumerates the rights of ownership as: "the right to use, enjoy and dispose of property 
fully and freely, ... " 
49 Art 1119 CCQ lists the dismemberments of ownership as "usufruct, use, servitude and emphyteusis" and 
confirms that they are real rights. 
50 Art. 1212 CCQ imposes this prohibition, except if it is done by gift or will. 
51 Ibid: it needs to be in writing and it is only valid "if it is temporary and justified by a serious and 
legitimate interest. Art. 1214 CCQ provides that: "it may not be set up against third persons uses unless it is 
r:ublished in the proper register." 
2 Thomas Merrill & Henry Smith, "Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: the Numerus Clausus 
Principle" (2000) 110 Yale L.J. 1; Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, "Property, Contract, and 
Verification: the Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights" (2002) 31 J. Legal Stud. 373. 
See also Dagan, supra note 27 at 4, on why the author supports the numerus clausus principle within the 
institutions of property. 
53 Merrill & Smith, supra note 52 at 9-23. 
54 Ibid at 11: "Jurisprudentially speaking, the numerus clausus functions in the common law much like a 
canon of interpretation, albeit a canon that applies to common-law decision making rather than statutory or 
constitutional interpretation, or like a strong default rule in the interpretation of property rights." 
55 Ibid at 5-6. 
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of property and serves to reduce the overall information costs with respect to similar rights.56 Inspired 
by the rationale of the 19th-century English case Keppel! v Bailey,51 Merrill and Smith applied a law and 
economics analysis to explain the dynamics at play as the need to constrain the information processing 
costs of parties that are not privy to a contract that creates another species of property rights: 
by allowing even one person to create an idiosyncratic property right, the information processing costs 
of all persons who have existing or potential interests in this type of property go up. This external cost 
on other market participants forms the basis of our explanation of the numerus clausus. 58 
As a result, this feature of the property institution reflects the need to reach "the optimal standardization 
of property law."59 Other commentators, such as Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, offer different 
explanations behind the raison d'etre of numerus clausus.60 
The efficiency rationale invoked by Merrill and Smith to justify maintaining a uniformity of property 
interests is a compelling justification that benefits: all community members who have similar ownership 
rights to the ones of the owner who alters them through one transaction, and also future transferees of 
the resource to which the ownership rights have been altered in an unconventional manner. The need to 
standardize the forms of property rights is as much the prerequisite of the opposability to all incidents of 
56 Merrill & Smith, supra note 52 at 8. 
57(1834) 39 Eng. Rep. 1042 (Ch.). In that case, the Court of Chancery had to interpret the tenns of a 
contract that in effect, did not create rights that fell within recognized types of servitudes enforceable 
against subsequent purchasers. Lord Chancellor Brougham enunciated the detrimental consequences of 
enforcing the contractual rights as new forms of property as follows: "great detriment would arise and much 
confusion of rights if parties were allowed to invent new modes of holding and enjoying real property, and 
to impress upon their lands and tenements a peculiar character, which should follow them into all hands, 
however remote. Every close, every messuage, might thus be held in several fashion; and it would hardly be 
possible to know what rights the acquisition of any parcel conferred, or what obligations it imposed.": Ibid 
at 1049. 
58 Merrill & Smith, supra note 52 at 27. 
59 Merrill & Smith, supra note 52. 
60 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 52 at 374-375, explain the numerus clausus principle not so much by 
the need to standardize rights as the need to aid potential purchasers to limit their "verification costs." For 
them: "The law's limitations on property rights take the form not of standardization into a discreet number 
of well-defined forms, but rather of regulation of the types and degree of notice required to establish 
different types of property rights." Dagan, supra note 27 at 33 justifies the need to standardize property as 
follows: "the best justification for the standardization of property lies in the internal dimension-within, 
rather than without, the zone of privity. Limiting the number of property forms and standardizing their 
content facilitates the roles of property in consolidating expectations and expressing ideal forms of 
relationship. Conversely, an open-ended approach to property or a failure to sustain the normative integrity 
of the institutions of property would have undermined both law's role in consolidating expectations and its 
function in expressing such normative ideals." 
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property as it is the rectifying tool to preserve it. How can a right efficiently be opposable to all if it can 
always be subject to innumerable customizations and alterations? And how can this distinctive feature 
of property survive without maintaining that standardization? 
Commentators debate the existence of the numerus clausus principle in the common law tradition. 61 In 
the context of analyzing the rationale behind courts' reticence to enforce personal property servitudes, 
Glen 0. Robinson raises doubts about the existence and justification of the numerus clausus principle in 
the common law of property, both legally and normatively.62 He is unconvinced that the application of 
the numerus clausus principle is justified by the need to reduce the information processing costs of the 
relevant audiences, as the needs for information are so varied. 63 For Robinson, the principle is hard to 
reconcile with the need to adapt property rights to the various needs of property owners. 64 The 
notification of terms can in fact reduce information costs without the standardization of property.65 
The argument that favours tailored property interests to suit individual needs over the standardization of 
property has some merit when it can be established that consumers have a broad range of needs with 
respect to specific products and that the market is able to respond to those individual preferences. 
Obviously, the argument of choice is relevant only to the extent that the preference of the consumer is 
one that the application of the standardization of property would restrict. It is questionable whether 
consumers have highly diverse needs and expectations for mundane products, such as digital copies of 
music, film, or mass-market computer software.66 Also, in consumer transactions of commercial copies 
of copyright works, there are indications that at least some of the restrictions imposed on the 
commercial copies are widespread rather than varied and individualized, e.g., restrictions on alienation 
of the commercial copy, or on the ability to produce derivative works from the work embedded in the 
commercial copy.67 Restrictions on the alienation of commercial copies increase the power and control 
of copyright holders over the commercialization of their works and are unlikely to be in place to 
61 For example, see Glen 0. Robinson, "Personal Property Servitudes" (2004) 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1449. 
62 Ibid at 1482ff. 
63 Ibid at 1485. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid at 1487. 
66 As I discussed in Chapter 2 Part IV, "consumer" refers to individuals who make transactions for personal 
or household purposes and not for business purposes. By definition, this limits the scope of needs and 
Freferences. 
7 See the analysis of selected non-negotiated standard end-user agreements in Chapter 3 Part III C. 
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respond to specific consumer needs. 68 While the restrictions on alienation of the commercial copy 
would typically fall within the purview of contractual clauses that the application of the numerus 
clausus principle could set aside, the application of the numerus clausus principle would not set aside 
restrictions such as the prohibition of the creation of derivative works. The right to create derivative 
works is part of copyright holders' exclusive rights, while the right to control the subsequent transfer of 
copies of copyright works, except in the case of loan or rental, is not typically so.69 
The argument that notification can reduce information costs without resorting to the standardization of 
property depends on the ability of the notification to effectively communicate a new property interest.70 
Even assuming that a notice meets the standard of effective communication that implies that consumers 
will understand its meaning and ramifications, it is questionable that notices could ever reduce 
information transaction costs to the same extent that the standardization of property can. A limited list 
of forms of property will always, conceptually, be more efficient than notifications giving potential rise 
to different forms of property interests for each new transaction. Even if a new form of property interest 
becomes an industry norm, consumers would never know for sure because it could always be subject to 
change and remain within the control of suppliers. 
The skepticism about the standardization of property can be justified to some extent when the numerus 
clausus principle implicates a trade-off: more standardization gives rise to greater efficiency for the 
collectivity of owners of similar interests; however it may reduce some choices (assuming that 
consumers have myriad preferences for a particular product, that the market adequately responds to 
individual consumer preferences, and that the choices in question would be of a nature to be limited 
through the standardization of property). In the case of mundane consumer transactions of commercial 
copies of copyright works, it is not clear that the standardization of property would limit choices for 
consumers. In the context of the mass commercialization of information products, perhaps reasons other 
68 A distinction needs to be made between the rental of a commercial copy which would restrict alienation 
powers while at the same time responding to specific consumer needs and a transaction that would resemble 
a sale in all other material aspects except for the restriction on alienation of the commercial copy: see the 
discussion in Chapter 7 Part IV and Chapter 8 Part II C. 
69 I discuss copyright holders' right to control the subsequent transfer of commercial copies of their works 
through the application of the exclusive distribution right and the principle of exhaustion or first sale 
doctrine in Chapter 3 Part II F, Chapter 7 Part III A (ii) and Chapter 8 Part IV. 
70 E.g., a prominent notice on packaging of commercial copy of copyright work would more effectively 
reduce information costs that a clause in lengthy terms and conditions. 
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than economic efficiency support the application of the numerus clausus principle, including the need to 
rectify various asymmetries between suppliers and purchasers.71 
Commentators who doubt the existence of the numerus clausus principle minimize the distinctive nature 
of property as opposable to all. For Robinson, property and contracts are two forms of private ordering 
and, on that basis, he questions why courts should give precedence to the former over the latter by 
refusing to enforce contract clauses that go against, inter alia, the standardization of property.72 The 
freedom of contract of private parties should prevail over broader collective implications and the 
standardization of property to accommodate individual needs.73 I discuss in Chapter 7, the ramifications 
of these conflicting views of the standardization of property on the enforceability of restrictive terms 
and conditions in commercial transactions of copies of copyright works.74 
The issue of the numerus clausus principle limiting the existing forms of property75 is put to the test 
when it is applied to the nature of copyright, copy ownership, and the contractual environment in which 
copies of copyright works are made commercially available. As I discuss in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, 
the application of the numerus clausus principle to the nature of copyright and of copy ownership 
provides important insights about their distinctive features. 76 In Chapter 7, I look at how the numerus 
clausus principle can mediate between the objectives that withstand the existence of copyright as set out 
in the CCA, and the prima facie open-ended freedom and power of copyright holders to exploit their 
71 See the discussion in Chapter 7 Part IV on the application of the numerus clausus principle to consumer 
transactions of copies of copyright works. I discuss the theory of asymmetries to justify consumer 
protection regulation in Chapter 10. See also Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, "The New Servitudes" (2008) 
96 Geo. L.J. 885 in particular at 924-949, where the author raises concerns on contractual restrictions on 
information products' uses, which the author calls "the new servitudes", by looking at three main areas of 
concern that arise with respect to real property and personal property servitudes, i.e.: notice and information 
costs, the problem of the future and externalities. 
72 Robinson, supra note 61 at 1477-1478. 
73 Ibid. 
74 See the discussion in Chapter 7 Part IV on the mediation between copyright, copy ownership, and 
contract through the standardization of property. 
75 Merrill & Smith, supra note 52 at 11. 
76 I discuss the implications of the application of the numerus clausus principle to copyright in Chapter 5, 
and apply the numerus clausus principle to copy ownership in Chapter 6 Part II C. 
137 
exclusive rights as they wish.77 
In addition to the controversies that subsist around the existence of the numerus clausus principle within 
the property institution, there is a more fundamental controversy about the underlying justifications of 
property and intellectual property that I will introduce next for the purpose of their further application in 
Chapter 6. 78 
IV. Justifications of and controversies around (intellectual) property 
As I set out the general and relevant characteristics of property for the analysis of copyright and copy 
ownership, it is opportune at this stage to briefly introduce the property justifications that are relevant to 
copy owners, with references to copyright holders. As I will discuss chapter 6, the scope of the 
ownership rights in commercial copies of copyright works is largely determined by the scope of 
copyright.79 As a result, the justifications behind the ownership rights in commercial copies of copyright 
works are interwoven with the justifications for the exclusive rights conferred by copyright.80 I analyze 
the nature and effects of the various theoretical justifications of copy ownership and copyright more 
extensively in Chapter 6. 81 
Property, and particularly private property, is a controversial institution. As Harris explains: 
a property institution at least confers some private domain over some scarce things, so that the 
separateness of persons is made evident in the face of collective decision-making. But that domain 
necessarily confers some power over others and hence is distributionally problematic.82 
Any theoretical justification of property needs to take into account the distributive effects of property 
regimes. 83 Because of its broader ramifications, property is necessarily social and does not merely create 
individual rights with powers to exclude.84 
77 In Chapter 7, Part IV, I look at how the numerus clausus principle can be applied to the manner by which 
copyright holders exploit their exclusive rights. 
78 See the discussion in Chapter 6 Part III. 
79 See the discussion in Chapter 6 Part II. 
80 See the discussion in Chapter 6 Part III. 
81 I apply selected theoretical justifications of property to copy ownership and copyright in Chapter 6 Part 
III. 
82 Harris, supra note 2, at 165; Grunebaum, supra note 23 at 169-170, his theory of private property and the 
concept of autonomous ownership lead him to conclude that private ownership is not morally justified. 
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However, in the case of copyright, the controversy around the proper scope of exclusive rights conferred 
does not arise as a result of scarce resources. Many forms of copyright works can be reproduced 
infinitely without depriving the original copyright holder and subsequent users of its enjoyment. Rather, 
it is the non-rivlarous nature of the works protected by copyright and the scope of the artificially created 
scarcity through copyright law that give rise to ongoing deliberations and passionate debate. ss 
Distribution issues on the extent to which this species of private property should unfold remain. The 
linkage of copyright to property, either in an attempt to define the nature of the right or by reference to 
property theories to justify its existence, is also the subject of ongoing debate and controversy. 86 
One corollary of the controversial nature of property is that there is no apparent single satisfactory 
unifying justificatory theory. Arriving at a cogent theory of property and intellectual property may in 
fact necessitate the co-existence of different underlying justifications.s7 The need to resort to various 
theoretical justifications to adequately justify property is attributable in part to the heterogeneous nature 
of property, and in the case of copyright, to the distinct nature of the exclusive rights that it confers.ss A 
pluralistic approach to justify property can also be attributable to the different understandings of the 
concept of property and of the fact that it implicates incommensurable values.89 On that ground, 
seemingly conflicting theories can play a complementary role in justifying the property institution.90 In 
83 For example see: Rashree Chandra, Knowledge as Property (New Delhi: Oxford University press, 2010) 
at 61. Related to this idea, the author notes that "all property systems distribute freedoms and unfreedoms; 
no system of property can be described, without qualification, as a system of liberty." 
84 Lametti 2003, supra note 31 at 34 7. 
85 See the discussion in Chapter 6 Part III. 
86 I discuss the debate that surrounds the nature of copyright as property or not in Chapter 5 Part III. 
87 Harris, supra note 2 at 13. See the summary of Harris' theoretical justification of property further below 
in Part IV of this chapter. With respect to intellectual property, see: Joseph P. Liu, "Owning Digital Copies: 
Copyright Law and the Incidents of Copy Ownership" (2001) William and Mary Law Review, 1245 at 
1300, who takes a pluralistic approach to justify copyright in a US context. See also the discussion in 
Chapter 6 Part III. 
88 For instance, there are likely to be distinct justifications to the exclusive right to authorize first 
publication, which has strong privacy and autonomy based moral justifications, from the exclusive right to 
authorize reproduction of a copyright work which under the predominant view, is justified for instrumental 
reasons of promoting the creation and dissemination of works: see the discussion in Chapter 6 Part III. On 
the distinct justification for the right to authorize first publication, see Sunny Handa, Copyright Law in 
Canada, (Markham, Ontario: Butterworth Canada, 2002) at 107 & fol. 
89 See Waldron, supra note 17 at 16ff., where the author describes four different conceptions of the right to 
private property as follows: immunities against expropriation; natural property rights; the eligibility to hold 
property; and a general right to property; Gregory S. Alexander, Eduardo M. Penalver, Joseph William 
Singer & Laura S. Underkuffler, "A Statement of Progressive Property" (2008-2009) 94 Cornell L. Rev. 
743 at 744. 
90 See the discussion in Chapter 6 Part III. On a related idea, for Alexander, Penalver, Singer & 
Underkuffler, supra note 89, because the incommensurable plural values that are implicated in property 
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fact, courts, legislators, and commentators are influenced by various theories when deciding on the 
scope of property (including intellectual property) rights. 91 
The justificatory theories of property developed by Harris, and upon which I build a theory of copy 
ownership, reflect a pluralistic approach.92 After an extensive review of natural property theories, 93 
property and freedom,94 and the instrumental values of property,95 Harris concludes that there exists no 
natural right to full-blooded ownership96 and that "the surviving property-specific justice reasons 
include the prima facie normative status of all ownership freedoms" and, to a lesser extent, " privacy, 
convention-dependent conceptions of labour-desert," as well as "pragmatic recognition of the wealth-
creating potential of incentives and markets. "97 I will explore in Chapter 6 the prima facie status of all 
"relate to qualitatively distinct aspects of human experience, they cannot be adequately understood or 
analyzed through a single metric. Reducing such values as health, friendship, human dignity, and 
environmental integrity to one common currency distorts their intrinsic worth." 
91 See the discussion in Chapter 6 Part III. 
92 See the discussion further below in Part IV of this chapter. See also David Lametti: "The Morality of 
James Harris' s Theory of Property", in Timothy Endicott, Joshua Getzler & Edwin Peel, eds, The 
Properties of Law: Essays in Honour of James Harris (Oxford: OUP, 2006) [Lametti 2006] at 145. 
93 Harris, supra note 2 at 182-228, namely as it is associated with labour (i.e. the concept of self-ownership, 
creation-without -wrong and labour-desert theories) and the assault analogy (i.e. first occupancy, 
personhood-constituting and privacy theories). 
94 Harris, supra note 2 at 230-277, in particular, a review of Hegel's conception of property freedoms, as 
well as criticism of property freedoms including the problem of fetishism, disparities in wealth and 
domination-potential. 
95 Ibid, at 278-306. 
96 Ibid, supra note 2 at 182-229, reviews various theories to justify a natural right to property to conclude 
that there is no natural right to full-blooded ownership: " ... no relationship between an individual and a 
resource arises such that just treatment of the individual requires that a property institution both surround 
the resource with trespassory rules availing the individual and any one to whom he chooses to transfer the 
resource and also conferring on the individual unlimited use privileges, control -powers, and powers of 
transmission over the resource."(at 228). Harris refutes labour theories relying on self -ownership to justify 
a natural right in the fruits of their labour as an extension of individuals owning themselves (because self-
ownership is a non sequitur, i.e. from the premise that no one can own an individual, it does not necessarily 
follow that the individual can own himself). Yet Harris, sees an important property specific justice reason in 
the fruits of one's labour that provides the "shell of a natural right", i.e. that the need for the reward to be 
ownership does not follow, rather, a person has a just claim for a portion of social wealth that is created by 
her work when her work is by convention valued by others and by convention, gives some entitlements to a 
reward. He also reviews the creation without wrong justification for a natural property right as being an 
important property justice reason but not the foundation of a natural right, because the creator cannot 
impose unilateral trespassory rights. Harris explores first occupancy theories and personhood-constituting 
theories, derived from bodily integrity. In the latter case, only in exceptional specific cases could there be a 
natural right derived from the personhood constituting aspect of the resource, i.e. a natural non-transferable 
limited right on specific resources having this character (e.g. never to be seen diaries, sacred mementos). 
Harris also recognizes the shell of a natural right that is based on privacy that is hostage "to the problematic 
balance between the requirement of a range of specially protected autonomous choice and necessary 
intervention by the community to prevent abuse." (at 227). 
97 Ibid, at 13. 
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ownership freedoms, the role of instrumentalist and labour-desert theories, and their impact on the 
nature and scope of ownership rights in copies of copyright works.98 Prior to that, I will introduce one 
last key component of the theoretical framework of property that I lay out in this chapter, i.e., the 
concept of property limitations. 
V. The limitations to property 
One of the strengths of Harris' s theory of property lies in his account of the nature and operation of 
limitations to property.99 Understanding the limitations of property is critical when seeking to define the 
scope of consumers' rights in commercial copies of copyright works that are constrained by 
copyright. 100 While all ownership freedoms have primafacie normative value, none of them is immune 
from various forms oflimitations. 101 In the Quebec civil law, this is reflected by article 947 of the 
Quebec Civil Code102 and by the jurisprudence related thereto. 103 A communitarian approach to property 
conveys the similar idea that ownership entails obligations and thus limitations that are justified by the 
necessity to promote human flourishing in the communities we live in. 104 For instance, Gregory S. 
98 See the discussion in Chapter 6 Part III. 
99 Harris, supra note 2 at 32-37, 332-361. 
100 See the discussion on the nature of commercial copies of copyright works in Chapter 6 Part II. Gregory 
S. Alexander, "The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property law" (2008-2009) 94 Cornell L.Rev. 
745, at 811, develops a social obligation norm theory in U.S. property law, based on the need to promote 
"human flourishing", under which a more nuanced view of the right to exclude is presented. He uses the 
example of the exclusive rights conferred by copyright as one instance where the interdependency between 
the copyright holder and the community to which copyright works are intended impose social obligations 
which in tum impact on the scope of her exclusive rights. See also in the context of property applied to 
copyright see: Christopher M. Newman, "Transformation in Property and Copyright" (2011) 56 Villanova 
Law Review 251 at 259, where the author comments on the fundamental feature of property as the power to 
exclude as being accurate to a certain extent only and potentially misleading: "It is also highly misleading, 
however, because it obscures the fact that property actually has goals beyond exclusion that place limits on 
the right to exclude. Property, too, is an attempt to achieve a carefully calibrated balance between protecting 
an interest and preserving freedom of action. Exclusion is not an end in itself, but part of the strategy for 
achieving this balance." 
101 Harris, supra note 2 at 275: from Harris' standpoint, there exists no natural right to "full-blooded 
ownership" that are not dependent of some social convention. 
102 Art 947 CCQ: "Ownership is the right to use, enjoy and dispose of property fully and freely, subject to 
the limits and conditions for doing so determined by law." 
103 For example, for a summary of the main principles derived from the jurisprudence on art 947 CCQ and 
how limitations to property may apply see: 2781875 Canada Inc. c. 91266403 Quebec Inc.- 2003 WL 
22480807 (CS Que) (in that case with respect to the right of property to land). 
104 For example, see Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Penalver, "Properties of Community" (2009) 10 
Theoretical Inq. L., 127, at l 38ff. where the authors elaborate on the concept of dependence and obligation, 
i.e., that the capabilities essential to "human flourishing", on which they base their theory of property, 
"cannot be acquired by individuals in isolation by themselves"; Alexander, supra note 100 at 795-796: 
"Private ownership of those aspects of a society's infrastructure upon which the civic culture depends 
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Alexander distinguishes two broad categories of property limitations that are based on whether a 
liability rule applies or not. 105 While communitarian theories of property have a general appeal for the 
purpose of defining consumers' rights to commercial copies of copyright work, their appeal is even 
greater in broader discussions about developing a robust public domain in contrast to the exclusive 
rights of copyright holders. 106 I have discussed in Chapter 2 how copyright consumers' rights raise 
specific issues that are not always well served by arguments for the preservation of the public domain 
and the public interest. 107 Harris' s account of the various forms of property limitations provides a level 
of specificity that can help mediate between competing private interests, as is the case between 
copyright holders and consumers with respect to the same object, i.e., the copyright work. 
Harris describes various forms of property limitations, four of which (i.e., the main ones) I shall briefly 
summarize here. The first refers to "property-independent prohibitions."108 While they effectively limit 
the open-ended-use privileges of an owned resource, they do so regardless of the status of ownership. 
They also vary in time and in space. Safety regulation could fall in that category, as well as criminal law 
prohibitions. For example, the fact that you own a music CD does not entitle you, or anyone having it in 
her possession, to force it down someone's throat (besides the fact that it would be physically 
impossible to do so). Property-independent prohibitions signal that certain uses prohibited to all are not 
comes with special obligations" and at 819, where Alexander justifies the owner obligations that the social-
obligation theory implies, in contrast with a law and economic approach to property, as follows: "it 
recognizes that the obligation imposed on owners to sacrifice their property interests in some way can often 
be justified on the basis of cultivating the conditions necessary for members of our communities to live 
well-lived lives and to promote just social relations, where justice means something more than simply 
aggregate wealth-maximization." 
105 Alexander, supra note I 00. Alexander defines two forms of property limitations. The first one is referred 
to as "entitlement sacrifices" where the property right is taken away from the owner (ex. forced sales in 
case of expropriation) but where the property owner is entitled to fair compensation (for this limitation, 
Alexander relies on the power of "eminent domain" which represents "collective judgment that the state is 
justified in demanding of us, as members of the political and social community that nurtures us as 
flourishing individuals, under certain conditions, the sacrifice of title to our land in exchange for just 
compensation'', ibid at 776). The second property limitation is referred to as "use sacrifices" under which 
property owners keep their property rights but those rights are subject to some limitations of uses that 
community regards as being against its collective interest (for example heritage conservation cases, 
environmental preservation cases). The first limitation maps out to Harris expropriation rule. The second 
limitation would overlap with Harris' "property independent rules" and "property-limitation rules" as 
discussed in Part V of this chapter. 
106 Alexander & Penalver, supra note 104 at 129, where the authors observe that "discussions on private 
ownership are focused on owners and all others are reduced to category of non-owners," and that this 
"obscures possibility that the community may have a moral status distinct from neighboring owners and 
non-owning individuals." 
107 See the discussion in Chapter 2 Part II. 
108 Harris, supra note 2 at 32-33. 
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primafacie part of the rights of even fool-blooded ownership. 109 This principle is reflected in article 947 
CCQ.110 
The second property limitation refers to "property-limitation rules," i.e., when the primafacie open-
ended privileges and powers of ownership are oveni.dden. 111 All property institutions are subject to 
various forms of property-limitation rules, 112 which are more frequent with respect to land than with 
respect to chattels. 113 Examples of property-limitation rules include the common law tort of nuisance, 
and limitations on the freedom to transfer property, for instance through the application of antitrust 
laws, or the application of fair dealing or fair use to limit the exclusive rights of copyright holders in 
specific cases. 114 They would also include the limitations imposed on property owners under 
environmental laws. 115 As it is the case with property-independent prohibitions, property-limitation 
rules may vary in time and in place. Property-limitation rules differ from property-independent 
prohibitions in that what they prohibit relates to an alleged harmful exercise of otherwise primafacie 
open-ended ownership privileges or powers, or one that by its nature is specifically addressed to owners 
and that raises public policy or distribution issues. 116 The normative exercise to assess the merit of 
property-limitation rules involves a balancing act between the values taken to be inherent in ownership, 
the freedom to act self-seekingly in relation to that which is one's own, and other values, individual or 
social. 117 One property nuisance case from the High Court of Australia, Victoria Park Racing and 
Recreation Grounds Co. Ltd. v Taylor [Victoria Park] 118 is a good illustration of how courts mediate 
109 Ibid. 
110 Supra note 94. 
111 Harris, supra note 2 at 34. 
112 Ibid at 33. 
113 Ibid at 90. 
114 Environmental conservation would be another example as well as other statutory restrictions. See Harris, 
supra note 2 at 35. See the discussion on fair dealing in Chapter 3 Part II C. For the application of property-
limitation rules to copyright, see Chapter 7 Part III. 
115 Harris, supra note 2 at 35. This is reflected in a Quebec Court of Appeal case: Abitibi (Comte) c. lbitiba 
Ltee 1993 WL 1435136 (CA Que.) at para 28, where the Court of Appeal applied a reasoning similar to 
Harris' property-limitation rule in assessing the reasonableness of the limitations imposed by environmental 
laws on the right to land and the balancing act that was required between the competing property rights of 
land owners and greater societal, environmental goals with respect to which each land owner had to share 
some burden. In that case, the Court rejected the argument that the environmental regulation amounted to an 
exf,ropriation of the property rights of the landowner: ibid at paras 28,29. 
11 Harris, supra note 2 at 32-37. 
117 Harris, supra note 2, at 90. 
118 ( 1937) 58 C.L.R. 4 79 (Australia HC). 
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between two competing ownership rights and how one right acts or does not act as a limitation on the 
other. 119 
Whether we characterize a limitation - e.g., a limitation imposed by copyright on the usage privileges, 
in the copy of a copyright work - as "property-independent" or as a "property-limitation rule" is crucial. 
In the latter case, there is a prohibition on one of consumers' prima facie open-ended privileges and 
powers that are at the essence of their ownership rights. In the former case, the prohibition is unrelated 
to the exercise by the consumer owners of their property freedoms. If one is to give weight to ownership 
and to the normative force of ownership freedoms, distinguishing the rights of owners from non-owners, 
one of the corollaries is that the property-limitation rules need to meet a special level of justification, 
process, and clarity that falls within the internal logic of the property institution and its limitations. 120 
The third form of limitation refers to the most extreme manifestation of property limitation, namely 
when property can be confiscated from the owner, i.e., through the application of expropriation rules. 121 
As I will discuss in Chapter 7, expropriation rules are not as directly relevant when defining the 
limitations that copyright imposes on owners of commercial copies of copyright works and the 
limitations that copy ownership imposes on copyright. 122 
Last but not least, Harris describes how practical and conceptual considerations impose limits on the 
scope of rights that property entails. 123 An interest that lacks a distance between the owner and the 
object of property is a conceptual limit to property. 124 Also, there are property externalities, which, for 
practical reasons, cannot fall under the purview of property. For example, it would be impractical to ban 
people from watching the beautiful garden of a private property, or to subject the pictures they take 
from the garden at a distance to the payment of a fee to the property owner. Some exclusive rights of 
119 See the discussion on Victoria Park in Chapter 7 Part III B. 
120 Harris, supra note 2 at 90-91, summarizes how property-limitation rules are set as follows: "the values 
taken to be inherent in ownership are set against other values, individual or social ... freedom to act, self-
seekingly, in relation to that which is one's own has served as a powerful normative lodestone." 
121 The confiscation of products of crime under criminal law, the powers of the trustee in bankruptcy in 
bankruptcy law, as well as division of patrimony under family law are various examples of expropriation 
rules. See Harris, supra note 2 at 37-38. "Appropriation rules" reflect the other side of the coin of 
expropriation and even beyond. For instance, in case where the owner cannot be located, which does not 
necessarily entail an instance of expropriation. Ibid, at 38-39. 
122 See the discussion Chapter 7 Part II and Part III. 
123 Harris, supra note 2 at 332-361. 
124 Ibid, at 332-333. 
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copyright holders fall in that category. 125 Those rights are not far from the example of the photograph of 
the lawn. 
Harris notes that there are, however, limits to how far the practicality argument can be invoked to 
impose limitations onprimafacie open-ended powers and privileges related to property. 126 To invoke 
practical considerations to place limitations on property, e.g., major obstacles in the ability to enforce 
certain property interests, will not be justified in instances where there are strong justice reasons for 
supporting a property interest. 127 And yet, the practicality argument may point to deeper considerations 
of important normative value that can add support to the application of other property limitations, for 
instance, property-limitation rules. 128 
Whether a property limitation is intended to benefit the public or a competing private interest is an 
important distinction in understanding how property limitations operate and how various competing 
interests are assessed against the other. While "property-independent prohibitions" tend to stem from 
public law and policy (for example, criminal law, road-safety law) property-limitation rules can either 
serve specific public domain interests (such as in the case of heritage conservation by-laws), private 
interests (such as the tort of nuisance between adjacent neighbours), or a hybrid of the two. 129 Whether 
the private property rights created by copyright benefit private or public interests heavily taints the 
ongoing debate around the scope of copyright holders' exclusive rights, including the impact that these 
exclusive rights have on the public domain, the public interest, and fundamental rights such as freedom 
of expression. 130 The design of copyright as a whole may be said to serve both the immediate private 
interests of the copyright holder - predominantly so during the protection of the copyright work - while 
it is also concerned with broader public policy considerations. 131 Similarly, the ownership rights in 
125 To illustrate that point, see CCA, supra note I, ss 29 - 32.5 which contain very detailed enumerations of 
what are not considered infringements of copyright. As one example: the fact that it is permitted to take a 
picture of an architectural building, which under copyright laws is protected as a work of authorship see 
CCA, ibid, s. 32.2 (I) b. The inference is that were they not listed, all those acts could be considered as part 
of the exclusive rights of the copyright holder. See discussion in Chapter 5 Part II and Part III on the nature 
of copyright and particularly on the expansion of copyright and in Chapter 7 Part II on how copyright 
limitations operate on commercial copies of copyright works. 
126 Harris, supra note 2 at 334. 
121 Ibid. 
128 See the discussion on how copy ownership can limits the exclusive rights of copyright holders in 
Chapter 7 Part III. 
129 Harris, supra note 2 at 32-37. 
130 See the discussion on the balance objectives of the CCA, supra note 2 in Chapter 2 Part II and on the 
theoretical justifications of copy ownership and copyright in Chapter 6 Part III. 
13t Ibid. 
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commercial copies of a copyright work may be said to benefit the private interests of consumers while 
also serving broader public interest goals. 132 The distinction between the public and the private benefit 
of property limitations is helpful when characterizing the limitations that copyright imposes on copy 
ownership and vice versa. 133 
The relationship between property limitations and the numerus clausus principle or standardization of 
property that I introduced above in this chapter requires some clarification. 134 Property limitations set 
limits on the primafacie open-ended powers and privileges of owners of a resource, while the 
standardization of property seeks to preserve the integrity of known forms of property interests by 
setting limits on the introduction of new forms of property interests. 135 Are the objectives of property 
limitations described by Harris in contradiction of the ones of the numerus clausus principle? 
In my view, there is no conflict between the objectives and effects of property limitations and the 
standardization of property because they operate at different levels. First, except in the extreme case of 
expropriation rules, property limitations do not denature prope1ty interests, e.g., ownership of land. 
Rather, they set targeted limits on the open-ended powers and privileges of owners that, in some cases, 
may shift their location on the ownership spectrum. 136 What the principle of numerus clausus seeks to 
prevent is the creation of a new interest unknown to the property institution, e.g., an interest that would 
resemble ownership in all aspects but for a contractual restriction on the primafacie open-ended power 
to transfer the property interest to another party. Second, property limitations tend to be set by law (e.g., 
environmental or heritage conservation law) or judicial decisions (e.g., setting limits to the exercise of 
powers and privileges of ownership in property nuisance cases), while the limitations that the 
standardization of property seeks to forbid are set by private agreement. 137 Property limitations 
generally arise from a formal enactment or judicial pronouncement that ensures the level of 
transparency and uniformity that is precisely what the standardization of property seeks to promote. The 
numerus clausus principle allows courts to annul the effect of private clauses (e.g., restrictions on 
132 Ibid. 
133 See the discussion in Chapter 7 Part II and Part III. 
134 See Part III of this chapter. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Property-limitation rules may have in some cases the effect of shifting the ownership on the ownership 
spectrum, away from "full-blooded ownership", while property-independent prohibitions will not have this 
effect: the limits they set are not even part of the primafacie open-ended powers and privileges of property 
owners: see the discussion on property limitations in Part V of this chapter. 
137 See the discussion on the numerus clausus principle or the standardization of property in Part III of this 
chapter. 
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alienation of property) that denature known forms of property and impact the certainty and efficiency 
that surround similar property interests by increasing the information search costs to all. 138 For these two 
reasons, the objectives of property limitations are reconcilable with the objectives of the numerus 
clausus principle. 
To sum up, property limitations are an integral part of Harris's theory of property and of the property 
framework that I apply to copyright and copy ownership. After discussing the nature and theoretical 
justifications of copyright and copy ownership in Chapter 5 and in Chapter 6, I will apply in Chapter 7 
the theory of property limitations that I introduced in this Part to the limitations imposed by copyright 
on copy ownership, and explore the extent to which copy ownership acts (or should act) as a limitation 
to copyright from a legal and normative standpoint. 139 
V. Conclusion 
The property institution applies to myriad resources and human interactions. 140 Harris's theory 
emphasizes the distinctive features of the property institution, i.e., trespassory rules and the ownership 
spectrum, as well as the inclusion of property-limitation rules and expropriation rules. 141 Ownership "as 
an organizing idea" emphasizes the common traits that ownership interests share on the ownership 
spectrum within the property institution. 142 
Harris' s detailed account of the main characteristics of the property institution, and, in particular, his 
theory of property limitations, provides a framework with which to analyze the interaction between 
copyright holders' exclusive rights and consumers' ownership rights in commercial copies of copyright 
works. I introduced the principle of numerus clausus or the standardization of property and how this 
principle will help further a deeper understanding of copyright and copy ownership, as well as provide a 
tool that addresses the tensions between property interests and the extent to which they can be altered by 
contract. 143 
138 Ibid. 
139 See the discussion in Chapter 7 Part II and Part III. 
140 Harris, supra note 2 at 4. See also Waldron, supra note l 7 at 26ff; Mossman & Flanagan, supra note 17 
at 2. 
141 Harris, supra note 2 at 5, 34. 
142 Ibid, at 63-84. 
143 See the discussion in Part III of this chapter. 
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Harris's theoretical justifications of the property institution reflect a pluralistic approach that rejects a 
natural right to full-blooded ownership and that includes "the prima facie normative status of all 
ownership freedoms" and, to a lesser extent, "privacy, convention - dependent conceptions of labour-
desert," as well as "pragmatic recognition of the wealth-creating potential of incentives and markets." 144 
The theoretical justifications of property developed by Harris serve as the base from which to look into 
the theoretical justifications of copy ownership and copyright in Chapter 6. 145 
The concepts that I introduced in this chapter will be applied throughout the Second Part of my thesis 
and, in particular, as I discuss the nature and justifications of copyright and copy ownership, 146 and how 
the theory of property limitations helps mediate between the competing property rights of copyright 
holders and consumers in the same object, i.e., the copyright work. 147 The concepts of property, 
ownership, and property limitations that I introduced here also play a central role in the Third Part of my 
thesis when I apply consumer protection law to commercial copies of copyright works. 148 I now begin 
with the application of the foundations of the property institution to define the nature of copyright. 
144 Harris, supra note 2 at 13. 
145 See Chapter 6 Part III. 
146 I discuss the nature of copyright in Chapter 5 and the nature and justifications of copy ownership in 
Chapter 6. 
147 See the discussion in Chapter 7, in particular in Part II and Part III. 
148 See Third Part: The Application of Consumer Law and Theory to Commercial Copies of Copyright 
Works (Chapter 8 to Chapter 11 ). 
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Chapter 5 
The Nature of Copyright 
I. Introduction 
An inquiry into the nature of copyright is essential to understand the nature of commercial copies of 
copyright works and consumers' rights thereto. In the previous chapter, I introduced the theoretical 
framework of property and the key components that I apply in the Second Part of my thesis and 
beyond to define copyright consumers' rights. In this chapter, I apply the attributes of property to 
copyright to inform a more nuanced understanding of the nature of copyright that emphasizes its 
distinct character. I discuss the dangers of inflating the property attributes of copyright, as well as of 
vilifying any association of copyright with property. 
In Part II, I look at how Canada's Copyright Act [ CCA] 1 and case law inform us on the nature of 
copyright, with reference to other jurisdictions. 2 In particular, I look at how copyright's scope in the 
CCA has expanded since its creation. In Part III, I discuss the ongoing debate on the nature of 
copyright as a form of property and challenge the notion that associating copyright with property 
necessarily contributes to the expansion of copyright. I explain how the controversy about the nature 
of copyright is dependent on divergent conceptions of property. In Part IV, I look at the attributes of 
copyright and how they compare to other forms of tangible property through the application of 
property law and theory. I conclude in Part V by defining copyright as a limited form of property that 
includes a property interest in the embodiment of works (e.g., commercial copies of copyright works) 
and by reflecting on the insights that this characterization brings to the debate on the nature of 
copyright. 
II. Copyright as defined in the CCA: a progressive expansion 
The CCA does not define the nature of the exclusive rights conferred by copyright, unlike the 
legislation in other jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom and France, where copyright is 
1 Copyright Act, RSC 1985, c. C-42. 
2 I.e., the US, EU, UK, and France. 
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specifically referred to as a property right.3 The CCA defines copyright, in relation to a work,4 as the 
sole right to produce or reproduce a work, to perform it in public, to publish it if unpublished, and 
other non-exhaustive exclusive rights, including the exclusive right to communicate the work to the 
public by telecommunication, and the sole right to authorize any such acts.5 Copyright also includes 
specific exclusive rights with respect to a performer's performance, sound recordings, and 
communication signals. 6 
In Canada and the other jurisdictions examined here, copyright has not ceased expanding during the 
last century in duration, in subject matter, and in scope. The CCA came into force in 1924. 7 It 
provided that the duration of copyright was the life of the author plus 50 years (still the current term 
of copyright in Canada),8 which is a longer term than that which prevailed in earlier colonial 
copyright law.9 In 1924, "copyright" meant the sole right to produce or reproduce the work, to 
3 U .K. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c 48, [UK CDP A] s 1 ( 1) "Copyright is a property right 
which subsists in accordance with this Part in the following descriptions of work"; art L-111-1 CPI: 
"L'auteur d'une oeuvre de l'esprit jouit sur cette oeuvre, du seul fait de sa creation, d'un droit de propriete 
incorporelle exclusif et opposable a tous." EC, Directive 2001129/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in 
the information society, [2001] OJ, L167/10, preamble, recital 9 provides that the harmonization goals of 
copyright law across the European member states are geared towards a high level of protection of 
copyright adding: "Intellectual property has therefore been recognized as an integral part of property." 
The US Copyright Act, 17 USC, does not define copyright as a property right but refers to copyright as 
"personal property", 17 USC § 201 ( d) ( 1) "The ownership of a copyright may [ ... ] pass as personal 
property by the applicable laws of intestate succession.", and to ownership (see 17 USC, Chapter 2: 
Ownership and Transfer of Copyright). 
4 i.e. an original work that falls under one of four categories: literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work: 
CCA, supra note 1, ss 2, 5. 
5 Ibid, s 3. 
6 Ibid, s 2 "copyright", ss 3, 15, 18,21,26. 
7 An Act to amend and consolidate the Law relating to Copyright, SC 1921, c. 24 [Copyright Act, 1921]. 
For the history of Canadian copyright law, see: Harold G. Fox, The Canadian Law of Copyright (Toronto: 
The University of Toronto Press, 1944) at Chapter II: "Historical Introduction to the Law of Copyright". 
8 CCA, supra note 1, s 6. 
9 Under the Copyright Law Amendment Act, 1842, 5 & 6 Viet., c.45, the general rule for the duration of 
copyright (which applied only to "books" as defined) was the longer of the life of the author plus seven 
years or forty-two years. This Act was held to apply to all the British Dominions including colonies that had 
their own Copyright Act in Routledge v Low (1868) LO.R. 3 H.L. 100 (Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council). The Dominion Copyright Act, 1875, 38 Vic. C. 88, was later embodied in the RSC 1886, C 2 and 
then carried forward in RSC 1906, C 70, s 4, which provided a term of copyright of 28 years from the time 
of registration of the copyright as prescribed by the Act, which could be extended for an additional 14 years 
in certain cases. See also Durand & Cie v La Patrie Publishing Co. (1960), [1960] S.C.R. 649 (SCC) at 
paras 15-20. 
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perform it in public, and to publish the work if it was unpublished. 1° Copyright protected every 
original literary, dramatic, musical, and artistic work; 11 each but one of the four categories of works 
was defined by a non-exhaustive list of possible forms of works. 12 
Major reform of the CCA did not occur until more than 60 years later, in 1988, 13 and included the 
explicit protection of computer programs as literary works, enhanced moral rights, the abolition of 
compulsory licences for the recording of musical works, and increased criminal sanctions for the 
infringement of copyright. 14 Other amendments came into force the following year to ensure Canada's 
compliance with its obligations under the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement,15 and 
included the addition of the exclusive right to communicate to the public by telecommunication. 16 In 
1993, the CCA was amended to clarify the definition of "musical work" 17 and, in the same year, to 
introduce the exclusive right to authorize rental of computer programs, as well as to increase 
copyright holders' protection against the importation of infringing copyright works. 18 The 
amendments were required for Canada to comply with its legal obligations under the North American 
Free Trade Agreement. 19 In 1996, the CCA was amended so that Canada complied with its obligations 
under the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.20 The amendments introduced 
rights for performers against unauthorized recordings of live events and unauthorized live 
1
° Copyright Act, 1921, supra note 7, s 3(1). 
11 Ibid, s 4(1 ). 
12 Ibid, s 2 (b), (g), (n), (p). The definition of artistic work, dramatic work and literary work referred to a 
non-exhaustive list of forms of works while the definition of musical work referred to a specific form of 
work, i.e.: "any combination of melody and harmony, or either of them, printed, reduced to writing, or 
otherwise graphically produced or reproduced.": ibid, s 2(p). 
13 An Act to amend the Copyright Act and to amend other Acts in consequence thereof, SC 1988, Cl5 
[Copyright Amendment Act 1988]. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, January 1, 1989, online 
http://www.international. gc .ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/us-
eu .aspx ?I an g=en g& vi ew=d. The amendments to the CCA, supra note 1 were made pursuant to An Act to 
implement the Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the United States of America, SC 1988, c 65, 
ss. 61 to 65. Sections 61 to 65 came into force on February 13, 1989: Sl/89-70. 
16 Ibid, s 62. Prior to that, s 3(1 )(f) of the CCA, supra note 1, referred to the exclusive right to communicate 
by radio communication (through the amendment brought on by the Copyright Amendment Act, 1931, SC 
1931, c. 8, s. 3). 
17 An Act to amend the Copyright Act, SC 1993, c. 23, s. 1. The amendment to the definition of "musical 
work" clarified that it covered both visual and audible representations of music. 
18 An Act to implement the North American Free Trade Agreement, SC 1993, c. 44, s 55, 66. 
19 North American Free Trade Agreement , December 17 1992, online : http://www.nafta-sec-
alena.org/en/view .aspx ?x=343. 
20 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Marrakesh, April 15, 1994, online: 
http://www.wto.org/enghsh/docs e/legaJ e/legal e.htm#finalact. 
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transmissions of their performances.21 Copyright was further expanded in 1997 as the CCA underwent 
significant amendments. 22 They included the addition of exclusive rights for performers and producers 
of sound recordings, commonly referred to as "neighbouring rights,"23 of the exclusive right to 
authorize rental of musical works,24 of the private copying regime,25 and of statutory damages for 
copyright infringement.26 The Criminal Code27 was amended in 2007 to make the unauthorized 
recording of films in movie theatres an indictable offence liable to imprisonment of up to five years.28 
Last but not least, after three previous failed attempts at legislative reform, the CCA was amended 
significantly in 201229 to comply with Canada's international obligations under the World Intellectual 
Property Organization Internet Treaties of 1996 [WIPO Internet Treaties]. 30 The amendments to the 
CCA included the exclusive right of copyright holders to control how their works are made available 
on the Intemet,31 the extension of the term of protection of performers' performance and sound 
recordings,32 and the introduction of provisions around technological protection measures [TPMs]. 33 
As I discussed in Chapter 3, the TPM provisions introduced separate acts of infringement for the 
21 An Act to implement the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, SC I 994, c. 47, ss 56-
69, which came into force on January 1, 1996: SI/96-1. 
22 An Act to amend the Copyright Act, SC I 997, C 24. 
23 Ibid, s 14. 
24 Ibid, s 3(3). 
25 Ibid, s 50. See the discussion on Canada's private copying regime in Chapter 3 Part II B. 
26 Ibid, s 20. 
27 RSC 1985, c C-46. 
28 An Act to amend the Criminal Code (unauthorized recording of a movie), SC 2007, c 28, which added s 
432 to the Criminal Code, supra note 28. 
29 Before Bill C-11, An Act to Amend the Copyright Act, 1st Sess, 41th Parl, 2011 (assented to June 29, 
2012) leading to the entry into force of the Copyright Modernization Act, S.C. 2012, c. 20 [CCA1A], three 
previous bills were introduced to amend the CCA, supra note 1, to address the various issues brought on by 
the digital environment, i.e.: Bill C-32, An Act to amend the Copyright Act, 3rc1 Session, 40th Parl., 2010 (1st 
reading June 2, 2010); Bill C-61, An Act to Amend the Copyright Act, 2nd Sess, 39th Parl, 2008 (first 
reading 12 June 2008); Bill C-60, An Act to Amend the Copyright Act, 1st Sess, 38th Parl, 2005 (first 
reading 20 June 2005). 
30 WIPO Copyright Treaty, 20 December 1996, W0033EN, online: 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/t11docs wo033.html#P8 189 [WCT]; WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty, 20 December 1996, W0034EN, online: 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt/trtdocs wo034.html [ WPPT]. The main purpose of the treaties is to 
address "the profound impact of the development and convergence of information and communication 
technologies on the creation and use of literary and artistic works.": WCT, Ibid, preamble. 
31 CCA, supra note 1, s 2.4 (1.1 ). 
32 Ibid, s 23 (1 ), (1.1 ). 
33 Ibid, ss 41-41 .21 . I discuss the scope and issues around the new I y introduced TPMs in Chapter 3 Part III 
B. 
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circumvention of TPMs put in place by copyright holders. 34 The 2012 amendments to the CCA also 
added new exceptions to copyright infringement.35 In 2013, Bill C-5636 was introduced and, if 
adopted, will strengthen the civil and criminal remedies in case of copyright infringement. 37 
The CCA' s expansionism of copyright protection follows the same trend that is occurring at the 
international level and in the other jurisdictions examined here. 38 Since its adoption in 1886, the Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works [Berne Convention] 39 has gone through 
many revisions to augment the protection of the exclusive rights of copyright holders.40 Any 
subsequent international agreements adopted under the Berne Convention, such as the WIPO Internet 
Treaties of 199641 must secure greater protection for copyright holders.42 The Agreement on the Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Law [TRIPS]43 which was signed upon the creation of the 
World Trade Organization [WTO], in 1994,44 creates minimum standard obligations for the protection 
and enforcement of intellectual property rights, including copyright, for all the World Trade 
Organization members.45 The Berne Convention and TRIPS have significant membership worldwide, 
34 Ibid. 
35 See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part II D. 
36 Bill C-56, An Act to amend the Copyright Act and the Trade-markr; Act and to make consequential 
amendments to other Acts, lst Session, 4lst Parl, 2013, (first reading, March I, 2013). 
37 Ibid, cl. 3-5. 
38 I.e. the US, the EU, the UK and France. On the progressive expansion of copyright historically and 
globally see: David Vaver, "Intellectual property: still a "bargain"?" (2012) 34 E.I.P.R. 579 at 582ff. 
39 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, 
September 9, 1886. 
40 Revisions were made in 1908 (in Berlin) in 1928 (Rome), in 1948 (Brussels), in 1967 (Stockholm) and in 
1971 (Paris). Other amendments were made in 1979: World Intellectual Property Organization, Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, online: 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/trtdocs woOOl .html. See also Sam Ricketson & Jane C. Ginsburg, 
International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, The Berne Convention and Beyond, 2e ed. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), vol. I, Chapter 3 "The Subsequent Development of the Berne Convention 
1886-1971 ". 
41 Supra note 30. 
42 Berne Convention, supra note 39, art 20 provides: "The Governments of the countries of the Union 
reserve the right to enter into special agreements among themselves, in so far as such agreements grant to 
authors more extensive rights than those granted by the Convention, or contain other provisions not 
contrary to this Convention [ ... ]" 
43 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization, Annex JC, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 29, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) 
[TRIPS]. 
44 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, supra note 20. 
45 TRIPS, supra note 43, Part II, 1, Part III. 
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including Canada, the US, the EU,46 the UK, and France.47 The signature of the Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement in 2011 [ACTA],48 including by Canada, illustrates a new wave of regulation toward 
strengthening the means by which copyright holders can enforce their exclusive rights and deter 
copyright infringement. 49 In Canada and worldwide, the trend, as intensified in the last decades, has 
been toward the progressive expansion of copyright in duration, in subject matter, and in scope. 
At first sight, the construction of copyright by the CCA exhibits characteristics that are commonly 
associated with property.50 The exclusionary powers that the CCA confers on copyright holders in 
relation to a work can be assigned in whole or in part, licensed, donated, or bequeathed as an object of 
commodification.51 Copyright holders exclusive rights are opposable to all,52 and, when infringed, 
entitle copyright holders to all civil remedies by way of injunction, damages, accounts, delivery up, 
and otherwise that may be conferred by law.53 Copyright infringement can also give rise to criminal 
sanctions. 54 
The Supreme Court has on numerous occasions distanced copyright law from property law, referring 
to Compo Co. v Blue Crest Music lnc.55 where Estey J. stated in a unanimous judgment: 
46 The European Union is a member of the World Trade Organization, hence a contracting party of TRIPS, 
supra note 43: WTO Membership, online: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatis e/tif e/org6 e.htm. 
It is not a contracting party of the Berne Convention, supra note 39: Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works, Contracting Parties, online: 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty id=l5. 
47 As of January 18 2013, there were 157 contracting parties to the Berne Convention, supra note 52: World 
Intellectual Property Organization, Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 
Contracting Parties, online: htW.~.!f~ww.~~jno.inJf!r~;;i.Jies/~Dl.Shm~.R~ults.j.fil271ill.m::J:.D_&!I~aty id=::J.-5. and 
157 members to the World Trade Organization, hence contracting paities to TRIPS, supra note 56 (latest 
information available on the WTO website: August 24, 2012): World Trade Organization, WTO 
Membership, online: http://www.wto.org/engJish/thewto e/whatis e/tif e/org6 e.htm. 
48 October 1, 2011, online: http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/fo/inte1lect property.aspx?view=d ACTA's signatory members include Canada, the EU and 
its member states, the US, Japan and Australia. 
49 Ibid. See the discussion on ACTA and related national laws in Chapter 1, Part II. 
50 See the discussion in Chapter 4 in particular Part II, on the concept of property and ownership. 
51 CCA, supra note 1 s 13( 4)-13(7); see Fiona MacMillan, "Copyright and Corporate Power", in Ruth 
Towse (ed), Copyright and the Cultural Industries (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2002) 99-118; Fiona 
MacMillan, "The Cruel C: Copyright and Film" (2002) 24 E.I.P.R. 483, in particular at 484. 
52 CCA, supra note 1, s 27 (1 ): "It is an infringement of copyright for any person to do, without the consent 
of the owner of the copyright, anything that by this Act only the owner of the copyright has the right to do." 
53 CCA, supra note 1, s 34(1 ). 
54 Ibid, SS 42-43. 
55 Compo Co. v Blue Crest Music Inc. (1979), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 357 (SCC). 
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copyright law is neither tort law nor property law in classification, but is statutory law. It neither cuts 
across existing rights in property or conduct nor falls between rights and obligations heretofore 
existing in the common law. Copyright legislation simply creates rights and obligations upon the 
terms and in the circumstances set out in the statute. 56 
And yet, property and ownership parlance is commonly used to describe copyright in judicial 
decisions, including by the Supreme Court.57 In my view and for reasons I will elaborate below in this 
chapter, the characterization of copyright in Compo Co. v Blue Crest Music Inc. emphasizes its 
statutory fabrication more than it forecloses any possible association between copyright and 
property. 58 
In Canada and worldwide, copyright has expanded in duration, scope, and subject matter. While the 
CCA does not specifically define the nature of copyright, it contains at first glance many of the key 
attributes that are normally associated with property. In the remainder of this chapter, I will examine 
the essential characteristics of copyright through the lens of the property law and theory framework 
that I introduced in Chapter 4, court decisions, and copyright scholarship. I will begin my analysis 
with an overview of the animated debate among copyright commentators on the characterization of 
copyright as property. 
56 Ibid, at para 23 (subsequently applied in numerous Supreme Court Judgements: see Society of 
Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Canadian Assn. of Internet Providers [2004] 2 
S.C.R. 427 at para 82, whereby the Court lists previous judgments by the Supreme Court having made the 
same statement. 
57 See for example: Desputeaux v Editions Chouette (1987) inc., 2003 sec 17 at para 57: "the Copyright 
Act deals with copyright primarily as a system designed to organize the economic management of 
intellectual property, and regards copyright primarily as a mechanism for protecting and transmitting the 
economic values associated with this type of property and with the use of it." See also Euro-Excellence Inc. 
v Kraft Canada Inc., 2007 SCC 37 at paras 27-39; BMG Canada v John Doe, 2005 FCA 193 at para 41. Cie 
Generate des etablissements Michelin v C.A. W.- Canada (1996) 71 C.P.R. (3d) 348 (F.C.T.D.). 
58 Supra note 55. See the discussion further below in Part IV of this chapter. 
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III. The ongoing debate: is copyright property? 
Copyright has been described as a monopoly,59 as a regulatory right or privilege,60 as a construction of 
statute,61 as an intellectual right,62 as a government subsidy,63 as property,64 and as akin to a 
dismemberment of ownership (i.e., usufruct). 65 While copyright shares important attributes with other 
forms of property,66 there is an ongoing debate on the nature of copyright and other intellectual 
59 R.J. Roberts, "Canadian Copyright: Natural Property or Mere Monopoly" (1979) 40 Can. Patent Reporter 
(2d) 33; Pierre-Emmanuel Moyse, "La nature du droit d'auteur: droit de propriete ou monopole?" (1998) 43 
McGill L.J. 507. 
60 L. Ray Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright and Fair Use" (1987) 40 Vand. L. Rev. 1 at 8; 
William Patry, Moral Panics and the Copyright Wars (Oxford University Press, 2009) at 110: historically, 
copyright in the U.S. was always regarded as a regulatory privilege, not as a property right; Mikhai'l 
Xifaras, La Propriete Etude de philosophie du droit (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2004) at 411 
and 425 describes copyright as a privilege. 
61 Compo Co. v Blue Crest Music Inc., supra note 55 at para 23; see also supra note 56. 
62 Severine Dusollier, Droit d'auteur et protection des oeuvres dans l'univers numerique, 2d ed. (Bruxelles: 
Larcier, 2007) [Dusollier 2007] at 322-323 where the author defines the nature of copyright (as well as 
other intellectual property rights) as a limited right of exploitation to the public that does not involve the use 
or enjoyment of a resource which contrasts it with property. 
63 Mark A. Lemley, "Property, Intellectual Property and Free Riding" (2005) Texas L. Rev. 1031 at 1069ff, 
the author, after making an analogy to real property, tort, government subsidy and government regulation, 
concludes that no analogy is fully adequate but the closest one is probably a government subsidy as it 
underlies the trade-off at play better than talking about it as a real property right. 
64 See supra note 57. For a historical perspective on the debate around the nature of copyright, i.e. either as 
a monopoly, property or creation of statute, see Fox, supra note 7 at 7-11, whereby after reviewing the three 
characterizations of copyright, the author concludes that copyright is incorporeal property: ibid, at 10-11; 
James W. Harris, Property and Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) at 42-47; David Vaver, "Canada's 
Intellectual Property Framework: A Comparative Overview" (2004) 17 I.P.J. 125 at 135; R. Hughes, S. 
Peacock & N. Armstrong, Hughes on Copyright & Industrial Design, 2d ed., loose-leaf (Toronto: 
LexisNexis Canada, 2005) at 101 where the authors refer to copyright as intangible incorporeal property; 
see Dusollier 2007, supra note 62 at 314- 323 who reviews doctrinal works qualifying copyright as property 
and the various arguments for and against the qualification of copyright as property; Peter S. Menell, "The 
Property Rights Movement's Embrace of Intellectual Property: True Love Or Doomed Relationship?" 
(2007) 34 Ecology L.Q. 713 at 721; Richard A. Epstein, "Liberty versus Property? Cracks in the 
Foundations of Copyright Law" (2005) 42 San Diego Law Review, I [Epstein, "Liberty versus Property"]; 
Adam Mossoff, "Is copyright property?" (2005) 42 San Diego Law Review, 29; Richard A. Epstein, "The 
Disintegration of Intellectual Property? A Classical Liberal Response to a Premature Obituary" (20 I 0) 62 
Stan. L. Re. 455 [Epstein, "Disintegration of Intellectual property"]. 
65 David Lametti "The Concept and Conceptions of Intellectual Property as seen through the lens of 
Property", in G. Comande & G. Ponzanelli, eds, Scienza e Diritto nel Prisma del Diritto Comparato 
(Torino: Giappichelli, 2004) 269 at 282, where the author finds some commonality between copyright and 
one of the dismemberment of ownership, i.e. usufruct, acknowledging that copyright in the end still shares 
the attributes of a property right. 
66 Copyright can be assigned in whole or in part, licensed, donated or bequeathed, and copyright is 
opposable to all: see the discussion in Part IV of this chapter. 
156 
property rights, and more particularly around the effects of assimilating copyright to property.67 I will 
deal with the debate on the property attributes of copyright at a substantive level below in this 
chapter.68 At this point, I will limit my remarks to the political dimension of associating copyright 
with property in contemporary copyright discourse. 
Commentators, including Lawrence Lessig and William Patry, describe how the assimilation of 
copyright to private property generally serves the proponents of strong copyright holders' rights.69 
The analogies and metaphors employed by Jack Valenti, as president of the Motion Picture 
Association of America, equating cultural property to the strongest forms of private property (and the 
need to give the former the same level of protection as the latter) are frequently cited examples of the 
use of strong tangible property rhetoric to secure more robust intellectual property rights.70 Lingo that 
is traditionally associated to tangible property, e.g., fencing-off, theft, and piracy is frequently used 
with respect to intellectual property and carries with it a powe1ful imagery that for some may have 
contributed to the progressive expansion of the scope of copyright.71 
Commentators who favour a robust public domain and the need to give greater consideration to 
copyright users and other competing interests, warn against the dangers of the propertization of 
copyright.72 It is not always clear that warnings against associating copyright with property 
necessarily reject that copyright can be a form of property.73 While commentators who point to the 
perils of equating copyright with other forms of tangible property will sometimes concede that 
67 Epstein, "Liberty versus Property", supra note 64; Mossoff, supra note 64; Hanoch Dagan, "Property and 
The Public Domain" (2006) 18 Yale J .L. & Human. 84; Dusollier 2007, supra note 62 at 309-328; Michael 
Spence, Intellectual Property (Oxford: OUP, 2007) at 13-15; Menell, supra note 64; Patry, supra note 60 at 
109-131. 
68 See the discussion on the property attributes of copyright in Part IV of this chapter. 
69 Lawrence Lessig, Free culture: How big media uses technology and the law to lock down culture and 
control creativity (New York: Penguin Press, 2004) at l 16ff.; Patry, supra note 60 at 109-132. 
70 Lessig, supra note 69 at l l 6ff.; Patry, supra note 60 at 109ff. 
71 Ibid. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright's Paradox (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 6-8. 
On the progressive expansion of copyright, see the discussion in Part II of this chapter. 
72 Patry, supra note 60 at 114. see also Carys Craig, "Locke, Labour and Limiting the Author's Right: A 
Warning Against a Lockean Approach to Copyright Law" (2002) 28 Queen's L.J. I [Craig 2002], in 
particular at 58 where the author describes the effects of the Lockean reasoning to defend copyright, 
starting with the author's entitlements, and working backwards to set its limits as opposed to starting the 
analysis with the public domain and then justifying authors' right to control in terms of encouragement to 
create. 
73 For example, Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas (New York: Random House, 200 I) at 6 does not 
question property per se as much as the need to rethink property; see also Lessig, supra note 69 at 172. 
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different conceptions of property can lead to different conceptions of the scope of copyright,74 they 
generally view the association of copyright with property as a dangerous slippery slope that is 
contributing to the progressive expansion of copyright holders' exclusive rights.75 Because of the 
uncertain contours of intellectual property and copyright, the application of property reasoning to such 
abstract concepts or intangibles may present even greater danger of expansion than in relation to other 
forms of tangible property. 76 
The recent Supreme Court jurisprudence that signals a move away from an absolutist view of 
copyright holders' rights reflects concerns similar to the discourse against the propertization of 
copyright.77 While initially not explicitly associating a more absolutist view of copyright with its 
propertization,78 the Court in a unanimous judgment recently made a clearer link between the two 
when it reflected on the recent evolution of its jurisprudence in Society of Composers, Authors and 
Music Publishers of Canada v Bell Canada [Bell Canada]:79 
Theberge reflected a move away from an earlier, author-centric view which focused on the exclusive 
right of authors and copyright owners to control how their works were used in the marketplace: see 
e.g. Bishop v Stevens, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 467, at pp. 478-79. Under this former framework, any benefit 
the public might derive from the copyright system was only "a fortunate by-product of private 
entitlement" [citing Carys J. Craig, "Locke, Labour and Limiting the Author's Right: A Warning 
against a Lockean Approach to Copyright Law" (2002), 28 Queen's L.J I, at pp 14-15]. 80 
74 For example, see Craig 2002, supra note 72 at 13, 40-41. 
75 Craig 2002, supra note 72, where the author warns against the detrimental effects on the copyright system 
of a pervasive Lockean rights-based view of property applied to copyright in copyright case law, that 
focuses on the relationship between the author and her work as opposed to centering on the relationship 
between the work and the public and the incentive-based system that needs to be put in place to encourage 
the creation and dissemination of works; Patry, supra note 60 at 114. 
76 See the discussion below in Part III of this chapter on Cie Generale des etablissements Michelin v 
C.A. W.- Canada (1996), 71 C.P.R. (3d) 348 (F.C.T.D.); see also Craig 2002, supra note 72 at 40-41. 
77 See the discussion on the objectives of the CCA, supra note 1 to balance competing interests in Chapter 2 
Part II. 
78 Ibid. In CCH Canadian Ltd. v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 SCC I 3 [ CCHJ at para 23 the Court 
took into consideration the need to preserve a robust public domain in defining what the proper test was to 
determine "original works" that give rise to copyright protection [citing Jessica Litman, "The Public 
Domain" (1990), 39 Emory L.J. 965, at 969, and Carys J. Craig, "Locke, Labour and Limiting the Author's 
Right: A Warning against a Lockean Approach to Copyright Law" (2002), 28 Queen's L.J. 1.]. 
79 2012 sec 36. 
80 Ibid, at para 9. 
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The move away from a focus on the exclusive right of authors as described by the Court set the base 
for its reiteration that fair dealing is a users' rights that required a generous interpretation of its 
purposes. 81 
In response to warnings against the effects of the propertization of copyright, other commentators 
attribute the so-called expansionist effects of qualifying copyright as property and the polarization it 
creates between copyright absolutists and copyright minimalists to a misconception of property. 82 
Rather than a monolith of unlimited exclusionary powers, property is a heterogeneous legal institution 
that is intrinsically subject to limitations and obligations.83 The property institution(s) can serve the 
interests of defenders of the public domain as much as it does the interests of the copyright holders. In 
that view, the proponents of a strong public domain even stand a better chance at constraining 
copyright expansionist arguments inside the property institution itself, rather than by invoking less 
defined concepts external to it. 84 
The persistence with which some commentators insist that copyright is not property serves, at times, 
the overt purpose of distancing copyright from a natural property right.85 This motive, it seems, 
confuses the nature of property with how it is sometimes justified, e.g., as a natural right, which is not 
a sine qua non condition for the existence of property. 86 Commentators who guard against the 
characterization of copyright as property confront a specific view of property, including a right-based 
view of property that opposes any form of regulation or interference with property, and as a powerful 
81 Bell Canada, supra note 79 at paras 11-50, in particular at paras 27-29 where the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed the principles enunciated in CCH, supra note 78, on fair dealing. See also the discussion on fair 
dealing in Chapter 3 Part II C. 
82 Dagan, supra note 67 at 86; Christopher M. Newman, "Transformation in Property and Copyright" 
(2011) 56 Villanova Law Review 251; Eduardo Moise Penalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property outlaws (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2010) at 43. 
83 Ibid. See also the discussion in Chapter 4, in particular Part II and V. Lessig, supra note 69 at 72 also 
shares the view that copyright is property; however he emphasizes how we need to take into account the 
balancing of competing interests that are at stake and define its scope accordingly. 
84 Dagan, supra note 67 at 92; Newman, supra note 82 at 78; see also David Fagundes, 'Property Rhetoric 
and the Public Domain" (2010) 94 Minn. L. Rev. 652 at 705. 
85 Roberts, supra note 59 at 34, Patterson, supra note 60 at 8. Other commentators have raised the reticence 
of qualifying copyright as property for political reasons including fear of the feudalist implications that the 
association of intellectual work protected by copyright with property may lead to: see Xifaras, supra note 
60 at 414. See also Patry, supra note 60atl12ff. 
86 Even though the existence of a natural right to property is the object of an ongoing debate, in an Anglo-
American context, instrumentalism, and in particular utilitarianism, is often viewed as the most influential 
justification for the existence of private property, including intellectual property: see the discussion on the 
theoretical justifications of copy ownership and copyright in in Chapter 6 Part III. 
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right that precedes the state.87 At other times, the underlying purpose of distancing the nature of 
copyright from property is to avoid the perceived absolutism and expansionist effects associated with 
the primafacie open-ended privileges and powers of property.88 
A striking example of the perils of interpreting the scope of copyright by using the analogy of strong 
tangible private property rights is the judgment in Cie Generale des etablissements Michelin v 
C.A. W- Canada [Michelin]. 89 The plaintiff Michelin sought an injunction against defendants CAW 
Union and others (CAW Union) based on trademark and copyright infringement for the use of the 
Bibendum (Michelin man) logo owned by Michelin. In an attempt to unionize the employees of 
Michelin Canada, CAW Union distributed various leaflets depicting the Bibendum logo in humorous 
or satirical ways. CAW Union was not successful in arguing that its use of the Bibendum logo was 
permissible as a parody or satire. Until the amendments to the CCA in 2012, 90 the CCA did not 
provide an exception to copyright infringement based on parody or satire as was already the case in 
other jurisdictions.91 
One of CAW Union's defences in Michelin was based on the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms (Charter), 92 arguing that their posters and leaflets depicting the Bibendum logo were forms 
of expression protected by section 2(b) of the Charter and that the CCA was unconstitutional to the 
extent that it forbade such use.93 Teitelbaum, J. for the Federal Court (trial division) rejected that 
argument: ''The Charter does not confer the right to use private property - the Plaintiff's copyright -
87 Netanel, supra note 7 at 6-8; Patry, supra note 60 at 97-132. see Craig 2002, supra note 72. 
88 For example see Netanel, supra note 71 at 6-8; Patry, supra note 60 at 114; see also Craig 2002, supra 
note 72, guarding against the expansionist effects of a Lockean rights-based view of copyright. 
89 Supra note 76, in particular at para 84, where the court referred to plaintiffs Michelin's copyright in the 
bibendum logo as private property, responding to an argument by defendants that copyright had to be 
analogized to a form of public property. For a discussion of this case see: Jane Bailey, "Deflating the 
Michelin Man: Protecting Users' Rights in the Canadian Copyright Reform Process" in Michael Geist, ed. 
In the Public Interest: The Future of Canadian Copyright Law, (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005) 125; see also 
Carys Craig, "Putting the Community in Communication: Dissolving the Conflict between Freedom of 
Expression and Copyright" (2006) 56 U. Toronto L.J. 75 [Craig 2006]. 
9° CCMA, supra note 29. 
91 Ibid, s 21 amended s 29 of the CCA, supra note 1, by adding parody or satire as one of the purposes under 
which the fair dealing exception to copyright infringement applies. In France, see art L 122-5 4 ° CPI; in the 
US, parody can be invoked as an exception to copyright infringement and is assessed under the fair use 
doctrine (17 USC § 107): Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
92 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U .K.), 1982, c.11. 
93 Michelin, supra note 76 at paras 82-86. For a discussion of this judgment and on the interaction between 
copyright and freedom of expression, see Craig 2006, supra note 89. 
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in the service of freedom of expression."94 It granted injunction relief to Michelin, ordering CAW 
Union to stop using the Bibendum logo on its leaflets. 
Through out its reasons for judgment in Michelin, the Court emphasized the private property nature of 
copyright and relied on case law that stated that the exercise of freedom of expression did not give the 
right to use someone else's private property.95 Even if the Court acknowledged that the use of the 
copyright (private property) of Michelin was different from the use of private property as the location 
for the exercise of the freedom of expression, it nevertheless held that an analogy could be made 
between the two to ultimately conclude that the use of private property was a prohibited form of 
expression under the Charter. 96 
By analogizing the reproduction of the Bibendum, a work protected by copyright and as a trademark, 
to the use of tangible private property, the Court failed to recognize important differences between the 
nature of copyright and the nature of ownership rights in tangible property, such as land or equipment. 
Among the differences, reproduction of the Bibendum was non-rivalrous, i.e., it did not deprive 
Michelin of the enjoyment of its property, nor was there any intrusion involved. The use of the 
Bibendum was not one that competed with the economic rights of Michelin's copyright work, which 
could have supported a form of "deprivation of enjoyment" by Michelin under a tangible private 
property law analysis.97 The reproduction by the defendants of Michelin's copyright work and 
trademark calls for a different rationale than the one that withstands the balancing act at play in cases 
involving the use of other forms of private property to exercise freedom of expression. The Court was 
concerned to offer copyright holders less protection than other "full property owners" on the basis that 
they held an intangible right.98 The Court likely implied the full strongest form of exclusionary 
94 Michelin, supra note 76 at para 85. 
95 Ibid at paras 94-118. The Court referred mainly to three judgments: Committee for the Commonwealth of 
Canada v Canada (1991), 77 D.L.R. (4th) 385 (S.C.C.), Harrison v Carswell, (1975), 62 D.L.R. (3d) 68, 
and New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. Ltd. v CRTC, [1984] 2 F.C. 410. 
96 Michelin, supra note 76 at para 107: "The Defendants have used private property not as a forum but as a 
means of conveying a message. However, despite these differences, I reason by analogy to Commonwealth 
that I am permitted to consider the parties' interests even before the Section 1 stage of the analysis in order 
to examine the scope of the Defendants' freedom of expression under Section 2(b) and determine if the 
expression is in a prohibited form. I hold that it is reasonable to equate doing something on private property 
as a forum for expression with using the property - the copyright - to convey expression." 
97 The effect of the use on the work protected by copyright, e.g. its commercial exploitation is also one of 
the criteria to consider to determine whether the dealing of the work is fair or not: see CCH, supra note 78 
at para 59. See also the discussion on fair dealing in Chapter 3 Part II C. 
98 Michelin, supra note 76 at para 109: "Copyright is an intangible property right. The owner therefore has a 
more challenging task in asserting his or her control over the use of the property. Launching an action for 
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powers that can be conferred on property owners, i.e., those invested with "full-blooded ownership."99 
It is as if the private property nature of copyright did not give the court the choice to treat copyright 
differently. 
Although the open-ended texture of property can lead to expansionism, 100 this is not necessarily an 
account of what property is. Property is not absolute: it is the object of various forms of limitations. 101 
The property institution regulates a multitude of heteroclite relationships and resources, both tangible 
and intangible. 102 The unqualified equation of copyright with private tangible property in Michelin 
reflects an absolutist and monolithic approach to property as opposed to a contextual approach 
looking in each case at the justifications or "property-specific justice reasons"103 that withstand the 
property right in question. Copyright's objectives embed the promotion of freedom of expression and 
other democratic values. 104 Exceptions to copyright infringement allow the mediation between 
copyright holders' exclusive rights and those fundamental rights when they come in conflict. 105 The 
CCA limitations on copyright holders' exclusive rights allow for the resolution of conflicts between 
competing interests and, in the case of Michelin, in a way that is even more apparent now than it was 
at the time. 106 Without getting into the actual merit of CAW Union's defence under the Charter and 
infringement under the aegis of the Copyright Act is the owner's prime tool for asserting his or her rights. 
But just because the right is intangible, it should not be any less worthy of protection as a full property 
right: (see Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. v William Hill (Football) Ltd., [1964] 1 W.L.R. 273 (H.L.) at 291)." 
99 In Harris' terms, the strongest form of ownership interest on the ownership spectrum: Harris, supra note 
64 at 5, 30; see also the discussion on the concept of property and ownership in Chapter 4 Part II. 
100 Different theoretical justifications of property can have an impact on a more expansive or restrictive 
view of property. I discuss the various theoretical justifications of (intellectual) property and their effect on 
the scope of copyright and copy ownership in Chapter 6 Part III. 
101 For a discussion on the operation of various forms of property limitations, see Chapter 4 Part V. 
102 Harris, supra note 64 at 4 and at 348 where the author notes: "It is a mistake to assume that either we 
must align property in information with property in other resources or else we must exclude information 
from the property agenda. Property-institutional design may be and should be much more flexible than 
these alternatives allow."; Mossoff, supra note 64 at 40-41; Newman, supra note 82 at 79: "The problems 
addressed by ownership of tangible things are not identical in all respects to those that underlie ownership 
of intellectual works, and careless property-based rhetoric can lead to error. But the areas of commonality 
are great, and we should not be too quick to conclude that property is always the problem and never the 
solution."; see also: Richard A. Epstein, "What is So Special about Intangible Property? The Case for 
Intelligent Carryovers" (2010), New York University Law and Economics Working Papers, Paper 243, 
online:. http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu Jewp/243. 
103 These are the reasons that can be invoked to justify a property institution: Harris, supra note 64 at 168. 
104 For a discussion on the theoretical justifications of copyright and copy ownership, see Chapter 6 Part 3. 
105 This is the case in particular with respect to the application of fair dealing: see the discussion in Chapter 
3 Part II C and in Part IV. 
106 I.e. Parody or satire, which could have been invoked in that case, was not a listed purpose under the fair 
dealing exceptions to copyright infringement, but the 2012 amendments to the CCA, supra note 1 added 
parody or satire as a listed purpose: CCA, ibid s 29. 
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the tests it had to fulfill to be successful, Michelin illustrates the pitfalls of a monolithic absolutist 
property approach to copyright, and gives cause for concern. 
To distance the nature of copyright from property is no guaranteed panacea against the expansionist 
tendencies of copyright that we have witnessed in recent years. The declared self-standing statutory 
nature of copyright107 has not stopped it from expanding, independently of equating copyright to 
property. 108 In respect of the trespassory powers and economic benefits that are presumed to be within 
the domain of copyright holders, copyright is often described as conferring inflated rights on 
copyright holders, compared to other property rights. Applying economic theory, Mark A. Lemley 
observes that copyright law allows copyright holders to benefit from positive externalities of their 
ownership rights to a degree that is not observed for other types of tangible property: 109 
... society in general doesn't prohibit free riding. Internalization of positive externalities is not 
necessary at all unless efficient use of the property requires a significant investment that cannot be 
recouped another way. And even then, economic theory properly requires not the complete 
internalization of positive externalities but only the capture of returns sufficient to recoup the 
investment. Only where there is a tragedy of the commons do we insist on complete or relatively 
complete internalization of externalities. 110 
This is the result, according to Lemley, of a focus by the courts on the benefit of those externalities, 
i.e., "free riding," and on the assumption that such benefits are necessarily unjust. 111 In Euro-
Excellence Inc. v Kraft Canada Inc, 112 Bastarache J. in his dissenting reasons applied a similar 
107 Compo Co. v Blue Crest Music Inc. supra note 55 at para 23. See also supra note 56. 
108 See the discussion on the progressive expansion of copyright in the CCA, supra note 1 and worldwide in 
Part II of this chapter. See also the discussion of copyright expansionism further below in Part III of this 
Chapter. 
109 Lemley, supra note 63 at 1033: "Courts and commentators adopt--explicitly or implicitly--the economic 
logic of real property in the context of intellectual property cases. They then make a subconscious move, 
one that the economic theory of property does not justify: they jump from the idea that intellectual property 
is property to the idea that the IP owner is entitled to capture the full social value of her right." 
110 Lemley, supra note 63 at 1050. See also Menell, supra note 64 at 744-745, where the author notes that 
one of the important differences between intellectual property and tangible property is precisely that there is 
no tragedy of the commons and hence no need that every component of the artificially created resource 
scarcity should necessarily be owned. 
111 Lemley, supra note 63 at 1044. 
112 Supra note 57 at para 85. 
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reasoning when he emphasized that the CCA does not protect all "positive externalities" of a 
copyright work but "only the legitimate economic interests of copyright holders."113 
One can think of many examples in the CCA that illustrate Lemley' s analysis of copyright as 
capturing a large number of positive extemalities. 114 Inceasingly, the legitimacy of the comer stone of 
copyright law, i.e., the exclusive right to reproduce copies of copyright works, needs to be 
reconsidered in the digital environment. Certain copies are not likely to threaten the creator-incentive 
primary justification of copyright, 115 for instance, when a consumer makes copies purely for 
convenience purposes. With the amendments in 2012, the CCA now allows users to make copies for 
private purposes under limited circumstances without copyright holders' consent and without the need 
to compensate copyright holders. 116 The introduction of a limited reproduction right for private 
purposes in the CCA shows some recognition that reproductions for private purposes do not 
unreasonably interfere, if at all, with copyright holders' exclusive rights. 117 A more controversial 
example is when the owners of commercial copies of copyright works make copies for family 
members or close friends. It is not always clear that the additional copies would be competing with 
the exclusive economic rights of copyright holders. In other words, even had the family members or 
close friends not been provided with the copy, they may not have purchased the copy of the copyright 
work at all. Making copies for family members or close friends can enhance other goals of copyright 
and could even benefit copyright holders, for example, by encouraging the beneficiaries of the burned 
copies to go to a concert or to buy the complete CDs or download other songs from the same 
musicians. 118 Nevertheless, in most cases, the rights and remedies that generally support the exclusive 
113 Ibid, Bastarache J. proposing a narrower interpretation of CCA, supra note 1 s 27(2), by seeking to 
define what were the legitimate economic interests of the copyright holder in the case at hand: "Section 
27(2) of the Act is meant to prohibit secondary infringement resulting from the wrongful appropriation of 
the gains of another's skill and judgment by way of the acts enumerated in paras. (a) to (c). Conversely, 
other economic interests - although they may seem to be closely associated with the interests legitimately 
protected as emanating from that skill and judgment - are not protected. In particular, if a work of skill and 
judgment (such as a logo) is attached to some other consumer good (such as a chocolate bar), the economic 
gains associated with the sale of the consumer good must not be mistakenly viewed as the legitimate 
economic interests of the copyright holder of the logo that are protected by the law of copyright." 
114 Lemley, supra note 63. 
115 I discuss the theoretical justifications of copyright and copy ownership in Chapter 6 Part III. 
116 See the discussion on the private purpose right in Chapter 3 Part II D (ii). 
117 Ibid. 
118 See generally Jessica Litman, "Lawful Personal Use" (2007) 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1871, in particular at 1881 
and also at 1911-1912, where the author develops parameters to help define what the scope of lawful 
personal use should be in US copyright law, based on whether the use in question enhances what the author 
describes as "copyright liberties" and the extent to which the use would undermine the incentive to create. 
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right to reproduce, lead to the inference that something is being taken away from copyright holders 
because someone made additional copies of the work without authorization or compensation. 119 
There are several other illustrations of copyright holders' ability to capture the positive externalities of 
their ownership rights even above and beyond what tangible property would allow. The narrow 
application that courts have given to the non-substantial-part doctrine to allow uses of copyright 
works without copyright holders' authorization is one example. 120 Another example is the "incidental 
inclusion" provision in the CCA. 121 It provides a limited exception to the inclusion of a work (e.g., a 
musical recording) in another work (e.g., a documentary film), but only if the use of the first work is 
incidental and not deliberate. 122 Thus, other than for uses of the work that are incidental and not 
deliberate, any other positive externalities of a copyright work, even if quite minimal, fall within the 
exclusive domain of the copyright holder. By contrast, the use of a vase or a desk lamp not subject to 
copyright (or to any other intellectual property right) is not subject to any form of restriction from the 
maker of the vase or desk lamp and the vase or desk lamp can be used freely in the documentary film, 
a positive benefit of owning that vase or desk lamp. Overall, the lists of exceptions to the exclusive 
rights of copyright holders are perhaps even more revealing of the extensive scope of copyright 
holders' exclusive rights than the provisions of the CCA dealing with the exclusive rights of copyright 
holders per se. 123 Educational institutions' specifically enumerated and carved-out exceptions, the four 
new user provisions that I discussed in Chapter 3, and the computer program limited copying 
exceptions for compatibility and backup purposes are illustrative of the far reaching scope of 
copyright. 124 
If copyright holders benefit from even more positive externalities than owners of other forms of 
tangible private property, the reason for such expansionist tendencies must be sought elsewhere than 
because copyright is assimilated to property by lawmakers, the judiciary, and commentators. 
See also the discussion on the theoretical justifications of copyright and copy ownership in Chapter 6 Part 
III. 
119 CCA, supra note 1, ss 3, 27, 34. 
120 See the discussion on the non-substantial part doctrine in Chapter 3 Part II A. 
121 CCA, supra note 1, s 30.7. 
122 Ibid. 
123 CCA, supra note 1, ss 29-32.2. 
124 Ibid, ss 29.4-30.4., 29.21-29.24, 30.4. See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part II D and F. 
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Expansionism is not the proper argument to use to exclude copyright from the property institution. 125 
In The Future of Ideas, Lessig invites us to rethink the current scope of property (including 
intellectual property), as well as broader legal and other frameworks under which we operate, to fully 
seize the opportunity and face the challenges of the Internet revolution. 126 For Lessig, the concept of 
property as the basis on which prosperity has been made possible is confusing us, but to question the 
scope of property is not to question property itself. 127 
The debate on the nature of copyright needs to centre on substantive considerations to adequately 
respond to mischaracterizations or misplaced applications of underlying concepts of property. It 
would be misguided and confusing not to call copyright property simply for fear that the designation 
of copyright as a form of property interest will lead to absolutism, if copyright shares the attributes of 
property at a substantive level. It is not so much the "propertization" of copyright that can lead to 
expansionism, but rather a misinformed application of the concept of property to copyright, and the 
view that overlooks the existence of equally meritorious competing property rights and the operation 
of property's intrinsic limitations. 128 As I argued above, distancing copyright from property is no 
safeguard against copyright's progressive expansion. 129 The sui generis nature of copyright can be 
invoked to limit its scope as much as to expand it. 130 The proper application of the property 
framework to copyright may in fact lead to more constraining effects on the scope of copyright than 
would otherwise be the case. 131 
In this part, I have discussed the debate and controversies about characterizing copyright as a form of 
property. While some commentators claim that the property rhetoric around copyright may have 
contributed to the expansion of copyright, others argue that, on the contrary, the property institution 
contains all the necessary tools to adequately calibrate the scope of copyright in accordance with its 
underlying justifications and objectives. I have argued that, if copyright shares many of the property 
125 Penalver & Katyal, supra note 82 at 39 and 42, describe intellectual property as being distinct from and 
far more complex than tangible property, while at the same time sharing important similarities with tangible 
property. 
126 Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas (New York: Random House, 2001) at 5-6. 
127 Ibid, at 5-6. See also Lessig, supra note 69 at 172. 
128 Newman, supra note 82 at 259-267. 
129 See the discussion above in Part III of this chapter. 
130 Ibid. 
131 See Newman, supra note 82, where the author reflects on the nature of property and on how it 
commands standardized and predictable rules that are not subject to the personal preferences of others. The 
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attribute~ at a substantive level, it is misguided to distance copyright from property for fear of its 
expansionist effects. The root cause of the progressive expansion of copyright is not necessarily its 
assimilation to property, but perhaps a misconception of property. No doubt, copyright is distinct in 
many respects from traditional forms of tangible property, but it also shares at a substantive level 
many common attributes with property that need to be investigated and acknowledged rather than 
evacuated. 
The peculiarity of copyright and the strong political undercurrents surrounding its nature make the 
need to study copyright through the lens of property law and theory all the more pressing in an effort 
to debunk misconceptions about property and how its inept application may contribute to an inflation 
of copyright. For instance, what is the resource within copyright that can be the object of property and 
what is the nature of copyright holders' powers and privileges over the physical embodiments of their 
works that are owned by consumers and other users? These are among the questions that an 
investigation into the property attributes of copyright seeks to answer. 
IV. The property attributes of copyright 
The abstract nature of copyright, that is, its uncontained simultaneous reach to multiple objects owned 
by different persons, offers a field of study of high interest to property and copyright theorists alike. 
Copyright, like other forms of intellectual property, challenges our common understanding of 
property as it relates to tangible resources. My objective here is not to provide a detailed review of 
how property theory applies to copyright, but rather to focus on those key aspects that will help a 
better understanding of the nature of commercial copies of copyright works, as well as to off er 
reasoned responses to some of the fears about the assimilation of copyright to property that I 
discussed above in this chapter. 132 To this end, the application of the ownership spectrum to copyright 
is particularly insightful for its ability to provide a nuanced approach to the property attributes of 
copyright. 
author demonstrates how the application of a rigorous and consequentialist property approach to copyright 
would constrain rather than expand the current scope of copyright exclusive rights. 
132 Commentators looking at the property attributes of intellectual property and copyright or reflecting more 
generally on their place within the property institution include: James E Penner, The Idea of Property in 
Law (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997) at 118-20; Harris, supra note 64 at 42-46; Spence, supra note 67 at 13-16; 
Dusollier 2007, supra note 62 at 314-321; Lametti, supra note 65; Penalver & Katyal, supra note 82, in 
particular at 39-50; in addition to the vast body of literature looking at the theoretical justifications of 
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James Harris defines the essence of every property institution as the twin manifestation of trespassory 
rules 133 and the existence of an ownership spectrum. 134 To what extent are the features that are 
common on the ownership spectrum described by Harris present with respect to copyright, i.e., (i) a 
juridical relation between a person and a resource, (ii) privileges and powers that are primafacie 
open-ended, and (iii) which authorize self-seekingness on the owner? 135 To what extent does 
copyright give rise to trespassory powers? In answer to the second question, copyright confers a list of 
exclusive rights on copyright holders with respect to their works, with correlative trespassory powers 
that are opposable to all. 136 The CCA describes when primary and secondary infringements to 
copyright occur, 137 as well as the remedies that are available to copyright holders. 138 The remedies for 
copyright infringement include injunction, (statutory) damages, accounts, and delivery up. 139 Criminal 
sanctions can be imposed, i.e. fines or imprisonment. 140 
To answer the first question, i.e., the extent to which copyright shares the characteristics that are 
common to all ownership interests, I will apply each of the three features on the ownership spectrum 
to determine whether copyright shares the basic characteristics of property as a resource that can be 
owned. 141 I will then consider how copyright interferes with the personal property rights of owners of 
commercial copies of copyright works and will complete the analysis of the property attributes of 
copyright by a discussion on the standardization of property. 142 
inte1lectual property and copyright through the application of the theoretical justifications of property that I 
will discuss in Chapter 6 Part III. 
133 Harris, supra note 64 at 25, 86, "trespassory rules" refer to all rules which, by reference to a resource, 
impose obligations (negative or positive) upon an open ended range of persons, with the exception of some 
privileged individual, group, or agency (i.e. the owner(s)). They are open-ended, and give rise to various 
civil or criminal remedies such as damages, possessory recovery, injunction or restitution. They presuppose 
the existence of a separate, reasonably identifiable resource. See the discussion in Chapter 4 Part II. 
134 Ibid at 5, the ownership spectrum spans from "mere property" to "fu11-blooded ownership." See the 
discussion in Chapter 4 Part II. 
i3s Ibid. 
136 The CCA, supra note I, s. 27 to 28.2 enumerates the primary and secondary infringements of copyright 
and of moral rights ''for any person" who does certain acts without the consent of the copyright holder. 
137 Ibid. 
138 Ibid, SS 34ff. 
139 Ibid, SS 34, 38.1. 
1401bid, s 42 (1), on conviction or on indictment, the fine can be up to one million dollars and the 
imprisonment cannot exceed five years. 
141 Harris, supra note 64 at 5. 
142 See the discussion in Chapter 4 Part III Band C. 
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A. Copyright on the ownership spectrum 
(i) Juridical relation between a person and a resource 
The requirement of a juridical relation between a person and a resource on the ownership spectrum 
implies that the person and the resource can be identified, as well as a separateness between the 
two. 143 Every property institution also implies a scarcity in resources and an exercise of wealth 
allocation. 144 In the case of copyright, the state creates an "artificial scarcity" through copyright laws 
to prohibit the unauthorized reproduction and other acts that could otherwise be performed freely with 
respect to a work of authorship. 145 
The CCA frequently refers to the "ownership of copyright" or "copyright owners."146 Without 
entering into metaphysical questions about what constitutes an author, in relation to copyright the 
person is generally identifiable as the author (joint authors) or other copyright holder(s) of the work as 
set out in the CCA .147 Views diverge on the resource with which the author or copyright holder has a 
legal relationship. Commentators looking into the property attributes of copyright refer to the resource 
or property as being the intangible work, 148 or the bundle of exclusive rights, 149 while other 
commentators refer to the resource as the monopoly that copyright confers. 150 
143 This is a requirement for any property institution: see the discussion in Chapter 4 Part II. 
144 Harris, supra note 64 at 24. 
145 Jbid at 42-43; Lemley, supra note 63 at 1055. 
146 CCA, supra note 1, ss 2 "exclusive distributor" and "infringing," 2.2, 2.7, 3, 14, 17, 24, 27, 27.1 refer to 
ownership in relation to copyright. See also UKCDPA, supra note 3, ss 2, 16 which refer to the exclusive 
rights of the "owner of copyright" or "copyright owner". References to ownership of copyright or copyright 
owners are not in and of itself conclusive on the nature of copyright: Lametti, supra note 65 at 269. 
147 CCA, supra note 1, s 13 provides that the author of the work is the first owner of the copyright therein, 
as well as the circumstances under which the first owner of the copyright in the work is a person other than 
the author (e.g., the employer), ss 6.1, 6.2, 77 address situations where the author is unknown or cannot be 
located. For a discussion on the difficulties that arise in the identification of authors of works and other 
creators in intellectual property law, see Spence, supra note 67 at 25-29. 
148 See for example Harris, supra note 64 at 42-48, refers to the object protected by intellectual property as 
« ideational entities». See also Dusollier 2007, supra note 62 at 316-321 who reviews the various theories 
on the nature of copyright and also the conceptual difficulties around the qualification of copyright as 
property. 
149 Spence, supra note 67 at 15-16; See Dusollier 2007, supra note 62 at 316-321 who reviews the various 
theories and also the conceptual difficulties around the qualification of copyright as property, cites at 318 as 
proponents of that view: A. Lucas et H.-J. Lucas, Traite de la propriete litteraire et artistique, 2d ed. (Paris: 
Litec, 2001) at 31-32. 
150 See Penner, supra note 132 at 118-20. For a review and critique of various characterizations of the 
"thing" or property, when analysing copyright as a form of property See Spence, supra note 67 at 13-16. 
See also Dusollier 2007, supra note 62 at 317-321 who discusses different approaches in qualifying 
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Each of the propositions describing the object of property that is owned in the case of copyright is 
deficient to some extent. To claim that copyright holders own their work is problematic to the extent 
that their correlative trespassory powers do not forbid uses by others of their works once they are 
published. 151 One of the objectives of copyright is to encourage the dissemination of works. 152 The 
trespassory powers that copyright confers on copyright holders once their works are published only 
allow them to restrict others from performing specific acts on their works. 153 To state that the object of 
copyright holders' ownership is a monopoly is also deficient to the extent that it does not describe 
adequately the powers and privileges that copyright confers. 154 It is also somewhat disappointing to 
claim that copyright holders' ownership pertains to a bundle of exclusive rights, for the same reason 
that to describe property through rights and relationships without reference to a resource is somewhat 
defective and incomplete. 155 Failure to take into account the role of the resource and the dynamics that 
revolve around the resource leaves out important distinctive features that set property apart from other 
legal institutions. 156 
The shortcomings of characterizing the resource that copyright holders can own as the intangible 
work or as the bundle of exclusive rights diminish when we combine the two objects: the resource 
with which authors or copyright holders have a direct legal relationship is the bundle of exclusive 
rights as they relate to the work. 157 When copyright holders license or assign their copyright, it is the 
copyright as property, either through the intangible work or through the bundle or exclusive rights that 
copyright law confers to authors. 
151 Penner, supra note 132 at 118-119; Spence, supra note 67 at 13-14; see also Lametti, supra note 65 at 
279-282; Dusollier 2007, supra note 62 at 318-321. 
152 Galerie d'art du Petit Champlain inc. v Theberge, 2002 SCC 34 at para 30. See also the discussion on 
the competing objectives of the CCA, supra note I, in Chapter 2 Part II. 
153 Spence, supra note 67 at 13-14. A distinction needs to be made between published works and 
unpublished works. In the latter case, the trespassory powers of authors to their works are greater: Harris, 
supra note 64 at 43-44. 
154 Ibid, at 15, where the author observes that a monopoly generally denotes an undue power on specific 
products in a given market and that it is unlikely that copyright would ever have that effect, given its 
protection to specific works of art (and given that copyright protects the expression of ideas, not the ideas 
themselves). 
155 See for example Harris, supra note 64 at 121-124 on how we cannot dispense of the "person-thing" 
relationship to describe property and on his critique of Hohfeld's theory of property based on the correlation 
of rights; in the context of the characterization of copyright see, Dusollier 2007, supra note 62 at 317-318. 
156 Ibid. 
157 CCA, supra note 1 ss 3, 15, 18,21,26; Spence, supra note 67 at 15 conveys a similar idea but seems to 
focus more on the exclusive rights conferred by copyright as being the object of ownership. The link to the 
underlying work as part of the object is not stated explicitly. 
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work, with its unique attributes and qualities, that is the object of interest and scrutiny. The work, 
while not the object of ownership per se, cannot be evacuated from the "person-thing" relationship 
and is necessary, both as an intangible entity and in its material form, for an ownership interest to 
arise. 
While copyright is generally associated with incorporeal or intangible property, 158 it exists only to the 
extent that a creation materializes and becomes a work, which attaches a corporeal or physical 
element to copyright. The fixation requirement requires eligible works 159 to be fixed in some 
materially identifiable form to be protected by copyright. 160 The separateness of copyright in the work 
from the copyright holder and from all others is fulfilled by the fixation requirement, which is 
consistent with the idea-expression dichotomy, i.e., the fact that copyright protects the expression of 
ideas, not the ideas themselves. 161 As a result, the resource with which copyright holders have a legal 
relationship is the bundle of exclusive rights as they relate to the work as materialized. 
Pinning down more precisely the resource that copyright holders own is not a trivial exercise. The 
exercise reveals that the work per se cannot effectively be the object of ownership in property terms 
and reveals the inadequacy of ownership of the work as inaccurate property parlance. Applying 
property concepts to copyright by reference to ownership of the work expands the nature of copyright 
beyond what it is and ever was. Parliament never intended copyright holders to own their work: the 
nature of copyright makes this relationship between copyright holders and lawful copies of their work 
impossible. However the progressive expansion of the scope of protection of copyright, in particular, 
the introduction of TPMs, the exclusive right of creators to control the distribution of copies of their 
works, the make-available right, and the rental right created an unprecedented rapprochement between 
copyright holders and their works. 162 
While copyright requires a work to take a.fixed physical form to exist, the material embodiment of the 
158 Art 899 CCQ; Hughes, Peacock & Armstrong, supra note 64 at I 01. 
159 CCA, supra note I s 5. 
160 
"Fixation" is not defined in the CCA, supra note I. CCA, s 2 requires explicitly that computer programs, 
dramatic works and sound recordings be fixed in order to fall under the application of the CCA. 
161 Lametti, supra note 65 at 279; Theberge, supra notel52 at para 25 and also at para 145. 
162 See the discussion on the expansion of copyright in Part II of this chapter. I discuss TPMs in Chapter 3 
Part III B and the distribution right in Chapter 3 Part II F. 
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work (e.g., copies of books, musical recordings, films, etc.) is an entity separate from copyright. 163 
Copyright and the material embodiment(s) of the work that copyright protects are generally owned by 
different parties, i.e., copyright holders own the copyright in the work while consumers own the 
books, musical recordings, DVD films, or computer program CDs that embody the protected work. 164 
At the same time, copyright confers privileges and powers on copyright holders on the copies and 
material embodiments of works. 165 I will discuss the legal nature of the physical embodiments (i.e., 
commercial copies) of copyright works as the base to define copyright consumers' rights in Chapter 
6.166 
Unlike other forms of property, the juridical relation that subsists between copyright holders and 
copyright is limited in time. 167 When the term of copyright expires, the work it protected falls into the 
public domain. The limited duration of a right is no stranger to the property institution. For example, 
in the civil law tradition, the real rights of emphyteusis and usufruct (each considered as a 
dismemberment of the right of ownership) have a limited duration of up to 100 years. 168 During the 
term of copyright, a juridical relation subsists between copyright holders and copyright, which fulfills 
the first characteristic common to all forms of ownership on the ownership spectrum. 169 Having 
established that copyright gives rise to a juridical relation between a person and a resource, I explore 
next the extent to which copyright confers primafacie open-ended privileges and powers. 
163 For example, 17 USC §202 provides: "Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under 
a copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied. Transfer of 
ownership of any material object, including the copy or phonorecord in which the work is first fixed, does 
not of itself convey any rights in the copyright work embodied in the object; nor, in the absence of an 
agreement, does transfer of ownership of a copyright or of any exclusive rights under a copyright convey 
property rights in any material object." In France, art L.111-3 CPI makes that distinction clear: "La 
propriete incorporelle definie par I 'article L.111-1 est independante de la propriete de I 'obj et materiel... ... 
Ces droits subsistent en la personne de l'auteur ou de ses ayants droit qui, pourtant, ne pourront exiger du 
proprietaire de l'objet materiel la mise a leur disposition de cet objet pour l'exercice desdits droits" The 
CCA, supra note 1, does not contain a similar provision. 
164 Ibid. 
165 See the discussion in Part IV B of this chapter. 
166 In particular see Chapter 6 Part II. 
167 CCA, supra note 2, s 6. For some commentators, the limited duration of copyright is incompatible with 
the concept of property. See for example Xifaras, supra note 60 at 411. 
168 Art 1119, 1123, 1197 CCQ. 
169 See also Dusollier 2007, supra note 62 at 316-317 who rejects the argument that the limited duration of 
copyright should discard the qualification of copyright as a form of property. 
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(ii) Open-ended privileges and powers 
The second feature common to all ownership interests on the ownership spectrum is that the privileges 
and powers that a person has in a resource are prima facie open-ended. 170 The open-ended texture of 
powers and privileges distinguishes ownership interests from other non-ownership proprietary 
interests that confer specific privileges and powers. 171 At first sight, the list of exclusive rights that 
copyright confers on copyright holders to perform or authorize certain acts with respect to their works 
have a closed texture to them, 172 which for some commentators disqualifies copyright as a form of 
property. 173 While copyright confers a defined list of exclusive rights, the manner by which copyright 
holders can share, exploit, license, subdivide, and transfer copyright is open-ended. 174 Copyright 
holders can "use" their copyright by modifying and adapting the work protected by copyright or 
produce derivative works from it. They also have the freedom not to use copyright, which, unlike 
other forms of intellectual property, does not lead to the possible extinction of the right. 175 There is 
also an open-ended texture to copyright, in that the exclusive powers it confers can give rise to legal 
interpretation and uncertainty. 176 While copyright confers a defined list of exclusive rights on 
copyright holders, it allows a broad range of privileges and powers of exploitation and myriad 
interchangeable scenarios that have an open-ended texture to them. From that perspective, the second 
characteristic that is required for an interest to be on the ownership spectrum is met. I will now look at 
the third element common to all ownership interests within the property institution, the one that 
authorizess self-seekingness to the owner. 
(iii) Privileges and powers that authorize self-seekingness to the owner 
The third feature common to all ownership interests on the ownership spectrum is that the privileges 
and powers that a person has in the resource confers privileges and powers that authorize self-
170 Harris, supra note 64 at 5. 
171 Harris, supra note 64 at 55-58. For example easements would fall under the category of non-ownership 
proprietary interests. 
172 See the discussion in Part II of this chapter. 
173 See for example Dusollier 2007, supra note 62 at 319. 
174 Harris, supra note 64 at 42-46, in particular at 45-46. 
175 The absence of the use of a trade-mark for an extended period of time can lead to it being expunged from 
the trade-marks registry: Canada Trade-Marks Act, RSC 1985, c. T-13, s 45. 
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seekingness for the owner. 177 Self-seekingness is the intimate relationship between the owner and the 
resource as to how the owner chooses to dispose of the resource, with prima facie no duty to account 
to any one on the merit or rationality of that preference. 178 By its design, copyright confers self-
seekingness on copyright holders. 179 It is a central feature of the operation of copyright that copyright 
holders may decide how, when, and to whom they want to dispose of copyright, with no duty to 
account to any one on the merit or rationality of that choice. 180 As the Supreme Court noted in 
Robertson v Thomson Corp, 181 on the issue of whether freelance authors had impliedly or not licensed 
the right to the Globe and Mail newspaper to republish their articles in electronic databases: "parties 
are, have been, and will continue to be, free to alter by contract the rights established by the Copyright 
Act." 182 While the modalities for the exercise of self-seekingness may vary between an individual 
author and a corporate copyright holder, self-seekingness is present in both cases.183 
To sum up, in addition to conferring trespassory powers, copyright shares to a large extent the three 
characteristics that are common on Harris's ownership spectrum. There is a juridical relation between 
copyright holders and copyright that confers powers and privileges that have a certain prima facie 
open-ended texture and that authorize self-seekingness to copyright holders. While copyright displays 
176 CCA , supra note 1, s 3 states: ""copyright'', in relation to a work, means the sole right to produce or 
reproduce the work ..... and includes the sole right.. .. " [emphasis added]. See also Menell, supra note 64 at 
744-745. 
177 Harris, supra note 64 at 5. 
178 Ibid at 65. 
179 Ibid at 46. 
18° CCA, supra note 1, s 13(4) provides: "The owner of the copyright in any work may assign the right, 
either wholly or partially, and either generally or subject to limitations relating to territory, medium or 
sector of the market or other limitations relating to the scope of the assignment, and either for the whole 
term of the copyright or for any other right by licence, .... "; s 14. I (1) also supports the self-seekingness 
aspect of copyright through moral rights, i.e. the right to the integrity of the work and the right to be 
associated with the work, which can be invoked by authors (i.e. physical persons). However, moral rights 
per se are inalienable (but they can be waived): at s 14.1 (2). 
181 2006 sec 43. 
182 Ibid, at para 58. Other cases illustrate the broad freedom that copyright holders have on the terms under 
which they make their copyright works commercially available, beyond the terms of their constitutive 
legislative act. For example, cases where courts uphold the characterization made by copyright holders of 
the transaction on the copy of a copyright work as a licence, rather than as a sale. As one recent example, 
see Vernor v Autodesk, Inc., F.3d 2010 WL 3516435 (91h Cir. 2010). See also the discussion in Chapter 7 
Part IV. I discuss the interaction between copyright as conferred by the CCA, supra note I and copyright 
holders' exercise of freedom of contract in Chapter 3 Part III. 
183 I.e., corporations may be subject to internal rules of governance or specific authorisations that would 
affect how they would make decisions with respect to the exclusive copyright that they hold in a work but 
to the outside world, they generally have open-ended powers and privileges in how they exploit the 
copyright they hold. 
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unique features, it fulfills the characteristics that are common on the ownership spectrum as a resource 
that can be owned. In the context of defining consumers' rights to commercial copies of copyright 
works, copyright holders' powers and privileges to the embodiments of their works display specific 
characteristics that I will now investigate further. 
B. Copyright holders' powers and privileges to embodiments of their works 
I have argued above in this chapter that the resource to consider when assessing whether copyright 
shares the attributes commonly associated with property is the bundle of exclusive rights that the CCA 
confers on a work as materialized. 184 It is the combination of the exclusive rights as they pertain to the 
work as materialized (and not the work itself, nor the physical embodiment of the work) that together 
form a species of intangible personal property. 185 The physical embodiment through which copyright 
and the work it protects come to life (e.g., the books, musical recordings, film DVDs) is not the 
resource on which copyright holders exercise their prima facie open-ended powers and privileges, as 
with other forms of tangible property. 186 The physical embodiments of copyright works are separate 
resources, that is, distinct forms of personal property. 187 
In addition to the immediate powers and privileges that copyright holders have with respect to 
copyright, copyright holders have remote specific interests over the material embodiments of their 
works. 188 The interests that copyright confers on copyright holders in the embodiments of their works 
owned by consumers and other users have been compared to a negative easement, 189 with the 
difference that in the case of copyright the property interest pertains to the personal property of others 
and not real property. 190 Others have made an analogy of the relationship copyright holders have with 
184 See the discussion in Part IV A of this chapter, in particular, Part IV A (i). 
185 Ibid. 
186 See the discussion in Part IVA (ii). 
187 Ibid. This is so after the first publication has occurred. Before the first publication of the work, the 
exclusive right to authorize the first publication confer exclusionary powers on the physical embodiment of 
the work as well: Harris, supra note 64 at 43-44. 
188 Julie E. Cohen "Overcoming Property: Does Copyright Trump Privacy?" (2002) U. 111. J.L. Tech. & 
Pol'y 375, at 377 where the author notes: "copyright law gives copyright owners (some) rights in things as 
proxies for rights in works." 
189 Christopher M. Newman, "Patent Infringement as Nuisance" (2009) 59 Cath. U. L. Rev. 61 [Newman 
2009] at I 06. A distinction needs to be made between negative easements created by copyright and negative 
easements or servitudes that are potentially created by copyright holders through contract: see the 
discussion in Chapter 7 Part IV. 
190 Except for some copyright works, e.g., architectural works. Servitudes typically apply to real property. 
Courts have been reluctant to enforce servitudes on personal property or chattels. See Thomas Merrill & 
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the embodiment of their works to a usufruct, one of the dismemberments of ownership in the civil law 
tradition. 191 The remedies available to copyright holders in case of infringement include gaining 
physical control over embodiments of works, such as by seizure and delivery up of infringing copies 
of copyright works. 192 
While the bundle of exclusive rights that the CCA confers on a work as materialized displays the 
attributes of property with prima facie open-ended powers and privileges in how copyright holders 
exploit it, 193 copyright holders' specific powers to interfere with the physical embodiment of their 
works as owned by consumers and other users are specific and remote and do not have the prima facie 
open-ended texture that is common to all ownership interests on the ownership spectrum. 194 Copyright 
holders' close-ended and remote powers on the embodiments of their works owned by consumers and 
other users are a form of non-ownership proprietary interest. 195 The constrained non-ownership 
proprietary interest in the embodiment of works contrasts with expansive property language whereby 
copyright holders own their work. 196 
As commercial copies of copyright works distributed online loose their physical object embodiment, 
as non-negotiated standard end-user agreements increasingly provide that copyright holders retain 
ownership in the copies, and given the uncertain application of the exhaustion or first sale doctrine, 
the powers and privileges of copyright holders over the physical copies of their works made available 
Henry Smith, "Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: the Numerus Clausus Principle" (2000) 110 
Yale L.J. 1at18; G. 0. Robinson, "Personal Property Servitudes" 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1449; Molly. Shaffer 
Van Houweling, "The New Servitudes" (2008) 96 Geo. L.J. 885. 
191 Lametti, supra note 65 at 281-282 where the author highlights how copyright holders cannot use the 
physical embodiment of their work owned by others (usus) unless they simultaneously own the physical 
embodiment of the copyright work together with the copyright. While copyright holders control to a large 
extent the economic activity that can be performed with that physical embodiment of the copyright work 
(e.g., reproduction and some rental rights) ifructus), they do not control the transfer of the physical 
embodiment when such physical embodiment is owned by another party and that they had authorized the 
first sale of that physical embodiment (abusus). 
192 CCA, supra note I, s 34(1 ). 
193 See the discussion in Part IV A (ii) of this chapter. 
194 Harris, supra note 64 at 55-58: non-ownership proprietary interests are specific, they lack the prima facie 
open-ended powers and privileges generally associated with ownership interests. For example, easements 
would fall in that category. 
195 Ibid. 
196 See the discussion in Part IV A (i) of this chapter on the resource to which copyright holders have a legal 
relationship as not being the copyright work itself and the consequences thereof. 
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to consumers are potentially expanding. 197 The new methods of distribution of commercial copies of 
copyright works raise questions related to the nature of copyright holders' interest in the copies. Can 
copies with no physical object embodiment be owned?198 If so, do copyright holders effectively retain 
ownership in the copies they distribute as provided by the terms of the contract? In the case of 
commercial copies made available to consumers for an indefinite duration (in contrast with a service), 
it seems that copyright holders' powers and privileges over the copies would still lack the open-
endedness that distinguishes ownership from other property interests, regardless of the terms of 
contract. 199 Copyright holders' rights in commercial copies distributed online with contract terms 
restricting consumers' ability to transfer their copies would create an interest akin to a non-ownership 
proprietary interest, to the extent that such restrictions are valid and enforceable.200 
Copyright holders' rights in relation to the embodiment of works owned by consumers is a non-
ownership proprietary interest that is potentially expanding in the online distribution environment. I 
will now turn to one last important aspect of the property institution and how copyright fares with the 
numerus clausus principle. 
C. Copyright and the standardization of property 
The standardization of property or the numerus clausus is the principle by which there is a fixed and 
closed list of property interests recognized by law and as one corollary, limitations on how owners can 
alter the nature of their property rights201 In Chapter 4, I discussed how I intend to apply the numerus 
clausus principle to define copyright consumers' rights, i.e., as a tool to calibrate the effects of the 
property regime created by the CCA and copyright holders' freedom of contract. 202 
Copyright may not fare so well on the terrain of the numerus clausus principle compared to other 
197 See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part II Fon exhaustion or the first sale doctrine, and Part III on the 
interaction between copyright, contracts and TPMs. 
198 I discuss the nature of commercial copies of copyright works distributed online with no supporting 
physical object in Chapter 8. 
199 See the discussion in Part IV A (ii) of this chapter. See the discussion on the distinction between goods 
and services in Chapter 8 Part II B. 
200 In addition to general questions of enforceability of non-negotiated standard end-user agreements, it is 
not clear that such clauses would be enforceable because of the exhaustion or first sale doctrine: see the 
discussion in Chapter 8 Part III and also in Chapter 7 Part III A (ii). 
201 See the discussion on the standardization of property in Chapter 4 Part III. 
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forms of property.203 On the one hand, copyright and other intellectual property are relatively well-
known and stable forms of property. 204 The list of exclusive rights that copyright confers on copyright 
holders is reasonably well defined and identifiable.205 Copyright holders can assign their copyright in 
whole or in part (e.g., with respect to the exercise of one exclusive right only), and for partial 
assignments the CCA treats the assignee and assignor as copyright holders for the part assigned and 
for the part retained.206 An analogy can be made between partial assignments and divided co-
ownership of tangible property. 207 There are formal requirements for copyright assignments to be 
valid which corroborate to some extent the standardization of property.208 While the CCA confers on 
copyright holders broad discretionary powers as to how they can authorize others to perform the acts 
reserved to them by copyright (qua duration, territory, type of exclusive right, and among an open-
ended group of individuals), only exclusive licences create a separate proprietary interest and are 
subject to formal requirements.209 By contrast, non-exclusive licences confer contract rights.210 On 
that basis, copyright could exemplify the numerus clausus principle. 
On the other hand, copyright may be an outlier to the numerus clausus principle in other respects. 
Given the intangible nature of copyright, courts may be more inclined to interpret the scope of 
copyright and other intellectual property in a less predictable manner than in relation to tangible 
202 Ibid. 
203 Newman 2009, supra note 189 at 105ff. 
204 Merrill & Smith, supra notel 90 at 19 note that intellectual property as protected by statute, eg patents 
and copyright, are stable forms of property and that how in the U.S. the federal preemption doctrine restricts 
the alteration ofIP interests at the state level. 
205 See the discussion on the nature of copyright as set out in the CCA, supra note 1 in Part II of this 
chapter. 
206 CCA, supra note 1, s 13(5) provides: "Where, under any partial assignment of copyright, the assignee 
becomes entitled to any right comprised in copyright, the assignee, with respect to the rights so assigned, 
and the assignor, with respect to the rights not assigned, shall be treated for the purposes of this Act as the 
owner of the copyright, and this Act has effect accordingly." 
207 Art. IO IO CCQ defines divided co-ownership as "where the right of ownership is apportioned among the 
co-owners in fractions, each comprising a physically divided private portion and a share of the common 
portions." 
208 The assignments do not need to be registered however CCA, supra note 1, s 13( 4) provides that "no 
assignment or grant is valid unless it is in writing signed by the owner of the right in respect of which the 
assignment or grant is made, or by the owner's duly authorized agent." 
209 See the discussion in Part II and in Part IV A (ii) of this chapter on copyright holders' open-ended 
powers and privilege to exploit their exclusive rights. CCA, supra note 1, sl3 (4)-(7). See also Robertson v 
Thomson Corp., 2006 SCC 43 at para 56, where the majority judgment cited Ritchie v Sawmill Creek Golf 
& Country Club Ltd. (2004), 35 C.P.R. (4th) 163. 
210 Ibid. 
178 
property.211 Copyright, unlike other forms of property (e.g., real estate) and intellectual property 
(patents and to a large extent trademarks)212 does not need to be registered for the CCA to confer 
protection on copyright holders with respect to their works.213 Registration plays an important 
notification function for third parties, notifying the existence and scope of property rights that are 
consistent with the standardization of property.214 However, registration is neither a constitutive 
element of all property interests nor is it necessary with respect to all forms of property to assert title. 
Last but not least, a troublesome aspect of copyright with respect to its conformity to the numerus 
clausus principle concerns the effects of the extension of copyright by contract, whereby copyright 
holders potentially create a new form of property interest in commercial copies of copyright works. I 
will explore this particular effect of the commercialization of copyright on the standardization of 
property with respect to the nature of commercial copies of copyright works in Chapter 6.215 
To the extent that copyright shares the attributes of property, the proper question to ask is not so much 
whether it conforms with the numerus clausus principle as justifying why copyright needs to comply 
as much as possible with the numerus clausus principle as a governance norm for the judiciary and 
law- and policy-makers.216 To what extent are the concerns favouring the standardization of property 
in the realm of tangible property as similar in the field of intangible property as copyright? In addition 
to asking whether copyright exemplifies the numerus clausus principle, the application of the 
principle to copyright holders' commercial practices that alter consumer property rights in copies of 
copyright works is a different question that I will address in Chapter 7.217 
211 Ibid, where the authors note that while intellectual property eg patents, copyright are relatively stable 
forms of property, the numerus clausus is at its weakest in the area of intellectual property, based on the 
tendency of courts to create new intellectual property interests. See also the discussion in Part III of this 
chapter on the debate around assimilating copyright to a form of property. 
212 Inventions need to be registered as patents to confer exclusionary powers to patent holders: Canada 
Patent Act, RSC 1985, c. P-4. Trade-marks can be registered but unregistered trade-marks can also benefit 
from protection: Canada Trade-Marks Act, RSC 1985, c. T-13. 
213 CCA, supra note 1, s 54 whereby registration of copyright is optional. The Berne Convention, supra note 
39, article 5(2) provides that the enjoyment and exercise of rights with respect to protected works shall not 
be subject to any formality requirements. 
214 See the discussion in Chapter 4 Part IV. 
215 See the discussion in Chapter 6 Part II C. 
216 I discuss the justifications for the application of the numerus clausus principle in Chapter 4 Part IV. For 
a discussion on the necessity of maintaining fragmentation in copyright see: Harvard Law Review Note, "A 
Justification for Allowing Fragmentation in Copyright" (2011) 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1751. 
217 The numerus clausus principle as it applies to copy ownership is discussed briefly in Chapter 6 Part II C. 
See also the discussion in Chapter 7, Part IV. 
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To sum up, two distinct proprietary interests emerge when looking at copyright through the lens of 
property theory. The first interest relates to copyright as a whole when considered as the object 
capable of commercial exploitation. It contains all three elements that are common on the ownership 
spectrum and confers trespassory powers to copyright holders. 218 The resource is not the copyright 
work per se, but the bundle of exclusive rights as they relate to the work as materialized.219 The 
requirement of prima facie open-ended powers and privileges is fulfilled differently than with respect 
to tangible forms of property.220 While the list of exclusive powers is relatively closed and defined, 
the exploitation or uses that copyright holders can make of their copyright are endless.221 
The second interest focuses on the nature of copyright holders' relationship with the physical 
embodiment of their works (e.g., the commercial copies owned by consumers or other users). A 
property analysis reveals that it is a limited non-ownership proprietary interest. 222 Unlike copyright 
when viewed as a whole, it lacks the open-ended powers and privileges that are required to qualify as 
an ownership interest.223 Finally, the application of the numerus clausus principle to copyright as a 
norm of judicial governance merits further investigation, in particular given the intangible nature of 
copyright and the non-rivalrous nature of the works that it protects.224 
V. Conclusion 
Unlike the laws in other jurisdictions, the CCA does not explicitly define the nature of copyright as 
property or a property right.225 The CCA confers on copyright holders a list of exclusive rights to 
restrict acts that can be performed on their works that are opposable to all. 226 Two distinct proprietary 
interests emerge when looking at copyright through the lens of property theory. The first interest 
relates to copyright as a whole when considered as the entity that is the object of commercial 
exploitation: it contains all three elements of an ownership interest on the ownership spectrum and 
confers trespassory powers to copyright holders.227 However, copyright does not confer ownership in 
218 See the discussion in Part IV A of this chapter. 
219 See the discussion in Part IV A (i) of this chapter. 
220 See the discussion in Part IV A (ii) of this chapter. 
221 Ibid. 
222 See the discussion in Part IV B of this chapter. 
223 Ibid. 
224 See the discussion in Part IV C of this chapter. 
225 See the discussion in Part II of this chapter. 
226 Ibid. 
227 See the discussion in Part IV A of this chapter. 
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the work but in the bundle of exclusive rights as they pertain to the work as materialized. 228 The 
second interest focuses on the nature of copyright holders' relationship to the physical embodiment of 
their works (e.g., the commercial copies owned by consumers or other users): it is a limited, remote, 
non-ownership proprietary interest.229 In recent years, both copyright as a limited form of property 
and the specific non-ownership proprietary interest that it confers on copyright holders on the physical 
embodiments of works (owned by consumers and other users) are expanding. 230 
The characterization of copyright as a form of private property is controversial and politically 
charged.231 The analysis of the property attributes of copyright that I conducted here is revealing and 
provides responses to some of the concerns raised in the debate about the nature of copyright. First, 
copyright parlance and rhetoric about copyright holders owning their works is far removed from what 
Canada and other jurisdictions created by statute. By its design, the CCA and similar laws in other 
jurisdictions never instituted such a relationship between copyright holders and lawful copies of their 
works and likely never will.232 Also, copyright holders' interest in the embodiments of their works 
(e.g., commercial copies made available to consumers) is a remote, specific proprietary· interest that 
does not belong on the ownership spectrum. Second, as a corollary to the first observation, there is 
reason to be concerned about erroneous property language whereby copyright holders own their 
works: it obliterates the framework of copyright as it exists. To be sure, what is troublesome is not 
that copyright is a limited form of property, which as the above analysis revealed is difficult to debate, 
but an erroneous and potentially dangerous application of the concept of property to copyright. 
No doubt the scope of copyright has been expanding in recent years. It may be attributable in part to a 
wrongful application of the concept of property to copyright. An erroneous application of property 
can be achieved perhaps more easily than with respect to tangible property, given the abstract and 
ubiquitous nature of copyright. As I argued in this chapter, negating the property nature of copyright 
altogether cannot counter the expansion of copyright and does a disservice to the debate by describing 
copyright as something that is removed from its nature as constructed by statute. Defining copyright 
as a sui generis right is no guarantee against the expansion of copyright. On the contrary, a reasoned 
analysis of the application of property theory to copyright reveals the limited scope of copyright. 
22s Ibid. 
229 See the discussion in Part IV B of this chapter. 
230 See the discussion in Part IV A and B of this chapter. 
231 See the discussion in Part III of this chapter. 
232 See the discussion in Part IV A of this chapter. 
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At a time when the legitimacy of copyright is increasingly under threat, there is an urgent need for 
coherence. Property provides a robust legal and theoretical framework to address complex questions 
around competing rights and interests, including consumers' rights to commercial copies of copyright 
works. The CCA is a very incomplete enunciation of copyright holders' and other participants' rights 
and obligations.233 The CCA relies quite heavily on the underlying institutions of property and 
contract. 234 Looking at copyright through the lens of existing legal institutions, such as property and, 
to a certain extent contract, is a test of its internal coherence and offers a better guarantee of the ability 
of copyright to evolve within broader spheres of interest and retain its legitimacy. Among other 
things, a better understanding of the nature of copyright as a unique and limited form of property 
helps define the legal nature of, and theoretical justifications supporting, the rights to commercial 
copies of copyright works. I explore these two questions in the next chapter. 
233 See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part III on the interaction between copyright and contracts. 
234 Ibid. 
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I. Introduction 
Chapter 6 
The Nature of Commercial Copies of Copyright Works 
and Justifications of Ownership 
In the previous chapter, I applied the property law and theory framework introduced in Chapter 4 to 
define the nature of copyright. I concluded that copyright is a limited form of property that also 
includes a specific non-ownership proprietary interest in commercial copies of copyright works. In 
this chapter, I build on the insights of the nature of copyright and further apply the property law and 
theory framework to define the nature of commercial copies of copyright works. I look at various 
property theories to justify what the proper scope of ownership of commercial copies of copyright 
works should be on the ownership spectrum. 1 
In Part II, I look at the property attributes of commercial copies of copyright works and at where they 
are located on the ownership spectrum. 2 In Part III, I look at the various theoretical justifications that 
underlie intellectual property and personal property in commercial copies of copyright works and how 
they influence the determination of what the proper scope of copy ownership should be. I conclude in 
Part IV that a property theory approach to define the nature of copies of copyright works underscores 
the extent to which they are distinct and in some ways deficient when compared to other forms of 
property. At the same time, the application of justificatory theories to commercial copies of copyright 
works sets a normative framework that emphasizes the need to make room for copy ownership and 
preserve it as an important vehicle to allow copyright users to fulfill the main goals of copyright. 
1 I discuss the "ownership spectrum" as developed by James W. Harris, Property and Justice (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1996) in Chapter 4 Part II. 
2 Ibid. 
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II. The nature of commercial copies of copyright works 
A. A peculiar form of personal property 
The nature of commercial copies of copyright works is a much less explored area in comparison to the 
nature of copyright.3 One may be inclined to look at Canada's Copyright Act [CCA] 4 for answers, but 
one would be looking in vain. As I discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, copyright laws are generally 
structured around defining the exclusive rights and remedies of copyright holders and to provide 
exceptions for certain acts that can be performed on copyright works without the authorization of 
copyright holders.5 Unlike legislation in other jurisdictions, the CCA does not define the nature of 
copies of copyright works.6 Even with respect to exceptions to copyright infringement or users' rights, 
the CCA is mostly silent on the legal relationship between the user performing the permitted acts and 
the copy of the work and on the attributes of the copy of the work. 7 The application of some of the 
3 See the discussion on the nature of Copyright in Chapter 5. Authors discussing the nature of ownership of 
copies of copyright works include Joseph P. Liu, "Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of 
Copy Ownership" (2001) 42 William and Mary Law Review, 1245 [Liu, "Owning Digital Copies"], whereby 
the author looks more broadly at the concept of "possession" of digital copies, beyond the scenarios of lawfully 
purchased copies of copyright works. See also Michael Seringhaus, "E-Book Transactions: Amazon "Kindles" 
The Copy Ownership Debate" (2009) 12 Yale J. L. & Tech. 147. For a European perspective, see Severine 
Dusollier, Droit d'auteur et protection des oeuvres dans l'univers numerique, 2d ed. (Bruxelles: Larcier, 2007) 
[Dusollier 2007] in particular at 377-418. 
4 RSC 1985, c C-42. 
5 In particular, see the discussion in Chapter 2 Part II and in Chapter 3 Part II. 
6 Other copyright laws are more explicit on the nature of copies of copyright works. For example in the US, 17 
USC § 202 provides: "Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, is distinct 
from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied. Transfer of ownership of any material 
object, including the copy or phonorecord in which the work is first fixed, does not of itself convey any rights in 
the copyright work embodied in the object; nor, in the absence of an agreement, does transfer of ownership of a 
copyright or of any exclusive rights under a copyright convey property rights in any material object." In France, 
art L.111-3 CPI, makes the distinction between ownership of copyright as intangible property and ownership in 
the material object that embeds the copyright work as follows: "La propriete incorporelle definie par ]'article 
L. I 11-1 est independante de la propriete de l'objet materiel... ... Ces droits subsistent en la personne de I' auteur 
ou de ses ayants droit qui, pourtant, ne pourront exiger du proprietaire de l'objet materiel la mise a leur 
disposition de cet objet pour l'exercice desdits droits." 
7 This is the case for the application of the non-substantial part doctrine ( CCA, supra note 4, s 3) see the 
discussion in Chapter 3 Part II A; the fair dealing provisions (ss 29-29.2), the non-commercial user -generated 
content provision (s 29.21) the private copying regime (s 80), exceptions with respect to educational institutions 
and libraries, archives and museums, although for some of the permitted uses it is implicit that the copy of the 
work from which they are allowed to perform acts without the authorization of copyright holders is under the 
control and power of the educational institution or library, archives and museums (ss 29.4-30.5). The later 
listening or viewing exception requires that the program to be recorded was received legally (s 23.23(1) (a)). 
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exceptions to copyright infringement requires that the acts be performed on a copy that the user owns, 
or on a lawfully acquired copy. 8 The transfer of ownership of the commercial copies of copyright 
works is also central to the application of the exhaustion of the exclusive distribution right (or first 
sale doctrine) introduced in the CCA in 2012.9 Still, the exact nature of copies of copyright works is 
left largely undefined by the CCA, with some fragmented implications by default through what 
copyright exclusive rights do not already cover. This is where property law and theory step in, as 
sources to augment the comprehension of the nature of commercial copies of copyright works. 
Every consumer commercial transaction of a copyright work traditionally involves two sets of rights 
where one tends to overshadow the other. When consumers buy a book, a music CD or a film DVD, 
they are the rightful owners of this chattel or personal property. Unlike copyright, the qualification of 
commercial copies of copyright works as personal property is at first sight less controversial; at least 
it was until recently. 10 However, one can reasonably assume that even the less-informed consumers 
know or ought to know that this chattel is like no other one. They should know or ought to know that 
by buying a book, a CD, or a DVD they do not become the owner of the expressive work that it 
contains. 11 The dichotomy between the chattel and the copyright that protects the copyright work has 
been traditionally presented as the distinction between the tangible and the intangible, the former 
being the physical embodiment of the copyright work owned by the purchaser of a copy, and the latter 
being the bundle of exclusive rights as they relate to the work as materialized owned by the copyright 
holder. 12 Because copyright holders have a specific non-ownership proprietary interest in commercial 
copies of their works, and for reasons I discuss below in this chapter, the separateness of the tangible 
8 This is a requirement for the application of the reproduction for private purposes exception (CCA, supra note 
4, s 29.22), the backup copies' exception (s 29.24), the exception applying to computer programs (s 30.6). See 
the discussion on the scope of these exceptions to copyright infringement in Chapter 3 Part II. 
9 CCA, ss3 (l)(j), 15 (l.l)(e), 18 (1.1) (b) where introduced with the entry into force of Canada's Copyright 
Modernization Act, SC 2012, c. 20 [ CC.M4]. See the discussion on the exhaustion or first sale doctrine in 
Chapter 3 Part II F. 
10 See the discussion on the debate around the association of copyright with a form of property in Chapter 5 Part 
III and on the property attributes of copyright in Chapter 5 Part IV. See the discussion on whether digital copies 
distributed online with no hand to hand exchange of physical medium constitute goods in Chapter 8. 
11 As Julie E. Cohen, "Overcoming Property: Does Copyright Trump Privacy?" (2002) U. Ill. J.L. Tech. & Pol'y 
375 [Cohen, "Does Copyright Trump Privacy?"] at 378, notes: "Conditions imposed on would-be users of 
things embodying copyright works far outstrip any conditions imposed on would-be users of other kinds of 
things." 
12 See the discussion in Chapter 5, Part IV A (i). 
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personal property of consumers and the intangible or incorporeal property of copyright holders is 
porous at best. 13 
The prominence of the literary, musical, or artistic work that forms the essence of the chattel 
trivializes the physical medium that supports it, and is relatively insignificant in comparison to the 
musical, literary work, or other work of art protected by copyright. 14 In that respect, copyright's 
ascendance on the physical embodiment is different from other intellectual property rights such as 
trade-marks or patents that tend, in commerce, to be more incidental to the product to which they are 
associated. 15 The online distribution of copyright works reinforces the trivialization of the physical 
embodiment in contrast to the creative work because the transfer of a physical component to 
consumers with the work becomes less apparent. 16 
The juxtaposition of copyright holders' exclusive rights as they relate to their work with the personal 
property of consumers to the copies makes the application of property law and theory to commercial 
copies particularly intriguing and challenging. The juxtaposition is also essential to defining and 
understanding the scope of copyright consumers' rights. To this end, I now look into the property 
attributes of commercial copies of copyright works, i.e., the twin manifestation of trespassory rules 
and their location on the ownership spectrum. 
B. Commercial copies of copyright works and the ownership spectrum 
James Harris defines the essence of every property institution as the twin manifestation of trespassory 
rules 17 and the existence of an ownership spectrum. 18 To what extent are the features that are common 
13 See the discussion in Chapter 5 Part IV B and in Part II B of this chapter. 
14 However, Dusollier, supra note 3 at 379 notes that in theory, there is no hierarchy between the two competing 
rights. 
15 In the case of the commercial copy of a copyright work, the main object of the transaction is the work, to 
which the exclusive rights of copyright holders are related. In the case of other goods to which a trade-mark or 
~atent are related, they are not the main object (if at all) of the commercial transaction but incidental. 
6 By contrast, in a transaction that involves a music CD or film DVD the CD or DVD the digital copy is 
embedded in a physical medium that is normally sold. I analyse the legal nature of digital copies distributed 
online with no physical object in Chapter 8. 
17 Harris, supra note 1 at 25, 86, "trespassory rules" refer to all rules which, by reference to a resource, impose 
obligations (negative or positive) upon an open-ended range of persons, with the exception of some privileged 
individual, group, or agency (i.e. the owner(s)). They are open-ended, and give rise to various civil or criminal 
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on the ownership spectrum described by Harris present with respect to commercial copies of 
copyright works, i.e., (i) a juridical relation between a person and a resource, (ii) privileges and 
powers that are primafacie open-ended, and (iii) which authorize self-seekingness on the owner? 19 To 
what extent do commercial copies of copyright works give rise to trespassory powers? In answer to 
the second question, owners of commercial copies of copyright works have trespassory powers 
similar to owners of other forms of personal prope1ty, powers that give rise to legal remedies, 
including revesting of the personal property in case of theft. 20 
To answer the first question, i.e., the extent to which commercial copies of copyright works share the 
characteristics that are common to all ownership interests, I will apply each of the three features on 
the ownership spectrum to determine the extent to which consumers own the commercial copies of 
copyright works they purchase. 
(i) Juridical relation between a person and a resource 
The requirement of a juridical relation between a person and a resource on the ownership spectrum 
implies that the person and the resource can be identified, as well as separateness between the two.21 
Every property institution also implies a scarcity in resources and an exercise of wealth allocation.22 
In the case of consumers and commercial copies of copyright works embedded in physical objects, the 
requirement of a juridical relation between a person and a resource is easily fulfilled. The consumer 
and the commercial copies of copyright works are identifiable and there is a separateness between the 
two. The situation is less clear with respect to commercial copies of copyright works distributed 
online with no physical supporting medium. As I will discuss in Chapter 8, the nature of commercial 
copies of copyright works distributed online with no supporting physical supporting medium is 
uncertain, more specifically, whether they can qualify as goods under sale of goods and statutory 
remedies such as damages, possessory recovery, injunction or restitution. They presuppose the existence of a 
separate, reasonably identifiable resource. See the discussion in Chapter 4 Part II. 
18 Ibid at 5, the ownership spectrum spans from "mere property" to "full-blooded ownership." See the discussion 
in Chapter 4 Part II. 
19 Ibid. 
20 For example see: the British-Columbia Sale of Goods Act [RSBC 1996] c 410, s 29. Under Quebec's civil 
law, the nature and scope of remedies depend on the good faith of the person in possession and on the 
application of prescription rules: art 928-933 CCQ. 
21 This is a requirement for any property institution: see the discussion in Chapter 4 Part II. 
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consumer law. 23 Without entering the debate on the proper qualification of goods at this point, even if 
commercial copies of copyright works distributed online with no physical supporting medium were 
not goods, this should not preclude commercial copies of copyright works from being an object or a 
resource capable of ownership. As I demonstrated in Chapter 5, copyright, as well as other forms of 
intangible property, can fulfill the requirement of a legal relationship between a person and a 
resource. 
24 Commercial copies of copyright works distributed online with no supporting physical 
medium are easily identifiable and retain their separateness from consumers. We can safely assume 
that commercial copies of copyright works, whether supported by a physical object exchanged from 
hand-to-hand or not, fulfill the first requirement on the ownership spectrum. 
(ii) Open-ended privileges and powers 
The second feature common to all ownership interests on the ownership spectrum is that the privileges 
and powers that a person has with respect to a resource are prima facie open-ended. 25 The open-ended 
texture of powers and privileges is central to distinguishing ownership interests from other non-
ownership proprietary interests that confer limited and specific privileges and powers.26 On that front, 
the open-endedness of copyright consumers' powers and privileges on their commercial copies of 
copyright works is increasingly diminished with the continued expansion of copyright holders' 
exclusive rights as accelerated in recent years.27 It is as if, as Julie Cohen notes, the fear of weakening 
copyright as intangible property justified each time increasing powers in the property of others (e.g. 
commercial copies) through which it takes form.28 
The addition of exclusive rental rights,29 the right to prevent parallel imports and the exclusive right of 
22 Harris, supra note I at 24. 
23 See the discussion in Chapter 8, in particular in Part II. 
24 See the discussion in Chapter 5 Part IV A (i). 
25 Harris, supra note I at 5. 
26 Ibid at 55-58. For example easements would fall under the category of non-ownership proprietary interests. 
27 See the discussion on the expansion of copyright in Chapter 5 Part IL 
28 Cohen, "Does Copyright Trump Privacy?", supra note 11 at 379. 
29 In Canada, the exclusive right to authorize the rental of copies of copyright works applies only to computer 
programs and to sound recordings of musical works: CCA, supra note 4 s 3(1) (h)-(i). In the US, see 17 USC 
§ 106(3), § 109(b) (I) (A). In Europe, EC, Parliament and Council Directive 20061115/EC on rental right and 
lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property, [2006] OJ, L376/28, 
at art 3, requires all member states to provide the exclusive right to copyright holders to authorize the rental of 
copies with respect to all copyright works and other subject of copyright with limited exceptions (i.e. it does not 
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distribution,30 the creation of new access control rights,31 and the less than certain application of 
exhaustion or first sale doctrine to digital copies distributed online with no physical supporting 
medium32 are examples of copyright holders' exclusionary powers that directly interfere with copy 
owners' powers and privileges beyond the traditional right to control the reproduction of works and 
their performance in public.33 The distinction between the exclusive rental or distribution right and 
other exclusive rights is disappearing when works are embedded in digital copies. Because of the ease 
with which other copyright reserved acts can be performed on digital copies of copyright works, 
restrictions on the right to reproduce, or on the ability to make the digital copies available to the 
public are becoming as intrusive on the property rights of the digital copy owner as restrictions on the 
right to transfer or rent the digital copy. 
In principle, consumers' powers and privileges in relation to commercial copies of copyright works 
should allow consumers to perform any act that is not exclusively reserved to copyright holders,34 
unless it has been authorized or falls under one of the exceptions to copyright infringement. 35 For 
example, consumers can read, listen to, view, or play a book, music CD, film DVD, or computer 
program for as often as they please. Consumers can play the music CD as part of a performance or 
apply to buildings and to works of applied art). The Directive repeals EC, Council Directive 921100/EEC on 
rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property, 
[1992] OJ L 346/61, which already provided for the application of the exclusive rental right to a similar broad 
range of copyright works and other subject matter of copyright. 
3° CCA, supra note 4, s 27 .1; s 3 U), introduced by the entry into force of the CCMA, supra note 9 in 2012, 
confers the exclusive right to copyright holders "in the case of a work that is in the form of a tangible object, to 
sell or otherwise transfer ownership of the tangible object, as long as that ownership has never previously been 
transferred in or outside Canada with the authorization of the copyright owner." See also the discussion on the 
distribution right and its exhaustion or first sale doctrine in Chapter 3 Part II F and Chapter 7 Part III A (ii). 
31 CCA, supra note 4, ss. 41.1-41.21, introduced by the entry into force of the CCMA, supra note 9. For a 
discussion on TPMs see Chapter 3 Part III B. 
32 See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part II F, Chapter 7 Part III A (ii) and Chapter 8 Part Ill. 
33 For instance, the rental right involves no copy being made of copyright works and is closely associated with 
the right to transfer the copy of the work, which through the application of exhaustion or the first sale doctrine is 
within the exclusive domain of copy owners: see the discussion on the exhaustion or first sale doctrine in 
Chapter 3 Part II F, Chapter 7 Part III A (ii) and Chapter 8 Part III. 
34 I.e. the exclusive right to produce or reproduce the work, to communicate it to the public, to perform it in 
public, to rent computer programs and musical recordings, to authorize the first sale of each copy of copyright 
works: CCA, supra note 4, ss 3, 15, 18, 21, 26. 
35 Liu, "Owning Digital Copies," supra note 3 at 1287 notes, regarding the unlimited ability to read copies of 
copyright works (in a US context): ''The legal "source" of this unlimited ability to read, to the extent there is 
one, can be found in the gaps in the Copyright Act. Section I 06 of the Act, as several commentators have noted, 
does not include in the bundle of copyright rights the right to control the reading of a given copy." I discuss the 
copyright holders' exclusive rights and how they interact with exceptions to copyright infringement that are 
relevant to copyright consumers in Chapter 3 Part II. 
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skit in the privacy of their home, can mark the commercial copies of copyright works with their name, 
can restore them,36 or can lend the copies to friends. All these acts are not exclusively reserved to 
copyright holders and should therefore be part of the open-ended powers and privileges of copy 
owners. 
The traditional open-ended privileges and powers to play, view, listen to, or read commercial copies 
of copyright works, particularly when distributed online with no physical supporting medium, is under 
increased pressure due to the combination of various factors. 37 An expansionist view of copyright, i.e., 
one under which copyright holders' exclusive powers and privileges should allow them to control 
access and uses of their works in their entirety, 38 is supported by the erroneous assumption that 
copyright holders own their works.39 As I discussed in Chapter 5, property law and theory inform us 
that copyright holders do not own their work, but rather the bundle of exclusive rights as they relate to 
the work as materialized.40 I will address the specific issue of the justifications behind safeguarding 
the unlimited powers and privileges to read, view, listen, to or play a copy of a copyright work in 
Chapter 7. 41 
The amendments to the CCA in 2012 allow consumers and other users to perform more acts than 
before without the authorization of copyright holders, expanding their powers and privileges in 
relation to copies of copyright works.42 For example, under the CCA,43 consumers cannot make copies 
of the musical recording, book, or film unless they are for private purposes and fulfill the other 
requirements of the reproduction for private purposes exception to copyright infringement.44 
36 Copy owners have rights to make modifications and repair at common law: David Vaver, Intellectual 
Property Law Copyright, Patents, Trade-Marks, 2d ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2011) [Vaver 2011] at 219- 220. 
37 Those factors include the scope of the exclusive right to authorize the reproduction of a work, the effect of 
technological protection measures and of non-negotiated standard end-user agreements for commercial copies of 
copyright works. See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part III B and III C, and the uncertainty around the 
characterization of those transactions as sales, licences or service contracts: see the discussion in Chapter 8 Part 
II. 
38 See the discussion in Chapter 2 Part III. 
39 See the discussion in Chapter 5 Part III and Part IV A (i). 
40 See the discussion in Chapter 5 Part IV A (i). 
41 See the discussion in Chapter 7 Part III A (iii). 
42 See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part II C and in Part II D. 
43 CCA, supra note 4, add reference to section. 
44 Ibid, s 28.22. See the discussion on the scope of the reproduction for private purposes exception in Chapter 3 
Part II D (ii). 
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Consumers may be able to reproduce the copyright work under the fair dealing provisions if it is for 
one of the specified purposes and if the dealing is fair. 45 Consumers can perform a broad range of 
reserved acts with respect to existing works for the purpose of creating new works if they fulfill the 
requirements of the non-commercial user-generated-content exception to copyright infringement.46 
While consumers can perform more acts on commercial copies of copyright works that they own than 
before, certain exceptions to copyright infringement can specifically be overridden by contract or by 
the application of technological protection measures (TPMs).47 For the other exceptions to copyright 
infringement, it is not clear whether they can be overridden by contract (i.e., their mandatory nature is 
not clear) even by non-negotiated standard end-user agreements.48 
There are still many acts that consumers cannot perform with the commercial copies of copyright 
works they own. For example, consumers cannot play the music CD or film DVD in public,49 
including at a neighbourhood fair,50 at a wedding, during a public performance in a park, or at the 
comer store where they work part-time, without obtaining the authorization of the copyright holders 
or paying royalties to the relevant copyright collective body. 51 Consumers cannot create derivative 
works from the work, telecommunicate to the public any substantial portion of their book, musical 
recording, or film, including posting it on Facebook, YouTube, or on their personal website, without 
the prior consent of the copyright holders, or unless it falls under one of the exceptions to copyright 
infringement;52 and the list goes on an on. 
The ability to generate revenues from commercial copies of copyright works is one of the most 
constrained powers and privileges on the ownership spectrum. Although acts performed on copies of 
45 Ibid, ss 29 to 29.2. See the discussion on fair dealing in Chapter 3 Part II C. 
46 Ibid, s 29.21. See the discussion on the non-commercial user-generated content in Chapter 3 Part II D (i). 
47 For example, this is the case of the reproduction for private purposes exception to copyright infringement 
(CCA, supra note 4 s 29.22) and in the case of the later listening or viewing exception to copyright infringement 
(s 29.33). 
48 See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part IV. 
49 However, they can recite in public "a reasonable extract from a published work": CCA, supra note 4, 
s.32.2(d). 
50 Unless the use would fall under one of the limited exceptions to copyright infringement for Educational 
institutions: sections. 29.4 to 30 of the CCA, supra note 4. 
51 Either directly or through the relevant collective agency that is administered by the Copyright Board under the 
CCA, supra note 4. 
52 I discuss the relevant exceptions to copyright infringement for consumers in Chapter 3 Part II. 
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copyright works do not necessarily need a commercial purpose to constitute copyright infringement, 
the commercial character of the use will bar or lessen consumers' or other users' ability to invoke 
exceptions to copyright infringement.53 There are exceptions: for example, in Canada, users can rent 
out the commercial copies of copyright works they own, except for computer programs and sound 
recordings embedding musical recordings. 54 The various restrictions of the acts that consumers can 
perform on the commercial copies of copyright works they own operate, without a doubt, as 
limitations on their primafacie open-ended privileges and powers. 
The restrictions imposed by copyright on commercial copies of copyright works go to the heart of the 
open-ended privileges and powers of consumers. Two examples illustrate that point for our discussion 
purposes: a laptop not protected by any relevant intellectual property right and an electronic book for 
which the copyright has expired after purchase. 55 As owners of the laptop, consumers can photograph 
it, use it in a film, lend it or sell it to a friend, use it for or incorporate it in an art work, bring it to their 
family business and use it in a profit-driven activity. They can even start a new line of business by 
making similar laptops.56 For all these activities, consumers do not need to ask permission of the 
suppliers or sellers of the laptop, nor is it written in any contract that they are allowed to do these 
things. As owners of a laptop, they have the power and privilege to perform all these acts, as well as 
an open-ended list of other uses. In the second example, compare an electronic book protected by 
copyright with an electronic book in which all copyright has expired after the copy was purchased. In 
the latter case, consumers can make as many copies as they wish for time- or space-shifting purposes, 
give it to friends, or post it on the Internet. They can convert it into a play or reproduce substantial 
parts and incorporate it in other works. All these acts would be restrained if the copyright had not 
expired.57 Once again, the list of powers and privileges is open-ended and consumers do not need to 
ask permission of anyone, nor is there any contract that tells them that they can perform all of these 
53 This is one of the factors to consider (although not detenninant) to assess whether the dealing in a work is fair 
under the fair dealing provisions (see the discussion on the scope of fair dealing in Chapter 3 Part II C), the 
commercial character of the acts performed on a work is a bar to the application of the non-commercial user-
generated content exception to copyright infringement (CCA, supra note 4, s 29.21). 
54 CCA, supra note 4 s 3(1) (h)-(i). 
55 The lap top would most likely bear a trade-mark. It may or may not be protected by an industrial design or 
fiatent. 
6 Except for the trade-mark under which the lap top is sold and subject to applicable patents or industrial 
designs. This last example takes us outside the realm of our discussion centered on the consumer. 
57 Subject to the application of specific limitations to the exclusive rights of copyright holders, including fair 
dealing. 
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acts. They simply can, as owners or possessors of the copy of the electronic book, in which copyright 
has expired. 
The open-ended powers and privileges to transfer the rights or otherwise dispose of commercial 
copies of copyright works are increasingly under threat. Traditionally, consumers can sell, donate, 
otherwise dispose of, or destroy their commercial copies of copyright works as embedded in a 
physical object (a book, a CD, a DVD). However, contract terms restraining consumers' and other 
users' ability to transfer or assign their commercial copies of copyright works have been held valid in 
spite of the exhaustion or first sale doctrine; the application is even less certain when digital copies are 
distributed on line with no physical supporting medium.58 As a result, the ability of consumers to 
transfer and assign their commercial copies of copyright works, one of the fundamental open-ended 
powers and privileges on the ownership spectrum, is also under theat. 
In the case of commercial copies of copyright works, the second feature on the ownership spectrum 
by which the powers and privileges on the resource are open-ended is much more constrained than 
most other forms of personal property. 59 The somewhat fastidious review conducted here of open-
ended powers and privileges and the limitation thereto reveals that the restrictions on commercial 
copies of copyright works are substantial and increasingly so. I will now examine the extent to which 
the privileges and powers related to commercial copies of copyright works authorize consumers' self-
seekingness. 
(iii) Privileges and powers that authorize self-seekingness to the owner 
The third feature common to all ownership interests on the ownership spectrum is that the privileges 
and powers that a person has in the resource confers privileges and powers that authorize self-
seekingness to the owner. 60 Self-seekingness is the intimate relationship between the owner and the 
58 See the discussion on the exhaustion or first sale doctrine in Chapter 3 Part II F, Chapter 7 Part III A (ii) and 
Chapter 8 Part III. 
59 As Cohen, "Does Copyright Trump Privacy?", supra note 11 at 378, notes: "The expansion is particularly 
dramatic in the case of things embodying works, and not just because the bundle of rights conferred by 
copyright is particularly limited to start with. Conditions imposed on would-be users of things embodying 
copyright works far outstrip any conditions imposed on would-be users of other kinds of things." 
60 Harris, supra note 1 at 5. 
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resource as to how the owner chooses to dispose of the resource, with prima facie no duty to account 
to any one about the merit or rationality of that preference.61 
The self-seekingness component common to all ownership interests is particularly significant for 
consumers of commercial copies of copyright works. By definition, consumers perform acts within 
their personal and intimate sphere of interest and not for business purposes. 62 On that terrain, the 
constraints on consumers' open-ended powers and privileges have repercussions on the extent to 
which the commercial copies of copyright works they own authorize self-seekingness. 63 The 
limitations on consumers' open-ended powers and privileges related to the commercial copies of 
copyright works they own are not trivial: they go to the heart of the uses that consumers increasingly 
want to make of copyright works.64 They directly and materially impede on the primafacie self-
seekingness that ownership in copies of copyright works should entail.65 The situation is here 
reversed: consumers are, to a large extent, a priori banned from the self-seekingness aspect of their 
property rights in the commercial copies of the copyright works they own. As a corollary to the 
important limitations on consumers' open-ended powers and privileges, the commercial copies of 
copyright works they own ability to authorize self-seekingness is also compromised in comparison to 
other forms of personal property. 
To sum up on the property attributes of commercial copies of copyright works, I started my analysis 
on the premise that unlike copyright, the personal property nature of commercial copies of copyright 
works was not controversial. My application of property law and theory to commercial copies of 
copyright works reveals that we need to rethink the fundamental assumption that commercial copies 
61 Ibid at 65. 
62 See my discussion on the specificity of consumers amongst the larger group of users in Chapter 2 Part IV. 
63 See the discussion on the restrictions to consumers' open-ended powers and privileges to commercial copies 
of copyright works in Part VI B (ii). 
64 For a review of consumer uses and expectations of copyright works, see for example the report: Center for 
Democracy & Technology, "Evaluating DRM: Building a Marketplace for the Convergent World" (2006) at 7-
8, online: http://www.cdt.org/copyright/20060907drm.pdf; see also Pamela Samuelson & Jason Schultz, 
"Should copyright owners have to give notice of their use of technical protection measures?" (2007) 6 J. 
Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 41 at 44-45. 
65 Joseph P. Liu, "Copyright Law's Theory of the Consumer" (2003) 44 Boston College Law Review, 397 [Liu, 
"Copyright Law's Theory of the Consumer"] at 412, refers to copyright works as not only being individual 
consumer goods but as also being social goods: " ... to make sense of and interpret many copyright works 
meaningfully, it is sometimes necessary to communicate with others about the works; to share viewpoints, to 
debate, and to argue. Although some works can certainly be consumed alone, by an individual consumer, many 
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of copyright works are personal property in some cases and, at best, realize that their location on the 
ownership spectrum is progressively weakening. 
Commercial copies of copyright works generally confer trespassory powers on consumers similar to 
other forms of personal property and the legal relationship between a person and a resource (and the 
identification and separateness between the two) is fulfilled. 66 However, the open-ended powers and 
privileges and self-seekingness that commercial copies of copyright works authorize are increasingly 
compromised, up to a point that, in some cases, ownership itself is put in question. 67 The amendments 
to the CCA in 2012 allow consumers to perform more acts on the commercial copies of copyright 
works they own without the authorization of copyright holders than they were previously able to 
perform. However, the newly introduced permitted acts, framed as exceptions to copyright 
infringements, are subject to the fulfillment of strict conditions and are, in some cases, explicitly 
subject to contract clauses or TPMs overriding the permitted use while their mandatory nature 
remains uncertain in the other cases.68 More fundamentally, the ability to assign and transfer the 
personal property without any duty to account to anyone is sometimes restricted through contract 
terms that have been upheld by the courts. 69 The uncertain application of the exhaustion or first sale 
doctrine, especially to commercial copies of copyright works distributed online with no supporting 
physical object, directly relates to the validity of commercial practices restraining consumers' 
privilege and power to assign or transfer the commercial copies of copyright works that they lawfully 
acquired.70 As consumers are deprived of the ability to transfer and assign the commercial copies they 
lawfully acquired, consumers' rights thereto resemble more a dismemberment of ownership than to 
works are suited to social consumption. The ability to communicate about copyright works enriches our 
understanding of those works and enables us to get much more out of them." 
66 See the discussion in Part II B (i) of this chapter. 
67 See the discussion in Part II B (ii) and (iii) of this chapter. 
68 For example, this is the case of the reproduction for private purposes exception to copyright infringement 
( CCA, supra note 4 s 29 .22) and in the case of the later listening or viewing exception to copyright infringement 
(s 29.33). See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part IV. 
69 See the discussion in Chapter 7 Part IV and in Chapter 8 Part II Con the treatment of contractual clauses that 
restrict the right to transfer commercial copies of copyright works lawfully acquired for an indefinite duration, 
other than in the case of rental agreements where such restrictions would be expected. 
70 See the discussion on the exhaustion or first sale doctrine in Chapter 3 Part II F, Chapter 7 Part III A (ii) and 
Chapter 8 Part III. 
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ownership itself. Even then, it may not fall within the characteristics of any known form of property 
interest.71 
Ownership in resources, including chattels, is a hard-wired concept that goes back through time 
immemorial. 72 The decal age between what consumers of commercial copies of copyright works 
should own a priori, through the application of property law and theory, and what they own in reality 
or may even not own anymore, 73 can explain to a large extent the growing incredulity or disbelief that 
even well-informed consumers have with respect to what they are entitled and not entitled to do with 
their commercial copies of copyright works. As methods of exploitation evolve toward the online 
distribution of copies of copyright works with no supporting physical object, the meaning of 
ownership - as opposed to no ownership - and the degree of privileges that it entails are even more 
critical questions than they ever were before.74 
Unlike other forms of property, whereby the exclusionary powers associated with ownership mean 
that the owner has the power to set the agenda,75 with respect to the ownership in copies of copyright 
works, we have come to accept that this agenda is to be almost exclusively set by the copyright 
holder. As we have entered a new copyright era whereby copyright work access controls merge with 
the control of acts reserved to copyright holders, there is a double standard on the forms of intrusions 
71 Art 1119 CCQ. Dismemberments of ownership, e.g. usufruct, servitudes or easements are known forms of 
property interests. In the case of lawfully acquired copies of copyright works for an indefinite duration with no 
right to transfer or assign the copy, the copies are deprived of an essential attribute of ownership. They may not 
fall under the traditional dismemberments of ownership either, such as usufruct, given the considerable other 
restrictions attached to the copies through the other restrictions of copyright. 
72 Harris, supra note 1 at 4; in the context of the significance of our understanding of conventional property to 
justify the ownership of digital copies of copyright works, Liu, "Owning Digital Copies," supra note 3 at 1300 
states: "as a purely descriptive matter, the incidents of copy ownership can be explained as having arisen from 
conventional and deeply embedded understandings about what it means to own or to possess physical personal 
property." 
73 That is in the case of copies distributed online, as a result of the applicable online terms and conditions. 
74 For instance, as I discuss in Chapter 7, the first sale or exhaustion doctrine, which normally allow copy 
owners to subsequently transfer their copies of copyright works without the authorization of copyright holders 
does not apply with respect to such digital copies distributed online. 
75 Larissa Katz, "Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law" (2008) 58 U of Toronto Law Journal 275 at 277-
278, whereby the author presents a narrower view of the power to exclude resulting from ownership, i.e.: "What 
it means for ownership to be exclusive is just that owners are in a special position to set the agenda for a 
resource." 
196 
that are acceptable to consumers versus the ones that are acceptable on copyright holders' exclusive 
rights.76 
For the purposes of our discussion, we need to ask, with respect to the phenomena leading up to the 
potential eradication of copy ownership: are there freedoms (ranges of autonomous choices) that 
would not exist without the property in the copy? Without these freedoms, would the copyright 
system treat consumers fairly, and would it still be coherent with its theoretical justifications? In 
instances where the ownership in the copy subsists, what is the proper scope of ownership and how 
can it legitimately be limited by the exclusive rights of the copyright holder? The impact of various 
justificatory theories of private property on copies of copyright works, as well as the operation of 
copyright as a limitation on consumers' ownership rights in copies of copyright works, are considered 
below in this chapter in an attempt to answer these pressing questions. Prior to that, I will look into 
the implications of the numerus clausus principle to commercial copies of copyright works, as another 
important attribute of the property institution. 
C. Commercial copies of copyright works and the standardization of property 
The standardization of property or the numerus clausus principle, by which there is a fixed and closed 
list of property interests recognized by law and, as one corollary, limitations on how owners can alter 
the nature of their property rights, is another distinctive feature of property. 77 In Chapter 4, I discussed 
how I intend to apply the numerus clausus principle to define copyright consumers' rights, i.e., as a 
tool to calibrate the effects of the property regime created by the CCA and copyright holders' freedom 
of contract. 78 
Commercial copies of copyright works do not fare so well on the terrain of the numerus clausus 
principle compared to other forms of property, and arguably, even less so than copyright.79 On the one 
hand, to the extent that commercial copies of copyright works qualify as personal property, the 
76 Cohen, "Does Copyright Trump Privacy?", supra note 11 at 380 refers to the legal endorsement of digital 
rights management as applied by copyright holders as being viewed as acceptable forms of intrusion on 
consumers' rights in copies of copyright works on the one hand, in contrast with consumer activities related to 
information products (such as use of automated software for comparative pricing) as being condemned on 
various legal bases, on the other hand. 
77 See the discussion on the standardization of property in Chapter 4 Part III. 
78 Ibid. 
79 See the discussion on the application of the numerus clausus principle to copyright in Chapter 5 Part IV C. 
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limitations imposed on the open-ended powers and privileges of consumers by copyright holders' 
limited non-ownership proprietary interest in the commercial copies are not a derogation from the 
numerus clausus principle, but rather an illustration of the flexibility of the property institution and of 
the endless variations of ownership interests on the ownership spectrum. In the same vein, the 
progressive expansion of copyright holders' exclusive rights,80 and with it of their non-ownership 
proprietary interest in commercial copies of copyright works,81 can be perceived as moving 
commercial copies of copyright works further down on the ownership spectrum without taking them 
out of the property institution by creating a unknown form of property interest. 
On the other hand, commercial copies of copyright works may be outliers to the numerus clausus 
principle in other important respects. The complex relationship between the exclusive rights of 
copyright holders and the ownership rights of consumers to commercial copies of copyright works 
may lead the judiciary to misinterpret the scope of copyright holders non-ownership proprietary 
interests in commercial copies of copyright works, leading to greater discrepancies in the 
homogeneity of the rights pertaining to commercial copies of copyright works than with respect to 
other forms of personal property. 82 An even more troublesome aspect of the conformity of 
commercial copies of copyright works to the numerus clausus principle concerns copyright holders' 
widespread licensing practices by which they restrict consumers' and other users' rights to assign and 
transfer copies of copyright works. 83 To the extent that these contractual rights are being enforced, the 
restriction of the power to alienate potentially disqualifies commercial copies of copyright works from 
being personal property.84 Similarly, the non-applicability of the exhaustion doctrine to digital copies 
of copyright works distributed online with no hand-to-hand exchange has the same effect.85 The 
restriction on the power to alienate creates a new form of property interest that more resembles a 
dismemberment of ownership, but which may still create an unknown proprietary interest in the 
property institution, which is precisely what the numerus clausus principle seeks to guard against. 
80 See the discussion in Chapter 5 Part II. 
81 See the discussion in Chapter 5 Part IV B. 
82 For example, see the discussion on the difficulty for courts to qualify the nature of commercial copies of 
copyright works because of the confusion between the exclusive rights of copyright holders and of the owners of 
commercial copies of copyright works in Chapter 8 Part II. 
83 See the discussion in Chapter 7 Part IV. 
84 See the discussion in Part II B in fine of this chapter. 
85 See the discussion on the exhaustion or first sale doctrine in Chapter 3 Part II F and in Chapter 7 Part II A (ii). 
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To the extent that commercial copies of copyright works are a form of personal property, the proper 
question to answer is why commercial copies of copyright works need to comply as much as possible 
with the numerus clausus principle as a guiding norm for the judiciary, law- and policy-makers.86 To 
what extent are the concerns favouring the standardization of property with respect to other forms of 
personal property similar with respect to commercial copies of copyright works? I will explore this 
question further in Chapter 7 as I apply the numerus clausus principle to commercial copies of 
copyright works as a tool to mediate between the property rights conferred on copyright holders by 
the CCA and their ability to alter those rights by contract. 87 
The discussions in Chapter 5 on the nature of copyright and in this chapter on the uncertain legal 
nature of commercial copies of copyright works illustrate a struggle between competing interests and 
progressive encroachments on the ownership interests of copyright consumers. How did we get here 
and can we justify this evolution? In the remainder of this chapter, I will apply influential property 
theories to commercial copies of copyright and to copyright in search of answers to these fundamental 
questions. 
III. Justificatory theories of (intellectual) property and of copy ownership 
The justification of the scope of ownership in commercial copies of copyright works is under-
theorized, just as is the case for its nature.88 By contrast, literature abounds on the theoretical 
justifications of copyright.89 As Jeremy Waldron noted when looking at copyright from the 
86 I discuss the justifications for the application of the numerus clausus principle in Chapter 4 Part IV. 
87 See the discussion in Chapter 7 Part IV. 
88 See the discussion in Part II A of this chapter. 
89See for example Edwin C. Hettinger, "Justifying Intellectual Property" (1989) 18 Philosophy & Public Affairs, 
31, in David Vaver, ed., Intellectual Property Rights, Critical Concepts in Law (London: Routledge, 2006) 
Vol.I, 97; Jeremy Waldron, "From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights & Social Values in Intellectual 
Property" ( 1993) 69 Chicago-Kent Law Review, 841, in David Vaver, ed., Intellectual Property Rights, Critical 
Concepts in Law (London: Routledge, 2006) Vol.I, 114 [Waldron, "From Authors to Copiers"]; William W. 
Fisher, "Theories of Intellectual Property" in Stephen R. Munzer (ed) New Essays in the legal and Political 
Theory of Property (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 168; Peter Drahos, A Philosophy of 
Intellectual Property (Aldeshot: Ashgate, 1996); Sunny Handa, Copyright Law in Canada, (Markham, Ont: 
Butterworth Canada, 2002) at 59-134; Carys J. Craig, "Locke, Labour and Limiting the Author's Right: A 
Warning Against a Lockean Approach to Copyright Law" (2002) 28 Queen's L.J. 1; Samuel E. Trosow, "The 
Illusive Search for Justificatory Theories: Copyright, Commodification and Capital" (2003) 16 Can. J.L. & 
Juris. 217; Brian F. Fitzgerald, "Theoretical Underpinning of Intellectual Property: I am a Pragmatist But 
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perspective of users and copiers: "We cannot unravel conundrums of moral justification unless we are 
willing to approach the issue even-handedly from both sides."90 It is beyond the scope and purpose of 
this chapter to provide a detailed review of the body of academic work on the theoretical justifications 
of property and, more particularly, of copyright.91 After starting with the normative status of prima 
facie open-ended freedoms reflected in the concept of ownership, and its ramifications to justify the 
scope of ownership in commercial copies of copyright works, I will then look at two other prevailing 
underlying theories of property and copyright. First, I review instrumental theories as they relate to 
copyright and commercial copies of copyright works. Instrumental theories are the most influential 
justifications for the existence of private property in general,92 and copyright in particular.93 Looking 
at the underlying instrumental theories to justify copyright provides a reference point to assess the 
application of property rules to the ownership in commercial copies of copyright works, to support or 
Theory is my Rhetoric" (2003) 16 Can. J.L. & Juris. 179; Abraham Drassinower, "A Rights-Based View of the 
Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law (2003) 16 Can. J.L. & Juris. 3; William M. Landes & Richard A. 
Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law (Cambridge: Mass Bellnap Press, 2003); Richard 
A. Posner, "The Law and Economics of Intellectual Property" (2002) Daedalus 5; Richard Polk Wagner, 
"Information Wants to be Free, Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of Control" (2003) 103 Columbia 
Law Review 995; David Lametti, "Coming to Terms with Copyright", in Michael Geist (ed) In the Public 
Interest: The Future of Canadian Copyright Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005) 480; Mark A. Lemley, "Property, 
Intellectual Property and Free Riding" (2005) Texas L. Rev. 1031; Karla M. O'Regan, "Downloading 
Personhood: A Hegelian Theory of Copyright Law" (2009) 7 Can. J. L. & Tech. 1; Giuseppina D' Agostino, 
Copyright, Contracts, Creators: New Media, New Rules (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2010) at 201-259. 
90 Waldron, "From Authors to Copiers", supra note 89 at 114. 
91 Among the several justificatory theories of property that are not discussed here are the first occupancy theory, 
personhood constituting theory, for example as developed in the work of Margaret Jane Radin: Margaret .Jane 
Radin, "Property and Personhood" (1982) 34 Stan. LR 957, and sovereignty theories. With respect to copyright 
in particular, personality-based theories are frequently invoked to justify the creation of private property rights 
through copyright. (For a survey of theoretical justifications of intellectual property, in particular personality 
based theories see Fisher, supra note 89 at 171-172, 174 and 189-192.) They also include notions of freedom 
and autonomy. Personality-based theories have a strong resonance to justify the existence of moral rights. Their 
inalienability gives strength to the argument that they are founded on personality-based theories although the 
justification of moral rights in Canada could be based on utilitarian grounds, see Handa, supra note 89 at 128-
130. Personality-based theories can also be invoked to justify the exclusive right of the individual author to 
authorize the first publication of her work. Once the work is published, personhood arguments to justify 
copyright exclusive rights are less than certain (for example, see Waldron, "From Authors to Copiers", supra 
note 89 at 137, where the author concludes that it is a mistake to generalize beyond the first right to publish that 
a copier's actions compromise the liberty of the author whose work she is using. See the discussion further 
below in Part III of this chapter on my motivations for focussing on specific theoretical justifications of property 
and copyright. 
92 Waldron, The right to private property (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988) [Waldron, "Private Property"] at 3. 
93 Namely under the US Const art I, s 8, Congress's power with respect to copyright (and patents) is "to promote 
the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right 
to their respective writings and discoveries:; see also Fisher, supra note 89 at 169, 173. In other common law 
jurisdictions: Handa, supra note 89 at 75. See also Harris, supra note lat 296, who views the instrumental 
justification of creator- incentive as the only plausible justification for intellectual property. 
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criticize the current scope of copyright, and to highlight important departures from its presumed 
prevailing theoretical justifications. Second, I will discuss the fruits of one's labour theory - another 
influential natural law theoretical justification of copyright - and how it affects our conceptions of 
ownership in commercial copies of copyright works. The recourse to various theories of property and 
copyright points to the lack of a coherent and uniformly applied justification. In the case of copyright, 
seemingly contradictory justificatory theories play a central role in how the courts, lawmakers, 
scholars, and interest groups characterize the exclusive rights conferred on copyright holders.94 
The deliberate selection of theoretical justifications of (intellectual) property is driven by the scope of 
inquiry of my research. First and foremost, I concentrate my analysis on theories that are either 
relevant to justify, or that are likely to be influential in determining the scope of ownership of 
commercial copies of copyright works as personal property, not copyright per se. Because of the close 
connection between copyright consumers' rights in the copies and copyright holders' exclusive rights 
in the works,95 I will apply each theory with reference to its implications for the rights of consumers 
and copyright holders. Given the focus of my thesis _on commercial copies of copyright works in a 
mass-market environment, I am also interested in those theories that are more apt to explain the 
dynamics of the exploitation phase of copyright works. In the case of musical works, films, and 
books, we are concerned with the proper justifications of copyright after the copyright work is 
commercialized. When consumers access the copyright works, the exclusive right to authorize first 
94 The CCA, supra note 4, generally exemplifies an instrumentalist approach to copyright (e.g., section 13 (3) 
states that the first owner of copyright is the employer of the author who created the work in the course of her 
employment) but also includes rights that can be justified by personality-based theories (e.g. moral rights: ss 
14.1-14.2) and clauses that illustrate both justifications (s 83 which provides for the reversion of copyright to the 
author in case of bankruptcy, which can be justified by instrumentalist theories as well as personality-based 
theories). In Theberge v Gallerie d'art du petit Champlain Inc., 2002 SCC 34 [Theberge] at para 30, the 
judgment for the majority seems to found the justifications of copyright on a combination of instrumental and 
natural property rights in the fruits of one's labour theories: "The Copyright Act is usually presented as a 
balance between promoting the public interest in the encouragement and dissemination of works of the arts and 
intellect and obtaining a just reward for the creator (or, more accurately, to prevent someone other than the 
creator from appropriating whatever benefits may be generated)". In BMG Canada v John Doe, 2005 FCA I 93 
at para 40, the Federal Court of Appeal adopts a utilitarian approach to copyright while resorting to Lockean 
fruits of one's labour theory language. The various theoretical justifications seem to co-exist in the European 
Union harmonization efforts of copyright. See for example EC, Directive 2001129/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related 
rights in the information society, [2001] OJ, LI 67 II 0, Preamble which point to utilitarian justifications (recital 
4) fruits of one's labour theory (e.g. recital 10) and persona1ity-based theories (e.g. recital 11). For a US 
perspective, see an analysis of the justificatory theories reflected in American copyright and intellectual property 
case law in Fisher, supra note 89 at 168; see also Adam Mossoff, "Is copyright property?" (2005) 42 San Diego 
Law Review, 29 at 36. 
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publication that is part of the bundle of copyright exclusive rights, which give rise to distinct 
theoretical justifications,96 has already taken place. I am also dealing with multiple commercial copies 
of copyright works as opposed to instances where there exists only one original of the copyright work, 
a situation that brings other considerations to determine the scope of ownership of commercial copies 
of copyright works.97 I begin my analysis with the theoretical justification that can help define the 
proper scope of ownership of commercial copies of copyright based on Harris' s theory of the prima 
facie normative status of all ownership freedoms. 98 
A. The prima /acie normative status of all ownership freedoms 
Central to Harris' s theory of property, as the incarnation of freedom and autonomous choice, is the 
ubiquitous manifestation in society of a wide spectrum of ownership interests. Ownership is an 
"organizing idea" in which all of these interests share to various degrees, open-ended privileges, 
powers, and self-seekingness.99 To invoke freedom as a moral justification for maintaining a property 
institution, one needs to ask "whether inherent property freedoms are a necessary feature of the just 
society."100 The proposition is that, quite apart from instrumental reasons, "property institutions by 
their very nature confer freedoms (ranges for autonomous choice) which would not exist without 
them; and for this reason no citizen is treated justly by his community unless it institutes or maintains 
a property institution." 101 Hence, open-ended uses and privileges nurture freedoms that contribute to 
autonomous choice and primafacie justify property institutions. 102 Harris arrives at this conclusion by 
finding no convincing argument that any of the powers and privileges on the ownership spectrum 
95 See the discussion in Chapter 5 Part IV B. 
96 See Handa, supra note 89 at 125-126 where the author suggests approaching copyright in two phases to apply 
coherent theoretical justifications. The first right to publish would be justified on the basis of privacy, while the 
exploitation right after publication has occurred would be justified by a social utility model. 
97 This would be the case of a unique painting, statue or architectural work. In such cases, the interaction 
between the property rights of the owner of the physical copy and the author is likely to be greater than in the 
case of commercial copies of a music CD or a film DVD, and raises distinct issues that are beyond the scope of 
my research. 
98 Harris, supra note I . 
99 Ibid at 63ff. 
100 Ibid at 231. 
101Jbid at 230. James 0. Grunebaum, Private Ownership (London, New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987) 
at 183, bases the moral justification of ownership in autonomy and develops a theory of "autonomous 
ownership". Within that framework, Grunebaum acknowledges how use controls of consumer goods violate 
autonomy: "Community control over consumer goods, either in the form of what goods are produced or control 
in the form of what uses consumer products may be put to, would violate autonomy." 
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should be a priori excluded from the concept of ownership: "the spectrum has evolved in human 
history and is available within property institutions as a means of conferring ranges of autonomous 
choice on individuals or groups." 103 A contrario, if there were no property-specific justice reasons to 
support those freedoms, "countless day-to-day unquestioned assumptions about people being free to 
do what they like with their own things and their own money would tum out to be morally suspect."104 
Autonomy is a value frequently invoked to justify property and, more particularly, personal property. 
105 
Based on the premise that there is no natural right to full-blooded ownership, none of these freedoms 
is sacrosanct, and they all may be overridden by justifiable property-limitation and expropriation 
rules, which are also widely observed and accepted in modern societies. 106 Although Harris's theory 
of a right to property based on freedoms, and derived from Hegel's theory of property, 107 
unequivocally rejects a natural right to full-blooded ownership, it may rejoin what Jeremy Waldron 
would call a "general right-based argument" to property (as opposed to a "special right-based 
argument"). 108 
The primafacie normative status of ownership freedoms is central to the justification of ownership in 
commercial copies of copyright works in at least two cases: with respect to the threat to eradicate 
102 Harris, supra note 1 at 231. 
103 Ibid at 275. 
104 Ibid at 65. See also Grunebaum, supra note 101. 
105 For example see Grunebaum, supra note 101 at 183: "The idea that autonomy requires a wide range of rights 
of title over consumer goods implies that so called consumer sovereignty is a moral as well as the economic 
requirement to maintain the value of income and to achieve or measure efficiency. That consumers legitimately 
exercise a wide range of rights of title over goods for personal consumption applies not only to what they 
actually purchase but to what is available for their purchase. Not only should individuals be able to exercise a 
broad range of rights of title over their living quarters, for example, but they should also have a wide range of 
options about the kinds of living quarters made available." 
106 Harris, supra note I at 275. 
107 Harris develops his property justification based on freedom mainly from the analysis of Hegel's theory: 
Harris, supra note 1 at 230ff. 
108 Waldron, "Private Property", supra note 92 at 116, defines the two concepts as follows: "A special-right-
based argument. . .is an argument which takes an interest to have this importance not in itself but on account of 
the occurrence of some contingent event or transaction. A general-right-based argument .. .is one which does not 
take the importance of such an interest to depend on the occurrence of some contingent event or transaction, but 
attributes that importance to the interest itself, in virtue of its qualitative character." Waldron's theory, based on 
Hegel, supports a general -right-based argument to property. He uses as an example of a special right- based 
argument John Locke's natural right theory of property that is based on labour-desert type of arguments. See 
also David Lametti, "Concept of Property: Relations through Objects of Social Wealth" (2003) 53 U. Toronto 
L.J. 325 at 356ff, who discusses Harris's "right-based" theory. 
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copy ownership altogether and, where copy ownership subsists, as a baseline to analyze what the 
proper scope of copy ownership freedoms should be. On that terrain, commentators have invoked 
other theories, including human-rights-based arguments to preserve users' scope of use of copyright 
works, which will I will not review here. 109 
On the threat to eradicate ownership in digital copies (through copyright holders' commercial practice 
of restricting consumers' rights to transfer and assign their copies, and through the confusion that 
subsists in the nature of digital copies of copyright works distributed online with no supporting 
physical medium), 110 the questions to ask are: how can the property institution of copyright serve as a 
justification to a priori exclude the powers and privileges that relate to the ownership in commercial 
copies of copyright works? Is it just to allow a shift to take place from day-to-day unquestioned 
freedoms (albeit limited) by consumers as copy owners of a copyright work, to countless suspicion, 
monitoring, and control by copyright holders over the fate of their copyright works? Given the 
ubiquity and centrality of ownership as a vehicle for infinite and repetitive minuscule exercises of 
freedom in all spheres of consumption and modem life, allowing such a shift to take place through 
copyright holders' change of business practices, without any intervention from the authority which 
created the property right in the first place (i.e., the state, through copyright statutes), is at best 
suspicious. 
Copyright holders justify their increased control over commercial copies particularly by restricting 
consumers' rights to assign and transfer commercial copies that they lawfully acquired on the basis of 
the need to combat piracy, which is a matter of legitimate concern. However, how much burden can 
copyright holders reasonably ask consumers to bear and how far can they impede consumers' 
legitimate freedom on that basis? Are these not too fundamental questions to be left to the will of 
copyright holders alone in how they exploit their copyright works by contract? The institution of 
intellectual property, as created by various statutes, is not self-justifying. 111 A fortiori, any further 
109 For example, see Julie E. Cohen, "A right to read anonymously: a closer look at 
"copyright management" In Cyberspace" ( 1997) 28 Conn. L. Rev. 981, makes an argument in favour of 
protecting users' right to read without intrusion from copyright holders that is based on the U.S. Constitution 
first amendment. Given the scope of my thesis on consumers lawfully accessing copies of copyright work, a 
property-based approach offers a more specific account of the rights at play: see the discussion in Chapter 4, in 
particular, Part I, II and VI. 
110 See the discussion in Chapter 7 Part IV and in Chapter 8, in particular Part II. 
111 As Waldron puts it: "The fact is however , that whether or not we speak of a burden of proof, an institution 
like intellectual property is not self-justifying; we owe a justification to anyone who finds that he can move less 
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material limitations on consumers' and other users' freedoms should not be left to the will of the 
private interests of copyright holders alone, without a proper debate taking place and the democratic 
process taking its course. 112 Given the current void in the copyright system on the status of 
commercial copies of copyright works and the general legal uncertainty that results therefrom, 
copyright holders are able to create material changes about the ownership of commercial copies of 
copyright works and to effectively broaden the scope of their exclusive rights. 113 
In parallel to copyright holders exhorting more power and control over their works, in cases where 
ownership in the copy of the copyright work subsists, what is the normative force of these 
increasingly open-ended freedoms of consumers as new technologies empower them more than ever 
before in how they access and experience copyright works? The primafacie normative status of 
ownership freedoms brings a substantive argument to support and understand ownership in 
commercial copies of copyright works, both for its scope and its subsistence, and to situate copy 
ownership vis-a-vis the private property regime that is created by copyright. 114 Various forms of 
property including personal property predate the existence of copyright and, therefore, it is one of the 
underlying assumptions, upon which copyright laws were created. 115 
Related to the normative value of freedom is privacy, which is also relevant in the debate about 
copyright holders' controls over the copies of their copyright works. Waldron arrives at a similar 
conclusion as Harris' s prima facie normative force of all ownership freedoms on the basis of the right 
freely than he would in the absence of the institution": Waldron, "From Authors to Copiers", supra note 89 at 
146. 
112 On that point, see the discussion in Chapter 3 Part III and IV on the ambiguities of the interaction between 
copyright, contracts, TPMs and exceptions to copyright infringement. 
113 On the debate on the effects of private contracts on the copyright system, see Chapter 3 Part III A. 
114 Liu, "Copyright Law's Theory of the Consumer", supra note 65 at 406-411, invokes autonomy as one of the 
aspirations of consumers of copyright works, e.g., "freedom in choosing when, how, and under what 
circumstances to consume a copyright work". The Author acknowledges that the U.S. copyright law already 
recognizes a fair degree of autonomy of the consumer among others through the application of the fair use 
doctrine. For Liu, "the sale of a copy represents a fixed bundle of entitlements giving the purchaser the ability to 
exercise a good deal of autonomy in consumption.": Ibid at 408. More generally, on the fact that autonomy 
requires a wide range of rights of title over consumer goods, See, Grunebaum, supra note l 01 at 183. 
115 Liu, "Owning Digital Copies," supra note 3 at 1301, reflects on the place of the incidents of copy ownership 
within the copyright regime as follows: "Copyright law, then, does not so much expressly build in such 
incidents of copy ownership, as it accepts and assumes such incidents as given. That is, under this view, 
understandings about physical copy ownership antedate the relatively more recent development of copyright 
law." On a related idea, on the interaction between intellectual property and tangible property see Jeremy de 
Beer and Robert Tomkowicz, "Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights in Canada" (2009) 25 C.I.P.R. 3 at 20-
24. 
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to privacy. 116 For Waldron, if every resource was publicly controlled, every use of that resource by an 
individual would be an "other-regarding" action; we would be accountable to all and this would be 
untenable. 117 This makes him conclude that: "there must be a realm of private freedom somewhere for 
each individual - an area where he can make decisions about what to do and how to do it, justifying 
these decisions if at all only to himself." 118 Perhaps that is so, precisely because privacy derives from 
the values of autonomy and freedom. It is a specific expectation, in certain circumstances, of a sacred 
space where these values can optimally flourish. Yet, for Harris, privacy plays a role distinct from 
freedom when it comes to justifying private property. For Harris, privacy can be the "shell" of a 
natural right to private property1 19 in very limited circumstances, when the intimate relationship that 
arises between a person and a thing is such that a just treatment would entail recognition of an 
ownership right in the resource. 120 One example of such a natural right would be the exclusive powers 
of an author on the right to authorize the first publication of her work on the basis of privacy. 121 
Privacy considerations (just like freedom and autonomous choice) have applications that go above and 
beyond justifying the existence of private property rights in a resource. It is one thing to say that, on 
the basis on privacy, the state will not enter the home of consumers or install cameras in public spaces 
to monitor their uses of copyright works. 122 Privacy is often invoked as the justification for the private 
copy exception to copyright infringement that exists in several European jurisdictions. 123 This is a 
116 Waldron, "Private Property", supra note 92 at 295 and at 343ff, where the author develops a general right to 
property derived from Hegel's theory of freedom and property. 
117 Ibid at 295 [citing J.S. Mill; Mill, On Liberty, CH. I]. 
118 Ibid. 
119 By "shell", Harris means that the extent of the natural right cannot be determined until "the problematic 
balance between the requirement of a range of specially protected autonomous choice and necessary 
intervention by the community to prevent abuse" has been exercised: Harris, supra note I at 227-228. 
120 Ibid at 224. 
121 Harris, supra note 1 at 225; Millar v Taylor (1769), 4 Burr. 2303, at 2379; Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. 
Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy" (1890) 4 Harv. L.R. 193 at 199-200, where the authors argue that the nature of 
the claim in that case is the enforcement of the right of privacy or "the right to be let alone" (not a property 
right) with exclusive reproduction rights (a property right). See also Handa, supra note 89 at 125-126. 
122 For instance, privacy is invoked as one of the justifications for the private copying regime that exists in many 
European jurisdictions, which allows consumers to make a limited number of copies of defined copyright works 
without infringing copyright, and which provides a levy system to compensate authors: see Natali Heiberger & 
P. Bernt Hugenholtz, "No place like home for making a copy, private copying in European copyright law and 
consumer law" (2007) 22 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1061 at I 068-1072. 
123 Ibid; Christophe Geiger, "The answer to the machine should not be the machine: safeguarding the private 
copy exception in the digital environment" (2009) 30 EIPR 121 at 122, although the author questions that 
privacy is still a justification of the private copy exception in a digital environment where copy controls can be 
effected remotely and outside the private sphere of individuals. 
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consideration separate from the constitutive and justificatory nature of the scope of exclusive rights 
and powers that consumers have in commercial copies of copyright works that they own. Although 
privacy is relevant to consumers to preserve their right to non-intrusion in a general context, it is not 
necessarily so to support the scope of their ownership rights in commercial copies of copyright 
works. 124 If this were to be the case, consumers ought to be granted privileges and powers in relation 
to commercial copies of copyright works through ownership because not to do so would violate the 
intimate relationship that they have with copyright works. 125 
Given that commercial copies of copyright works are not creations of the consumers, and are often by 
nature, although not necessarily, works that are communicated and shared with others, it seems that 
privacy, as a specific subset of freedoms and autonomous choice, is not the relevant justification for 
the existence of ownership in commercial copies of copyright works. Privacy could be a justification 
for ownership in the "mini" or more substantive derivative works or compilations of works that 
consumers may create from commercial copies of copyright works, certainly with respect to the right 
to authorize their disclosure through the exclusive right to authorize first publication. 126 
Beside the cases involving the creation of new copyright works derived from the use of commercial 
copies of copyright works, a better characterization of the relationship between privacy and ownership 
in commercial copies of copyright works could be that the right of privacy can act in certain 
circumstances as an "independent property-prohibition rule" that would set limits on the exclusionary 
powers (and related enforcement rights) of copyright holders on consumers. 127 One illustration of the 
application of privacy rights to limit the exclusionary powers conferred by copyright is BMG Canada 
Inc. v. John Doe. 128 In that case, the plaintiffs, various music providers in Canada, sought an order to 
compel various Internet service providers to disclose the names of the customers who used specific IP 
addresses at times that were material to the proceedings. 129 The Federal Court dismissed the order on 
the basis that the plaintiffs did not meet the "equitable bill of discovery requirements." On appeal, the 
124 However see in a US context, Cohen, "Does Copyright Trump Privacy?" supra note 11 at 377-378, where 
the author links the first sale doctrine, which gives copy owners the right to resell copies of copyright works 
without copyright holders' consent, and is therefore one of their freedoms as owners, to user privacy. 
125 See Harris, supra note 1 at 224 on the relationship between privacy and moral justifications for private 
property. 
126 Harris, supra note 1 at 224-225; Millar v Taylor (1769), 4 Burr. 2303 at 2379; Warren &Brandeis, supra note 
121 at 199-200; Handa, supra note 89 at 125-126. 
127 See the discussion of independent property prohibition rules in Chapter 4 Part V. 
128 BMG Canada Inc. v John Doe, 2004 FC 488; on appeal: BMG Canada Inc. v John Doe, supra note 94. 
129 BMG Canada Inc. v John Doe (FC), supra note 128 at para 9. 
207 
resolution of the issue revolved around the proper test to balance the personal property rights of the 
plaintiffs as copyright holders and the privacy of Internet service providers' consumers, which the 
Federal Court of Appeal described as follows: 
Thus, in my view, in cases where plaintiffs show that they have a bonafide claim that unknown 
persons are infringing their copyright, they have a right to have the identity revealed for the purpose 
of bringing action. However, caution must be exercised by the courts in ordering such disclosure, to 
make sure that privacy rights are invaded in the most minimal way. 130 
The Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, but without prejudice to the plaintiffs' right to 
commence a further application for disclosure of the identity of the "users," taking into account the 
reasons given by the Federal Court of Appeal. 131 The plaintiffs later decided not to pursue their 
claims. 
To sum up, the primafacie normative status of ownership freedoms and, incidentally and in specific 
cases of consumer creations, the right to privacy, are justifications that support and help substantiate 
consumers' claims to primafacie open-ended privileges and powers to commercial copies of 
copyright works. The prima facie open-ended privileges and powers evolve in conformity with the 
environment in which the commercial copies are being supplied. The technological environment that 
surrounds the manner by which commercial copies can be experienced changes consumers' 
expectations of their open-ended powers and privileges to commercial copies of copyright works and 
needs to be taken into account. 132 The primafacie normative status of ownership freedoms can also 
provide a normative framework to respond to copyright holders' eradication of copy ownership 
through their commercial practice of restraining consumers' rights to assign and transfer the 
commercial copies they lawfully acquire. The primafacie normative status of ownership freedoms in 
commercial copies of copyright works is distinct from the instrumental justifications for copy 
ownership and copyright, which I explore next. 
130 BMG Canada Inc. v John Doe (FCA) supra note 94 at para 42. 
131 Ibid at para 55. 
132 See the discussion on the environment in which commercial copies of copyright works are made available in 
Chapter 1 Part I. 
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B. Instrumental justifications of (intellectual) property 
Instrumental justifications of property and copyright can complement and support the justification of 
copy ownership that is based on the prima facie normative status of ownership freedoms, as 
previously discussed in this chapter. 133 Two instrumental justifications are particularly relevant to the 
discussion about copy ownership of copyright works. The first justification is the incentive to create 
and to disseminate works, i.e., the extent to which this prevailing justification for the existence of 
copyright also justifies copy ownership in copyright works. Concepts of freedom and autonomy are 
also being explored within the context of this creator-incentive justification, but from an instrumental 
perspective, i.e., certain behaviours that ought to be promoted within the framework of copyright 
laws. The second justification is an economic efficiency argument that is generally invoked to support 
ownership in chattels, and that I apply here more specifically to commercial copies of copyright 
works. 
Copyright in Canada, as a creation of statute, 134 is justified mainly by instrumental justifications as 
stated by the Supreme Court in Theberge v. Galerie d'Art du Petit Champlain inc [Theberge]: "a 
balance between promoting the public interest in the encouragement and dissemination of works of 
the arts and intellect and obtaining a just reward for the creator (or, more accurately, to prevent 
someone other than the creator from appropriating whatever benefits may be generated)."135 As I will 
133 See the discussion in Part III A of this chapter. 
134 Compo Co. v Blue Crest Music Inc. [1980] 1 S.C.R. 357 at para 23. See the discussion on the nature of 
copyright in Chapter 5, in particular in Part II. 
135Theberge, supra note 94 at para 30. The Supreme Court has frequently referred to the objectives of copyright 
law as stated in Theberge in subsequent judgments: see the discussion on the balance in copyright law in 
Chapter 2 Part II. Arguably, the reference by the Supreme Court in Theberge to a need to reward authors leans 
towards natural property rights in the fruits of one's labour justificatory arguments: see the discussion in Part III 
C of this chapter. In BMG Canada v John Doe, supra note 94 at para 40, the Federal Court of Appeal described 
the raison d'etre of Canadian copyright law in instrumental terms: "Copyright law provides incentives for 
innovators - artists, musicians, inventors, writers, performers and marketers - to create. It is designed to ensure 
that ideas are expressed and developed instead of remaining dormant. Individuals need to be encouraged to 
develop their own talents and personal expression of artistic ideas, including music. If they are robbed of the 
fruits of their efforts, their incentive to express their ideas in tangible form is diminished." This view is also 
prevalent in Canadian copyright policy reports: Economic Council of Canada, Report on Intellectual and 
Industrial Property, Information Canada, by B.V. Hindley (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, 1971) at 37 
states that "the institution of the copyright system implies[ ... ] that the additional titles produced as a result of 
copyright are worth more to the community than the loss resulting from any reduction in the number of copies o 
titles that would have been distributed in the absence of copyright."; Canada, Departments of Consumer and 
Corporate Affairs and Communications, From Gutenberg to Telidon: A White Paper on Copyright: Proposals 
for the Revision of the Canadian Copyright Act (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1984) at 1, where 
copyright justification is said to be to: "reinforce the general principle of protecting the results of creative effort 
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discuss below in this chapter, the reference by the Supreme Court in Theberge to a need to reward 
authors also leans toward natural property rights in the fruits of one's labour justificatory 
arguments. 136 In the US, instrumentalist theories are often invoked to justify copyright: under the US 
Constitution, Congress's power with respect to copyright (and patents) is "to promote the progress of 
science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to 
their respective writings and discoveries." 137 Under Harris's theory of property, the creator-incentives 
instrument is the sole plausible justification for creating private property through copyright. 138 
The biggest flaws in the instrumental justification of copyright to incent creators and the 
dissemination of works reside in its inconsistency, lack of persuasiveness, 139 and difficulty of 
application. 140 What scope of property rights needs to be conferred on copyright holders for them to 
be incented to create? Is property the sine qua non condition of encouraging creativity or are there not 
other ways to incent it? 141 Is there not sufficient evidence of creative processes taking place 
independently of an immediate motive of financial gain 142 or in areas where no intellectual property 
rights are being conferred? 143 What type of creativity and innovation should be promoted to maximize 
in the social and technological context in which it must be applied." Instrumentalism, (in particular, 
utilitarianism) is the most frequently invoked theoretical justification for western copyright law: Handa, supra 
note 89 at 75. For a review of Supreme Court of Canada copyright cases confirming an instrumentalist approach 
to copyright law, see Daniel Gervais, "The Purpose of Copyright Law in Canada" (2005) 2 U. Ottawa L. & 
Tech. J. 315. 
136 See the discussion in Part III C of this chapter. 
137 US Const art I, s 8. 
138Harris, supra note 1 at 296ff. 
139 For example see Ruth Towse, "Creativity, Copyright and the Creative Industries Paradigm" (2010) 
63 KY.KLOS 461, where the author evaluates studies on economics of creativity to see the correlation between 
copyright as an economic incentive for individuals to create and actual individual creativity, concluding that a 
lot of work remains to be done to assess the effectiveness of economic incentives to individual creativity. See 
David Vaver, "Intellectual Property Today: Of Myths and Paradoxes" (1990) 69 Can. Bar Rev. 98 at 102-113 
where the author reviews utilitarian justifications of copyright through three myths: the myth that copyright law 
is designed to protect authors, the myth that copyright law encourages art and literature, and the myth that 
copyright law encourages dissemination of works. 
14° For a review and critique of instrumental and utilitarian theories as they relate to intellectual property, see 
Hettinger, supra note 89 at 107-110; Fisher, supra note 89 at 169, 173-174 and 177-184. 
141 See Hettinger, supra note 89 at 109. 
142 I refer here more particularly to the various forms of works that fall within the scope of copyright law that are 
freely shared and communicated through the internet by individual authors. See also: Julie. E. Cohen, 
"Copyright as Property in the Post-Industrial Economy: A Research Agenda" (2011) 2011 Wis. L. Rev. 141 
[Cohen, "Copyright as Property"] at 143. 
143 As one example, the high end cuisine industry is one area where a significant volume of innovation and 
creativity takes place in spite of very little intellectual property rights protection. On the theme of innovation in 
areas where there is little intellectual property protection see generally Kai Raustiala & Jonathan Springman, 
The Knockoff Economy: How Imitation Sparks Innovation (New York: OUP, 2012): where the authors explore 
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net social welfare and is copyright law preoccupied at all by this question? 144 Who are we incenting: 
authors or firms to invest in the production and distribution of copyright works?145 
One of the greatest disappointment of all in the application of the instrumental balancing act of 
copyright between the incentive to create and disseminate works and a fair reward to the creator, is 
the failure to create the right level of incentive by paying as much regard to the effect of such private 
property on the recipients or "intended beneficiaries" of copyright works as it does to the scope of the 
rights of copyright holders. In their book devoted to users of copyright works, Ray Patterson and 
Stanley Lindberg attributed this imbalance in consideration that is to the detriment of copyright users 
to the focus of copyright's function on creation rather than on distribution and on the abstractedness 
of users' interests in the process: 
By treating copyright's function as encouraging the creation (rather than the distribution) of works, 
courts have increased the difficulty of equating the user's interest in having access to the work for 
learning with the copyright owner's interest in protecting the right to profit. The difficulty is 
compounded because the claim of profit is a concrete right with an equitable basis (creation and 
highly creative industries where copying is generally legal such as fashion, food, finance and professional 
sports. 
144 Copyright protects "original" works in the sense of artistic, dramatic, literary or musical works "originating" 
from its creator and is not concerned with the artistic quality or novelty or contribution of the work to society. 
The threshold for a work to receive copyright protection is fairly low as it was recently confirmed by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in CCH Canadian Ltd. v Law Society of Upper Canada 2004 SCC 13 [ CCHJ at paras 
14-16. 
145 See Fiona Macmillan, "Copyright and Corporate Power" in Ruth Towse (ed), Copyright and the Cultural 
Industries (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2002) 99-118, where the author argues how copyright law is 
structured to promote power -hegemony of a few leading firms in the cultural industry; Cohen, "Copyright as 
Property", supra note 142, invites us to reframe the justifications of copyright from an author- incentive-based 
theory to a capital- investment incentive in creative industries' focus, as the more accurate account of the 
objectives of copyright. The recognition of the role of and support given to firms (in contrast with individual 
authors) within copyright law is reflected in different ways. For example, the CCA, supra note 4, s 13 (4)-13(7) 
provides for the assignability in whole or in part of copyright and other contractual arrangements for its 
exploitation. For a discussion on copyright as a resource capable of exploitation, see Chapter 5 Part IV A (i). 
See also, CCA, supra note 4, s 13(3) which provides that where "the author of a work was in the employment of 
some other person under a contract[ ... ] and the work was made in the course of his employment by that person" 
the employer of the author shall be unless provided otherwise by contract, the first owner of the copyright. In 
Europe, EC, Directive 2001129/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, [2001] OJ, Ll67/10 
[Directive 2001129/EC] Preamble, 10th recital, emphasizes the need to encourage investment in cultural 
industries to justify strong intellectual property rights: "If authors or performers are to continue their creative 
and artistic work, they have to receive an appropriate reward for the use of their work, as must producers in 
order to be able to finance this work. The investment required to produce products such as phonograms, films or 
multimedia products, and services such as on-demand services, is considerable. Adequate legal protection of 
intellectual property rights is necessary in order to guarantee the availability of such a reward and provide the 
opportunity for satisfactory returns on this investment." 
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distribution of the work), whereas learning is only an abstract right with no equitable basis. Yet the 
fallacy that copyright is intended to encourage the creation of works has been a prime cause of the 
copyright-is-the-ownership-of-the-work fallacy. And given this latter fallacy, it takes judges with 
vision to balance the right of learning with the right to profit, as did the framers of the copyright 
clause. 146 
Carys Craig makes a similar argument to that of Patterson and Lindberg by pointing to the need to 
centre the instrumentalist justifications of copyright on the work-public rather than on the current 
author-work relationship upon which the framework of copyright is based. 147 In Chapter 5, I 
demonstrated how property theory can constrain copyright holders' exclusive powers deriving from 
the author-work relationship by the impossibility of copyright holders to own their work. 148 I also 
discussed how, in Canada and other jurisdictions worldwide, the exclusive rights of copyright holders 
have progressively expanded in subject matter, scope, and duration. 149 While in recent years the 
Supreme Court has accentuated the importance of the rights of users within the objectives of the CCA, 
copyright law continues to offer a limited and fragmented articulation of the rights of the intended 
beneficiaries of copyright works. 150 The more realistic account of the nature and narrower scope of 
copyright holders' exclusive rights to counter the over-propertization tendencies of copyright that I 
presented in Chapter 5 has direct implications on how we apply the creator-incentive instrumentalist 
justification of copyright. 151 
Setting aside the difficulties in the application of instrumental justifications to copyright, the 
assumption is that the progress of science and the promotion of creation are to serve primarily as 
146 L.Ray Patterson, & Stanley W. Lindberg, The Nature of Copyright a Law of Users rights (Athens:University 
of Georgia Press, 1991), at 208-209. 
147 Craig, supra note 89 at 5-6: the "public interest approach justifies copyright in light of its public purpose of 
encouraging intellectual creativity. Rights are granted to authors in the belief that intellectual works will be 
underproduced unless there is sufficient opportunity to exploit them for financial return. Only if we appreciate 
the relationship between society and intellectual works can we recognize this underproduction as a danger that 
public policy should seek to avert.", adding "if we understand copyright as based upon some conception of the 
author-work link, we fail to see the relationship between the public and the work as anything other than the 
consequence of the author-work relationship. Conversely, an effective and justifiable copyright system requires 
that the copyright interest (the link between author and work) be structured with deference to the public-work 
link." 
148 See the discussion in Chapter 5 on the limited scope of copyright holders' exclusive rights as not extending 
to ownership of the work, in particular, Part III A (i) 
149 See the discussion in Chapter 5 Part II. 
15° CCH, supra note 144; Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Bell Canada, 2012 
SCC 36 [Bell Canada]; Alberta (Education) v Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access Copyright), 2012 
SCC 37 [Alberta]. See the discussion on the place of users in copyright law in Chapter 2, in particular Part II. 
151 See the discussion in Chapter 5, in particular in Part III and Part IV. 
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justifications for the property rights of copyright holders. The creativity-incentive policy objective 
behind stronger copyright protection often posits consumers as necessarily benefiting from this 
creativity as passive recipients, but not as participants. 152 This assumption alone may explain in part 
the expansion of copyright to a point where it can become counterproductive to its initially stated 
goals of incenting creations and the dissemination of works. 153 With the amendments made in 2012, 154 
the CCA makes more room for consumers and other users as creators within the framework of 
copyright. 155 However, in Chapter 2, I argued that the recognition of "consumers as creators" is 
important, but that it should not overshadow the place that the copyright framework needs to make for 
seemingly more passive consumers and their part in innovative processes. 156 
Modern societies generally value and encourage innovation and creativity as main engines for growth 
and prosperity. 157 Copyright consumers benefit from recent innovation and creativity within and 
outside the subject matter of "original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic work" that copyright 
protects. 158 The digital revolution, the explosion of communication networks, technological 
information access, and reproduction tools have led to unprecedented dissemination and sharing of 
works protected by copyright. 159 Recent technological developments allow consumers to experience 
copyright works in ways that were, not so long ago, unthinkable, and in volumes that are 
152 Regarding the framework of international copyright law see for example, see WIPO Copyright Treaty, 20 
December 1996, W0033EN, online: http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocs wo033.html#P8 189 [WC1] 
Preamble; and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, 20 December 1996, W0034EN, online: 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt/trtdocs_ wo034.html [WP P1], Preamble. For a discussion on Canada's 
international copyright law obligations, see Chapter 3 Part V. In a European context, see Directive 21129/EC, 
supra note 145, Preamble, Recital 9-10. 
153Michael Heller refers to over protection of intellectual property leading to the "tragedy of the anti-commons": 
see Michael Heller, The Gridlock Economy: How Too Much Ownership Wrecks Markets, Stops Innovation, and 
Costs Live, (New York: Basic Book, 2008); Peter S. Menell, "The Property Rights Movement's Embrace of 
Intellectual Property: True Love Or Doomed Relationship?" (2007) 34 Ecology L.Q. 713 at 744, whereby the 
author makes the argument that treating intellectual property too much like tangible real property, can lead to an 
underutilisation of intellectual property, while exclusionary powers associated with tangible real property are 
meant to avoid an over utilization of the resources (i.e. the "tragedy of the commons"). 
154 The amendments were introduced with the entry into force of the CCMA, supra note 9. 
155 CCA, supra note 4, s. 29.21, i.e., the "non-commercial user-generated content" exception to copyright 
infringement; s 29 now allows the fair dealing of existing copyright works for the purposes of parody or satire. 
156 See the discussion on the place of users in copyright law in Chapter 2, in particular in Part V. 
157 As this is reflected among others in a utilitarian approach to copyright. For Handa, supra note 89 at 118, the 
reason why utilitarian theories have been more prevalent than creator natural rights based theories in Anglo-
American traditions of copyright is consistent with emphasis on knowledge and progress in these copyright 
traditions. 
158 CCA, supra note 4 s 5. 
159 See the discussion in Chapter 1 Part I. 
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unprecedented. 160 As I discussed in Chapter 3, International intellectual property treaties that were 
adopted in recent years, and which set the framework for copyright reform at the domestic level, 
responded to one perspective of the technological revolution by strengthening copyright holders' 
rights, as part of the digital agenda. 161 The agenda was led chiefly by the fear of the ravages of piracy 
on the copyright house and by the fear that copyright holders would be reluctant to make their works 
available through the Internet. 162 Through the digital agenda, there was no regard for the other 
perspective on the technological revolution and how this could empower consumers and other users in 
ways that could support and promote the declared creator-incentive objectives of copyright. Many 
years into the digital revolution, we are still waiting for a legal and normative even-handed treatment 
that includes looking at the beneficial impacts and legitimate expectations that it has created for 
copyright consumers. 
There is a need to make room for consumers through the recognition of their integral role in the 
"incent to innovate" instrumental equation invoked as the main justification of copyright, alongside 
the place that is given predominantly to copyright holders. 163 Why stimulate creations if it is not for 
the benefit of those who will access them? 164 As Niva Elkin-Koren argues, in a US context: 
to promote creativity it is insufficient to provide incentives to authors by empowering them to exclude 
second-comers. It is also inappropriate to exempt only transformative uses of copyright works. 
Promoting creativity requires expanding access to creative works. Copyright law must therefore 
160 Ibid. 
161 See the introductory comments in Chapter 3 Part III Bon the digital agenda initiative as led by the World 
Intellectual Property Organization giving rise to the signature in 1996 of WCT, supra note 152 and the WPPT, 
su'fra note 152. See also the discussion on Canada's international obligations in Chapter 3 Part V. 
16 Ibid. 
163 Niva Elkin-Koren, "Making Room for Consumers Under the DMCA" (2007) 22 Berkley Technology Law 
Journal 1119 at 1141 argues: "What we call "consumption" of informational works is never a passive behavior--
it is a conversation, or a social activity of interaction. When a reader engages with an artistic expression, she 
contributes to its meaning. Thus, consumption of informational works, even for one's sole benefit, promotes 
copyright goals .... This reality of exchange and interaction suggests that in order to promote creativity it is 
insufficient to simply provide incentives to authors to produce. It is also necessary to expand access to creative 
works. Access, in this sense, becomes a central means for promoting production, creation, and progress."; see 
also Liu, "Owning Digital Copies," supra note 3 at l 309ff. For a discussion on the alignment between copy 
ownership and the copyright incentives see Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz "Copyright Exhaustion and the 
Personal Use Dilemma" (2012) 96 Minn. L. Rev. 2067 at 2110-2112. 
164 Jessica Litman, "Lawful Personal Use" (2007) 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1871 [Litman, "Lawful Personal Use"] at 
1879, refers to "copyright liberties": i.e. the fact that "copyright law was designed to maximize the opportunities 
for non exploitative enjoyment of copyright works in order to encourage reading, listening, watching, and their 
cousins". The author argues that they are "both deeply embedded in copyright's design and crucial to its 
promotion of the "Progress of Science."" 
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expand the balance it strikes between authors and users to cover not only subsequent authors but also 
simply consumers of cultural goods who might become authors in the future. 165 
For Elkin-Koren, consumers are no less means of production than authors. 166 Thus, from that 
perspective, the justification of copyright based on the incentive to create and to disseminate works 
also needs to weigh in the optimal access to consumers and users that can further support that goal at a 
broader level and on a longer-term basis. 167 In that light, the information age offers an unprecedented 
opportunity to reconsider the role of competing property rights in commercial copies of copyright 
works as part of the overall property design of copyright. Balancing the incentive to create and to 
disseminate works while fairly rewarding the creator also means balancing those interests in the 
immediate term - i.e., through the property rights conferred to the creator - and on a longer-term basis 
- i.e., through incenting consumers to be culturally engaged and innovative. Without this balancing 
act, there is a risk of taking copyright out of its instrumental justification orbit. 168 
One mean to incent consumers to be culturally engaged and promote innovation with respect to 
commercial copies of copyright works that they access is to protect a certain level of freedom and 
autonomy in how they experience the works. 169 Ownership is one important vehicle for the exercise of 
freedom and autonomy, which includes, for instance, the ability to choose how and when and with 
whom a consumer will enjoy the copyright work. In that sense it allows communication and self-
165 Elkin-Koren, supra note 163 at 1141. 
166 Ibid. see also Litman, "Lawful Personal Use", supra note 164 at 1880. 
167 See Geiger, supra note 123 at 123 who argues in favour of maintaining the private copy exception to 
copyright infringement as a means to ensuring future creations by future authors: "If the idea that copyright is 
intended to be the instrument for cultural and social progress is taken seriously, it is appropriate to favour the 
uses of works already created that serve the creation of future works ("creative" uses), to an extent going beyond 
the cases provided for teaching and research. The freedom of expression and information of the creator could 
impose such a solution." 
168 See Jessica Litman, "Creative Reading" (2007) 70 Law & Contemporary Problems 175 [Litman, "Creative 
Reading"] at 187, on how to support a "cultural environmentalism": "We need to do this by developing much 
more robust language, theories, and stories about the rights of readers, listeners, and viewers. We need to gather 
a more compelling collection of justifications for the borders between controlled and uncontrolled uses of 
copyright works." 
169 Liu, supra note 65 at 406-420; Elkin-Koren, supra note 163 at 1143, refers to a "breathing space" which may 
include "the freedom to choose the work one wishes to consume or any part of it (and, likewise, the freedom to 
ignore or refuse other parts); the freedom to choose where to experience the work and how; the freedom to 
experience the work in privacy without the fear of surveillance; and the freedom to make one's own reading of 
the work, to experiment with it, and to share that reading." 
215 
expression in respect of the copyright work. 170 Here, freedom and autonomy are promoted to perfect 
the overarching goals of copyright as instruments. Elkin-Koren argues that the consumption of 
copyright works may require even greater protection than other consumptive goods to preserve 
essential autonomy and freedoms: 
Cultural artifacts are not simply useful commodities. While they often have an entertainment value 
that could be quantified, they also possess a communicative value and a symbolic significance. They 
engage our minds in a more direct and intimate way than do mundane commodities and, therefore, 
expose consumers to a higher risk of deeper and more intrusive restrictions of freedom. This 
particular vulnerability of information consumers is often overlooked. 171 
If we maintain the current passive approach to the definition of the property rights in commercial 
copies of copyright works and leave it to copyright as currently framed and interpreted, and to the will 
of copyright holders through their exclusive rights to authorize, we are effectively weakening 
expectations with respect to the participation that consumers ought to play in a modern, cultural, and 
innovative society and, in turn, shaping their own perception of the same. 172 From that perspective, a 
creator-work dissemination-incentive instrumental justification of copyright, that takes into account 
consumers and other users' interests, also leads to the need to preserve a certain level of freedom and 
autonomy of copy owners. 
In parallel to the incentive to create and to disseminate copyright works as a justification for the 
ownership in commercial copies of copyright works, there is also a widespread economic efficiency 
argument that generally supports maintaining a property institution with respect to chattels and other 
real property. The argument is that by doing so the state delegates "use-channelling and use-policing 
functions" to individual owners and takes the burden off the community for such functions. 173 
Conversely, a society that does not support property institutions would offer access to resources in a 
communal, controlled, monitored, and policed use environment. 174 In their work affirming the 
existence of users' rights to copyright, Patterson and Lindberg invoked a similar market efficiency 
argument: 
170 Liu, supra note 65 at 406-41 I; Elkin-Koren, supra note 163 at 1143; Litman, "Lawful Personal Uses" at 
1879. 
171 Elkin-Koren, supra note 163 at 1136-1137. 
172 Ibid at 1143. 
173Harris, supra note I at 242. 
174 Ibid. 
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The law of users' rights, in other words serves a socially desirable purpose in that it promotes market 
discipline by allowing market forces to determine prices. To deny the right of individual use would be 
to employ copyright to control the conduct of countless citizens for the alleged financial benefit of a 
few. But contrary to the claims of the industry, copyright was never intended to create and guarantee 
profit, only to protect the work in the market place. Users also have rights. 175 
Efficiency is not an objective of copyright design or justification for the existence or limitation of 
copy ownership that exists in isolation of other substantive values or instrumental goals. 176 
Nevertheless, efficiency is often an important indicator that can lend support to substantive values or 
point to important difficulties in their promotion and implementation. In the context of copyright and 
copy ownership, an efficiency analysis of the interests at stake can signal the proper scope of property 
rights that should be maintained to incent creations on the one hand, and to value and allow prima 
facie open-ended freedom powers and privileges of copy ownership on the other. 177 With respect to 
copyright works embedded in tangible objects, e.g., books, CDs, DVDs, consumers are generally 
aware of their privileges and powers as owners of the copies of the copyright works and look after 
their own interests to put their ownership rights to the most efficient and productive use (e.g., 
unlimited reading, listening, viewing, sharing, lending, donating, second-hand sale, etc.). 
The economic efficiency argument supports the prima facie normative status of ownership freedoms 
as a justification to define the scope of ownership in commercial copies of copyright works previously 
discussed in this chapter. 178 It is the widespread and well-established concept of ownership that 
creates the efficiency: as owners, consumers generally know what they can do with their commercial 
copies of copyright works embedded in physical objects without the need to resort to elaborate lists of 
terms and conditions of use. 179 In the case of digital copies either distributed online or with a physical 
175 Patterson & Lindberg, supra note 146 at 193. 
176 A contrary view may be provided by law and economics theories which tend to focus on how copyright law 
can promote economic efficiency as an end goal. See for example: William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 
"An Economic Analysis of Copyright law" (1989) 18 Journal of Legal Studies. 
177 In several European jurisdictions, the economic argument, or the realization of a market failure is invoked to 
justify the private copying regime, together with other justifications such as privacy, freedom of expression of 
consumers, justice to authors through the automatic levy remuneration system. Under the private copying 
regime, consumers are allowed to make a limited number of copies of defined copyright works without 
infringing copyright. The private copying regime provides for a levy system to compensate authors: see 
Heiberger & Hugenholtz, supra note 122 at 1068-1072. 
178 See the discussion in Part III A of this chapter. 
179 Seringhaus, supra note 3 at 171, argues that copy ownership of copyright works need to be maintained on 
that basis. See the discussion on the standardization of property in Chapter 4 Part III and Part II C of this 
chapter. I discussed however that the standardization of property or numerus clausus principle was less present 
in the case of personal property embedding copies of copyright works than with respect to other commodities. 
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medium, and in both cases with a non-negotiated standard end-user agreement, at least two factors 
affect the applicability of the economic efficiency argument. First, the potential freedoms of use by 
consumers are growing exponentially by new network, access, copying, and sharing capabilities, 180 
with the result that consumers have a new understanding about ownership in commercial copies of 
copyright works. Consumers' understanding does not necessarily corroborate what copyright law (and 
the contractual terms dictated by copyright holders) allow them to do, which means significant 
information costs for consumers. 181 Second, the traditional economic efficiency justification for 
maintaining ownership in chattels can be invoked to counter the growing commercial practice of 
copyright holders to eradicate copy ownership altogether by restricting consumers' ability to transfer 
and assign the commercial copies they lawfully acquired. 182 By maintaining traditional ownership in 
the copies of copyright works, copyright holders lower their production and marketing costs (i.e., 
drafting, implementing, and maintaining convoluted terms and conditions), as well as their 
enforcement costs. In fact, by eradicating copy ownership, copyright holders are creating an 
environment whereby every act is subject to potential scrutiny and varies according to the terms and 
conditions that copyright holders dictate, as opposed to the common understanding of ownership. 
Over time, it is possible, although speculative, that efficiency would be increased - and even brought 
to a similar level as traditional common understandings of copy ownership - by consumers becoming 
accustomed to new access rights to commercial copies of copyright works and to the fact that they no 
longer own the commercial copies. This would require inter alia that all copyright holders' terms and 
conditions would become substantially similar. In the meantime, and generally, the implementing and 
enforcement costs of an environment of non-negotiated standard end-user agreements with possible 
variable terms each time tend to be underestimated. 183 
180 This includes all capabilities made available through the digitization of works and the accessibility that the 
Internet provides: MP3 devices, Facebook, Y ouTube, are examples of widespread reproduction tools and 
network sharing capabilities. See also the discussion in Chapter 1 Part I. 
181 Seringhaus, supra note 3; Eduardo M. Penalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 2010) at 40 refer generally to intellectual property's "unpredictability", 
engendering huge information costs for consumers, and pointing generally to inefficiency and counter 
productivity of intellectual property's private property regime. See the discussion on the standardization of 
property in Chapter 4 Part III and Part II C of this chapter. I discussed however that the standardization of 
property or numerus clausus principle was less present in the case of personal property embedding copies of 
copyright works than with respect to other commodities 
182 See also the discussion on the standardization of property applied to commercial copies of copyright works in 
Part II C of this chapter. 
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The cost of use-channelling and use-policing functions is not to be borne by private copyright holders 
alone; it also becomes the burden of society, through other private intermediaries, 184 the court system, 
and police authorities' involvement to enforce copyright holders' trespassory powers. The efficiency 
argument to support the subsistence of copy ownership only has value to the extent that we can 
address the first issue adequately, namely the modified understanding that consumers have about 
owning digital commercial copies of copyright works. Until we are willing to consider the 
implications of the shift that has taken place in the basic understanding of copy ownership in a digital 
environment, 185 and make the proper adjustments, the confusion that prevails over the meaning of 
ownership of commercial copies of copyright works will remain an important obstacle to transaction 
efficiency. 
To sum up, the instrumental creator-incentive justification to support the creation of property interests 
through the copyright regime also supports the interests of copyright consumers as full participants in 
the creative process. As one of the most influential justifications of copyright, the instrumental 
creator-incentive rationale also justifies a scope of ownership of prima facie open-ended powers and 
privileges in commercial copies of copyright works that recognizes that the incentive to create should 
also apply to consumers. I will now turn to another influential theoretical justification of copyright 
and, more particularly, to the impact it can have on defining the scope of ownership of consumers' 
rights to commercial copies of copyright works. 
C. Natural property rights in the fruits of one's labour 
Property theories justifying natural rights in the fruits of one's labour offer little direct support to 
determine the proper scope of ownership in commercial copies of copyright works. 186 Natural right 
property theories on the fruits of one's labour are invoked to justify the existence of copyright by 
183Liu, "Owning Digital Copies," supra note 3 at 1321. 
184 Such as the resources that need to be deployed by internet service providers to comply with their legal 
obligations in case of copyright infringements. 
185 On the idea of paying attention to certain manifestations of "property outlaws", the main thesis of Penalver & 
Katyal, supra note 178, is to look at the effect that property disobedience has had in recent history on the 
evolution of the concept of property. The authors argue that movements or property disobedience are an 
essential component to property's dynamism, evolution and longevity. 
186 Liu, "Owning Digital Copies," supra note 3 at 1326, arrives at the same conclusion by looking at various 
justificatory theories that can support the ownership in copies of copyright works. 
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focusing on the entitlements to creations. 187 The consumption of copyright works by consumers does 
not necessarily or effectively entail the immediate creation of anything ideational or corporeal.188 
Nevertheless, I will address some of the implications of natural rights property theories on the fruits of 
one's labour because of their profound influence on copyright law and theory189 and, in tum, on 
consumers' rights to commercial copies of copyright works. 
The question of whether a person can claim a natural right to property is whether she has a moral 
claim to a resource, independent of social convention or positive legal provisions, so that others must 
confer or be subject to ownership use-privileges and control powers over that resource. 190 The natural 
property rights in the fruits of one's labour as a justification of copyright has been the object of strong 
criticism. Among other things, the applicability of the fruits of ones' labour theory to intangible 
property has been questioned, 191 as well as the difficulty in applying proportionality between the 
labour contribution and the exclusive rights conferred by copyright. 192 Other criticisms include the 
argument that exclusive property rights do not "naturally" flow as the sole reward or recognition for 
one's labour193 and that the right to use and possess one's labour and the right to profit from it by 
selling it in the marketplace derive from distinct justifications. 194 At a more fundamental level, the 
natural property rights in the fruits of one's labour theory are problematic when the theory is 
interpreted as inferring that copyright holders own their work, a tendency that I condemned as I 
discussed the nature of copyright in Chapter 5. 195 
187 See the discussion below in Part III C of this chapter. 
188 See the discussion on the various aspirations of copyright consumers from the more passive to the consumer-
author in Chapter 2 Part V. 
189 Hettinger, supra note 89 at 100, refers to the entitlement to the fruits of one's labour as perhaps the "most 
riowerful intuition supporting property rights" including with respect to products of the mind. 
90 Harris, supra note 1 at 182. 
191 Fisher, supra note 89 at 184-189. 
192 Hettinger, supra note 89 at 101,104. 
193 One of the mistakes is to conflate the issue of deserving a reward with what the reward should be: Hettinger, 
supra note 89 at 103. The type of reward is in fact dictated by social convention and is not as such a natural 
right: Harris, supra note 1 at 207. 
194 For instance, Hettinger, supra note 89 at 100-103, argues that while there may be a natural right in possessing 
and using one's labour, there is no natural right in selling it and making a profit from it in the market place, 
which is largely a socially created phenomenon. 
195 See the discussion in Chapter 5, in particular Part Ill and IV. See also Craig, supra note 89 and the discussion 
further below in Part III C of this chapter. 
220 
Arguments that copyright derives from a natural right to the fruits of one's labour were "officially" 
put to rest in Canada196 and also in the US 197 Yet, regardless of the existence or not of a natural right 
to the fruits of one's labour from which property rights derive, fundamental aspects of copyright law, 
such as the low threshold of originality required for a work to be protected by copyright, seem to fit 
more nicely with the fruits of one's labour theory198 than with an instrumental justification of 
copyright. 199 Moreover, case law abounds with natural property rights in the fruits of one's labour 
derived analyses for rewarding copyright holders for the uses of their work, or for expanding the 
scope of copyright property rights. 200 
There is a "natural" appeal to apply the fruits of ones' labour natural law theory to copyright, one of 
the elements of which is a disconcerting facility of conceptualization and of application: everything 
that emanates from an author that qualifies as a copyright work she owns.201 Copyright becomes 
justified to provide the trespassory powers that concretize that ownership. This is a much simpler 
proposition than trying to establish the optimal scope of copyright insofar as it incents creations and 
dissemination of works under the instrumental justification of copyright. 202 Craig attributes the 
tendency to rely on the fruits of ones' labour theories to justify copyright on the centrality of the 
author-work relationship in copyright law, which embeds a reliance on a romantic vision of 
authorship and a conception of the requirement of originality as implying the notion of "independent 
196 the Supreme Court of Canada declaration In Compo Co. v Blue Crest Music Inc., supra note 58 at para 23, 
considerably weakens the strength of any argument that copyright derives from natural law: "copyright law is 
neither tort law nor property law in classification, but is statutory law. It neither cuts across existing rights in 
property or conduct nor falls between rights and obligations heretofore existing in the common law. Copyright 
legislation simply creates rights and obligations upon the terms and in the circumstances set out in the statute." 
(subsequently applied in numerous Supreme Court Judgements: see Society of Composers, Authors and Music 
Publishers of Canada v Canadian Assn. of Internet Providers, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427 at para 82 ). 
197 US Const, Art I, s 8, stipulates that Congress's power in the area of Copyright (and patents) is to promote the 
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to 
their respective writings and discoveries. 
198 In CCH, supra note 144 at para 15, the Supreme Court of Canada referred to how the various existing legal 
traditions on the applicable threshold of originality in copyright law derive from natural law concepts based on 
the fruits of one's labour. 
199 Under which there should arguably be a greater scrutiny and selection in the types of works that society 
wants to incent to create and disseminate, and hence a higher threshold in the types of works that deserve 
copyright protection. 
20° From a Canadian perspective, see Craig, supra note 89. From a US perspective, see Fisher, supra note 89 at 
174, where the author cites examples from law reform debates, US Supreme Court decisions as well as lower 
court decisions. In Theberge, supra note 94, the Supreme Court of Canada also seems to invoke the fruits of 
one's labour theory as a justification for copyright, as I discuss further below in Part III C of this chapter. 
201 See the discussion on the nature of copyright and on the debate of associating copyright with property in 
Chapter 5 in particular Part III A (i) and Part II. 
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work."203 As a result, "[t]he individuality and originality of authorship establishes a simple route 
towards individual ownership and the propertization of creative achievement."204 Views diverge 
greatly on the beneficial or detrimental effects of applying the fruits of one's labour theory, in 
particular, Locke's labour-desert theory of property and its ability to ensure the legitimacy of the 
copyright system.205 As I discussed in Chapter 5, an erroneous application of property to copyright 
can lead to the over-propertization of copyright. 206 We need to guard against any theoretical 
justification of copyright or interpretation that leads to unfounded copyright expansionism. 
The way in which the fruits of one's labour theory has been applied to copyright is harmful to the 
assertion of clearer property rights in commercial copies of copyright works in at least two respects. 
First, under that theory, the competing claims are unequivocally framed as labourers (i.e., copyright 
holders) v. idlers and free riders (i.e., consumers).207 The consumers cannot reap where they have not 
sown is the premise. The copyright holder labourers are deemed to be a priori meritorious (even if 
copyright law does not impose any requirement of artistic quality or novelty for a work to be 
protected). The fruits in one's labour theory to justify copyright places copyright holders on a 
pedestal.208 Any claim of unauthorized use of the copyright holders labourers' work is, from that 
standpoint, a priori suspicious. Second, as I already argued above in this chapter, the fruits of one's 
labour natural law theories can be harmful to copyright consumers if, in spite of its own internal 
limitations, for instance by Locke's famous provisos,209 they effectively lead to an "over-
propertization" of copyright. The inflation of copyright holders' exclusive rights then acts as an ever-
202 See the discussion in Part III B of this chapter. 
203 Craig, supra note 89 at 7. 
204 Ibid. 
205 A more nuanced application of Locke's natural law justification of property to intellectual property that fully 
accounts for Locke's provisos may not lead to such expansionist tendencies. See: Christopher M. Newman, 
"Transformation in Property and Copyright" (2011) 56 Villanova Law Review 251 at 297-298. For a review and 
critique of the arguments that Lockean fruits of one's labour property theory can effectively ensure a robust 
public domain, see Craig, supra note 89, in particular at 51-57. On the application of Locke's natural law theory 
to copyright freelancers and publishers, see Giuseppina D' Agostino, supra note 89 at 205-219. 
206 See the discussion in Chapter 5, in Particular Part III and Part IV. 
207 On the emphasis that is placed by law and policy makers on the concept of "free riding" and its harmful 
effects, see Lemley, supra note 89 in particular at 1044. 
208 Craig, supra note 89 at 58, develops a similar argument on how the application of labour-desert derived 
analysis to copyright law begins the reasoning from the copyright holder standpoint, and how this directly 
impacts on the outcome. 
209 Locke's provisos are commonly referred to as the "no spoilage" and "enough as good" provisos: for a review 
and critique of the application of Locke's provisos as a mean to limit the scope of copyright, see Craig, supra 
note 89 in particular at 22ff and at 48ff. 
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expanding limitation on the ownership in commercial copies of copyright works, to the point that the 
property interests in copies of copyright works are hollowed out of any meaningful substance.210 
To sum up on the effects of the fruits of one's labour theories, consistent with my earlier 
characterization of copyright as a limited property interest, to the extent that the fruits of one's labour 
theories, including the Lockean labour-desert theory of prope1ty, and as a matter of fact any other 
theory, would inexorably or predominantly lead to the over-propertization of copyright, it should, in 
and of itself, be sufficient to discredit the theories as plausible justifications of copyright. 
To sum up, I have discussed three theoretical justifications of property, either for their guidance to 
define the proper scope of ownership of commercial copies of copyright works or for their influence 
on the fate of ownership in commercial copies of copyright works. I will conclude this part by 
discussing how the three theoretical justifications of property that I discussed here are present to some 
extent in the reasons by the majority in Theberge, the leading case of the Supreme Court on the 
objectives of the CCA.211 The underlying normative value of copy ownership, the need to incent 
creation and dissemination of works212 efficiency, and arguably fruits of one's labour justifications of 
copyright (i.e., the need give a just reward to the author), are each present to some extent in the 
reasons of the majority in the Theberge judgment.213 
In Theberge, Binnie J. for the majority drew the line between the rights of the owner in the physical 
copy of a copyright work and the rights of the copyright holder. Having decided that the transposition 
of lawfully purchased posters of artist Claude Theberge's paintings on a canvas was not a 
"reproduction" of the copyright work as per the exclusive rights conferred to Theberge under section 
3 of the CCA, the Court's majority decided that such transposition did not fall within the economic 
rights of the artist (while it may have fallen under his moral rights). One of the reasons given by the 
majority was: 
210 See the discussion on the dangers of the misapplication of property concepts to copyright in Chapter 5 Part II 
and Part Ill. 
211 Theberge, supra note 94. See also the discussion on the balance objectives of copyright law as they are 
enunciated in Theberge in Chapter 2 Part II. 
212 With long term interests in mind so that there are no undue hindrances to incorporation and embellishment of 
future creative works, or that it does not create "practical obstacles to proper utilization": Theberge, supra note 
94 at para 32. 
213 Ibid. 
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The proper balance among these [i.e., the creator's rights] and other public policy objectives lies not 
only in recognizing the creator's rights but in giving due weight to their limited nature. In crassly 
economic terms it would be as inefficient to overcompensate artists and authors for the right of 
reproduction as it would be self-defeating to undercompensate them. Once an authorized copy of a 
work is sold to a member of the public, it is generally for the purchaser, not the author, to determine 
what happens to it. Excessive control by holders of copyrights and other forms of intellectual property 
may unduly limit the ability of the public domain to incorporate and embellish creative innovation in 
the long-term interests of society as a whole, or create practical obstacles to proper utilization.214 
The peculiarity of the facts in this case invites some caution on the extent to which it asserts greater 
property rights in commercial copies of copyright works. The fact that this is a four-to-three decision 
also illustrates the ambiguity that prevails around the breadth that we are willing to give to copyright 
holders' rights, even beyond the exclusive rights expressly conferred to them by the CCA. And yet, 
the above-cited reasons in Theberge articulate the balancing act between various competing interests 
that needs to take place within copyright law, with a particular emphasis on owners of commercial 
copies of copyright works. While the reasons for the majority refer to the need to incent the creation 
of works and to offer a just reward to creators, they strongly echo the freedoms that are intrinsic to the 
property rights in the copy of Claude Theberge's painting, the need to set limits to copyright holders' 
ownership rights to encourage future creations, as well as the instrumental efficiency that results from 
such freedoms and proper limitations. Theberge illustrates a pluralistic approach to the justifications 
of copyright and copy ownership. The significance of Theberge on the limits that copy ownership can 
set on the ownership rights of the copyright holder cannot be underestimated. 
IV. Conclusion 
In this chapter I looked at the nature of commercial copies of copyright works from a property theory 
perspective and presented the theoretical justifications that can help define their scope, i.e., the prima 
facie normative force of ownership freedoms, the specific role that copy ownership plays in the 
instrumental design of copyright, as well as greater transaction efficiency for both copyright holders 
and consumers. 
Improving our understanding of the nature and proper scope of rights of commercial copies of 
copyright works sets the balancing act within copyright law into motion, beyond rhetoric and 
aspiration goals. It seeks to counterbalance the traditionally copyright-holder-centric framework of 
214 Ibid at paras 31- 32. 
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copyright law. As I discussed in Chapter 3, some of the so-called users' rights (e.g., the non-
substantial-part doctrine, fair dealing) are of limited appeal for copyright consumers, while other 
users' rights remain limited in scope.215 The purpose of this chapter was to show how ownership of 
commercial copies of copyright works creates a distinct relationship between copyright consumers 
and copyright holders that deserves more attention in copyright law. I also believe that a better 
understanding of the nature, theoretical justifications, and dynamics of ownership of commercial 
copies of copyright works offer a targeted approach that can deal more effectively with copyright 
consumers' claims than can broader public policy or public domain considerations.216 The analysis of 
the nature of copy ownership and its possible theoretical justifications that I presented here will serve 
as the basis for, as well as be enriched by, the application of consumer law and theory to assert 
copyright consumers' rights further. 217 
In copyright law theory there is controversy around the qualification of copyright as property.218 At 
the same time, commercial copies of copyright works have generally been assimilated to a form of 
personal property.219 A closer look into the nature of ownership of commercial copies of copyright 
works informs us that the controversy is misplaced. It is the qualification of the copy of the copyright 
work as property that is becoming increasingly problematic. The non-ownership property interest of 
copyright holders to interfere with commercial copies of copyright works continues to expand,220 
transfiguring commercial copies of copyright works into an increasingly peculiar form of property.221 
The primafacie open-ended powers and privileges and self-seekingness characteristics of ownership 
are constrained to a large extent, and lead, in some cases, to the disqualification of commercial copies 
of copyright works as property.222 
215 E.g., the private copying regime, the non-commercial user-generated content and the reproductions for 
private purposes exceptions to copyright infringement: see the discussion in Chapter 3, in particular Part II .. 
216 As Waldron, "From authors to Copiers" supra note 89 at 117 observed: if broad public policy arguments are 
the only counter balance to the private property of the copyright holder, we may be leaving out of the picture 
those who are directly and immediately affected by the enforcement of the property rule, "those to whom, above 
all, a justification of property is owed." See the discussion on the place of users and consumers in copyright law 
in the context of public interest and public domain considerations in Chapter 2 Part II. 
217 See in particular, the discussion in Chapter 8 on the treatment by sale of goods and consumer law on the 
nature of commercial copies of copyright law. 
218 See the discussion in Chapter 5 Part III and Part IV. 
219 See the discussion in Part II of this chapter. 
220 See the discussion on the expansion of copyright in Chapter 5 Part II and on the non-ownership proprietary 
interest within copyright in Part IV B of the same chapter. 
221 See the discussion in Part II of this chapter. 
222 Ibid. 
225 
I applied theoretical justifications to help determine what the proper scope of copy ownership should 
be and in an effort to de-trivialize the nature of copy ownership and the rights of copy owners. What 
surfaces from this exercise is that copy owners may be getting less and less of what they should 
expect through their juridical relation with the resource they own. The justifications of copy 
ownership are much intertwined with the justifications of copyright. Too much disregard of the 
interests of copy owners at the expense of copyright holders is unjustified and, as a consequence, 
undermines the coherence and credibility of copyright and, over time, its legitimacy. In the next 
chapter, I will apply the property principles and theoretical justifications that I have developed so 
far223 and see how they can effectively mediate between the property rights of copy owners and the 
property rights of copyright holders in accordance with their respective property-specific justice 
reasons. 
224 
223 I.e. in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and throughout this chapter. 
224 Harris, supra note I at 168. 
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Chapter 7 
The Mediating Solutions within Property 
I. Introduction 
The application of property law and theory to copyright and commercial copies of copyright works 
that I presented in Chapters 4 through 6 provides important insights into their respective scope and 
interaction within the heteroclite domain of property. 1 The application of property law and theory also 
situates copyright and copy ownership as two competing property rights in the same object. This 
chapter serves the double function of concluding the property theory part of my thesis2 by applying 
the available tools to help resolve inherent conflicts between the competing property rights of 
copyright holders and those of copy owners with respect to the copyright work. It also bridges the 
regime of property law to the contractual regime, which is the main focus of the Third Part of my 
thesis. 3 These two functions are achieved through the application of property-limitation rules on the 
one hand and of the numerus clausus principle on the other. In Part II, I apply the concept of property-
limitation rules to describe how copyright acts as a property-limitation rule for the ownership rights in 
the copy. In Part III, I apply property-limitations rules to an area that has been much less explored, 
i.e., the extent to which copy ownership limits (or should limit) copyright. The analysis spans from a 
legal and normative approach dictated by the specific scenario to which I apply the property-
limitation rule. In Part IV, I look at how the standardization of property, as it is reflected by the 
numerus clausus principle, can help maintain copyright and copy ownership truer to their core 
objectives and justifications by constraining the shift of powers brought on by prevailing standard 
contract practices. In Part V, I conclude on the contribution of property law and theory to the 
illumination of contemporary debates on and conflicts between copyright and copy ownership as they 
have been discussed in Chapter 4 through Chapter 7. 
1 I.e., within the Second Part of my thesis: The Application of Property Law and Theory to Copyright and 
Commercial Copies of Copyright Works (Chapter 4 to Chapter 7). 
2 Ibid. 
3 The Third Part of my thesis: The Application of Consumer Law and Theory to Commercial Copies of 
Copyright Works (Chapter 8 to Chapter 11). 
227 
II. Copyright limitative effects on commercial copies of copyright works 
The bundle of exclusive rights conferred by Canada's Copyright Act [CCA] 4 on the copyright 
holder sets limits on the property rights of copy owners. 5 Moral rights operate in the same 
manner.6 Characterizing copyright as a limitation on the individual private rights of 
consumers is not trivial. As Jeremy Waldron notes: "It sounds a lot less pleasant if, instead of 
saying we are rewarding authors, we turn the matter around and say we are imposing duties, 
restricting freedom, and inflicting burdens on certain individuals for the sake of the greater 
social good."7 What is the exact nature of copyright limitations under property law and theory 
and what insights can we gain therefrom? We can quickly dismiss the most extreme form of 
property limitation, namely expropriation rules. It would be far fetched to deem as such the 
effect of copyright on copy ownership, except perhaps in some very specific cases. 8 The use 
privileges are already taken out from consumers' ownership rights when they purchase copies 
of copyright works, as opposed to a removal occurring after consumers become owners of 
copies. 9 
4 Copyright Act, RSC 1985, c. C-42. 
5 See the discussion in Chapter 6 Part II. 
6 In Canada, moral rights refer to the right to the integrity of the work and the right to be associated with the 
work, which can be invoked by authors only, i.e. physical persons, and not copyright holders who are not 
the authors: CCA, supra note 4, s 14.1 (1 ). The extent to which moral rights of authors (as opposed to 
copyright holders) act as limitations to the ownership rights in the copy of a copyright work is not the focus 
of this chapter, as we are dealing with copyright works usually held by copyright holders (such as film 
production or music label undertakings) who in Canada do not have entitlements to moral rights, in a 
consumer market, after the first publication of the copyright work has occurred. In that context, moral rights 
issues would more likely occur between the author and the copyright holder to whom the copyright was 
transferred or licensed. 
7 Jeremy Waldron, "From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights & Social Values in Intellectual Property" 
(1993) 69 Chicago-Kent Law Review, 841, in David Vaver, ed., Intellectual Property Rights, Critical 
Concepts in Law (London: Routledge, 2006) Vol.I, 114, at 129. 
8 For example, through the application of technological protection measures or digital rights management, 
some usages could be restrained a posteriori. In such cases, the expropriation or confiscation analogy could 
be plausible. 
9 For expropriation to occur, the rightful owner would normally need to have had benefits conferred that 
where taken away from her. In the case of copyright, it operates as a limit on the owners' rights from the 
beginning. 
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The qualification of copyright as a property-independent prohibition10 also needs to be rejected. 
Copyright is opposable to all and, therefore, it imposes limitations on anyone in possession of or 
accessing a copy of the copyright work, independently of whether the person owns that copy or not. 
This could be an argument for characterizing copyright as a property-independent prohibition. 11 What 
would follow is that the use privilege and power limitations imposed by copyright on copy owners 
would not even be primafacie part of copy owners' ownership entitlements. Their ownership rights 
would be to no avail to contest limited usage rights on the copies, e.g. of musical works or films. They 
would need to find solace on other moral or legal grounds. This characterization needs to be rejected 
for the following reasons. First, the fact that copyright is opposable to all is a confirmation of the 
property right that Parliament created in favour of private or public entities. 12 Second, the restrictions 
imposed by copyright on copy ownership go to the heart of the open-ended privileges and powers of 
the copy owners. Two examples illustrate that point for our discussion purposes: an electronic book in 
which the copyright has expired after purchase, and a laptop not protected by any relevant intellectual 
property right. 13 As an owner of the laptop, the consumer can photograph it, use it in a film, lend it or 
sell it to a friend, use it for or incorporate it in an art work, bring it to their family business, and use it 
in a profit-driven activity. They can even start a new line of business making similar laptops. 14 For all 
these activities, consumers do not need to ask permission of the store that sold the laptop, nor is it 
written in any contract that they are allowed to do these things. As an owner of a laptop, the consumer 
has the power and privilege to perform all these acts, as well as an open-ended list of other uses. In 
the second example, compare an electronic book protected by copyright with an electronic book for 
which all copyright has expired after the copy was purchased. In that case, consumers can make as 
many copies as they wish for time- or space-shifting purposes, give it to friends, post it on the 
Internet. They can convert it into a play or reproduce substantial parts and incorporate it in other 
works. All these acts would be restrained if the copyright had not expired. 15 Once again, the list of 
powers and privileges is open-ended and consumers do not need to ask permission of anyone, nor is 
10 I.e. prohibitions that effectively limit the open-ended use privileges of an owned resource regardless of 
the status of ownership: see the discussion on property limitations in Chapter 4, Part V. 
II Ibid. 
12 The property attributes of copyright are discussed in Chapter 5 Part IV. 
13 The laptop would most likely bear a trademark. It may or may not be protected by an industrial design or 
patent. 
14 Except for the trademark under which the laptop is sold and subject to applicable patents or industrial 
designs. This last example takes us outside the realm of our discussion centered on the consumer. 
15 Subject to the application of specific limitations to the exclusive rights of copyright holders including fair 
dealing. 
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there any contract that tells them that they can perform all of these acts. They simply can, as owner or 
possessor of the copy of the electronic book in which copyright has expired. 
These two examples signal that copyright acts as a property-limitation rule rather than as property-
independent prohibition. The limitations imposed by copyright are part of copy owners' prima facie 
open-ended privileges and powers as owners of the copy of a copyright work, but are being taken 
away from them, to varying degrees and under different conditions, for the duration of the term of 
copyright. Copyright limitations have everything to do with constraining otherwise primafacie open-
ended ownership rights in the copy. The fact that copyright is opposable to all, including non-owners 
who come into possession of a copyright work, does not exclude that it operates as a property-
limitation rule. Such rules extend to lawful possessors of the copy of a copyright work vested with 
open-ended use privileges, not just to owners. 16 Finally, this property-limitation rule is primarily 
intended to benefit the private interests of the copyright holder, although from an instrumental 
perspective, copyright is also intended to benefit consumers and the public, as it presumably 
encourages the creation and dissemination of copyright works. 17 
The characterization of copyright as a property-limitation rule provides critical insights into the legal 
nature of copyright, of commercial copies of copyright works, and the interaction between the two. 
First, it brings the normative force of ownership freedoms in the copy of the copyright work forward, 
and takes them out of the shadow of copyright to which they have been traditionally relegated, as an 
afterthought and by default of the application of copyright law. Second, it brings out the expansive 
and invasive nature of copyright's bundle of limitations on the prima facie open-ended privileges and 
powers of the ownership rights in the copy of the copyright work. To have overlooked this rather 
16 James W. Harris, Property and Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) at 34. 
17 On the one hand, the limitation copyright imposes on the property rights of the commercial copy of a 
copyright work is for the immediate benefit of the private interests of the copyright holder. On the other 
hand, such benefits arguably act as a "temporary proxy" (on a related idea of copyright holders' holding the 
balance between authors and users, see in David McGowan, "Some Copyright Consumer Conundrums" in 
Consumer Protection in the Age of the "Information Economy" (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2006) 
at 155) to a greater public interest, as they encourage the creation and dissemination of copyright works that 
will moreover eventually fall in the public domain. Still during the life of the exclusive rights conferred by 
copyright, individual moral entitlements favouring the private interests of copyright holders have made their 
way in policy design: Waldron, supra note 7 at 120. One of the side effects is the increasingly generous 
duration of the exclusive right granted by law to copyright holders (for example in the U.S. and in Europe) 
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obvious legal characterization before may, as I argued above, explain in great part the skepticism, 
disbelief, and rebellion that we witness in copyright consumers on the scope of their users' rights and 
actual end goals of copyright laws. 18 The tension is likely to increase as the potential for the list of 
prima facie open-ended privileges and powers of consumer uses is expanding with increasing 
capabilities of network and reproduction technologies. Third, well-established property rules - in 
particular property-limitation rules - abound and provide a cogent framework to mediate between two 
competing property claims (which, in this case, are pertaining to the same copyright work). 
To use the example of the tort of nuisance, for plaintiffs to be successful in a property tort of nuisance 
case, not only do they need to show that they have suffered a harm from the defendant property 
owners, they must also establish that the defendants have caused it by going above and beyond what 
is necessary for them to have the natural use of their own property. 19 The property positive and 
negative externalities are assessed on equal terms for the plaintiff and defendant property owners and 
measured against each other. From a normative standpoint, giving due weight to the primafacie 
ownership freedoms in the copy of a copyright work requires such a balancing exercise. Copyright as 
a limitation on the ownership rights in the copy of a copyright work would be justified only in so far 
as the contested use of the copy is an unreasonable exercise of ownership that caused harm to the 
copyright holder. 
One property nuisance case that illustrates the breadth of exclusionary powers inherent in property 
and how courts need to mediate between two seemingly competing exercises of ownership rights is 
the judgment by the High Court of Australia in Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds Co. 
Ltd. v. Taylor [Victoria Park].20 The plaintiff, owner of the Victoria Park racecourse, sought an 
injunction against defendant Taylor, who owned adjacent property and who had installed wooden 
platforms to see the racecourse and the notice boards with information about the races (and against 
Angles who stood on the platform and commented about the race over the telephone, and a 
broadcasting company that broadcasted the comments of Angles). Such alleged nuisance was caused 
and their increasing de jure powers to control that right. In that light, public interest considerations play a 
secondary role during the term of a copyright work. 
18 Joseph P. Liu, "Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of Copy Ownership" (2001) 42 
William and Mary Law Review, 1245 at 1365 argues that to make every act with respect to a digital copy 
an infringing act of copyright will increase the disrespect of the public for copyright law. 
19 Harris, supra note 16, at 34, citing: West Cumberland Iron and Steel Company v Kenyon [1879] 11 Ch. D 
782 at 787. 
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by the "unnatural" use of the adjacent land by Taylor and others. The Australia High Court dismissed 
the plaintiff's appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales in a three-to-two decision. 
Although there was uncontested evidence that plaintiff lost revenues as a result of the defendants' use 
of the adjacent land, the court found no interference with the use and enjoyment of the plaintiff's land. 
Qualifying the defendants' actions as providing a competitive entertainment, Latham J. continued: 
The facts are that the racecourse is as suitable as ever it was for use as a racecourse. What the 
defendants do does not interfere with the races, nor does it interfere with the comfort or enjoyment of 
any person who is on the racecourse ... I am unable to see that any right of the plaintiff has been 
violated or any wrong done to him. Any person is entitled to look over the plaintiffs fences and to see 
what goes on in the plaintiffs land. Further, if the plaintiff desires to prevent its notice boards being 
seen by people from outside the enclosure, it can place them in such a position that they are not 
visible to such people.21 
The outcome of this case does not necessarily lead to one party limiting the prima facie open-ended 
ownership rights of the other per se, on the ground that the court found no loss of enjoyment by the 
plaintiff of his property. In other words, the activities and even profits made by Taylor and others, 
leading to a loss of profit by the plaintiff, were not within the realm of the property rights of the 
plaintiff. 
From a property-limitation rule perspective, Victoria Park can also illustrate how primafacie open-
ended privileges and powers, including the power to derive profits from one's property, can be limited 
by other competingprimafacie open-ended privileges and powers, e.g., here, of defendant Taylor 
(and others), the adjacent property owner. It also illustrates how co-existing exercises of ownership 
rights can benefit or have negative effects on one and other, without one party being liable to the other 
for the benefits she obtained from the other owner's property (in this case, defendants' profits 
resulting from commenting on the races that took place on the plaintiffs adjacent property, even 
though it was demonstrated that the plaintiff lost profits from defendant's activities), provided that 
each party acted within the normal exercise of their ownership rights.22 
20 ( 1937) 58 C.L.R. 4 79 (Australia HC). 
21 Ibid, reasons delivered by Latham J. 
22 For a detailed analysis of Victoria Park, supra note 20, and its significance in property law and theory, 
particularly on the limits of the power to exclude, see: Kevin Gray, "Property in Thin Air" (1991) 50 
Cambridge L.J. 252 at 264ff. 
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Victoria Park provides an important property law perspective on the expansion of copyright within 
the property institution. There is a prevailing assumption that any benefits and enjoyments that are 
derived from the copyright works ought to be considered within the exclusive domain of copyright 
holders.23 Victoria Park informs us that this assumption with respect to other tangible private property 
is wrong.24 Under the CCA, copyright holders can invoke one of their exclusive rights, such as the 
exclusive right to reproduce or to telecommunicate to the public the copyright work, to limit the 
ownership rights in the copy of the copyright work. 25 Only in instances where the alleged act is not 
within the list of exclusive exclusionary rights conferred on copyright holders, such as was the case in 
Theberge v. Galerie d'Art du Petit Champlain inc [Theberge], 26 or if we reframe copyright law by 
giving more weight to the ownership rights in the commercial copies of copyright works, does the 
meditation of conflicting ownership rights as illustrated in Victoria Park bear some relevancy. 27 
Property law and theory provide other insights into the limits of copyright, which have ramifications 
above and beyond the fate of ownership rights to commercial copies of copyright works. For instance, 
as a property institution, copyright should not extend beyond its underlying property-specific justice 
reasons.
28 Under the prevailing view that copyright is justified predominantly by instrumental reasons 
to incent creations and the dissemination of works, and given the specific scope of my thesis,29 this 
subjects copyright to constant revisions and attacks, e.g., to the extent that incentives are no longer 
necessary, or that the breadth of its rights would undermine its underlying public policy 
considerations.30 Indeed, unlike other forms of traditional tangible private property, which are not 
23 This is illustrated inter alia by the broad interpretation that courts have typically given to copyright 
infringement occurring upon the production, reproduction or performance in public of a "substantial part" 
of the work: see Chapter 3 Part II A. Marc A. Lemley, "Property, Intellectual Property and Free Riding" 
(2005) Texas L. Rev. I 031 at I 044 observes that courts tend to qualify any benefit derived from the positive 
externalities of copyright as "free riding" leading to copyright infringement, on the underlying assumption 
that such benefits are necessarily unjust. See more generally, the discussion in Chapter 5 Part IV. 
24 Supra note 20. 
25 See the discussion in Chapter 5 Part IV B. 
26 2002 sec 34. 
27 See the discussion in Part IV of this chapter. 
28 Theberge, supra note 26 at paras 30-32. See the discussion on the relevant underlying theoretical 
justifications of copyright in Chapter 6 Part III, whereby I refer to instrumentalism as being the prevailing 
theory invoked to justify copyright and whereby I argue that instrumental ism justifications of copyright 
include the promotion of innovation and creativity of copyright consumers, not solely of creators of works 
protected by copyright. 
29 Namely because we are dealing with the mass-market commercialisation of copyright works after the first 
publication of the work has occurred. 
30 Harris, supra note 16 at 298; Peter S. Menell, "The Property Rights Movement's Embrace of Intellectual 
Property: True Love or Doomed Relationship?" (2007) 34 Ecology L.Q. 713 at 752 refers more generally to 
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intended to benefit the public a priori,31 the specific goals behind the creation of copyright as private 
property include the incentive to create and disseminate works for the benefit of the public. Thus, 
while the self-seekingness aspect in copyright is present as a result of its private property nature, it 
needs to be interpreted within, and is constrained by, this important constitutive public interest 
parameter.32 Finally, the property rights of copyright should not extend beyond what the property 
institution can or should conceptually and practically support. In addition to a consumer being 
rightfully entitled to certain open-ended uses and privileges over the copy of a copyright work, and to 
the copyright holder being rightfully limited in having any claim on those uses (or trespassory rights), 
it would be impractical as much as it would be inefficient to go after every instance of personal use of 
copyright works that is made on the Internet and elsewhere with network and copying device 
capabilities. Without constituting an argument in itself, the practicality argument helps corroborate the 
above normative analysis to the consumer and copyright holder's rights. It also signals instances 
where property owners (i.e., copyright holders) may be seeking powers and privileges that go beyond 
what their property rights can justify. 
III. Ownership in commercial copies of copyright works as a property-limitation rule of 
copyright 
The poor articulation of copy ownership in our current laws33 leads to a lack of clarity around the 
extent to which they can or should effectively limit the ownership rights of copyright holders. To the 
same extent that copyright acts as a property-limitation rule to copy ownership, 34 a much less-
explored terrain is the extent to which copy ownership also operates as a limitation on the ownership 
intellectual property design needing some "breathing space" if it is to serve its function to incent creation 
and innovation properly. 
31 While they may need to accommodate community interests in specific circumstances such as compliance 
with heritage municipal by-laws. See Gregory S. Alexander, "The Social-Obligation Norm in American 
Property law" (2008-2009) 94 Cornell L. Rev. 745, more specifically at 795-796. 
32 Menell, supra note 30 at 752-753 refers to intellectual property's interdependence with public 
information and with other pre-existing works to allow for the creation of new intellectual property rights. 
An optimal system for the protection of intellectual property as the motor to creativity and innovation needs 
to be open to societal and technological changes. The sharing culture that is more and more prevalent within 
intellectual property is unlikely to support traditional tight ownership and control powers. 
33 See more generally the discussion about the lack of clarity on the place of users in copyright law in 
Chapter 2 and on the legal nature of copy ownership of commercial copies of copyright works in Chapter 6 
Part I and Part II. 
34 See the discussion in Part II of this chapter. 
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rights of copyright holders.35 To explore this further, I look at this interaction as a property-limitation 
rule, for the same reasons that copyright is better described as a property-limitation rule of copy 
ownership than as an expropriation rule or as a property independent prohibition. 36 This should come 
as no surprise. It attests to the interdependence between copyright holders and copy owners. The 
former cannot earn a living without the latter and the latter cannot enjoy literary, musical, and other 
works without the former. For Gregory S. Alexander, this interdependence justifies obligations to one 
and other. 37 
An investigation into how copy ownership acts as a "property-limitation rule" is both legal and 
normative. It is legal in that it provides an analytical tool under the current law to mediate between the 
ownership rights in commercial copies of copyright works and the exclusive rights of copyright 
holders when the rights of the latter are not clearly defined, and to determine the rights of the former 
within the current scheme of the CCA. It is normative by its application of property-limitation rules to 
justify broader open-ended freedoms and powers, as they relate to copy ownership, than are currently 
permitted by the present scope of copyright holders' exclusive rights. 
A. Legal analysis of copy ownership as a property-limitation rule of copyright 
Three scenarios exemplify how copy ownership acts as a property-limitation rule of copyright to 
mediate between the competing rights of copyright holders and copy owners: when the scope of 
copyright is unclear, when the exhaustion or first sale doctrine applies, and with respect to the 
35 Severine Dusollier, Droit d'auteur et protection des oeuvres dans l'univers numerique, 2d ed. (Bruxelles: 
Larcier, 2007) [Dusollier 2007] at 377-418 explores how the property rights in the physical embodiment of 
a copyright work limit the exclusive rights of copyright holders. She notes, ibid at 383: " le monopole de 
droit qu' est le droit de propriete sur I' obj et corporel, devient reservation de fait sur l' oeuvre, obj et 
incorporel". The author also generally discusses how the interaction between the rights in the embodiment 
and the copyright is evolving as the physical support or embodiment of copyright works "dematerializes": 
ibid. 
36 See the discussion in Part II of this chapter as to why copyright is unlikely to qualify as an expropriation 
rule or as an independent property-limitation rule of copy ownership and why it shares the attributes that are 
common to property-limitation rules. This is not to suggest that copy ownership does not also entail 
froperty-independent prohibition rules that are distinct from the exclusive rights of copyright holders. 
7 Alexander, supra note 31 at 812: "The existence of multiple and overlapping communities in the world of 
copyright means that the copyright owner or license holder, because of their dependency on members of 
their communities, owes obligations to a wide range of persons to nurture the capabilities necessary for 
those persons to flourish. It also means that as members of those wide and ever-expanding networks 
flourish, the artists themselves flourish by virtue of the feedback effects of flourishing networks. The 
overall effect of the social obligation, then, is synergistic." 
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unlimited power and privilege to play, view, listen to, or read copyright works. I examine those three 
cases in the same sequence. 
(i) The scope of copyright is unclear 
The Theberge judgment is a good illustration of the application of property-limitation rules to copy 
ownership and copyright. In that case, the issue was whether or not the transposition of lawful copies 
of paintings onto canvasses was an unauthorized production or reproduction of the paintings of 
Claude Theberge, and whether or not it was an infringement of his copyright. The lawful ownership 
rights of the copies of the paintings were asserted by the appellants (various art galleries) against the 
exclusive rights of respondent Claude Theberge in the paintings. The appellants purchased copies of 
the paintings in the open market from a publishing firm that was the licensee38 of artist Claude 
Theberge, and not a party to the action. 39 There was no explicit: contractual licence between Claude 
Theberge and the appellants (nor between the latter and the publishing company). 
Binnie J. for the majority held that the appellants did not infringe the copyright of Claude Theberge in 
his paintings. Commenting on the dissenting opinion's interpretation of the exclusive rights of the 
copyright holder (as including the act of transposing the copy of the paintings from a cardboard to a 
canvass), Binnie J. stated: "In my view, with respect, this expansive reading of the s. 3(1) economic 
rights tilts the balance too far in favour of the copyright holder and insufficiently recognizes the 
proprietary rights of the appellants in the physical posters which they purchased."40 
Theberge is one example of upholding the primafacie open-ended privileges and powers of an owner 
in the copies of the paintings as a property-limitation rule setting limits to the primafacie open-ended 
privileges and powers of artist Claude Theberge.41 As Binnie J. stated for the majority: "Once an 
authorized copy of a work is sold to a member of the public, it is generally for the purchaser, not the 
38 The licence did not explicitly authorize or forbid the acts performed by the appellants purchasers of the 
copies from the licensee: Theberge, supra note 26 at paras 12-14. This is relevant only in so far as it could 
have provided some evidence of Claude Theberge having relinquished his rights to the publishing company. 
39 The printing license between Claude Theberge and EGI Dutil did not preclude the subtraction act which 
is alleged to infringe the copyright of Claude Theberge: Theberge, supra note 26 at para 13. 
40 Theberge, supra note 26 at para 28 . 
41 See the discussion on the nature of copyright in Chapter 5 in particular Part IV. 
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author, to determine what happens to it."42 The copy ownership rights of the appellants were assessed 
and brought to the fore in a manner that pressed the Court to look into the scope of the prim a facie 
open-ended privileges and powers of copyright. The ownership rights of the appellants in 
reproductions of Claude Theberge's paintings acted as a property-limitation rule on the copyright of 
artist Claude Theberge. The exercise involved a balancing act between the values taken to be inherent 
in ownership freedoms in relation to the owned copies of the paintings on the one hand, and copyright 
in the paintings on the other.43 The valid exercise of ownership freedoms by the appellants effectively 
set a limit on the undefined or open-ended contours of artist Claude Theberge's exclusive ownership 
rights in the paintings. Theberge illustrates how copy owners are not on equal footing with other 
copyright users accessing copyright works: their property rights in the physical embodiment of 
copyright works confers on them privileges and powers that effectively limit copyright holders' 
exclusive rights.44 
In addition to addressing situations where the scope of copyright holders' exclusive rights is unclear, I 
explore next the extent to which the exhaustion or first sale doctrine is another manifestation of how 
copy ownership acts as a property-limitation rule of copyright. 
(ii) The exhaustion or first sale doctrine 
The exhaustion or first sale doctrine is a good illustration of how the ownership of commercial copies 
of copyright works acts as a property-limitation rule on the exclusive rights of copyright holders. As I 
discussed in Chapter 3, the exhaustion or first sale doctrine is the rule by which once the first sale (or 
other transfer of ownership) of physical objects embodying copyright works (such as a book, DVD, or 
a music CD) has occurred with the authorization of copyright holders, the copyright holders cannot 
dictate the fate of subsequent transfers of that object.45 Once copyright consumers become lawful 
owners of commercial copies of copyright works, the exhaustion or first sale doctrine limits copyright 
holders' exclusive rights to control their subsequent sales to allow consumers to exercise one of the 
basic ownership rights, i.e., to transfer the copies to another person. 
42 Theberge, supra note 26 at para 3 I . 
43 Harris, supra note I 6 at 90. 
44 Dusollier 2007, supra note 35. 
45 The exhaustion or first sale doctrine pertains to copyright holders' exclusive distribution rights as it is 
discussed in Chapter 3 Part II F. 
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I discussed in Chapter 3 how the future of the exhaustion or first sale doctrine future is imperilled. 
First, the exhaustion or first sale doctrine is threatened by prevailing commercial practices of 
copyright holders to circumvent its application and retain control over subsequent transfers of 
commercial copies of copyright works. 46 Second, the instances where the exhaustion or first sale 
doctrine comes into play are decreasing under the predominant view that it does not apply to 
commercial copies distributed online with no supporting tangible object.47 
To support my claim that the exhaustion or first sale doctrine acts as a property-limitation rule of 
copyright holders' exclusive rights and that it should be maintained with respect to commercial copies 
distributed online, I will first review the three main theoretical justifications of the exhaustion or first 
sale doctrine and explain why the most convincing theory is grounded in the property rights of copy 
owners as supported by other theories. I will then argue that the property theory is still applicable as 
the core justification of the application of the exhaustion or first sale doctrine with respect to digital 
copies distributed online. 
The first frequently invoked justification of the exhaustion or first sale doctrine is the property 
theory.48 It revolves around the need to reconcile copyright holders' exclusive copyrights and buyer's 
ownership rights in the commercial copy.49 I include under this theory the justification based on the 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Herman Cohen Jehoram, "Prohibition of Parallel Imports Through Intellectual Property Rights" (1999) 
30 International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 495 at 497-500; Andre Lucas, 
"International exhaustion" in Lionel Bently, Uma Suthersanen & Paul Torremans, eds, Global Copyright 
Three Hundred Years Since the Statute of Anne, From 1709 to Cyberspace (Cheltenham: Edward Edgar 
Publishing, 2010) 304, at 306; Andreas Wiebe, "The economic perspective: exhaustion in the digital age" 
in Lionel Bently, Uma Suthersanen & Paul Torremans, eds, Global Copyright Three Hundred Years Since 
the Statute of Anne, From 1709 to Cyberspace (Cheltenham: Edward Edgar Publishing , 20 I 0) 32 I, at 322; 
Tomasz Targosz, "Exhaustion in digital products and the "accidental" impact on the balance of interests in 
copyright law" in Lionel Bently, Uma Suthersanen & Paul Torremans, eds, Global Copyright Three 
Hundred Years Since the Statute of Anne, From 1709 to Cyberspace (Cheltenham: Edward Edgar 
Publishing, 2010) 337 at 340,344; Pierre-Emmanuel Moyse, Le droit de distribution: Analyse historique et 
comparative en droit d'auteur (Cowansville, Qc: Yvon Blais, 2007) at 426-427. 
49 Ibid. See also: Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, "Digital Exhaustion"(201 I) 58 UCLA L. Rev. 889 at 
909-9 IO; Jeremy de Beer and Robert Tomkowicz "Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights in Canada" 
(2009) 25 C.I.P.R. 3, at 18 who refer to a tool to calibrate copyright holders rights to the use of a physical 
object embodying the work. 
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English common law rule against restraints on alienation of property50 and similar doctrines in civil 
law jurisdictions.51 
Restrictions on alienation of property have always been treated with suspicion in property law, 
especially in the case of chattels.52 The landmark US Supreme Court judgment Bobbs-Merrill 
Company v. Isidor Straus [Bobbs-Merrill]53 is one of the earlier articulations of the exhaustion or first 
sale doctrine that illustrates that reticence. The copyright holder Bobbs-Merrill Company sued Isidor 
Straus for copyright infringement, claiming that its copyright in the book entitled the right to regulate 
the price of subsequent sales of books subject to its copyright by a notice affixed on the book. In 
effect, the copyright holder was claiming that its property rights extended to a power to exclude all 
subsequent sellers and purchasers who did not comply with the price notice. The US Copyright Act as 
it was in force at the time did not spell out such exclusive rights for copyright holders.54 The Supreme 
Court referred to the rule against restraints of the alienation of property when applying a strict 
statutory interpretation of the rights that the US Copyright Act conferred on copyright holders. 55 The 
Court framed the question to be answered as follows: 
What does the statute mean in granting "the sole right of vending the same?" Was it intended to create 
a right which would permit the holder of the copyright to fasten, by notice in a book or upon one of 
the articles mentioned within the statute, a restriction upon the subsequent alienation of the subject-
matter of copyright after the owner had parted with the title to one who had acquired full dominion 
over it and had given a satisfactory price for it? It is not denied that one who has sold a copyrighted 
article, without restriction, has parted with all right to control the sale of it. The purchaser of a book, 
once sold by authority of the owner of the copyright, may sell it again, although he could not publish 
50 The English common law rule against restraints on alienation of property has been invoked in the US as 
the historical and policy justification for the existence of the first sale doctrine: U.S. Copyright Office, A 
Report of the Register of Copyrights pursuant to section 104 of the DMCA (2001) online: 
http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/dmca study.html [DMCA 2001 Report] at 20, 86. See also 
Liu, supra note 18 at 910-911. The Supreme Court of Canada invoked the common law doctrine with 
respect to restraint of trade and free competition by applying the exhaustion principle to trade-marks in 
Consumers Distributing Co v Seiko Time Canada Ltd., [1984] 1 S.C.R. 583 at para 26. 
51 See Lucas, supra note 48 at 306; Wiebe, supra note 48 at 322 where the author refers to this justification 
as the "marketability theory." 
52 For a discussion on the law of servitudes and how it has been applied on chattels, and its relevancy to 
interpret current restrictive terms of copyright, see: Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, "The New Servitudes" 
(2008) 96 Geo. L.J. 885 at 906ff. 
53 210 U.S. 339, 28 S.Ct. 722 (1908). The first sale doctrine was codified in the year following Bobbs-
Merrill and carried forward in the Copyright Act of 1976 and is presently found in 17 USC §I 09 (a). 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid, at 349-351. 
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a new edition of it.56 
Having found that the right to sell as defined by the statute was silent on granting such powers to 
copyright holders, the Court dismissed the copyright holder's claim and found that there had been no 
infringement of copyright.57 The holding in Bobbs-Merrill was thereafter codified in the US 
Copyright Act. 58 
Under the property theory, the exhaustion or first sale doctrine is justified by the ownership in the 
copy imposing an outer limit on the competing exclusive rights of copyright holders in the same 
object, e.g., the copyright work. The exhaustion or first sale doctrine is one example of a property-
limitation rule that is specific to the effects of copy ownership on copyright holders' exclusive rights. 
For the exhaustion or first sale doctrine to apply, a lawful transfer of ownership in the commercial 
copy needs to take place. 59 The exhaustion or first sale doctrine recognizes and delineates the effects 
of the ownership rights of purchasers in the tangible embodiment of copyright works and sets them 
against the exclusive rights of copyright holders. The absence of the exhaustion or first sale doctrine 
would lead to the denaturalization of the transaction through which the purchaser of the copy of a 
copyright work acquires the copy and his ownership rights from its bare essence. It would amount to 
stripping off one of the fundamental attributes of full blooded-ownership, i.e., the primafacie open-
ended power and privilege to alienate without any duty to account to anyone. 60 
In Chapter 3, I discussed the uncertainty of the application of the exhaustion or first sale doctrine 
when the copyright work is distributed online with no supporting physical object (e.g., a CD, a DVD, 
a book).61 Commentators have raised doubts about the property theory's ability to justify the 
56 Bobbs-Merrill, supra note 53 at 349-350. 
571bid, at 350-351. The Court was also able to arrive at that conclusion by distinctively separating the nature 
of the rights of the copyright holder as strictly being confined to a bundle of intangible rights and not 
extending to their physical embodiment citing Stephens v Cady, 14 How. 528, 530, 14 L. ed. 528, 529, 
where Nelson J. stated: 'The copyright is an exclusive right to the multiplication of the copies, for the 
benefit of the author or his assigns, disconnected from the plate, or any other physical existence. It is an 
incorporeal right to print and publish the map; or, as said by Lord Mansfield in Millar v Taylor, 4 Burr. 
2396, ['a property in notion, and has no corporeal, tangible substance.]. 
58 The first sale doctrine was codified a year after Bobbs-Merrill, supra note 53 in the Copyright Act of 
1909, s 27. I 7 USC §I 09 (a) is the present codification of the first sale doctrine. 
59 See the discussion on exhaustion or first sale doctrine in Chapter 3 Part II F. 
60 Harris, supra note I 6 at 30. 
61 See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part II F. 
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exhaustion or first sale doctrine when the commercial copies have no physical supporting media.62 
This position ties in to the broader consideration of the application of the exhaustion or first sale 
doctrine to commercial copies that are not embedded in a physical object (e.g., a CD or DVD).63 To 
answer this question, and based on the exigencies of the application of the exhaustion or first sale 
doctrine, I will explore in Chapter 8 the ramifications that the nature of digital copies distributed 
online have on its application, as well as the distinction between goods and services and between a 
sale and a licence.64 For now, I will analyze the other frequently invoked justifications for the 
application of the exhaustion or first sale doctrine and the extent to which they support the property 
theory. 
The second frequently invoked justification of the exhaustion or first sale doctrine is the need to 
preserve the free circulation of commercial copies of copyright works. 65 I regroup under this theory 
the free competition arguments, i.e., how the application of exhaustion or first sale doctrine favours 
the free movement of goods, which allows a secondary market that competes with the copyright 
holder's primary market in the same goods. 66 In the EU, the promotion of a free market within all 
Member States underlies the application of the exhaustion principle as it applies to various forms of 
intellectual property rights, including copyright.67 
I include under the theory of free circulation of copies, public policy arguments in which the 
exhaustion or first sale doctrine is justified on the basis that it ensures the continued free circulation of 
ideas, outside the control of copyright holders, allowing for a greater balance between the interests of 
62 Targosz, supra note 48 at 344-345. 
63 See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part II F. 
64 See the discussion in Chapter 8 Part II B and C, Part III and Part IV. 
65 Moyse, supra note 48 at 427-432; Targosz, supra note 48 at 341, 344-345. The marketability theory 
under which the primary purpose of the exhaustion principle is to avoid inappropriate hampering of trade in 
copies also falls within the justification of the free circulation of commercial copies: Wiebe, supra note 48 
at 322. 
66 Ibid; The competition underpinnings of the first sale doctrine have been invoked as one justification 
underlying the first sale doctrine in the US: DMCA 2001 Report, supra note 50 at 21, 86; Perzanowski & 
Schultz, supra note 49 at 895 ff. From an economic perspective, the distribution rights of copy owners 
enable price competition with copyright holders: Wiebe, supra note 48 at 323. 
67 EU, Opinion Advocate General Bot, Case C-128/11, Axel W. Bierbach, administrator of UsedSofl GmbH 
v Oracle International Corp., 24 April 2012 at para 46. See also Targosz, supra note 48 at 341-342. 
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copyright holders, copyright users, and the public.68 Under that theory, the exhaustion or first sale 
doctrine protects the "ideal" interests of users beyond their economic interests in the commercial 
copies and the flourishing of a "second-hand market of ideas."69 It also ensures accessibility to works 
that might otherwise no longer be available.70 
The justifications based on the free circulation of commercial copies underscore the benefits of the 
application of the exhaustion or first sale doctrine, but they do not provide on their own a plausible 
justification for its existence. While it is true that the exhaustion or first sale doctrine favours 
secondary markets for commercial copies lawfully transferred that compete with the primary market 
of copyright holders, exhaustion only applies to the exclusive right to control the distribution of 
copyright works. 71 It does not apply to all other exclusive copyrights, including rental rights, 
communication to the public by communication, and other exclusive rights that allow copyright 
holders to retain the market control of their works with respect to a broad range of commercial 
offerings. 72 First sale or exhaustion only applies after a lawful transfer of ownership of the 
commercial copy occurs. In that sense, the competition argument endorses the property theory 
discussed above by confirming that leaving the right to transfer commercial copies with subsequent 
lawful owners is consistent with the broader imperative of free market competition. 
The justifications based on the public policy arguments favouring free circulation of commercial 
copies also underscore the benefits of the application of the exhaustion or first sale doctrine, but they 
do not provide on their own a plausible justification for its existence. Once again, first sale or 
exhaustion is limited in its application to lawful acquirers of commercial copies of copyright works. A 
broad category of users regularly access copyright works without ever falling into that category. In 
such instances, the public interest would be safeguarded under other doctrines, including fair dealing, 
fair use, non-substantial part, and non-commercial user-generated content.73 The broader public 
68 Targosz, supra note 48 at 343. See also Moyse, supra note 48 at 435-442 who refers to the users' right 
justification to the exhaustion or first sale doctrine that falls under the broader argument of the need to 
balance competing interests within copyright law. 
69 Ibid. 
70 EC, Parliament, DG for Internal Policies, Policies Department: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional 
Affairs, "The Relations Between Copyright Law And Consumers' Rights From A European Perspective", 
by Severine Dusollier (20 I 0) [Dusollier 20 I 0] at 26; Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 49 at 895. 
71 See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part II F. 
72 Ibid. 
73 See Chapter 3 Part II A, C, D (i). 
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interest arguments (and the need to balance competing interests within copyright law) justify for their 
greater part not first sale or exhaustion itself, but the need to maintain the integrity of the ownership 
rights of copy owners by allowing them to freely transfer the commercial copies they own as part of 
their open-ended powers and privileges as owners of commercial copies.74 As I argued in Chapter 6, 
the property rights in commercial copies of copyright works are justified by the normative values of 
freedom and autonomy that underlie personal property, as well as the instrumental goals of copyright 
to encourage the creation and dissemination of copyright works (when viewed from a broader 
perspective that also encompasses copyright users).75 Those property rights include the right to 
transfer the commercial copy as it is safeguarded by the exhaustion or first sale doctrine. 76 
Third, the idea of a just reward for copyright holders or the remuneration theory is frequently invoked 
to justify the existence of the exhaustion or first sale doctrine.77 Under that theory, a right of 
remuneration beyond the first sale of a copy protected by copyright would go over and above a fair 
compensation for authors. 78 In the recent judgment UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle International Corp 
[UsedSoft],79 the Court of Justice of the EU applied a concept similar to the remuneration theory.80 
Relying on former judgments by the same Court:, it justified the application in the EU of the 
exhaustion of the exclusive right of distribution as a means to balance two competing interests: the 
need to avoid the partitioning of the common market with the protection of copyright holders' 
exclusive rights "to what is necessary to safeguard the specific subject-matter of the intellectual 
property concerned," in this case the online distribution of computer programs protected by 
copyright. 81 
74 See the discussion in Chapter 4 Part II. 
75 See the discussion in Chapter 6 Part III A. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Lucas, supra note 48 at 306; Wiebe, supra note 48 at 322; Moyse, supra note 48 at 432-435; Targosz, 
supra note 48 at 341 . 
78 Ibid. 
79 C-128/11, [2012] OJ C 287. 
80 Ibid, at para 62. 
81 Ibid [citing: Case C-200/96 Metronome Musik [1998] ECR 1-1953 at para 14; Case C-61/97 FDV [1998] 
ECR 1-5171 at para 13; and Football Association Premier League and Others at para 106]. The Court 
concluded in that case that to limit the exhaustion of the distribution right under Article 4(2) of Directive 
2009/EC/24 solely to copies of computer programs sold on a material medium, would allow copyright 
holders to control subsequent sales and that such restriction "would go beyond what is necessary to 
safeguard the specific subject-matter of the intellectual property concerned.": Ibid, at para 63 [citing 
Football Association Premier League and Others paras 105-106]. 
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In my view, the remuneration theory fails to adequately justify the application of the exhaustion or 
first sale doctrine and is probably the least convincing of the theories examined so far. To establish 
what is a "fair reward" for each commercial copy inevitably leads to some arbitrariness. Copyright 
holders have the power to exercise their exclusive rights through a multitude of offerings (e.g., sale 
involving a CD, DVD, book, online services, online transfer of a commercial copy, rental of 
commercial copies for a limited duration), the majority of which do not implicate the application of 
the exhaustion or first sale doctrine. 82 In UsedSoft, the Court invoked the need to compensate 
copyright holders to the degree that is necessary to safeguard their rights as one rationale leading to 
the application of the exhaustion principle.83 The Court did not rely on a market analysis to assess 
whether the licences to the computer programs offered by Oracle factored in the restriction on 
subsequent transfers of the copies or whether, on the contrary, Oracle had obtained a fair 
remuneration that would not justify retaining control over the subsequent transfer of copies by users. 
To have done so would have required market comparisons between different commercial offerings. 84 
Even then, it is unclear whether such an exercise would determine that copyright holders obtained a 
"fair remuneration" on their copy. 
Given the limited application of the exhaustion or first sale doctrine to the exclusive distribution right 
of copyright holders and, consequently, the various means through which copyright holders can 
receive remuneration through the commercialization of their works that do not involve the application 
of exhaustion, the fair remuneration theory cannot on its own justify the application of the exhaustion 
or first sale doctrine. It seems to become even less plausible as a justification for the application of the 
exhaustion or first sale doctrine in an environment where the variety of ways through which copyright 
works are made available to consumers increases. 85 At a minimum, the fair remuneration theory 
cannot be applied without a case-by-case analysis of the actual reward received by copyright holders 
for the sale of copies of copyright works as compared to other offerings. The fair remuneration or just 
82 The exhaustion or first sale doctrine only applies in the instance of the lawful transfer of ownership of a 
commercial copy to a consumer or other user: see the discussion in Chapter 3 Part II F. 
83 UsedSoft, supra note 79 at paras 62-63. 
84 The different commercial offerings to be compared would include factors such as whether the user has 
the right to transfer or not the copy, whether the use is for unlimited or fixed duration. 
85 E.g., sale of copies of copyright works, rentals, services through which copyright works are accessed 
without involving a sale or a rental of the copy. 
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reward theory does however generally support the need to balance competing interests and, therefore, 
to set a limit on copyright holders' remuneration for the sale of copies of their works.86 
In addition to the property theory, the free circulation of copies theories and the remuneration theory, 
other justifications have been invoked in support of the exhaustion or first sale doctrine. 87 They 
include the need to ensure legal certainty, which in and of itself does not provide a justification to the 
application of the exhaustion or first sale doctrine. 88 It does support the preservation of traditional 
powers and privilege associated with ownership, which include the ability by copy owners to transfer 
the copies they own. At the same time, the legal certainty argument is not likely to offer much support 
to copyright consumers to justify the application of the exhaustion or first sale doctrine. Owning 
commercial copies of copyright works is already fraught with encroachments and legal uncertainties 
that are not present to the same extent in other forms of personal property. 89 
Because the current scope of application of the exhaustion or first sale doctrine, i.e., the fact that it 
applies only to the exclusive distribution right and only to copies of copyright works that have been 
lawfully transferred to users, the more plausible justification for its application is the property rights 
in the copies that are vested in lawful copy owners. From this perspective, the ownership in the copy 
creates a property-limitation rule on the exclusive rights of copyright holders. The free circulation of 
copies theories (i.e., centered around competition considerations or on the need to balance copyright 
holders' rights with public interest issues) and, to some extent, the fair remuneration theory and the 
86 See the discussion above in Part III A (ii) of this chapter on the circulation of copies theory and the need 
to preserve a balance between the interests of copyright holders and the public interest. For a contrary view, 
see Moyse, supra note 48 at 433 who argues that copyright holders should be entitled to remuneration for 
each and every commercial transaction of commercial copies of copyright works, without interfering 
however with their free circulation, rejecting the principle of exhaustion of the distribution right as it 
currently applies. 
87 They include the requirement for legal certainty: Targosz, supra note 48 at 341, 344; Perzanowski & 
Schultz, supra note 49 at 895ff. discuss other advantages of the first sale doctrine. See in particular, ibid at 
897-898 where they refer to the protection of consumer privacy, the promotion of market efficiency and 
transaction clarity, the promotion of innovation, (i.e. "innovation by copyright owners to compete with 
secondary markets, innovation by secondary market providers, and user innovation") and platform 
competition (i.e. the reduction of "consumer lock-ins" who remain tied to a platform because of the high 
costs of switching to another provider even if the latter is more competitive and offers a superior product. 
The first sale doctrine allows consumers to recoup their investment through resale and to stimulate lower 
prices of competing platforms. 
88 The argument of legal certainty does not explain why exhaustion should favour copy owners as opposed 
to copyright holders: Targosz, supra note 48 at 341. 
89 See the discussion in Chapter 6 Part II. 
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legal certainty theory support the property theory even further but cannot on their own justify the 
existence of the exhaustion or first sale doctrine. 
In Chapter 3, I discussed the uncertainty of the application of the exhaustion or first sale doctrine 
when the copyright work is distributed online with no supporting physical object (e.g., a CD, a DVD, 
a book).90 The prevailing view is that the exhaustion or first sale doctrine does not apply to digital 
copies of copyright works distributed online with no physical supporting media.91 The application of 
the exhaustion or first sale doctrine to digital copies distributed online with no supporting physical 
media requires an understanding of various concepts,, including the distinction between tangibility 
and intangibility that I will explore in Chapter 8.92 For the time being, I will discuss the theoretical 
justifications for the prevailing view of the non-application of the exhaustion or first sale doctrine to 
digital copies of copyright works distributed online with no physical supporting media. 
The arguments against the application of the exhaustion or first sale doctrine to digital copies 
distributed online with no physical supporting media rely more on technical rather than substantive 
considerations. They also reflect a copyright-holder-centric view of the issues at stake. Opponents to 
the application of the exhaustion or first sale doctrine to digital copies with no physical supporting 
media invoke the distinct features of digital copies: they can be reproduced with the exact same 
quality with no possibility of differentiating between the two.93 This would likely have more adverse 
effects on copyright holders' ability to exploit their work than is the case with the transfer of tangible 
copies.94 Under that view, owners of digital copies of copyright works distributed online with no 
90 See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part II F. 
91 Ibid. 
92 See the discussion in Chapter 8 Part III and Part IV. 
93 Wiebe, supra note 48 at 323, 324; Marybeth Peters, "The Legal perspective on exhaustion in the 
borderless era: consideration of a digital fist sale doctrine for online transmissions of digital works in the 
United States" in Lionel Bently, Uma Suthersanen & Paul Torremans, eds, Global Copyright Three 
Hundred Years Since the Statute of Anne, From 1709 to Cyberspace (Cheltenham: Edward Edgar, 2010) 
329 at 334. 
94 Ibid. Peters, as former U.S. Register of Copyrights at the US Copyright Office, referencing the DMCA 
2001 Report, supra note 50 at 82-83, 89, recalls: "The Copyright Office recommendation was based on 
interrelated economic and practical considerations. One concern was the impact of a digital first sale 
doctrine on the ability of right holders to exploit their works. Works in digital format can be reproduced 
without any degradation in quality and transmitted rapidly with little cost. Thus digital transmissions, and 
the ease of pirating perfect copies, are likely to affect adversely the market for copies of a work to a greater 
degree than transfers of physical copies." 
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supporting physical media cannot exercise one of their basic powers and privileges of ownership, i.e., 
the right to subsequently transfer their copy to another person. 
The position against the application of the exhaustion or first sale doctrine to digital copies distributed 
online pays no attention to the property rights and the reasonable expectations that result therefrom on 
the part of copy owners.95 It looks at the general functioning of the market, from the point of view of 
copyright holders.96 Second, the perfect copy phenomenon argument that is used against the 
application of exhaustion to digital copies of copyright works distributed online is an attribute of 
digital copies, not of the fact that there is no supporting physical object (e.g., a CD or DVD).97 Third, 
requirements can be imposed to address the potentially detrimental effects to copyright holders' rights 
when exhaustion applies to digital copies. Among those, the adaptation of first sale or exhaustion of 
digital copies distributed online could include the requirement that the transferor not retain a copy 
when she transfers her copy to a subsequent purchaser.98 Such a requirement exists in the CCA with 
respect to the newly introduced reproduction for private purposes right.99 It requires lawful acquirers 
to destroy any reproductions made upon transfer or lease of the original copy. 100 The Court of Justice 
of the EU, in UsedSoft, pointed to the necessity of such requirement for copyright exhaustion to apply 
to computer programs distributed online. 101 
95 DMCA 2001 Report, supra note 50 at 100-101 considered briefly the reasonable expectations of 
consumers with respect to digital copies as an argument to support the application of the first sale doctrine 
to digital copies of copyright works distributed online but dismissed it expeditiously, giving way to the 
threat that its application would represent to the exclusive rights of copyright holders. 
96 Ibid. 
97 CDs and DVDs of digital works can be replicated in perfect copies unless protected by technological 
protection measures, which can also be applied to copies distributed online. 
98 Dusollier 2010, supra note 70 at 26-27. In the US, see Peters, supra note 93 at 335, as former Register of 
Copyright, US Copyright Office referencing the DMCA 2001 Report, supra note 50 at 83-85, 97-98 raises 
that there were concerns around forward- and- delete type of technologies in that they did not correspond to 
typical uses users would make of digital copies of copyright works. Consumers would not readily delete the 
copy upon transfer and there was concern that it would be difficult to monitor whether this had occurred or 
not.See also: Evan Hess, "Code-ifying Copyright: an Architectural Solution to Digitally Expanding the First 
Sale Doctrine" (2013) 81 Fordham L. Rev. 1965, at 2007-2010, recommending the application of 
technologies allowing the degradation of digital copies ove1time, to replicate the condition of physical 
(paper) copies. 
99 CCA, supra note 4, s 29.22. See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part II A (ii). 
100 Ibid., s 29.22 (4): the right to make reproductions for private purposes includes the requirement to 
destroy any copies made upon transfer of the original copy. 
101 UsedSoft, supra note 79 at paras 69-70. 
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The reproduction capabilities of digital copies are not a strong enough argument to discard the 
application of copyright exhaustion to digital copies distributed online with no physical supporting 
media. If it were, first sale would not apply to digital movies sold on a DVD or digital music sold on a 
CD. A more refined understanding of the nature of digital copies of copyright works and of 
technologies mimicking transfers similar to the analogue world attenuate concerns that prevailed 
earlier regarding the application of digital exhaustion. 102 The recognition by the Court of Justice of the 
EU in UsedSoft that exhaustion or first sale doctrine applied to computer programs distributed online 
with no physical supporting media exemplifies this recent trend. 103 
To allow the radically different treatment of digital copies distributed online from other copies, by 
focusing primarily on the interests of copyright holders, without considering the nature of the product 
and the legal transaction through which it is accessed by consumers, reflects a trivialization of copy 
owners' rights and interests. 104 It exemplifies a copyright-holder-centric approach to regulation that 
too often forgets the property regime from which it was elaborated and how it interacts with contracts, 
its principal vehicle for commercialization of works. It leads to a progressive disengagement of the 
law toward (consumer) information products in favour of private market forces. Left unleashed, it will 
deepen the void through the (de)regulation of (consumer) information products. 105 
Adding to the uncertainty of the application of the exhaustion or first sale doctrine with respect to 
digital copies distributed online, the commercial practice by which copyright holders avoid its 
application altogether continue to undermine its application. I discuss how property law and theory 
can offer avenues to address this issue below in this chapter. 106 Before doing so, I will discuss how 
another open-ended power and privilege of copy ownership acts as a property-limitation rule on the 
102 See supra note 94. Peters, supra note 93 at 334, as fom1er Register of Copyrights, US Copyright Office, 
referencing the DMCA 2001 Report, supra note 50 at 98-99: "It was also not clear at the time that reliable 
technology existed to delete automatically the sender's copy in a forward-and-delete system." New 
commercial offerings including ReDigi create a market place for the resale of pre-owned digital copies of 
musical recordings purchased online and claim to provide a mechanism for erasing the initial copy from the 
seller when she transfers it to the buyer: https://www.redigi.com/. See also the discussion in Chapter 8 Part 
III and IV. 
103 Ibid. 
104 See supra note 95. 
105 As I discuss in Chapter 8, the results of the radically different treatment of digital copies distributed 
online can be observed in the field of copyright, sale of goods, contract, consumer law and electronic 
commerce law. The radically different treatment of digital copies distributed online may become less 
attractive to knowledgeable consumers and slow down the growth in that market segment. 
106 In particular in Part IV of this chapter. 
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exclusive rights of copyright holders and the increasing importance of reinforcing that claim in a 
digital landscape. 
(iii) The powers and privileges to play, view, listen, and read 
The scope of the powers and privileges of consumers and other users to play, view, read, and listen to 
a copyright work is not specifically enunciated in the CCA. None of the exclusive rights of the 
copyright holder (i.e., the exclusive right to produce, reproduce, perform in public, and authorize first 
publication) limit those freedoms of use, at least with respect to commercial copies transferred, with 
no technological protection measures [TPMs]. 107 In Chapter 3, I discussed how copyright law confers 
on copyright holders the powers and privileges to decide by contract how, to whom, for what duration 
and territory they commercially exploit their works. 108 I also discussed areas of uncertainty about the 
extent to which copyright holders can exercise their contractual freedom, particularly when it comes 
in conflict with the overall objectives of the property rights conferred on them by the CCA. 109 
Similarly to my earlier discussion in this chapter on the application of the exhaustion or first sale 
doctrine, 110 the question here is: to what extent can copyright holders alter by contract the essential 
attributes of copy ownership over and beyond what the CCA already expressly confers? 111 
Traditionally, ownership in copies of copyright works has been viewed as conferring the unlimited 
powers and privileges to play, view, read, listen to and perform otherwise than in public a copyright 
work. 112 The consumer who owns copies of copyright works is distinct in that regard from any other 
consumers and users who access copyright works through other legal transactions (or the absence 
thereof), such as the rental of a computer program for a fixed duration, a ticket to the theatre (or an 
Internet streaming service) that confers to its holder (subscriber) the right to one screening (or view) 
107 See the discussion on technological protection measures in Chapter 3 Part III Band how their recent 
introduction in the CCA, supra note 4, confers new rights to copyright holders who seek to protect their 
works through them. 
108 See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part III C. 
109 See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part III A and Part IV. 
110 See the discussion in Part III A (ii) of this chapter. 
111 See the discussion in Chapter 6 Part II, where I analyze how copyright confers exclusive rights to 
copyright holders that make commercial copies of copyright works a distinct and unique form of personal 
property from other goods. 
112 In addition to the power to transfer (e.g. sell, donate, bequeath) the ownership in the copy of the 
copyright work. In Theberge, supra note 26 at para 31: as Binnie J. stated for the majority: "Once an 
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of a film, or simply by browsing a copyright work available on the Internet. In these examples, 
consumers can more readily and reasonably expect that their right to use, view, listen, or in other 
instances read the copyright work is limited, either because of the nature of the legal transaction that 
took place (e.g., a rental, a service agreement, etc.) or because of the absence thereof. 113 In contrast 
with a contract of rental or of specific services involving copyright works, when consumers own 
copies of copyright works they can reasonably expect that they have the primafacie unlimited power 
and privilege to use, view, listen to, and read the work with no duty to account to anyone, as they have 
done so for years and as they are generally able to use the goods they own for the purposes for which 
they were intended. 114 
At first glance, consumers' unlimited power and privilege to play, view, listen to, or read commercial 
copies of copyright works they own appear to be the least controversial of all claims to copy 
ownership, in contrast with the right to make copies, share the work on digital networks etc. Unlike 
the exclusive right to publish, produce, reproduce, perform in public, and, now, distribute the work, 
the acts of playing, viewing, listening to, and reading a work are not specifically subject to the 
authorization of copyright holders. 115 Through the combined effects of the current state of the law 
regarding copyright holders exclusive rights, 116 TPMs, 117 commercial terms of use of commercial 
copies of copyright works, 118 and of the uncertainty around the characterization of those transactions 
as sales, licences, or service contracts, 119 the traditional unlimited privilege and power to play, view, 
authorized copy of a work is sold to a member of the public, it is generally for the purchaser, not the author, 
to determine what happens to it."; Liu, supra note 18 at 1287. 
113 For example, in the case of browsing a copyright work available on the Internet, no formal agreement 
took place between the user and the copyright holder that confers rights to the copy to the user on the basis 
of which she could build reasonable expectations. 
114 This last point touches upon the application of implied conditions or warranties of suppliers under sale of 
goods or consumer laws which I discuss in Chapter 9 Part II A and in Chapter 11. 
115 CCA, supra note 4 ss 3, 15, 18, 26. 
116 In particular, under the exclusive right to authorize the reproduction of copyright works, each access a 
user makes to a copyright work can involve a new reproduction of the work, that necessitates the 
authorization of copyright holders: Liu, supra note 18 at 1286 observes that transposing traditional copy 
owner freedoms into the digital age is a delicate exercise because it directly interferes with the copyright 
holders' right to control reproduction of her copyright works. See also Jane C. Ginsburg, "Essay: From 
having copies to Experiencing works: The development of an access right In U.S. copyright law" (2003) 50 
J. Copyright Soc'y U.S.A. 113, in particular at 117-118 and at 120-121 & 126. 
117 See the discussion on the effect of technological protection measures in Chapter 3, Part III B. 
118 See the discussion on non-negotiated standard end-user agreements for commercial copies of copyright 
works in Chapter 3, Part III C. 
119 See the discussion in Chapter 8 Part II. 
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listen to, or read commercial copies of copyright works distributed online with no physical supporting 
medium is under increased pressure. 
Commentators, including Jessica Litman and Joseph Liu, have noted the threat that ill-adapted 
copyright laws in the digital environment pose to the traditional freedom to read, view, listen to, and 
play copies of copyright works. 120 They argue in favour of the protection of such freedoms. 121 Other 
scholars, including Jane Ginsburg, argue that the right of copyright holders to control each individual 
access to their works through TPMs is justified and critical in a digital environment, a view that 
supports a broad interpretation of the new access right that was introduced in the US with the entry 
into force of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act [DMCA]. 122 Diverging views on the theoretical 
justifications and objectives of copyright and how they should be implemented lie at the heart of this 
legal and normative debate on what the proper scope of copyright exclusive rights should be. In 
Chapter 6, I argued that the prevailing theoretical justifications of copyright demand more room for 
copyright consumers and other users for copyright law to retain its coherence and legitimacy. 123 
Qualifying the unlimited right to play, read, listen, and view as the exercise of freedom by personal 
property copy owners and as a "property-limitation rule" of copyright gives a whole new significance 
to the digital environment given the combination of TPMs, their legal endorsement, and of other 
120 Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 2001) [Litman, 2001] at 29ff; Liu, 
supra note 18, at 1288-1289. See also Jessica Litman, "The Exclusive Right to Read" (1994) 13 Cardozo 
Arts & Ent. L.J. 29. 
121 Litman2001, supra note 120; Jessica Litman, "Lawful Personal Use" (2007) 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1871 
[Litman 2007] at 1879 refers to "copyright liberties": i.e. the fact that "copyright law was designed to 
maximize the opportunities for non-exploitative enjoyment of copyrighted works in order to encourage 
reading, listening, watching, and their cousins". Author argues that they are "both deeply embedded in 
copyright's design and crucial to its promotion of the 'Progress of Science"'; Liu, supra note 18, in 
particular at 1237ff, argue in favour of such unlimited rights. As Liu observes, transposing these copy 
owner freedoms into the digital age is a delicate exercise because it directly interferes with the copyright 
holders ' right to control reproduction of her copyright works: Liu, ibid at 1286. 
122 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998), amending 17 USC, including the introduction of§§ 1201-
1205; Ginsburg, supra note 116 at 117-118, 120-121 and at 126 where the author states: " ... [t]he physical 
object "copy" is distinct from the incorporeal "work of authorship" that the copy embodies, and I do not 
access "the work" until I have entered the password (from the correct computer). Thus, "access to the 
work" becomes a repeated operation; each act of hearing the song or reading the document becomes an act 
of "access." When the DMCA bars circumvention of controls on access to the "work," the law, in effect, 
says that I cannot listen to the song or read the document without implicating the copyright owner's access 
right." 
123 See the discussion in Chapter 6 Part III. 
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restrictive commercial terms. 124 The qualification as an exercise of freedom by personal property copy 
owners provides a legal tool that positively anchors copy owners' rights through property law, with its 
inherent mediating balancing act to respond to the (unintended) expansion of copyright, either through 
the effect of TPMs, contracts, or recent legislative reform. 125 It relies on the fact that these ownership 
freedoms have long been considered as reasonable exercises of copy ownership open-ended powers 
and privileges and, as I argued in Chapter 6, are justified by the theoretical justifications and overall 
objectives of copyright law. 126 
In my view, the unlimited powers and privileges of consumers to play, view, listen to, and read 
copyright works revolve around securing the scope of ownership rights to commercial copies of 
copyright works. There is no unfettered unlimited right to play, view, listen to, and read copyright 
works outside copy ownership. 127 The legal framework that I propose here, i.e., that copy ownership 
acts as a property-limitation rule on copyright holders' exclusive rights that preserves consumers' 
open-ended powers and privileges to play, view, listen to, and read the commercial copies of 
copyright works they own, will secure this freedom only to the extent that there is more certainty 
about the concepts of what constitutes a sale and what constitutes goods for commercial transactions 
involving copies of copyright works. I will analyze these two legal concepts with respect to 
commercial copies of copyright works in Chapter 8. 128 
To the extent that commercial offerings of copyright works may include fewer sales of copies and 
move towards other legal transactions (e.g., rental and services), the open-ended powers and 
privileges to play, view, listen to, and read copyright works with no duty to account to copyright 
holders will consequently shrink. This is a different matter than the current discussion on the proper 
allocation of powers and privileges between the competing property rights of copyright holders and of 
124 See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part III Band Con TPMs and non-negotiated standard end-user 
agreements of copies of copyright works distributed online. 
125 Either through the uncertainties brought on by recent legislative reform including the recent addition of 
TPMs (see the discussion in Chapter 3 Part III B) or by the commercial transactions through which 
copyright holders make copies of their works available to consumers (see the discussion in Chapter 3 Part 
III C). 
126 See the discussion in Chapter 6 Part III. 
127 I.e., in cases where consumers access copyright works without the transfer of ownership in a commercial 
copy, i.e. through a service, a loan from the library or by browsing a copy of a work that is available on the 
internet, the access is either limited in duration, instances of access or, as in the case of a work available 
online, so long as it remains on the Internet or if it is downloaded or copied by the user, under terms of use 
that either forbid such acts or are otherwise restricted or are unclear. 
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copy owners. The multiplication of commercial offerings requires an understanding of the nature of 
the legal transaction through which copyright works are accessed and the nature of consumers' rights 
and remedies that result therefrom. It may or may not involve property rights for consumers and 
includes an examination of consumers' reasonable expectations with respect to the transaction 
through which they access copyright works. I address these questions by looking at the interaction 
between property, copyright, contract, and consumer law and theory in the Third Part of my thesis. 129 
I have proposed in this part a legal analysis of three instances in which copy ownership acts as a 
property-limitation rule of copyright: when the scope of copyright is unclear, as a mean to understand 
the scope and application of the exhaustion or first sale doctrine, and to secure copy owners open-
ended powers and privileges to play, view, listen to, or read the commercial copies of copyright works 
they own. I will now apply the concept of property-limitation rules in a normative analysis of copy 
owners' rights to commercial copies of copyright works. 
B. The normative force of copy ownership as a property-limitation rule of copyright 
In addition to the legal effects of copy ownership acting as a property-limitation rule on the exclusive 
rights of copyright holders on their work, it also has powerful normative value. As the various forms 
of uses that consumers can make of digital copies of copyright works are increasing, it challenges the 
traditional legal framework of the exclusive rights of copyright holders by asking whether or how we 
need to accommodate these incessantly evolving uses for copy owners. As I discussed in Chapter 6, 
many of the primafacie open-ended privileges and powers of copy owners are countered by explicit 
ownership rights of copyright holders that unequivocally limit the scope of copy ownership. 130 
Commentators have looked at the normative value of copy ownership to consider the appropriateness 
of current copyright laws when dealing with an increasingly digitalized environment. 131 For instance, 
Aaron Perzanowski and Jason Schultz advocate the need to rehabilitate copy ownership through a 
broader understanding of the exhaustion or first sale doctrine, beyond the right to transfer the 
128 See the discussion in Chapter 8, in particular Part II and Part IV. 
129 I.e. "The Application of Consumer Law and Theory to Commercial Copies of Copyright Works" 
(Chapter 8 to Chapter 11 ). 
130 See the discussion in Chapter 6 Part II. 
131 Liu, supra note 18; Dusollier 2007, supra note 35 at 377-418; Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 49. 
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ownership of a lawfully acquired copy. 132 The expanded exhaustion doctrine would encompass many 
acts that are implicit in the ownership of copies, but the status of which is either not authorized or 
unclear under current copyright law. The authors analyse earlier copyright common law cases that 
permitted certain acts for copy owners 133 and how this earlier jurisprudence can provide solutions that 
can be adapted to the digital environment. 134 Such acts include the ability to transfer digital media, to 
modify digital media for device-shifting, and to make copies for time- and space-shifting purposes. 135 
Looking at the normative implications of copy ownership is valuable in any attempt to redesign 
copyright as a private property right in keeping with its underlying objectives of incenting creativity, 
innovation, and the dissemination of copyright works. It is also critical to address the fate of digital 
copies. 136 At an instrumental level, affirming broader ownership rights to copies of copyright works 
may also create an additional incentive toward lawful copy ownership and lessen the appeal of pirated 
copies. This would engender a more credible and robust copyright system. 
To view copy ownership as a property-limitation rule of copyright provides a valuable framework on 
which to adequately qualify and address the increased capabilities of consumers' use of copyright 
works. By the conjecture of new technologies, the primafacie open-ended privileges, powers, and 
self-seekingness inherent to copy ownership are effectively expanding, both physically and in the 
minds of consumers. This is one possible application of the adaptability of the property institution, in 
the present case, as it pertains to copyright and to chattels (whether physically exchangeable from 
hand-to-hand or not). 137 Property law and theory provide a nom1ative and legal force that cannot be 
ignored and that can solve the consumer-copyright holder conundrum of rights to commercial copies 
of copyright works. It can succeed where the CCA, in its current structure and design, no longer can. 
The purpose of the property-limitation rule analysis undertaken here is not to list all instances of copy 
ownership uses that need to be recognized to be within the ownership rights of the copy owner of a 
132 Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 49. 
133 Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 49 at 912ff. Those acts are: repair and renewal, adaptation and 
modification and display and performance. 
134 Ibid at 935ff. 
135 Ibid at 938ff. 
136 Indeed, most uses of digital works involve a reproduction at some point which is an exclusive ownership 
right of the copyright holder and an infringement of copyright unless it falls under one of the exceptions to 
copyright infringement. 
137 I discuss the physical attributes and legal treatment of digital copies of copyright works in Chapter 8. 
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copyright work. Rather, it offers a normative analytical framework based on the principles of property 
law and theory discussed so far to substantiate when and how copy ownership should limit the 
exclusive rights of copyright owners. Two parameters need to be considered when asserting the 
ownership rights in the copy of the copyright work. The first is to recognize the need to assert a space 
for the prima facie open-ended freedoms and self-seekingness that are inherent in the ownership of 
copies of copyright works, and supported by the instrumental justifications to incent creation and the 
dissemination of works. 138 The second parameter is that such ownership freedoms cannot extend as 
far as to harm the ownership rights of copyright holders. The fact that the harmful exercise to the 
copyright holder comes second is significant in that, just as in traditional property law and theory, the 
qualification of harm depends in part on the recognition of the competing property freedoms; this was 
well illustrated in Victoria Park. 139 The application of these two parameters engenders mediation 
between two competing ownership rights. This balancing act brings copyright closer to other 
traditional tangible property and counters a decried expansive view of copyright exclusionary powers 
as encapsulating more positive externalities that derive from the copyright work than they should. 140 
With respect to the first parameter, the consumer-owners' open-ended uses and privileges should not 
extend beyond their underlying justifications, i.e., the primafacie normative status of all ownership 
freedoms, the instrumental promotion of creative and innovative citizens benefiting from their access, 
communication, and network environment, as well as the need to preserve and protect their autonomy 
and freedom in how they experience copyright works. 141 Any use that is not supported by at least one 
of these underlying justifications would not fall a priori within the open-ended privileges and uses of 
an owner of the copy of a copyright work. To the extent that certain uses or privileges are justified by 
their underlying property-specific justice reason, then such uses or privileges would give rise to 
trespassory rules. 142 As consumers' uses shift from the private, personal sphere to the commercial 
138 See the argument that I develop in Chapter 6 Part III A and B regarding the theoretical justifications of 
ownership of copies of copyright works. 
139 Supra note 20. In particular, the fact that the reasonable exercise of the ownership rights of the defendant 
(adjacent owner of the plaintiff race track owner) included taking advantage of positive externalities of the 
plaintiff race track property, so long as the plaintiff did not lose the enjoyment of his property. To say the 
contrary would have deprived the defendant of the reasonable enjoyment of his own property. 
140 See Lemley, supra note 23 at 1033,1044. 
141 See the discussion on the justifications of copies of copyright works in Chapter 6 Part III A and B. 
142For instance, this could apply to TPMs that impeach the consumer to make copies of a music CD 
(assuming such use is asserted as being within the open-ended uses supported by the ownership rights in the 
CD). The corollary is that the consumer would be entitled to legal remedies against this technological 
measure. 
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sphere, the underlying property-specific justice reason for their ownership rights in copies of 
copyright works is altered. 143 The shift of property-specific justice reasons, when moving from 
personal to commercial uses, that would directly compete with the copyright holders' economic 
rights, provide insights into when and why the open-ended uses and privileges in copies of copyright 
works may no longer be justified and should be altered. 144 The shift also resonates with the internal 
limits set by an instrumental view of copyright as a tool to incent creation and the dissemination of 
works, 145 although, until recently, the CCA made little distinction between commercial and non-
commercial uses for the purpose of copyright infringement. 146 With its recent amendments, the CCA 
relies increasingly on that distinction, 147 although copyright infringement is still determined for the 
greater part on the basis of an act as opposed to a purpose basis. 148 The shift from personal to 
commercial uses also brings different property-limitation rules and independent-property 
prohibitions. 149 Finally, any uses or privileges that the property institution cannot support either at a 
conceptual or practical level should not fall within the property domain of the lawful owner of the 
copy of a copyright work. 
With respect to the second parameter, any exercise of the prima facie open-ended freedoms associated 
with the ownership rights in commercial copies of copyright works that would harm the ownership 
1430ne of the reasons being that the commercial sphere involves different distributive consequences: see 
Harris, supra note 16, at 275, where the author [citing John Christman, The Myth of Property (OUP, 1994), 
pt. 3] refers to two distinct concepts within ownership, i.e. "control ownership" and "income ownership": 
"the first would encompass use-privileges and all unilateral exercises of powers (including gifts) and the 
latter all exercises of power made for consideration (hire, rent, sale, or exchange)" the reason being "that 
the former can be justified by autonomy considerations whereas the latter has distributional consequences." 
144 For instance, the use of a copyright work as part of a commercial activity could give rise to either 
property remedies, such as injunctive relief and damages or a liability rule, such as a compulsory license. 
145 See Litman 2007, supra note 121 at 1911-1911 who proposes in a US context a model of four categories 
of personal uses that should be considered in establishing personal use rights of copyright works, whereby 
the personal uses are measured against their likely effect on "copyright liberties" and on the incentive to 
create of the copyright holder. 
146 I discuss the non-commercial v. commercial purpose distinction in Chapter 2 Part IV. 
147 I discuss the recent amendments to the CCA, supra note 4 and the four new user provisions in Chapter 3 
Part II D. 
148 I discuss the non-commercial v. Commercial purpose distinction in Chapter 2 Part IV. 
149For example, the property of a laser printer supports certain open-ended personal uses and privileges that 
change once the use of the laser printer is made for commercial purposes. Other independent property-
limitation rules may start to apply, such as safety in the workplace rules, quality standard rules for 
consumer usage and so on. The same can be said of the copy of a copyright work. Once the use shifts from 
a private, non-commercial use to a public or commercial use, different property-limitation and property-
independent rules would apply, including those limitations that are based on the copyright holder's 
exclusive rights, as reframed by the limitations imposed by the consumers' ownership rights in copies of 
copyright works. 
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rights of copyright holders would not be authorized, as it would be unjust that ownership rights be 
exercised in a way that harms the ownership rights of others, including of copyright holders. 150 In 
such a case, the consumer owning the copy of the copyright work would act outside the property-
specific justice reasons that support her ownership rights. 
Putting forward the normative force of consumers' ownership freedoms as supported by instrumental 
justifications151 forces us to revisit the scope of exclusive rights of copyright holders. If uses fall 
within the realm of what copy owners should be a priori able to do with the copy in their personal 
sphere, then the onus should be on copyright holders to prove that a certain act caused economic or 
moral harm. By the same token, the assumptions around what causes economic harm would need to 
give way to the competing ownership rights of copy owners. To be sure, acts that currently fall under 
the exclusive domain of copyright holders (reproduction, telecommunication to the public, 
performance in public) when performed by a copy owner, would not necessarily fall within the 
domain of copyright holders, unless they could prove that copyright holders suffered economic or 
moral harm. 
Under the current wording of the CCA, any act of reproduction and any performance in public that the 
consumer makes of or with the copy of the copyright work is an infringement of copyright unless it 
falls under one of the specific stated exceptions, or unless it has been specifically authorized by 
copyright holders. 152 However, such acts do not necessarily cause harm to the copyright holder's 
exclusive rights, 153 although they may still give rise to statutory damages under the CCA. 154 
150 Through the application of Harris's theory around "property-limitation rules" the exercise of prima facie 
open-ended privileges and powers are limited when such exercise is harmful to others, Harris supra note 16 
at 35. See also Part II and III of this chapter. 
151 I.e., the first parameter that I reviewed above in Part III B of this chapter. 
152 CCA, supra note 4, ss 27-27.1. See also the discussion on exceptions to copyright infringement in 
Chapter 3, in particular Part II. 
153 On this matter see for example Lisa N. Takeyama, "Piracy, Asymmetric Information and Product 
Quality" in Wendy J. Gordon & Richard Watt, eds, The Economics of Copyright (Cheltenham, UK: Edward 
Elgar, 2003) at 62, where the author analyses the actual economic harm of copying on copyright holders. 
She concludes, inter alia, that "the information value from copying can improve social welfare over that 
without copying where there is asymmetric information about product quality. In some cases, the presence 
of copying can induce a Pareto improvement in social welfare, as it has the potential to solve the result 
adverse selection problem." The author also concludes that standard measures of harm from copying may 
be largely overstated, since they do not account for the possibility that copiers subsequently purchase the 
work": ibid. See also Stan Liebowitz, "Back to the Future: Can copyright Owners Appropriate Revenues in 
the Face of New Copying Technologies?" in Wendy J. Gordon & Richard Watt, eds, The Economics of 
Copyright (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2003) at 1-25. See also Liu, supra note 18 at 1282. 
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Reframing copyright infringement (i.e., copyright holders' exclusionary powers) by first recognizing 
the primafacie normative force of copy ownership and around the notion of economic or moral harm 
inflicted on the ownership rights of copyright holders, as opposed to around acts of production, 
reproduction, and performances in public is one suggestion among other valuable approaches. 155 True 
to the property-specific justice reason of copyright at the stage of commercialization of copyright 
works, harm to copyright holders needs to aim more specifically at dealings with the copyright works 
that undermine the incentive for the creation and dissemination of copyright works. 
To frame the ownership in copies of copyright works positively as a property-limitation rule of 
copyright is to refuse the status quo (and to passively accept one of the starting premises of my thesis) 
i.e. that the ownership rights in commercial copies of copyright works have been and continue to be 
defined consequentially and by default to the ownership rights of copyright holders in their works. 
From a property theory perspective, maintaining the status quo is the equivalent of automatically 
making the ownership rights in property A subject to how the ownership rights in property Bare and 
will be defined in the future, therefore discriminating for copyright holders and against copy owners, 
by preferring the former over the latter. This approach fails to recognize the reality of two different 
but equally meritorious, in their own right, competing property claims that need to be mediated one 
against the other. 156 Depending on the issue to be resolved, emphasis will be placed on the limiting 
effects of copyright or on the limiting effects of the ownership rights in the copy of the copyright 
work. 
154 As per CCA, supra, note 4, s 38.1, it is possible for a copyright holder to claim a fixed dollar amount per 
instance of copyright infringement without having to prove actual damages. However, the ability to claim 
statutory damages for infringement that arises from uses for non-commercial purposes is limited under this 
provision. 
155 Litman 2001, supra note 120 at Chapter 12, whereby the author recommends to reframe the exclusive 
rights conferred by copyright as an exclusive dissemination right for commercial exploitation; Daniel 
Gervais, "Towards a new core international copyright norm: the reverse three-step test" (2005) 9 Marq. 
Intell. Prop. L. Rev. I .The author proposes a restructuration of copyright holders' exclusive rights by 
combining the fair use doctrine with the "three-step test" found under the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex JC, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 29, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [TRIPS], to become the definition of 
copyright holders' rights and not the exceptions. In other words, everything that is not permitted by fair use 
and the Three-Step test should be within the exclusive rights of copyright holders. See the discussion in 
Chapter 12 Part IV. 
156 On this point, see Dusollier 2007, supra note 35 at 379 who points to the absence of hierarchy between 
the competing property rights of copyright holders and of copy owner with respect to the same object, the 
work. 
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The discrimination between two competing property owners or double standard by which prominence 
is given to the property rights of copyright holders at the expense of the property rights of copy 
owners is intensifying in the digital age. As Julie Cohen notes: 
the legal regime being created in digital space is not "simply" a regime based on property rights 
designed to mimic the behavior of property rights in real space. Instead, we are constructing a legal 
regime in which notions of boundedness are applied unevenly and unequally. In a legal culture that 
believes in taking property seriously, resolving the tension between owners' and users' rights in 
things requires consideration of users' countervailing rights in some less expedient manner than 
simply defining them away. 157 
Cohen voices concerns similar to the ones that I raise, throughout this chapter and elsewhere, on the 
poorly substantiated rationale behind the progressive effacement of ownership rights in copies of 
copyright works as personal property for the sake of another form of property, i.e., copyright. 
The ownership in the copy of a copyright work is one among many other property-limitation rules to 
copyright. The use of a copyright work (other than as owner of a copy) under one of the stated 
purposes of fair dealing, under the public policy exception, 158 under the visual disability rules, or even 
under competition law, are other distinct manifestations of property-limitation rules to copyright. For 
David Vaver, such "exceptions" or "users' rights" set the outer limits of copyright: "owners cannot 
control acts falling under the exceptions because their rights do not extend that far." 159 Under a 
property-limitation rules' analysis, copyright holders' rights would normally restrict the relevant act, 
but for the exception or limitation that copyright law imposes. Hanoch Dagan refers to the limitation 
of fair use in copyright law as a "right of entry." 160 
In contrast with these property-limitation rules, when consumers buy commercial copies of copyright 
works, they acquire property rights in the copies that set the consumers apart from other relationships 
between copyright holders and other users. From the copyright holders' perspective, this transaction 
with consumers-purchasers alters the primafacie open-ended privileges and powers as private 
copyright owners with these particular consumers, to make way to their status as copy owners. 
157 Julie Cohen, "Overcoming Property: Does Copyright Trump Privacy?" (2002) U. Ill. J.L. Tech. & Pol'y 
375 at 381. 
158 Public policy grounds can operate as a specific property-limitation rule of copyright in some cases. For a 
recent discussion of this limitation to the exclusive rights of copyright holders see: Alexandra Sims, "The 
denial of copyright protection on public policy grounds" (2008) 30 E.I.P.R. 189. 
159 David Vaver, Copyright Law (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc., 2000) at 170. 
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In this part of the present chapter, I discussed the legal and normative value of copy ownership as a 
property-limitation rule of copyright and how copy ownership needs to be considered at par with 
copyright holders' exclusive rights in their work. Defining and ascertaining copyright consumers' 
rights begins with understanding the ownership rights in commercial copies of copyright works as an 
anchor to understand vehicles other than ownership to access copyright works. The next step is to 
look at the extent to which the contractual relationship modulates the competing property rights of 
copyright holders and copy owners. 
IV. Mediating between copyright, copy ownership, and contract through the standardization of 
property 
The numerus clausus principle by which there is a fixed and closed list of property rights recognized 
by law and, as one corollary, limitations on how owners can alter the nature of their property rights, is 
particularly relevant to the personal property rights of purchasers of copies of copyright works, as 
such rights may from time to time be altered by contract. 161 I have discussed in Chapter 4, the debate 
about the numerus clausus principle's existence and justification in the common law tradition of 
property, 162 and in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, about the insights that the numerus clausus principle 
brings to the understanding of the distinct nature of copyright and of copies of copyright works .. 163 
The survey that Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith conducted on the common law of property led them 
to conclude that there were even fewer forms of property available for personal property than for real 
property. 164 In other words, there is a greater level of standardization in the realm of personal property 
than with respect to real property. Its benefit and, as Merrill and Smith argue, its justification, is to 
constrain information processing costs - in the present case - of all personal property owners of 
similar copies of copyright works and, at a broader level, of all personal property owners in a given 
jurisdiction. 165 
160 Hanoch Dagan, Property Values and Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) at 50. 
161 See the discussion on the numerus clausus principle in Chapter 4 Part III. 
162 Ibid. 
163 See the discussion in Chapter 5 Part IV C and Chapter 6 Part II C. 
164 Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, "Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: the Numerus 
clausus Principle" (2000) 110 Yale L.J. 1at17-18. 
165 Ibid. See the discussion on the standardization of property in Chapter 4 Part III. 
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In effect, the numerus clausus principle as a "norm of judicial self-govemance" 166 is a tool to equip 
the judiciary to maintain essential attributes of the ownership of personal property copy owners when 
copyright holders seek to strip it of its essential attributes, inc1uding the prima facie open-ended 
power and privilege to authorize transfer in the copy. In the context of copyright, it is one way to 
qualify copyright holders' freedom of contract to balance copyright holders' interests against the 
competing interests of copy owners. It constrains copyright holders' possible inc1ination to expand 
their property rights at the expense of personal property copy owners. It mediates between competing 
property rights and the effect that contracts can have on those rights. 
In the discussion on the exhaustion or first sale doctrine and its exemplification of copy ownership 
acting as a property-limitation rule to constrain the scope of copyright, I raised concerns around the 
well-documented circumvention of this legal principle by copyright holders through contract. 167 
Through this commercial practice, copyright holders effectively created a species of personal property 
that is devoid of one of its core attributes, the prima facie open-ended freedom and power of 
alienation. Courts in the US have given different weight to the characterization of the contract as a 
licence and have at times tended to look to the substance of the transaction to determine whether a 
sale or licence of the commercial copy of the copyright work took place rather than to rely on how it 
was designated in the contract. 168 In Vernor v. Autodesk, [Autodesk], 169 the US Court of Appeals, 
166 Ibid at 11. 
167 I refer here more particularly to the terms of the licence agreement that restrict the right to transfer the 
copy of the copyright work and not other terms necessary to allow the use of the copy, e.g. the right to 
reproduce the work including to make backup copies, etc ... The newly introduced distribution right in the 
CCA increases copyright holders' powers to subject the distribution of copies of their works to additional 
restrictions that will be opposable to all. See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part II F and in Part III A (ii) of 
this chapter. 
168 In a the recent judgment by the U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, Vernor v Autodesk, Inc., F.3d 2010 
WL 3516435 (91h Cir. 2010) the Court reviewed previous judgments by the same Court on the factors that 
should be considered to determine whether a sale or a licence of copies of computer programs had taken 
place, giving particular weight to copyright holders' restrictions on the ability to transfer copies to other 
parties to determine that no sale had taken place. The reasoning applied by the U.S. District Court of 
California in: Softman Products Company, LLC, v Adobe Systems Inc., 171 F.Supp.2d I 075, 45 UCC 
Rep.Serv.2d 945 (C.D. Cal. 2001) at para 14, is one illustration of how courts have qualified the transaction, 
regardless of suppliers labelling the contract as a licence: "the following factors require a finding that 
distributing software under licenses transfers individual copy ownership: temporally unlimited possession, 
absence of time limits on copy possession, pricing and payment schemes that are unitary not serial, licenses 
under which subsequent transfer is neither prohibited nor conditioned on obtaining the licensor's prior 
approval (only subject to a prohibition against rental and a requirement that any transfer be of the entity), 
and licenses under which the use restrictions' principal purpose is to protect intangible copyrightable 
subject matter, and not to preserve property interests in individual program copies". The court relied on the 
comments made by Professor Nimmer: "Ownership of a copy should be determined based on the actual 
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Ninth Circuit, enunciated three considerations that courts may use to determine whether a licence or a 
sale of the copy of a copyright work took place, giving particular weight to the designation in the 
contract as a licence, as well as to terms restricting the right to transfer copies of copyright works. 170 
The guidance factors enunciated in Autodesk have been applied in subsequent judgments by the same 
Court and lower US courts. 171 As I will discuss in Chapter 8, the Court of Justice in the EU took a 
different approach in UsedSoft, looking to the substance of the transaction to determine that the sale 
of copies of computer programs had taken place, regardless of contract terms stating that the copy of 
h 1. d 172 t e computer program was 1cense . 
The resistance by some courts to enforce contract terms that restrict the alienability of copies of 
copyright works lawfully purchased may be explained through the application of the numerus clausus 
principle, even though the courts do not specifically refer to that principle. 173 Viewed through the lens 
of the numerus clausus principle, these cases bring other important insights on the relationship 
between the standardization within property and the justifications for the exhaustion or first sale 
character, rather than the label, of the transaction by which the user obtained possession. Merely labelling a 
transaction as a lease or license does not control. If a transaction involves a single payment giving the buyer 
an unlimited period in which it has a right to possession, the transaction is a sale. In this situation, the buyer 
owns the copy regardless of the label the parties use for the contract. Course of dealing and trade usage may 
be relevant, since they establish the expectations and intent of the parties. The pertinent issue is whether, as 
in a lease, the user may be required to return the copy to the vendor after the expiration of a particular 
period. If not, the transaction conveyed not only possession, but also transferred ownership of the copy". 
See also Michael Seringhaus, "E-Book Transactions: Amazon "Kindles" The Copy Ownership Debate" 
(2009) 12 Yale J. L. & Tech. 147 at 16lff. 
169 Supra note 168. 
170 Ibid. The Court held, at 8 that based on earlier judgments by the same Court there were three 
considerations that the court may consider to determine whether "a software user is a licensee, rather than 
an owner of a copy. [ ... ] a software user is a licensee rather than an owner of a copy where the copyright 
owner (1) specifies that the user is granted a license; (2) significantly restricts the user's ability to transfer 
the software; and (3) imposes notable use restrictions." Petition for writ of certiorari was denied by the US 
Supreme Court: Vernor v Autodesk, Inc., 132 S.Ct. 105 (2011). 
171 MDY Industries, LLC v Blizzard Entertainment, Inc, 629 F.3d 928 (9th Cir 201 O); Apple Inc. v Pystar 
Corporation, 658 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir, 2011 ); Adobe Systems Incorporated, v Hoops Enterprise, 2012 WL 
1710951 (ND Cal.), in which the Courts applied Autodesk, supra note 166, and found that the software user 
was a licensee. In UMG Recordings Inc. v Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir 2011) the Court found that 
transfer of ownership of the copy of promotional music CDs to the user had taken place. 
172 See the discussion in Chapter 8 Part III. See also Dusollier 2007, supra note 35 at 405, 413, where the 
author notes how licences to commercial copies are often sales in the commercial copies regardless of their 
designation as licences. In such cases, clauses restraining the alienability of the physical object embodying 
copyright works of no force and effect. The transmission of a physical object, the payment of a one-time fee 
and the absence of a limitation of term on the possession of the object are factors that would indicate a sale: 
ibid. 
173 Ibid. For example, this was the case in UsedSoft, supra note 79 and in Softman Products Company, LLC, 
v Adobe Systems Inc., supra note 168. See also United States v Wise, 550 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir.1977) at 1192. 
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doctrine. The most common explanation of its origin, the English common law rule against restraints 
on alienation of property, 174 can be viewed as an application of the numerus clausus principle. The 
right to transfer property is one of the fundamental open-ended powers and privileges attached to 
ownership. The prohibition against alienation of property is the expression of a reticence to alter a 
form a property in such a significant way. The exhaustion or first sale doctrine can also be explained 
by the need to limit the existing forms of property or the numerus clausus principle. 
While it is a tenet of copyright law to grant extensive freedom to copyright holders to decide how, 
when, and to whom they authorize the exploitation of their exclusive rights, the standardization of 
property can be the justification not to enforce contracts that create another form of property, 
including in cases where the main purpose is to circumvent the exhaustion or first sale doctrine. To 
reach another conclusion leads to a dislocated and incoherent application of the nature and scope of 
copyright, of the scope of the prerogative of freedom of contract that comes with it, and of the nature 
and powers of property. 
The existence of the numerus clausus principle and its application to copies of copyright works to 
preserve the integrity of ownership in the copies is debatable. This includes applying the first sale 
doctrine by constraining licence terms that forbid the subsequent transfer of copies of copyright 
works. Glen 0. Robinson defends the existence of various contractual limitations, including the 
limitation on the right to transfer copies of software in licence agreements. 175 He equates such 
limitations to a form of property servitude. 176 Robinson finds no convincing ground for the traditional 
reluctance by courts to enforce personal property servitudes, including restrictions of use and transfer 
of software copies in licence agreements. The instances where such use and transfer restrictions could 
be restrained by courts would be the exception rather than the rule: they would possibly include cases 
where such use restrictions preclude a fair use by copy users. 177 He rejects the argument that personal 
property servitudes restraining the right to transfer software copies should be held unenforceable on 
the basis of the first sale doctrine and of its presumed underlying justification for prohibiting restraints 
to the alienation of property, two arguments that he finds unconvincing. 178 For Robinson, the public 
policy grounds for the first sale doctrine are not clear and are likely not at the same level of 
174 See the discussion in Part III A (ii) of this chapter. 
175 Glen 0. Robinson, "Personal Property Servitudes" (2004) 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1449. 
176 Ibid. at 1449. 
177 Ibid at l 509ff. 
178 Ibid, at 14 70ff. 
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importance as the doctrine of fair use and it is debatable that it should be a ground to invalidate 
clauses that restrict the transfer of the copy of a software. 179 Robinson doubts the existence and 
justification of the numerus clausus principle in the common law tradition of property, both legally 
and normatively. 18° For him, the notification of terms can in fact reduce information costs without the 
standardization of property. 181 In the case of restrictive terms in software licence agreements, their 
prevalence also changes users' expectations and become the norm, which addresses any initial issue 
of information transaction costs. 182 
It is not surprising that Robinson questions the existence of the numerus clausus principle, as well as 
the merit of the first sale doctrine. The exhaustion or first sale doctrine can be justified by the 
standardization of property as they share common concerns about maintaining the integrity of rights 
conferred by ownership of property by limiting the forms of property interests. The acceptation or 
rejection of the numerus clausus principle reflects important diverging views on the nature of property 
and on its specificity. 183 For Robinson, property and contracts are two forms of private ordering and, 
on that basis, he questions why courts should give precedence to the former over the latter by refusing 
to enforce contract clauses that go against, inter alia, the standardization of property. 184 
The argument that freedom of contract should be encouraged on an equal footing with property as a 
form of private ordering is of little application in the context of non-negotiated consumer agreements 
where freedom of contract is very limited. The assumption that freedom of contract is necessary to 
address the individual needs of the consumers and other users cannot readily be made. As a result, the 
competing property rights of consumers and other users tend to be trivialized. 185 Likewise, the broader 
balancing act of competing interests that withstand the property grant in copyright is easily trumped 
by the terms of the contract set by suppliers. 186 It is so unless one is willing to concede that in some 
specific cases the substance of the property right in question should take precedence over the terms of 
contract to maintain coherence and hence efficiency within property law and within copyright law. 
179 Robinson, supra note 175 at 1479. 
180 Ibid at I 482ff. See the discussion on the debate on the existence and justifications of the numerus 
clausus principle in property in Chapter 4 Part III. 
181 Ibid, at 1487. 
182 Ibid at I 490- I 491. 
183 See the discussion on the standardization of property in Chapter 4 Part III. 
184 Robinson, supra note 175 at 1477-1478. 
185 See the discussion of standard non-negotiated end-user agreements of commercial copies purchased 
online in Chapter 3 Part III C. 
186 Ibid. 
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Another criticism of the application of the numerous clausus principle to consumer contracts of copies 
of copyright works is that it may deprive copyright holders and consumers of the advantages of price 
differentiation, for example, based on the ability to transfer, or not transfer, copies of copyright 
works. 187 In response to this criticism, regarding the personal property portion of the commercial 
transaction (as opposed to the intangible right to make uses otherwise restricted by copyright), 
copyright holders remain free to utilize all legal vehicles that are well recognized in property law and 
generally known to consumers: sale, lease, rental, as well as outside property law, for instance, by 
offering a service, 188 in the place of a licence having all the attributes of the sale of the copy, except 
for the right to transfer ownership in the copy or other restriction substantially depriving consumers of 
their ownership rights in the copy. It is with respect to this specific portion of the transaction that the 
numerus clausus principle would limit any attempt to create new species of property rights. 
The notification effects that the known form of property right exerts on consumers are a key element. 
The restriction on transfer of the copy in a transaction that has all the attributes of a sale in the copy 
would typically not be advertised to allow consumers to make a trade-off in exchange for a more 
advantageous price. 189 It is more likely that the right to transfer the commercial copy of the copyright 
work purchased online would be buried in the non-negotiated standard end-user agreements that are 
increasingly part of the online distribution of copies of copyright works. 190 Also, a consumer 
protection analysis informs us that certain rights, such as the freedom to alienate a chattel, can simply 
not be sold except as specifically contemplated by specific fom1s of known agreements such as 
rentals. 191 Last, freedom of contract is no longer an absolute concept in relation to consumer 
transactions; consumer contract terms are subject to various consumer protection mechanisms that 
have developed over the years. 192 
187 Jean Braucher, "Contracting Out of Article 2 Using a "License" Label: a Strategy that Should not Work 
for Software Products" (2007) 40 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 261 at 272 proposes that there should be specific rules 
of digital exhaustion that dictate when restrictions on copy transfers should be enforced and when not. She 
bases her arguments on the merits of price differentiation in the market place: ibid. 
188 For example, streaming services with no possibility to download or copy would fall in that category. 
189 See the discussion on standard non-negotiated end-user agreements for the purchase of commercial 
copies of copyright works online in Chapter 3 Part III C. 
190 Ibid. 
191 See Chapter 9 for the review of the relevant consumer law principles and Chapter 11 for the application 
of consumer law to various scenarios involving copies of copyright works. 
192 Ibid. . 
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I have argued in this Part that the numerus clausus principle, as a "norm of judicial self-
governance,"193 can provide guidance to courts to limit any expansion of copyright that interferes with 
copy ownership by creating another form of property interest. 194 It provides a legal framework to 
secure the scope of consumers' ownership rights to copies of copyright works. Other mechanisms can 
achieve similar results by constraining copyright holders' property rights and the contract terms that 
govern their commercial exploitation. They include statutory provisions giving no force and effect to 
contract terms for the commercialization of copies of copyright works that deviate materially from the 
objectives of the property rights conferred to copyright holders by copyright law. 195 
V. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I looked at the interaction of copy ownership and copyright through the lens of 
property-limitation rules. I demonstrated how their application offers legal solutions as well as a 
normative framework to address areas of uncertainty or of discontent as to how the competing 
property rights of copy owners and of copyright holders are presently mediated. 
When consumers lawfully acquire the copy of a copyright work, two property rights are always 
competing. The increasing permutation of "lawful acquisition" by "lawful access through licence" 
may amplify this tension rather than alleviate it. It leaves behind the justice and efficiency benefits of 
well-established and flexible concepts of personal property. Should copyright digital distribution 
evolve toward a complete eradication of copy ownership in digital copyright works, the fundamental 
interests of copyright consumers discussed in this chapter and in the Second Part of my thesis 196 
remain highly relevant and applicable, and still need to be addressed. Depending on how they are 
incorporated into the copyright design, they may still act as property-limitation rules on copyright. 
193 Merrill & Smith, supra note 164 at 11. 
194 E.g., through the commercial practice of transferring possession in commercial copies of copyright work 
for an indefinite duration but to limit the right to transfer the copy to another party to avoid the application 
of the exhaustion or first sale doctrine. 
195 This legal mechanism is broader in its application than the numerus clausus principle and can extend to 
contract terms that are contrary to exceptions to copyright infringement or to contracts that do not involve 
the transfer of ownership in copies of copyright works. See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part III A and 
Chapter 12 Part III E. 
196 Second Part: The Application of Property Law and Theory to Copyright and Commercial Copies of 
Copyright Works (Chapter 4 to Chapter 7). 
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The potential "property conflict" or "lawful access conflict" between consumers and copyright 
holders is a specific, yet very widespread manifestation within the broader copyright access spectrum 
and public domain debate. As I demonstrated throughout this chapter and the Second Part of my 
thesis, property and copyright law and theory help to explain the nature of this specific legal 
relationship at play more incisively than simply opposing broad public policy considerations against 
the ownership rights of copyright holders. As Waldron observed: 
if broad public policy arguments are the only counter balance to the private property of the copyright 
holder, we may be leaving out of the picture those who are directly and immediately affected by the 
enforcement of the property rule, "those to whom, above all, a justification of property is owed. 197 
The broader policy objectives are important considerations to define the scope of copyright and copy 
ownership respectively, within the framework and solutions offered by the property institution. 
Throughout the Second Part of my thesis, I have defined the nature of copy ownership and copyright 
as distinct forms of property rights, looked at how they compete, and offered a theoretical framework 
to help mediate between these two competing rights with particular attention to copy ownership. This 
is the first step in substantiating copy owners' rights in commercial copies of copyright works. 
Building on the property law and theory analysis to copy ownership and copyright that I presented 
here, the next task is to understand the extent to which consumer law and theory can further 
strengthen consumers' rights to copies of copyright works and offer another perspective on the 
intricate dynamics at play. 
197 Waldron, supra note 7 at 11 7. 
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Chapter 8 
Commercial Copies of Copyright Works: Unfit to be Goods? 
I. Introduction 
In the Second Part of my thesis (i.e., Chapters 4 to 7) I looked at copyright and copy ownership 
through property law and theory and at how they can address the disjunctions of copyright consumers 
rights identified in the First Part of my thesis. In particular, I presented a legal and normative 
framework that looks at copy ownership and copyright on an equal footing to reverse the trend of a 
progressive trivialization in copy ownership rights, as copies are increasingly dematerialized through 
their online distribution and through copyright holders' commercial practices. 
In the third part of my thesis, starting with this chapter, I build on the insights of property law and 
theory and look at how consumer law and theory can further contribute to strengthening copyright 
consumers' rights to copies of copyright works. I apply consumer law principles and look at how they 
can counterbalance the copyright-holder-centric framework of copyright law. For instance, does 
consumer law give consumers the legal tools to fulfill their reasonable expectations on the scope of 
permitted uses of copies of copyright works, even when those expectations are contrary to what 
copyright holders authorize? In particular, I look at the extent to which consumer law limits copyright 
holders' freedom of contract in the area of implied obligations, and the rationale for these constraints. 
The effects of consumer law have been described as "une extension du cercle contractuel." 1 The 
mandatory nature of the consumer protection obligations of particular interest to copies of copyright 
works,2 the rejection of the parol evidence rule,3 the nullity of provisions discarding verbal 
agreements,4 and the potentially binding nature of representations made by suppliers external to the 
1 Which can be translated as: "the extension of the contractual sphere": Nicole L'Heureux, Droit de la 
consommation, 5e edition (Cowansville, Que: Yvon Blais, 2000) at 21. 
2 The specific consumer law obligations that I apply to copies of copyright works are: statutory implied 
obligations of quality and fitness for purpose, correspondence with description, title, quiet possession and 
freedom from encumbrances, restrictions and prohibitions of unfair practices, and information disclosure 
requirements: see Chapter 9. Consumer implied obligations are generally mandatory: Ibid. 
3 For example, as stated in Quebec Consumer Protection Act, RSQ, c. P-40.1 [QCPA] art 263; 
Saskatchewan Consumer Protection Act of the Statutes of Saskatchewan, 1996 c C-30.1 [SCPA], s 46. 
4 QCPA, supra note 3, art 263. 
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contract5 are illustrations of that extended contractual realm. In essence, the contract is one among 
several other relevant factors to consider when determining the application of consumer-protection-
implied obligations.6 From that perspective, consumer protection law offers, a priori, a credible 
counterweight to the exclusive property rights of copyright holders and how they are exercised in 
consumer transactions. From a property theory perspective, I am particularly interested in looking at 
the extent to which consumer law acts as a property-limitation rule of copyright holders' exclusive 
rights.7 
In Canada, the regulation of consumer commercial transactions is a matter of provincial jurisdiction8 
and is generally found in consumer protection statutes. The provincial consumer laws of relevance to 
implied obligations9 often explicitly build upon the existing sale of goods laws (in the common law 
provinces and territories) 10 or, in Quebec, co-exist with the Civil Code of Quebec [CCQ]. 11 Applying 
these bodies of laws to digital copies of copyright works is at times arduous. It involves statutes of 
other eras dominated by preoccupations that seem to show little regard to objects such as 
commercially available digital copies of copyright works. 12 Commentators have noted the 
5 QCPA, supra note 3, art 41-43; EC, Parliament and Council Directive 1999144/EC of 25 May 1999 on 
certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees [ 1999] OJ L 171 /07 at 12 
[Directive 1999144/EC] the object of which is (article 1) the approximation of the laws of the Member 
States on "certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees in order to ensure a 
uniform minimum level of consumer protection in the context of the internal market"; in the UK, the public 
statements on specific characteristics of goods is one of the relevant factors to consider to assess what 
constitutes "satisfactory quality": Sale of Goods Act 1979 (UK), 1979, c. 54 [UKSGA], s 14 2 (d), the 
Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c. 29 [ UKSGSA], ss 4 (2)B & 9 (2)B. 
6 I discuss the application of consumer-implied obligations in Chapter 9. 
7 James W. Harris, Property and Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) at 34, i.e.: "when prima facie 
normative claims founded on the prevailing ownership conception are overridden. They are premised on the 
notion that but for the limitation they contain, the owner would be free to do as he pleases." 
8 At least, the consumer protection matters that are related to contracts, which are matters of provincial 
jurisdictions: Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30&3 l Viet., c. 3 [ 1867 Act], ss 92(13), 92(16). 
9 E.g. implied obligations of quality and fitness for purpose, of title and of quiet possession. 
1° For example, see the Ontario Consumer Protection Act, S.O. 2002, c. 30, schedule A, [OCPA] ss 9(2), 
9(3). S 9(3) refers to the existing implied obligations of the Ontario Sale of Goods Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S-1, 
[OSGA] and adds additional protection for consumer agreements: "Any term or acknowledgement, whether 
part of the consumer agreement or not, that purports to negate or vary any implied condition or warranty 
under the Sale of Goods Act or any deemed condition or warranty under this Act is void." See also British 
Columbia Sale of Goods Act, RSBC 1996 c.410, s. 20 [BCSGA]. 
11 Art 1384 CCQ specifically refers to consumer contracts and defines consumer contracts generally. In 
some respects, CCQ is broader in its application than QCPA, supra note 3: see L'Heureux, supra note 1 at 
35ff. 
12 For instance, see the definition of "goods" in the OSGA, supra note 10, s I (1 ): ""goods" means all 
chattels personal, other than things in action and money, and includes emblements, industrial growing 
crops, and things attached to or forming part of the land that are agreed to be severed before sale or under 
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incongruities and uneasiness of the application of sale of goods and consumer protection laws to 
copies of copyright works. 13 Whether copies of copyright works are "goods" is one illustration of such 
incongruities that I analyze in the present chapter. 
While the primary goal here is to resort to consumer law as a means to clarify and substantiate 
consumers' rights to copies of copyright works, and not to offer an extensive critique on the merit and 
effectiveness of the current consumer protection mechanisms in place, this exercise inevitably leads to 
uncovering some of their shortcomings. Where pertinent, I identify existing gaps and opportunities 
that lie within the consumer protection obligations as a regulatory tool of consumer transactions of 
copies of copyright works. 
In Part II, I look at how courts assess the nature of copies of copyright works in sale of goods and 
consumer law by placing an undue emphasis on the presence of physical supporting media exchanged 
from hand-to-hand. I analyze the jurisprudence that assesses the goods-like nature of copies of 
copyright works through three dichotomies, i.e., tangible v. intangible, goods v. services, and sale v. 
licence, and revisit their application for a more coherent qualification of the nature of copies of 
copyright works. In Part III, I draw parallels between my analysis on the incoherent qualification of 
the contract of sale( ... )"; Treatises on sale of goods law and on consumer protection law rarely discuss in 
much detail the applicability of this body of law to information products, except for the few references to 
whether computer programs constitute goods or not: See for example Gerald H.L. Fridman, Sale of Goods 
in Canada, 5th ed. (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2004) at 47-60, discussion on "good" includes little 
reference to information products which are commonly referred to as "intangibles"; L'Heureux, supra note 
1, does not discuss the particularities of goods subject to intellectual property or information products. See 
also Anthony Gordon Guest, (gen. ed.) Benjamin's Sale of Goods, ?1h ed. (London : Sweet & Maxwell, 
2006), at para 1.086.; P.S. Atiyah & John N.Adams, The Sale of Goods, 10th ed (Harlow, England: Pearson 
Education, 2001) at 66. Jean Braucher, "Contracting out of Article 2 using a "License" label: a Strategy that 
should not work for Software Products" (2007) 40 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 261, 278-279, raises the awkwardness 
of the application of sale of goods legal framework, e.g. the US Uniform Commercial Code to computer 
software, while still acknowledging that it offers sufficient flexibility to accommodate computer software. 
13 David Nimmer, Elliot Brown & Gary N. Frischling, "The Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand" 
(1999) 87 Cal. L. R. 17, at 68ff, reflecting in particular on the application of the US Uniform Commercial 
Code to the licensing of computer software; Gail E. Evans, "Opportunity Costs of Globalizing Information 
Licenses: Embedding Consumer Rights within the Legislative Framework for Information Contracts" 
(1999) 10 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 267, more particularly at 283ff, on the inaptitude of sale 
of goods legislation to deal with information products. On the difficulties more specific to the application of 
consumer law to copyright law, see Lucie Guibault & Natali Helberger, "Copyright law and Consumer 
Protection" (2005) study carried out for the European Consumer Law Group, ECLG/035/05; Natali 
Helberger & P.Bernt Hugenholtz, "No place like home for making a copy, private copying in European 
copyright law and consumer law" (2007) 22 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1061; Niva.Elkin-Koren, "Making Room 
for Consumers Under the DMCA" (2007) 22 Berkley Technology Law Journal 1119. 
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goods under sale of goods and consumer law in Part II and the application of copyright exhaustion. In 
Part IV, I propose a unified approach to the qualification of goods and to the scope of copyright 
exhaustion through property law and theory. Such an approach enables movement away from the 
somewhat arbitrary emphasis on the presence of physical supporting media, both with respect to the 
qualification of goods and the application of copyright exhaustion, and offers an analytical framework 
that is more inclusive of digital copies distributed online with no physical supporting medium. I 
conclude in Part V that as much as the introduction in this chapter to the application of consumer law 
to copyright may foreshadow the erratic nature of the exercise, the inconsistencies that it underscores 
should not stand in the way of the further exploration of how consumer law can help substantiate 
consumers' rights to copies of copyright works. 
II. Misunderstood dichotomies 
An inquiry into the application of consumer law to copies of copyright work begins with two 
seemingly trivial yet determining questions: are the copies "goods" and how are they made 
commercially available to consumers? Particularly, the goods-like nature of digital copies of 
copyright works is unsettled when there is no supporting physical medium (e.g., a CD or DVD) 
exchanged from hand-to-hand with the delivery of the copyright work (e.g., the musical recording or 
film). 14 While these two questions of classification (i.e., whether it is a good and whether it is sold or 
licensed) are not relevant to the application of all consumer law obligations, they are determinant in 
one important area, i.e., the application of consumer-protection-implied obligations to copies of 
copyright works. 15 These two requirements of scope originate from the strong underpinnings of sale 
of good laws for these particular consumer protection obligations. 16 In Canada and the other 
jurisdictions explored here, the application of the other consumer protection obligations that I analyze 
14 See the report where the authors analysed the laws of I I countries including the US, the UK, France and 
other European states by: Marco B.M. Loos, Natali Heiberger, Lucie Guibault, Chantal Mak, Lodewijk 
Pessers, Katalin J. Cseres, Bart van der Sloot & Ronan Tigner, "Analysis of the applicable legal 
frameworks and suggestions for the contours of a model system of consumer protection in relation to digital 
content contracts" (2011) University of Amsterdam, Centre for the Study of European Contract Law 
(CSECL), Institute for Information Law (IViR), Amsterdam Centre for Law and Economics (ACLE), 
online: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/consumer-marketing/events/digital conf en.htm, at 32. 
15 I.e., the application of statutory implied obligations of quality and of fitness for purpose, of 
correspondence with description, of title, quiet possession and freedom from encumbrances: see Chapter 9. 
16 1.e., consumer-protection-law-implied obligations typically expressly build upon or refer to sale of goods 
law in the field of consumer implied obligations: see supra note I 0. 
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in my thesis 17 do not require the presence of "goods," nor do they rely on the nature of the legal 
transaction involved. 18 
Although the goods-like nature of copies of copyright works and the legal vehicle through which they 
are made available to consumers are distinct matters, courts tend to blend the two concepts 
interchangeably to assess the applicability of sale of goods and consumer law. 19 When the legal 
requirements for the application of sale of goods and consumer law are not met, similar implied 
obligations may apply under the common law20 or the CCQ.21 This is a small consolation compared to 
the greater level of protection and greater simplicity that statutory implied obligations offer to 
consumers.
22 In jurisdictions outside Canada, the application of implied obligations to consumer 
transactions still largely depends on the existence of "goods," in some jurisdictions more than in 
others.23 
17 E.g., more specifically the information disclosure requirements and the prohibition of unfair practices: see 
Chapter 9, Chapter 1 0 and Chapter 11. 
18 The implied obligations of sale of goods and consumer law apply only to goods and the information 
disclosure requirements and prohibitions against unfair practices apply to consumer transactions generally: 
see Chapter 9. 
19 See the discussion in Part II C of this chapter. 
20 St. Albans City & District Council v international Computers Ltd., [ 1996] 4 All ER 481 (C.A.) [St. 
Albans]; Gretton (tla Open Systems Design) v British Millerain Co Ltd (formerly British Millerain (1922) 
Co Ltd) (1998) WL 1120719 (HC, TCC) at paras 45- 48. 
If the transaction is qualified as one for the provision of services, implied obligations applicable to services 
may apply. I discuss the distinction between goods and services in Part II B of this chapter. 
21 E.g., CCQ art 1723- 1731. 
22 Robert Bradgate, "Consumer rights in digital products" (2010) online at 
http://www.google.ca/search?sourceid=navclient&ie=lJTF-
8&rlz= IT 4ADBF enCA27 5CA27 5&q=Brad gate%2c+Consumer+ri ghts+i n+di gital+products+ 20 l 0 at 20, 
refers to three main characteristics of implied obligations under ss. 12 to 15 of UKSGA, supra note 5: "(a) 
they are easy to prove; (b) their breach allows the consumer buyer to seek to bring into play a range of 
powerful remedies; and (c) neither they nor liability for their breach can be excluded where the buyer "deals 
as consumer." See also Ibid at 49. 
23 For example, in the UK the UKSGA, supra note 5, provides implied obligations for sale of "goods" (ss 2, 
64, 12-14) and the UKSGSA, supra note 5, provides implied obligations in "contracts for the transfer of 
goods" such as the supply of labour and materials and hire contracts (ssl, 2ff). There is a separate implied 
term for services at s 13 which provides that the supplier "will carry out the service with reasonable care 
and skill" ... "where the supplier is acting in the course of a business": ibid.; Directive 1999144/EC, supra 
note 5, applies to "goods" (art. 1 (2) b, 2 (1 )). In the US the Uniform Commercial Code, Official Text (2000) 
(amended 2003) online: http://www.law.cornell.edu/ucc/ucc.table.htmJ [US UCC],§ 2-312, § 2-314, § 2-315 
implied obligations also apply to transactions in "goods". 
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Given the overall policy objective of consumer protection laws and the additional level of protection 
that they offer to consumers,24 any issue of scope that may discredit the application of implied 
obligations to consumer transactions needs to be examined carefully. When this exclusion affects an 
increasingly large segment of the consumer market, i.e., information products distributed online, there 
is cause for concern. When it is compounded with the increasing trivialization of the ownership rights 
in copies of copyright works examined in the Second Part of my thesis, an alarming pattern of 
diminished rights and protection for consumers starts to take shape. 
Commercial copies of copyright works that are sold through the hand-to-hand supply of a physical 
medium (such as music CDs or film DVDs) are generally characterized as goods in Canada and 
elsewhere.25 By contrast, the applicability of sale of goods- (and consumer-) law-implied obligations 
to digital content supplied online is still an unsettled area of the law. The absence of the hand-to-hand 
supply of a physical medium and the uncertainty of the distinction between "goods" and "services" 
are at the heart of this equivocalness. 
24 I discuss the theoretical justifications of consumer protection obligations in Chapter 10. 
25 E.g. in the US, EU, UK and France as it is discussed further below. See Gerber Scientific Instrument Co. 
v Bell-Northern Research Ltd. 1994 CarswellOnt 1029, 17 B.L.R. (2d) 21 (OCA) where the Ontario Court 
of Appeal upheld the lower court judgement applying the OSGA, supra note 10, to a computer system, 
holding that that the supplier of the computer system was in breach of the implied obligation of fitness for a 
particular purpose ( OSGA, ibid s 15, ); See Lalese Enterprises Inc. v Arete Technologies Inc 1994 
CarswellBC 1220, 59 C.P.R. (3d) 438 (BCSC) where the implied condition of fitness for a particular 
purpose was held to apply to a customized computer system (hardware and software); Western Engineering 
Service Ltd. v Canada Malting Co., [1994] OJ No. 2026 (Gen. Div.) whereby sale of goods law was held to 
apply to a software package; Classified Directory Publishers Inc. v Image Management Technologies Inc., 
1995 CarswellOnt 2449 (OCJ(G.D.)) where the court applied the implied condition of fitness for a 
particular purpose to a computer system (hardware and software); Michael's Pizzeria Ltd. v LP Computer 
Solutions Inc. 1996 CarswellPEI 31, 139 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 295, 433 A.P.R. 295 (PEI SC TD) where 
computer system held to constitute "goods" under Prince Edward Island Sale of Goods Act; Villeseche v 
Total North Communication Ltd. 1997 CarswellYukon 53 (YCA) where the Yukon Court of Appeal upheld 
the lower court judgment that the Sale of Goods Act, RSYT 1986-1990 implied obligation of 
merchantability applied to a computer system; W.J. Caul Funeral Home Ltd. v Pearce, 1997 CarswellNfld 
11, 153 Nfld. & PEIR 252 (NSCTD) where the implied condition of fitness for a particular purpose was 
held to apply to computer equipment and computer software; Saskatoon Gold Brokers Inc. v Datatec 
Computer Systems Ltd. 1986 Carswell Sask 401, 55 Sask. R. 241 (Sask QB) where the Saskatchewan Sale of 
Goods Act, RSS 1978, c. S-1 implied obligation of fitness for a particular purpose was also held to apply to 
a computer system. In the US, see RRX Industries Inc. v Lab-Con Inc., 773 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1985) where 
the US Court of Appeals, 9th circ., held that a software package constituted "goods" under the California 
Commercial Code; in the UK, see St. Albans, supra note 20; Kingsway Hall Hotel Ltd v Red Sky IT 
(Hounslow) Ltd, 2010 WL 1639690 (QB) where the court applied the implied obligations of the UKSGA, 
supra note 5, to an off the shelf software package. For a contrary view in the US context, see: Lorin 
Brennan, "Why Article 2 Cannot apply to Software Transactions" (2000) 38 Duq. L. Rev. 459. 
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The legal nature of digital copies of copyright works distributed online and whether consumers' rights 
should extend to the supply of digital content has been at the heart of recent consumer protection 
reform debates in the EU. Consumer Goods Guarantees26 have been interpreted as not applying to 
digital content.27 The Green Paper on the Consumer Acquis28 invited Member States to consider the 
expansion of the European Union regime of consumer sale of goods to the supply of digital content.29 
This proposal met fierce resistance,30 with the result that the proposal for reform did not expand the 
application of the European consumer sales legal framework to the supply online of digital content.31 
The recent adoption by the European Parliament and the Council of Directive 2011183/EU on 
consumer rights32 is an attempt to clarify how the European Union intends to classify and regulate 
consumer transactions of digital content. Directive 2011183/EU deals more specifically with traders' 
information disclosure obligations and formality requirements in consumer contracts, including 
distance contracts. 33 It confirms the approach by the EU not to treat digital content as a good when it 
is supplied with no supporting physical medium exchanged from hand-to-hand, while specifying the 
type of protection that it deserves. 34 The foundations and rationale behind the insistence on the 
presence of a physical supporting medium exchanged from hand-to-hand are not entirely clear and 
merit further investigation. 
26Directive 1999144/EC, supra note 5. 
27 Directive1999144/EC, supra note 5, at art I 2. (b) defines "consumer goods" as "any tangible movable 
item" with some exceptions applying to utilities and goods sold by execution or authority of law: ibid. EC, 
The Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer Acquis (Brussesls: EC, 2006) [Green Paper on the 
Consumer Acquis] s 5.1, takes the position that Directive 1999144/EC, ibid, does not apply to the supply of 
digital content, such as online music. It presented the option to extend the scope of the Directive to the 
supply of digital content: ibid. 
28 Supra note 27. 
29 Ibid, at section 5.1. 
30 Especially with respect to the distribution of online software, see: Peter Rott, "Download of Copyright-
Protected Internet Content and the Role of (Consumer) Contract Law" (2008) 31 J. Consum. Policy, 441 at 
452. 
31 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on consumer rights, COM (2008) 
614 final, [Consumer Directive Proposal (2008)] art 2 (4) which defines "goods", leaves unchanged the 
definition of "consumer goods" in Directive 1999144/EC, supra note 5. 
32 EC, Council and Parliament Directive 2011183/EU of 22 November 2011 on consumer rights, amending 
Council Directive 93113/EEC and Directive 1999144/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
and repealing Council Directive 851577/EEC and Directive 9717/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, [2011] OJ L 304/64 [Directive 2011183/EU]. This directive applies to contracts concluded after 13 
June 2014: Ibid, at art 28 (2). 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
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The particularity of copies of copyright works is that they embed dichotomies in varying degrees that 
have at times misled courts, commentators, law- and policy-makers on how to weigh those diverging 
interests. Those dichotomies relate primarily to the concepts of tangibility v. intangibility, the 
distinction between goods and services, and the distinction between sale and licence. I will explore 
these three dichotomies in that same order. Other dichotomies that are specific to copies of copyright 
works need not be explored here. They are: the objective v. subjective elements and the functional v. 
non-functional components of copies of copyright works.35 
A. Tangible v. intangible 
The tangible v. intangible dichotomy is employed to describe categories of property and goods in 
property and sale of goods and consumer law. In sale of goods and consumer law, intangible property 
is frequently excluded from the definition of goods.36 Copyright is generally described as "intangible 
property" or "choses in action."37 The tangible v. intangible distinction also derives from the 
application of an ordinary meaning interpretative approach to the signification of "goods" and 
"services."38 A review of sale of goods and consumer protection case law reveals that the application 
of this dichotomy sometimes gives rise to confusion when it is applied to copies of copyright works. 
The tangible and intangible dichotomy manifests itself in three different ways in court decisions and 
commentators' analyses on the applicability of obligations implied by sale of goods and consumer 
35These dichotomies contrast goods embedding copyright works from other goods in that the subjective, 
non-functional elements (e.g., artistic merit, originality) are typically significantly greater than the 
objective, functional elements. Sale of goods/consumer law would typically protect purchasers (e.g., 
through implied warranties or conditions of quality, fitness for use and quiet possession) with respect to the 
objective, functional elements of the copies of copyright works (access, permitted uses, quality of images, 
sounds, print, etc ... ). 
36 For example, see definition of "goods" in the OSGA, supra note 10, s 1 (1 ); BCSGA, supra note I 0, s 1; 
US UCC, supra note 23 § 2-103 k); UKSGA, supra note 5, s 61. 
37 For a historical perspective on the debate around the nature of copyright in Canada, see H. G. Fox, 
Canadian law of Copyright (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1944) at 7-11, whereby after reviewing 
various characterizations of copyright, the author concluded that copyright is incorporeal property. See the 
discussion on the property attributes of copyright in Chapter 5 Part IV. 
38 Fiona Smith & Loma Woods, "A Distinction without a Difference: Exploring the Boundary between 
Goods and Services in the World Trade Organization and The European Union" (2005) 12 Colum. J. Eur. 
L. I, at 40ff. As discussed by the authors, the distinction between tangible and intangible is dictated in part 
by the ordinary dictionary meaning attributed to "goods" and "services", which is the approach chosen by 
the authors in the context of assessing the meaning of goods and services in an international trade context, 
e.g. at the World Trade Organization level: ibid. 
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law.39 The first application of this dichotomy is reflected by the emphasis that courts and 
commentators place on the presence of a physical medium (tangible) as the vehicle supporting the 
actual creative intellectual work protected by copyright (often characterized as "intangible," such as 
software, a musical work, a film, or a literary work). The second application of the tangible v. 
intangible dichotomy is one that emphasizes the intangible nature of the intellectual property rights 
(which are usually retained by the copyright holder) present in the transaction, thereby tainting its 
characterization as a whole. The third application of the tangible v. intangible dichotomy is one 
whereby courts and commentators fail to contrast the end result, i.e., the commercialized product, 
with the intellectual labour-intensive creation that went into it. 
The first manifestation of the tangible v. intangible distinction (i.e., the one that places emphasis on 
the presence of a physical medium exchanged hand-to-hand as the vehicle supporting the actual 
creative intellectual work protected by copyright) is well illustrated by the landmark English Court of 
Appeal judgment St. Albans City & District Council v. International Computers Ltd.40 Sir lain 
Glidewell, in a frequently cited obiter dictum, stated that the presence or not of a physical medium to 
supply the copy of the computer software would be the decisive factor to determine whether a 
computer program qualified as a good or not.41 Canadian and American courts have also been more 
readily inclined to find that copies of copyright works are goods in presence of the supply of a hand-
to-hand physical object. 42 In doing so, courts have at times applied a reasoning by analogy and 
39 The tangible v. intangible dichotomy is a leading distinction to determine the applicability of sale of 
goods and consumer laws to a specific transaction: Fridman, supra note 12, at 14. For a discussion on the 
treatment of computer programs as being tangible or intangible see Ken Moon, "The nature of computer 
programs: tangible? goods? personal property? intellectual property?" (2009) 31 E.I.P.R. 396. 
40 St. Albans, supra note 20. 
41 Ibid. In that case, it was held that the defendant was under an express contractual obligation to provide 
the plaintiffs with software which would allow them to accomplish certain functions. It was therefore not 
necessary to consider the legal ground (e.g. statutory or common law) under which implied obligations 
would apply. Nourse L.J. indicated concurrence with the obiter dictum. See also Southwark LBC v IBM UK 
Ltd, 2011 WL 722364 (QB), at paras 96ff, where in an obiter dictum Akenhead J. stated that software could 
constitute goods under UKSGA, supra note 5 but in the context of the transfer of a supporting physical 
medium such as a CD. 
42 See supra note 25. Courts tend to approach contracts for the supply of computer hardware and computer 
software as a whole as sale of goods: see Barry B. Sookman, Computer, Internet, and Electronic Commerce 
Law, loose-leaf (Toronto:Thomson Carswell, 1988), at para 2.17 (b). In Arvie Search Services Inc. v Foam 
Shop Ltd, 2008 ABPC 256, the court in a obiter dictum, stated that a software did not constitute goods. In 
that case, the issue of the application of implied obligations under the Alberta Sale of Goods Act, did not 
need to be addressed as the issue to be tried revolved around the consequences of non-performance of the 
contract by both parties. In the US, courts have been willing to consider software alone as involving a 
transaction in goods. See for example the frequently cited case: Schroders Inc. v Hogan Systems Inc., 522 
276 
assimilation. 43 Familiar objects such as discs and tapes, which have long been recognized as goods, 
justify that the predominant feature of the product, e.g., the musical recording, the film, or computer 
software, also be assimilated to a good.44 In St. Albans, Sir Iain Glidewell made the distinction 
between the transfer of a computer disc for money, which would trigger the application of warranties 
under the applicable sale of goods law as the allegedly defective instructions (e.g., the code in the 
computer program) were part of the disc, and would have made the disc (i.e. a good) defective.45 
However, in this case, the mere provision of a computer program did not, even though a disc was 
involved in the arrangement, trigger the application of sale of goods warranties because the installer 
had transferred the program himself onto the computer but had retained the disc: 
As I have already said, the program itself is not "goods" within the statutory definition. Thus a 
transfer of the program in the way I have described does not, in my view, constitute a transfer of 
goods. It follows that in such circumstances there is no statutory implication of terms as to quality 
or fitness for purpose.46 
The lower Court in that case had stated, also in obiter dictum, that software would constitute goods.47 
The rejection that computer software are goods, as per the obiter by Sir Iain Glidewell, was applied in 
Horace Holman Group Ltd. v Sherwood International Group Ltd.48 In the earlier judgment Beta 
Computers (Europe) Ltd v Adobe Systems (Europe) Ltd,49 while Lord Penrose acknowledged the 
N.Y.S. 2d 404 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 1987) at para 3) where the US UCC, supra note 23 (as adopted in the State of 
New York), was held to apply to software licences even if no hardware was being transferred; Shema 
Kolainu-Hear our Voices v Providersoft, LLC, F.Supp.2d 2010 WL 2075921 ( USDC E.D.N.Y. 2010), 
where the court refers to case law supporting treatment of software licence as good under US UCC, supra 
note 23, noting uncertainty in the area. In that case, the parties had agreed to treat the software licence 
agreement as "goods"; Gross v Symantec Corporation., not reported in F Supp (2d) (ND Cal 2012), at 9 
where the court held that a software delivered online with no physical supporting medium qualified as 
goods under the California UCC. 
43 On how courts have had recourse to reasoning by analogy in a US UCC context, see Bonna Lynn 
Horovitz, "Computer Software as a Good under the Uniform Commercial Code: Taking a Byte out of the 
Intangibility Myth" (1985) 65 B.U. L. Rev. 129, at 146-147. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Supra note 20. See also Southwark LBC v IBM UK Ltd, supra note 41. 
46 Ibid at 266. 
47 St A/ban's City and District Council v International Computers Limited [ 1995] F.S.R. 686 (QB) at 699: 
" ... I am of the view that software probably is goods within the Act. Programs are, as has been pointed out, 
of necessity contained in some physical medium, otherwise they are useless. As Mr Mawrey put it, it is just 
as much a supply of goods as if paint were applied to a wall or printing ink to a blank page. It is not simply 
abstract information like information passed by word of mouth. Entering software alters the contents of the 
hardware." 
48 2000 WL 491372 (TCC) [Horace]. 
49 1996 SLT 604 (Outer House). 
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artificiality of giving prevalence to the supporting medium as the determining factor to qualify the 
object of the transaction as goods,50 the Court refused to treat the supply of computer software as the 
sale of goods. 51 
The application of the reasoning of Sir Iain Glidewell in St. Albans, as referred to in Horace,52 has 
profound effects on the regulation of digital content distributed online. If copies of copyright works 
distributed online with no supporting physical media are not goods under the relevant statutory 
provisions of sale of goods and consumer laws, they cannot benefit from the protection mechanisms 
offered through implied consumer obligations. This limits the protection to any remaining common 
law implied obligations, the breach of which can be more difficult to establish than their statutory 
counterparts.53 Implied obligations, as they apply within the framework of consumer protection law, 
can be invoked more easily, give rise to a broad range of remedies, and are typically mandatory.54 In 
50 Lord Penrose stated: "It appears to emphasize the role of the physical medium, and to relate the 
transaction in the medium to sale or hire of goods. It would have the somewhat odd result that the dominant 
characteristic of the complex product, in terms of value or of the significant interests of parties, would be 
subordinated to the medium by which it was transmitted to the user in analyzing the true nature and effect 
of the contract. If one obtained computer programs by telephone, they might be introduced into one's own 
hardware and used as effectively as if the medium were a disk or CD or magnetic tape.": Ibid, at 608-609. 
On the triviality of the physical medium in comparison to the computer programming see also Horovitz, 
supra note 43, at 132-133. The confusion that arises from the presence of intellectual property rights and 
other intangibles and the physical medium supporting it was noted by Andrew Rodau, "Computer Software: 
Does Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code Apply?" (1986) 35 Emory L.J. 853, at 861-862. The 
artificiality of this distinction in an increasing world of online distribution of copyright works (and 
generally information products) is also discussed by Atiyah & Adams, supra note 12, at 68-71. The authors 
come to this conclusion by a consequential argument, as to whether liability for a defective software should 
be different based on how the software is delivered, i.e. a disc or online (answering this question in the 
negative). 
51 Supra note 49. In that case, Lord Penrose qualified the software license agreement as a sui generis 
contract. 
52 Ibid. 
53 St. Albans, supra note 20, Sir Iain Glidewell in obiter, stated that an implied obligation would apply at 
common law to computer software supplied under contract, citing: Trollope & Coils Ltd v N. W 
Metropolitan Regional Hospital Board (1973) I WLR 601 at 609: "An unexpressed term can be implied if 
and only if the court finds that the parties must have intended that term to form part of their contract; it is 
not enough for the court to find that such a term would have been adopted by the parties as reasonable men 
if it had been suggested to them; it must have been a term that went without saying, a term which, though 
tacit, formed part of the contract which the parties made for themselves." Sir Iain Glidewell then concluded 
on that basis that "In the absence of any express term as to quality or fitness for purpose, or of any term to 
the contrary, such a contract is subject to an implied term that the program will be reasonably fit for, i.e. 
reasonably capable of achieving the intended purpose." The court applied this passage of Sir Iain Glidewell' 
obiter in Horace, supra note 48. 
54 See the discussion on implied obligations in Chapter 9 Part II. In a UK context, see Bradgate, supra note 
22 at 26. 
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some cases, copies made accessible online could benefit from the protection of implied obligations as 
they apply to services.55 
Directive 2011!83/EU56 places a similar emphasis to that of Sir Iain Glidewell in St. Albans57 on the 
presence of a supporting physical medium exchanged from hand-to-hand to determine whether copies 
of copyright works ("digital content") qualify as a good or not. On the one hand, copies of copyright 
works that are supported by a physical medium exchanged from hand-to-hand are "goods."58 On the 
other hand, copies distributed online with no physical supporting media exchanged from hand-to-hand 
are neither goods nor services, but of a sui generis nature.59 This directive harmonizes the laws of 
Member States with respect to traders' information disclosure requirements in consumer contracts, 
including distance or off-premises contracts, as well as with respect to formal requirements for these 
specific types of contracts.60 While it clarifies that the right of withdrawal applies to digital content 
regardless of its status as a "good,"61 the impact of this sui generis treatment and whether it will be 
replicated in future European Union regulation of consumer transactions are unclear. 
The presence of a physical tangible product may be pertinent to determine whether it is a good when, 
for instance, the copy of the copyright work is ancillary to the whole product (such as embedded 
software in a camera or digital recorder). It seems less justified as a defining attribute when the 
physical embodiment is in fact the ancillary part of the product (such as the CD of a musical recording 
or the DVD of a film). 62 As acknowledged by Lord Penrose in Beta Computers (Europe) Ltd v Adobe 
Systems (Europe) Ltd,63 the presence or not of a hand-to-hand physical supporting medium (such as a 
55 This would then give rise to different regimes of protection. The distinction between goods and services 
is discussed in Part II B. of this chapter. 
56 Supra note 32. 
57 Supra note 20. 
58 Directive 2011183/EU, supra note 32, Preamble, Recital 19. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid, art 5ff. 
61 Ibid, Preamble, Recital 19. 
62 See Bradgate, supra note 22 at 40-41, who analogizes such reasoning to placing more emphasis on the 
packaging than the substance of the product as the test of its qualification, such as focusing on the bottle of 
a bottle of whiskey to determine the nature of whiskey. 
63 Supra note 49. 
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disc) with the copy of a copyright work (such as software) as a determinant factor of its nature as 
good is somewhat artificial. 64 
There is no requirement of tangibility in the definition of "goods" as understood in that narrow 
sense.65 The plausible explanation for this requirement is a misunderstanding about the typical 
exclusion of intangible property (choses in action) from the definition of goods.66 Depending on the 
circumstances surrounding their access, digital copies of copyright works can share the attributes that 
are common to other goods. The tangible v. intangible divide dissolves when one acknowledges the 
physical nature of digital works. While they cannot be touched, and in some cases not seen, the pixels 
and binary codes that make up the musical recording or the film are as "physical" as the CDs or 
DVDs that support a digital copy. 67 
In the context of the US Uniform Commercial Code [US UCC], the requirement of "movability" has 
been raised as the predominant factor having taken precedence over the divide between tangible and 
intangible, prominent in the earlier common law,68 to determine whether products are "goods" or 
not.69 Adopting a purposive approach to the US UCC to assess the nature of computer software, one 
commentator suggests that the concerns for excluding intangibles such as "choses in action" from the 
definition of goods in the US UCC are not present in the context of this information product:7° 
64 Ibid. 
65 See Bradgate, supra note 22, at 41-42, 50. See the definition of goods under sale of goods law legislation 
in Canada, supra note I 2, infra note 132. However, the EU makes that distinction clearly Directive 
2011183/EU, supra note 32, Preamble, Recital 19. 
66 I discuss the undue emphasis that is placed on the presence of intangible property rights in copies of 
copyright works further below in this section. 
67 An interesting analogy is found in art 906 CCQ, which states that "Waves or energy harnessed and put to 
use by man, whether their source is movable or immovable, are deemed corporeal movables." 
68 As this is still reflected by the exclusion of choses in action from the definition of goods, including under 
the US UCC, supra note 23. Horovitz, supra note 43, at 137-138 explains how the common law employed a 
strict definition of goods: "The common-law definition of what was or was not a good was strict. At 
common law only those things that could be the subject of larceny or were susceptible of delivery could be 
the subject matter of a sale. Choses in action were not considered to be goods because they were incapable 
of delivery. The law merchant, from which Article 2 of the UCC eventually developed, governed only those 
things which could be bought and sold commercially. Intangibles were viewed as personal rights incapable 
of sale; these rights traveled with the owner, were personal t:o him, and died with him." 
69 See Horovitz, supra note 43 at 138, a frequently cited article by US courts when confronted to qualifying 
the nature of computer software as good or service. 
70 Horovitz, supra note 43 at 151-152: "The fact that a computer program cannot be seen or felt should not 
preclude UCC coverage, as the UCC does not make those qualities the test for exclusion. The type of 
intangibility meant to be excluded from Article 2, that of choses in action, is different from the type of 
intangibility characteristic of software. That program instructions are intangible does not rule out UCC 
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While the UCC does distinguish between goods and things in action, excluding the latter from 
coverage, software, no matter how it is classified, should not fall within this exclusion .... It is 
unlike intangible legal rights, intangible laws and principles, and intangible assets. A program is 
intangible in the sense that it cannot be touched or felt, but not in the sense that it cannot be 
moved and identified to a contract.71 
From that perspective, movability, transferability, and the possibility of identification at the time of 
sale are the critical factors for the qualification as goods, not tangibility (in the narrow sense of the 
term).72 Computer programs and other copies of copyright works are tradable objects regardless of 
their material form, unlike perhaps forms of intangible property or choses in action that are not 
tradable objects falling under the ambit of sale of goods and consumer laws. 
Movability implies something "to take with oneself'73 and is the underlying requirement for the 
transfer of ownership as another means to distinguish specific goods from other products. 74 Referring 
to the definition of "copy" in the US Copyright Act,75 Jean Braucher notes the incongruity of not 
treating copies of software as "tangible material objects." If it were so, it would not prohibit making 
unauthorized copies under that act. 76 For Braucher: 
There is no good reason not to extend this version of tangibility, assuming tangibility is necessary, 
to the realm of Article 2. 77 Software copies are perceivable by a machine and in that sense 
tangible, making them easily "things," which may not require tangibility. Software copies can be 
moved in various ways, including on computers and disks and by electronic download.78 
applicability, as programs can be identified, moved, transferred, and sold in the same manner as other 
pieces of personal property classified as goods." 
71 Ibid, at 162. For a contrary view, e.g. that computer software does not fulfill the requirement of 
"movability" see Brennan, supra note 25 at 535-536. 
72 Horovitz, supra note 43 at 151. For a contrary view in the case of computer software fulfilling the 
requirement of being "identifiable" under the U.S. Uniform Commercial Code regime, see Brennan, supra 
note 25 at 536-537. 
73 As in the concept of "personal" property. 
74 See Smith & Woods, supra note 38 at 45. 
75 The US Copyright Act, 17 USC, § 10 I defines copies as "material objects ... from which the work can 
be perceived ... either directly or with the aid of a machine .... "."Copy" is not defined in Canada's 
Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42 [CCA]. The concept in Canadian copyright law (and other laws 
worldwide) of fixation of copies of copyright works is discussed in Part II A. 
76 Braucher, supra note 12 at 268. 
77 E.g. referring to article to of the US UCC, supra note 23, which is the article that regulates contracts of 
sales. 
78 Braucher, supra note I 2 at 268. 
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Braucher points to movability and the ability to perceive or identify the software copies as the 
determinant attributes to assert their goods-like nature. Digital copies of copyright works purchased 
online possess these two attributes. BEUC, The European Consumers' organization,79 made a similar 
analysis in a position paper on the regulation of digital products in the European Union, emphasizing 
consumers' ability to access digital products on a permanent basis, and to store them, as determinant 
factors of the goodness of digital content. 80 Directive 2011183/EU opted for a different approach, 
treating digital content with no physical supporting medium exchanged hand-to-hand as neither goods 
nor service, while clarifying the level of protection that it deserves. 81 International classifications, e.g., 
in the area of trademarks, provide insights on the classification of software as goods regardless of the 
presence of a supporting tangible medium. 82 
The second common application of the tangible v. intangible dichotomy in court decisions and 
commentators' analyses is one that places undue emphasis on the existence of the copyright holders' 
exclusive rights in the copyright work itself. In personal property terms, these exclusive rights are 
often referred to as "choses in action" or "intangible personal property" and are specifically excluded 
from definitions of goods in the relevant sale of goods or consumer law statutes. 83 At times, courts 
79 BEUC, The European consumers' organisation, is the umbrella organisation for 42 independent national 
consumer organisations across Europe. Its main task is to represent the interests of these organisations and 
all consumers across Europe: see BEUC, The European consumers organisation official website at: 
http://www.beuc.org/Content/Default.asp?PagelD=59 l. 
80 BEUC, "Digital Products, How to include them in the Proposal for a Consumer Rights Directive", 
Position Paper, Brussels, 2010, available online at http://www.beuc.org/Content/Dcfault.asp?PageID=2135 
, at 3. 
81 Supra note 32, Preamble, at recital 19. 
82 Under the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the 
Purposes of the Registration of Marks, June 15, I 957, as amended, online: 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/classification/nice/trtdocs wo019.html, there are 45 registration classes, 34 
for goods and 11 for services. Class nine (goods) would cover software. The explanatory notes to Class nine 
states that this class includes: "all computer programs and software regardless of recording media or means 
of dissemination, that is, software recorded on magnetic media or downloaded from a remote computer 
network." International classification of goods and services under the Nice Agreement, 101h edition, online: 
http://www.wipo.int/classifications/nivi1o/nice/index.htm?1ang=EN# The trade-mark classification system 
fulfills different purposes: i.e. it allows trade-mark applicants to define for which types of goods and 
services they (intend to) use their trade-mark and claim exclusive rights. In Canada, "software" falls under 
the classification of wares and/or of services for the purpose of trade-marks registration: Canadian 
Intellectual Property Office, "The Wares and Services Manual", online: http://www.ic.gc.ca/app/opic-
cipo/wrs/dsplyPblcSrch.do. 
83 OSGA, supra note 10, s 1(1), defines goods as "chattels personal" other than "things in action", which 
dictates the scope of application of implied obligations in consumer contracts ( OCPA, supra note I 0, ss 9 
(2),9(3)). OCPA, supra note I 0, s I, has a broader definition of goods as "any type of property" which 
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and commentators are confused by the presence of intangible property rights of copyright holders 
when ascertaining the nature of the object of study, e.g., copies of the copyright works per se. 84 
An important distinction needs to be made between the rights in copyright works85 and in commercial 
copies of the copyright works. 86 In this exercise, the intangible nature of the rights of copyright 
holders is not in itself conclusive, as noted in the two leading US cases, Advent Systems Ltd. v. Unisys 
would apply to other consumer protection obligations under the OCP A, ibid. See BCSGA, supra note I 0, s. 
I (a). See also Alberta Sale of Goods Act RSA 2000, c. S-2 [ASGA], s. I (h); Alberta Fair Trading Act, RSA 
c. F-2 [AFTA], s 1(1) (e). Certain definitions refer to "tangible" personal property: Manitoba Consumer 
Protection Act, RSM 1987, c. C200, C.C.S.M. c. C200 [MCPA], s. 1(1); New Brunswick Consumer Product 
Warranty and Liability Act, SNB 1978, c. C-18. l [NBCPWLA], s. 1 (I); Directive 1999144/EC, supra note 5, 
art. 1 (2) b), defines goods as any "tangible" movable item, with some limited exceptions. US UCC, supra 
note 23, § 2-103 (k) defines goods as "all things that are movable at the time of identification to a contract 
for sale", and includes "manufactured goods", but excludes information and "choses in action." The 
UKSGA supra note 5, s. 61 defines "goods" as including all "personal chattels, excluding choses in action 
and money". A traditional distinction between "choses in action" and "choses in possession" is that in the 
former case, recovery necessitates court intervention as choses in action cannot be physically possessed: see 
Bradgate, supra note 22, at 35. 
84 Robinson v Graves [1935] 1 K.B. 579 where the Court of Appeal (UK) needed to assert whether the 
commissioning of a painting was a contract for skill and labour or one for the sale of goods. At least three 
justices invoked the exclusive copyright of the painter, which could only be assigned to the eventual 
purchaser of the painting by an act in writing, to conclude that the contract was one of skill and labour and 
not for the sale of goods, confusing the copyright with the property rights in the physical embodiment of the 
painting. See Braucher, supra note 12 at 262. In Southwark LBC v IBM UK Ltd, supra note 41, the Queen 
Bench Division (UK) decided that the UKSGA, supra note 5 implied obligations did not apply to the 
software because it was not sold to the purchaser. In doing so, the court placed particular emphasis on the 
intellectual property rights of the supplier, which remained with the supplier, and on other restrictive terms 
which pertained to the copy of the copyright work (i.e. no right of transfer, obligation to destroy the copy 
upon termination) with less emphasis on the fact that the licence in the copy of the software was perpetual 
(which could indicate that the copy had been transferred to the purchaser). In a US context, another case 
illustrates the particular emphasis on the intellectual property rights of the supplier. In Architectronics, Inc. 
v Control Systems, Inc. 935 F.Supp. 425 (SDNY 1996), the US District Court, SD New York held that the 
transaction involving the delivery of an unfinished customized software did not qualify as a sale of goods 
because the contract involved the transfer of the intellectual property rights of the copyright holder to the 
other party. The court came to that conclusion in spite of the fact that a product, the actual customized 
computer software, was also transferred to the other party with functionalities and operational aspects (at 
para 9). The confusion between the exclusive rights of copyright holders and the ownership rights in the 
copy of the work also arises in the context of various exceptions of copyright infringement including 17 
USC,§ 117 "Limitations on exclusive rights: Computer programs." The same confusion arose in Advanced 
Computer Services of Michigan, Inc. v MAI Systems Corporation 976 F.Supp. 149 (ED Virginia 1996). See 
: Applied Information Management, Inc. v Daniel P. !CART and Brownstone Agency, Inc., (1997) 976 
F.Supp. 149 (EDNY 1996), at para 1-5. See also Loos & al., supra note 14 at 15. 
85 I.e. intangible incorporeal movable property right. 
86 I.e. as discussed throughout Part II A, the copy of the copyright work, such as a software program is 
treated variably by courts as tangible or intangible based on the presence or not of a hand to hand physical 
supporting medium or based on a substantiality test. 
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Corp87 and Triangle Underwriters Inc. v. Honeywell lnc,88 in which computer software was held to 
constitute goods under the relevant statutes.89 In Triangle Underwriters, the US District Court of E.D. 
New York observed: 
Although the ideas or concepts involved in the custom designed software remained Honeywell's 
Intellectual Property, Triangle was purchasing the product of those concepts. That product 
required efforts to produce, but it was a product nevertheless, and though intangible, is more 
readily characterized as "goods" than "services."90 
To be sure, the copy of a musical recording for which the copyright has expired (i.e., in which the 
copyright in the musical work, sound recording and performers' performance no longer subsists) does 
not change the nature of what the consumer is accessing, e.g., the copy of a musical work. Whether 
there is intangible copyright attached to the copy of the musical work or not should not be conclusive 
for the purpose of determining the nature of this object.91 
The third application of the tangible v. intangible dichotomy in the jurisprudence and commentators' 
analyses is a variation of the second. It occurs through the particular emphasis placed on the ideas, the 
artistic or intellectual effort or quality that go into the completion of a copyright work, i.e., 
intangibles, 92 without paying similar respect to the end result. 93 The attention devoted to the labour 
87 925 F.2d 670 (C.A.3 Pa. 1991) [Advent Systems]. 
88 457 F. Supp. 765 (EDNY 1978). Affirmed on this issue: 604 F 2d 747 (CANY 1979) [Triangle 
Underwriters]. 
89 The distinction between the intangible intellectual property rights of the copyright holders which often 
remain their property and the nature of the product delivered to the purchaser was made in Triangle 
Underwriters, supra note 88. This case involved the supply of turnkey system including hardware, custom 
ar plication software, training services and maintenance support services. 
9 Ibid. 
91 By contrast, the intangible nature of the rights of the copyright holder could be relevant to ascertain 
whether, in a transaction under which the copyright holder assigns her copyright to another party, sale of 
goods laws apply or not. See: Atiyah & Adams, supra note 12 at 66: " ... .items of intellectual property such 
as copyrights, patents and trademarks are not personal chattels or corporeal movables and so fall outside the 
definition, although of course goods may exist which embody these intellectual property rights." See also, 
Rodau, supra note 50 at 882. 
92 For example in the case of software, it is reflected in the algorithms, coding instructions, sequences 
leading to a software which performs distinct functions. 
93 This is particularly the case for contracts involving the delivery of a prototype or customized software or 
other product, in spite of the fact that the end product involves a physical, tangible, movable medium. 
Courts seem to be paying particular attention to the presence or not of standard commercialized product (a 
good) or an unfinished product (such as a prototype). For example, see TK Power, Inc. v Textron, Inc. 433 
F.Supp.2d 1058 (NDCal 2006) where the court held that the delivery of prototypes was a contract of 
services not goods. Textron was bargaining more for TK's "knowledge, skill, and ability." The court 
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intensiveness of copyright works has also given rise to confusion about how courts determine 
elements of a transaction as "goods" or "services," an important distinction that I discuss further 
below.94 In Advent Systems, the United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, made the distinction 
between the two components embedded in copies of copyright works, i.e., the ideas and the 
commercialized end result, and the need to focus on the latter: 
Computer programs are the product of an intellectual process, but once implanted in a medium are 
widely distributed to computer owners. An analogy can be drawn to a compact disc recording of 
an orchestral rendition. The music is produced by the artistry of musicians and in itself is not a 
"good," but when transferred to a laser-readable disc becomes a readily merchantable commodity. 
Similarly, when a professor delivers a lecture, it is not a good, but, when transcribed as a book, it 
becomes a good. 95 
In that case, the Court held that computer software was a good for the purposes of the relevant 
statute.96 Courts make similar distinctions in strict liability cases whereby only the "tangible" end 
result may qualify as a product and may fall under the strict liability regime, as opposed to the 
information, ideas, expression embedded in them.97 Thus, the presence of intangibles, such as ideas 
assimilated the facts in this case to and applied the reasoning of the court in Data Processing Services, Inc., 
492 N.E.2d at 318-19, (customized software held to be a service). There is inconsistency in the case law 
regarding the distinction between contracts for the sale of goods and contracts for labour and material as 
this is discussed in Part II B of this chapter. 
94 See the discussion on the confusion that resides in the distinction between goods and services in Part II B 
of this chapter. 
95 Supra note 87. 
96 Ibid. See also Keillian West Ltd. v Sports page Enterprises Ltd. ( 1982), 23 Alta . LR (2d) 199 (QB) where 
the court made the distinction between the labour and the end product to decide that a contract for the 
printing of 20,000 sports programmes was a contract for the sale of goods, not for the provision of services: 
"There is no reason to suppose that the substance of the contract was the skill and labour involved in the 
production of the programmes rather than the programmes themselves." 
97 For example in Winter v G.P. Putnams 's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033 (9th cir. 1991) the US Court of Appeals, 
Ninth Circuit, made the distinction between the ideas, expression and commercialised end result: "A book 
containing Shakespeare's sonnets consists of two parts, the material and print therein, and the ideas and 
expression thereof. The first may be a product, but the second is not. The latter, were Shakespeare alive, 
would be governed by copyright laws; the laws of libel, to the extent consistent with the First Amendment; 
and the laws of misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, negligence, and mistake. These doctrines 
applicable to the second part are aimed at the delicate issues that arise with respect to intangibles such as 
ideas and expression. Products liability law is geared to the tangible world." In that case, the plaintiff 
claimed that product strict liability regime applied to the publishers of a book on mushrooms on which they 
relied and as a result of which they became very sick after having eaten certain mushrooms. See also: 
Sanders v Acclaim Entertainment, Inc. 188 F.Supp.2d 1264 (D.Colo.2002) and James v Meow Media, Inc. 
90 F.Supp.2d 798 (WDKy 2000). 
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and information,98 in the creation or commercialized end result is not mutually exclusive of the latter 
being defined as goods. It is almost inconceivable that ideas, concepts, trade secrets, information in 
the development process,99 or the end product are not embedded in goods. 
The classification of various forms of property is not foreign to the concept of transformation, e.g., 
from immovable to movable property (or from real to personal property in the Anglo-American 
tradition) depending on the context. 100 While sounds and visual elements have an intangible nature 
that may well form the essence of a musical recording or a film, when embedded in a commercialized 
product through their registration in binary codes or otherwise they form part of "goods." 101 
To sum up on the effects of the application of the tangible v. intangible dichotomy, the emphasis that 
is placed on the presence of a physical supporting medium exchanged from hand-to-hand to decide 
whether copies of copyright works are goods is somewhat artificial. As I discuss below, the same 
comment can be made with respect to the need of this supporting medium to determine the application 
of the exhaustion or first sale doctrine in copyright law. 102 The artificiality of the requirement of a 
physical supporting medium exchanged hand-to-hand can be remedied by a broader definition of 
"tangible" (i.e., one that acknowledges the physicality of digital copies distributed online regardless of 
the presence of a supporting physical medium exchanged from hand-to-hand) in those jurisdictions 
where it is a requirement for their determination as goods, 103 and by focusing on movability, 
transferability, identification (perception), which entail a permanent, open-ended autonomous access, 
as the determinant attributes of goods. 104 One additional complexity of copies of copyright works is 
98 
"Information" is often qualified as an intangible and excluded therefore from the definition of goods in 
sale of goods statutes. In the US, information is explicitly excluded from the definition of goods in the US 
UCC, supra note 23, § 2-103 (k). 
99 As this was noted in Crescent Amusement Co. v Carson, 23 Beeler 112, 187 Tenn. 112, (S.W.2d 27 Tenn. 
1948): "There is scarcely to be found any article susceptible to sale or rent that is not the result of an idea, 
genius, skill and labour applied to a physical substance. A loaf of bread is the result of the skill and labour 
of the cook who mixed the physical ingredients and applied heat at the temperature and consistency her 
judgment dictated. A radio is the result of the thought of a genius, or several such persons, combined with 
the skill and labour of trained technicians applied to a tangible mass of substance. An automobile is the 
result of all these elements, and of patents, etc.; and so on, ad infinitum." 
10° For example, in the civil law tradition, see CCQ art 900-903. 
101 In the context of the nature of computer software, see Rodau, supra note 50 at 875. 
102 See the discussion in Part III of this chapter. 
103 For example Directive 1999144/EC, supra note 5, and Directive 2011183/EC, supra note 32. 
104 I discuss the significance of the attribute of permanence and autonomous open-ended access in the 
distinction between goods and services: see Part II B of this chapter. 
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that they are often commercialized through licence agreements that affect their "transferability," a 
subject that I address below. 105 
At other times, the difficulty in recognizing the goods-like nature of copies of copyright works is 
attributable to an undue emphasis that is placed on the intangible intellectual property rights that 
copies contain, or on the intangible intellectual labour and creativity that went into the creation of the 
end product. The intangible property ("chose in action") nature of the exclusive copyright embedded 
within a copy of a copyright work bears little relevance to the determination of whether the copies are 
goods or not. The intellectual or creative concepts or ideas leading to the commercialized end result 
that is the copy should have no particular influence because similar intangibles are present in other 
goods, albeit to varying degrees. 
The exclusion of copies of copyright works from the definition of "goods" has radical effects in that it 
precludes the application of the implied obligations of sale of goods and consumer law to copies of 
copyright works, an important component of consumer protection law. 106 In some cases, the 
obligations may give rise to implied obligations applying to services, which then gives rise to 
different and generally lower levels of protection. 107 Otherwise, implied obligations at common law 
could apply, but they are more limited in scope and generally more difficult to establish than statutory 
implied obligations. 108 The discussion on the other two dichotomies below offers further insights that 
critically challenge the resistance against treating digital copies of copyright works distributed online 
as goods. 
B. Goods v. services 
The classification of products as goods or services remains a nebulous area of sale of goods and 
consumer protection law. 109 Uncertainty about the difference between goods and services stems from 
105 See the discussion on the distinction between sale and licence in Part II C of this chapter. 
106 Bradgate, supra note 22 at 26. 
107 The distinction between goods and services and the different levels of implied obligations that apply to 
them is discussed further below in Part II B of this chapter. 
108 Bradgate, supra note 22 at 20. 
109 For a review of Canadian case law characterizing contracts as sale of goods or service agreements, or a 
combination of both, i.e. for "work and material", see also Fridman, supra note 12 at 16ff. See also, 
Jacob.S. Zie~el & Anthony J. Duggan, Commercial and Consumer Sales Transactions, Cases, Text and 
Materials, 41 ed. (Toronto: Edmond Montgomery publications limited, 2002) at 49-61. For the European 
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the confusion about the difference between the labour involved to deliver the commercialized end 
result and the end result itself. 110 It also flows from the combination of goods and services in the same 
transaction. 111 This is especially true when there is no physical component exchanged from hand-to-
hand in the transaction, for example, when copies of copyright works are transferred online to 
consumers through downloads from the Internet. In such cases, the tendency is to forget that the 
transaction also involves the transfer of copies of copyright works and not only services. The 
distinction is important because different levels of legal protection apply to purchasers of goods and 
services under sale of goods and consumer law. 112 It is also a determinant factor of the application of 
copyright exhaustion. 113 
The uncertain boundaries between what constitutes goods and services are unlikely to disappear in the 
information age. This is true with respect to copies of copyright works distributed online with no 
physical supporting medium exchanged from hand-to-hand--copies which may qualify as goods, 
services, or be of a sui generis nature. 114 The manner by which they are accessed (e.g., by 
Union and World Trade Organization context, see Smith & Woods, supra note 38, on the distinctions 
between goods and services. In the context of the World Trade Organization, the treatment of digital 
products distributed online has not been settled and is the object of a work programme on electronic 
commerce: online at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/ecom e/ecom e.htm. See also: Tania Yoon, "A 
New Approach to Audiovisual Products In The WTO: Rebalancing Gatt And Gats" (2007) 14 UCLA Ent. 
L. Rev. 1., at 8-9. The uncertainty of the proper treatment of these products as goods or services needs to be 
understood within the economic, political and legal context proper to the World Trade Organization 
treatment of goods and services: Ibid. This discomfort to treat digital copies of copyright works as goods is 
discussed in Part II A of this chapter. 
11° For example, see: TK Power, Inc. v Textron, Inc., supra note 93; Systems America, Inc. v Rockwell 
Software, Inc. not reported in F.Supp.2d, 2007 WL 218242, (NDCal 2007), where the court focused on the 
development aspect, e.g. of a computer software, to determine that it was a contract for services, rather than 
focusing on the existence of an end product, the newly developed software. Horovitz, supra note 43 at 143, 
explains the need to make the distinction between the labour intensiveness of several information products 
and the end results. The distinction between services that are applied to perfect goods from other forms of 
services is a helpful distinction in that respect. See Micro Data Base Systems, Inc. v Dharma Systems Inc., 
148 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 1998). The need to draw the distinction between the two forms of labour in a 
contract involving the supply of customized computer software was made in the leading case Triangle 
Underwriters, supra note 88. See also Propulsion Technologies, Inc. v Attwood Corp. 369 F.3d 896 (5th Cir. 
2004) where the US Court of Appeals, 5th circuit, characterized the sale of unfinished propeller castings as 
goods in spite of the contract contemplating substantial services from supplier. 
111 See the discussion in Part II B of this chapter. 
112 Ibid. 
113 See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part II F and in Part III of the present chapter. 
114 In the absence of a hand to hand physical medium there remains confusion on the nature of digital 
content which can result in a qualification as a service. In Trib gr inst Nanterre, 6th Chamber, 15 Decembre 
2006, Association UFC Que Choisir v Societe Sony France, Societe Sony United Kingdom Ltd, online : 
http://www.legalis.net/jurispruclence-clecision.php3? id article=] 816, the supply of downloadable musical 
recordings through an Internet platform was qualified by the court as the supply of services under the 
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downloading or streaming) has an important bearing on their classification as goods or services. 
Whether a consumer downloads a commercial copy of a copyright work or streams a copyright work 
involves different acts reserved to copyright holders with implications for the collective management 
of copyright. 115 Even in cases where copies of copyright works distributed online qualify as goods, it 
is increasingly hard to conceive experiencing such "goods" without the operation of a service of some 
sort including Internet access, cell phone services, or web storage-space services. 116 The combination 
of goods with services causes additional confusion at times. For instance, when copies of copyright 
works are distributed online, there is a service delivery component that can give rise to doubt about 
the proper characterization of the transaction as a whole. 117 
When transactions involve a combination of goods and services, courts tend to apply an essential 
character of the transaction test118 or substantiality test119 to determine, on a case-by-case basis, 
whether the commercial transaction is one for goods or services. Although the application of these 
French Code de la consommation. Directive 2011183/EU, supra note 32, Preamble, Recital 19, treats such 
copies of copyright works as neither goods or services. see Severine Dusollier, Droit d'auteur et protection 
des oeuvres dans l 'univers numerique, 2d ed. (Bruxelles: Larcier, 2007 ) [Dusollier 2007] at 395-396, 399 
who holds that copies of copyright works downloaded from the internet cannot be the object of a sale but 
rather the provision of a service, conceding however that there is a product involved in the transaction but 
that the transmission of the product (the copy) characterizes the whole transaction as the provision of 
services. See also ibid, at 382. 
115 Entertainment Software Association v Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers a/Canada, 
2012 SCC 34 at para 28, where the Supreme Court made the distinction between downloading and 
streaming as follows: "Although a download and a stream are both "transmissions" in technical terms (they 
both use "data packet technology"), they are not both "communications" for purposes of the Copyright Act. 
This is clear from the Board's definition of a stream as "a transmission of data that allows the user to listen 
or view the content at the time of transmission and that is not meant to be reproduced" (para 15). Unlike a 
download, the experience of a stream is much more akin to a broadcast or performance." The Court held 
that the online delivery of a permanent copy of a video game did not amount to a "communication" under 
CCA, supra note 75, s 3(1 )(j): ibid, at para 43. See also further reference to that case in Part III of this 
chapter. 
116 I.e., what is commonly referred to as the "cloud" phenomenon. 
117 This is the case in the context of the World Trade Organization qualification of such products as goods 
or services. Yoon, supra note 109, at 17-18, proposes that in the context of the World Trade Organization 
agreements, such products should be treated as services. Braucher, supra note 12, at 269-270 notes the 
artificiality of the distinction between a copy of software that is preloaded in a physical medium from one 
that is being downloaded. 
118 Preload Co. of Can. Ltd. v Regina (City), (1958) 23 WWR 433, 13 DLR (2d) 305 (Sask CA) at paras 
51ff; aff'd SCC: [1959] SCR 801; Keillian West Ltd. v Sportspage Enterprises Ltd., supra note 96. 
119 In a US context, see for example Advent Systems, supra note 87; Colonial Life Ins. Co. of America v 
Electronic Data Systems Corp. 817 F.Supp. 235 (DNH 1993); Jn re Mesa Business Equipment, Inc., 931 
F.2d 60 (CA 9 1991 ); Synergistic Dahlmann v Sulcus Hospitality Technologies, Corp. 63 F.Supp.2d 772 
(ED Mich.1999); Allstate Life Ins. Co. v Peoplesoft, Inc. not reported in F.Supp.2d, 2004 WL 1375383 (ND 
111. 2004); ePresence, Inc. v Evolve Software, Inc. 190 F.Supp.2d 159 (D.Mass. 2002); Heidtman Steel 
Products, Inc. v Compuware Corp. Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2000 WL 621144 (NDOhio 2000). 
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tests may flow from valid procedural requirements and allow flexibility, uncertainty remains on the 
ultimate treatment of mixed transactions as a whole, 120 and, by rippling effect, on the boundaries 
between goods and services. 
The distinction between goods and services affects not only the scope of protection available to 
purchasers in sale of goods and consumer law, but also the nature of claims121 and the applicable 
regime of liability. Implied obligations applicable to goods impose a strict liability regime where 
consumers need to prove that goods are not meeting certain standards, e.g., of quality or fitness for 
use, while implied obligations applicable to services apply a fault-based regime where consumers 
must prove that the supplier was negligent in how the services were provided. 122 It also affects the 
nature of remedies available123 and involves evidentiary and statute of limitations considerations. 124 
While information disclosure obligations and protection against unfair commercial practices typically 
apply equally to transactions of "goods" and "services," 125 this is not the case with respect to implied 
obligations (e.g., of quality, fitness for purpose, con-espondence with description, title, and quiet 
120 The uncertainty about the qualification of software license agreements as falling under goods or services 
under the US UCC, supra note 23 remains, as recently noted by the US District Court ED New York in 
Shema Kolainu- Hear our Voices v Providersoft, LLC, supra note 42. 
121 For instance if the transaction is characterized as one for services, a successful claim would lie in an 
actionable tort for example negligent misrepresentation or breach of contract. 
122 Bradgate, supra note 22 at 28-29. See the discussion in Chapter 9 Part II A. In the case of services, for 
example under the OCP A, supra note 10, s 9( 1) the implied warranty applicable to services is that the 
services are of a "reasonably acceptable quality." See also MCPA, supra note 83, s. 58(6), which provides a 
non-mandatory implied warranty, "that the services sold shall be provided in a satisfactory manner."; and 
UKSGSA, supra note 5, s 13, which provides that "supplier will carry out the service with reasonable care 
and skill." 
123 See the report analysing the laws of 11 states with respect to the regulation of digital content, mainly in 
Europe, including EU law, the UK, France, and also of the US: Loos & al., supra note 14 at 125. 
124 Consumer protection laws tend to alleviate evidentiary requirements in favour of consumers. For 
example, the parol evidence rule often does not apply to consumer contracts: see supra note 18. In a US 
context, See generally Horovitz, supra note 43 at 140-143. 
125 When such jurisdictions explicitly provide such regimes of protection. For instance, this is the case 
under the OCPA, supra note 10; MCPA, supra note 83; AFTA, supra note 83; Business Practices and 
Consumer Protection Act, SBC 2004 c.2 [BCBPCPA], SCPA, supra note 3. This is also the case of the 
European Union, under Directive 2011183/EU, supra note 32, and under EC, Council Directive 93113/EEC 
of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, [1993]01L95/04 at 29 [Directive 93113/EEC] 
which seeks to approximate the laws of the European Union member states with respect to non-negotiated 
contracts with consumers (article 1 ). This is also the case in France under the Code de la Consommation, 
and in the United Kingdom pursuant to Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) Regulation 2000 - SI 
2000/2334 and pursuant to the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999. 
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possession). In most jurisdictions, the said implied obligations do not apply to services, 126 leaving any 
applicable claims and remedies against a defective service to the common law. 127 In others, a different 
statutory implied obligation applies to services, requiring, for instance, that the services are deemed to 
be of a "reasonably acceptable quality." 128 In transactions involving both goods and services, the 
"substantiality test" or "essence of the transaction test" indirectly allows the implied obligations to 
apply to services with necessary modifications, where the sale of goods prevails over the provision of 
services. The line of argument in Quebec's civil law jurisdiction under which services are 
"incorporeal movable property" and are therefore subject to consumer-protection-implied obligations 
applicable to goods would engender the same effect. 129 
The unclear delineation between "goods" and "services" shares similarities with the tangible v. 
intangible dichotomy discussed above. 130 In Canada and the other jurisdictions examined here, while 
the definitions of "goods" generally refer to (tangible) "chattels personal," "personal property," or, in 
civil law jurisdictions, "movable property," 131 and often exclude "things in action," 132 services are 
126 This is the case under of QCPA, supra note 3, art 36-38, although the statutory warranty of 
correspondence with the description applies equally to goods and services: ibid, at art. 40. This is also the 
case under the MCPA, supra note 83; AFTA, supra note 83; BCSGA, supra note 10; SCPA, supra note 3, 
and NBCPWLA, supra note 83; US UCC, supra note 23, applies only to goods: see supra note 27; Directive 
1999144/EC, supra note 5, also only applies to goods. 
127 See supra note 20. 
128 Statutory implied warranties as adapted in the case of the provision of services have been introduced in 
some jurisdictions. For example under the OCPA, supra note 10, s 9(1), the implied warranty applicable to 
services is that the services are of a "reasonably acceptable quality". See also MCPA, supra note 83, 
s 58(6), which provides a non-mandatory implied warranty, "that the services sold shall be provided in a 
satisfactory manner"; UKSGSA, supra note 5, s 13 provides that "supplier will carry out the service with 
reasonable care and skill." 
129 This is what L'Heureux, supra note I at 64-65, argues with respect to the QCPA, supra note 3. 
130 See Part II A of this chapter. 
131 QCPA, supra note 3, art l(d) defines goods as "any movable property", which is defined in art 905 CCQ, 
as "Things which can be moved either by themselves or by an extrinsic force". Art 907 CCQ states that all 
other property, if not qualified by law is movable. Thus the definition of goods is broad and would include 
incorporeal property (art 899 CCQ). In France, Code de la Consommation, art. L21 l provides that the 
provisions dealing with warranties of conformity apply to movable, corporeal property. Other articles of the 
Code de la Consommation, for instance, the ones dealing with information disclosure requirements (Ll 11-
1 ff) and the ones dealing with unfair commercial practices (L 120-1 ff) refer to "property" ("biens") which is 
not defined, and would thus include movable and immovable property: CcF, art 516, unless specifically 
limited in the specific provision of the Code de la Consommation. 
132 OSGA, supra note 10, s. 1(1) defines goods as "chattels personal" other than "things in action", which 
dictates the scope of application of implied obligations in consumer contracts: OCPA, supra note 10, s 9 (2) 
and (3). OCPA, supra note 10, s 1, has a broader definition of goods as "any type of property" which would 
apply to other consumer protection obligations under the OCP A, ibid. See also BCSGA, supra note 10, s I 
(a); see also the ASGA, supra note 83, s 1 (h) and AFTA, supra note 83, s 1 (1) (e). Certain definitions refer 
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rarely defined and when they are, not in a manner that elucidates their nature and scope. 133 The Statute 
of Frauds' formality requirements, which require that certain contracts be in writing to be enforceable, 
have traditionally only applied to the sale of goods and not to the provision of services. 134 This has, at 
times, led courts to make artificial distinctions between of "goods" and "services," 135 making the 
distinction between the two concepts even more confusing. 
Property law and theory shed some light on the distinction between goods and services in sale of 
goods and consumer law. Analogies can also be drawn with the requirement of fixation for works to 
be protected under copyright law. 136 Property is foundational to sale of goods and consumer protection 
laws, with the concept of sale traditionally embedding transfer of title. 137 Eligible candidates to a sale 
need to possess the characteristics that make them capable of "transfer of ownership." The 
classification that singles out tangibles from intangibles has been borrowed from property law as a 
to "tangible" personal property: MCPA, supra note 83, s 1(1); NBCPWLA, supra note 83, s 1(1); Directive 
1999144/EC, supra note 5, art. 1 (2) b) defines goods as any "tangible" movable item, with some limited 
exceptions. US UCC, supra note 23, § 2-103 (k) defines goods as "all things that are movable at the time of 
identification to a contract for sale", and includes "manufactured goods", but excludes information and 
"choses in action." The UKSGA supra note 5, s 61 defines "goods" as including all "personal chattels, 
excluding choses in action and money". 
133 For example BCBPCPA, supra note 125, s. 1 (I), defines services as: "services, whether or not the 
services are together with or separate from goods, and includes a membership in a club or organization". 
AFTA, supra note 83, S. 1(1) k, defines services as " ... any service offered or provided primarily for 
personal, family or household purposes" and includes specific examples. SCPA, supra note 3, s 3(f), defines 
services as: "services ordinarily provided for personal, family or household purposes that have been or may 
be sold, leased or otherwise provided by a supplier to a consumer." 
134 In a sale of goods context, Statute of Frauds impose that contracts for the sale of goods above a certain 
amount be in writing for contracts to be enforceable. For example, the Statute of Frauds requirements have 
been codified in the US UCC, supra note 23, § 2-201 which imposes such formal requirement for contracts 
of $5,000 or more. This requirement was abolished in some provinces of Canada (e.g. British Columbia: 
Statute Law Amendment Act, SBC 1958, c. 52, s. 17). This requirement was abolished in the UK by the 
repeal of s. 4 of the Sale of Goods Act of 1893 through the Law Reform Enforcement of Contracts Act, 
1954, 2 & 3 Eliz. 11, c. 34, s. 21. 
135 For example see one leading case on the distinction between skill and labour and materials: Robinson v 
Graves, supra note 84, where it was held that the commissioning of a painting by oral agreement, the order 
of which was later annulled by the defendant, was a contract for skill and labour and not material. Therefore 
the statute of frauds rule by which contracts of a certain value needed to be in writing to be enforceable was 
not applicable. It is debatable that this was not a contract for materials. See also generally, Michael Bridge 
(Gen. ed.) Benjamin's Sale of Goods, 81h ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell 2010) [Benjamin's Sale of Goods 
81h ed.] at para 1-041. 
136 The description and application of the concept of "fixation" is further described below in this Part. 
137 For a discussion on the various potential meanings of "property" and "transfer of property" when 
employed in a sale of goods law framework. See Fridman, supra note 12, at 61ff; Atiyah & Adams, supra 
note 12, at Chapter 19. 
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means to exclude the latter from the application of sale of good laws. 138 
Courts and commentators resort, from time to time, to the connection between property and sale of 
goods and consumer protection regimes to characterize a transaction as goods or services, 139 and 
borrow from the distinction between the tangible and intangible dichotomy in property law. For 
instance, the requirement of "tractability" has been combined with the one of "tangibility" to provide 
various filters leading toward the differentiation between goods and services. 140 The centrality of 
movability to assert the nature of goods, as opposed to "tangibility," has already been discussed. 141 
Movability implies something "to take with oneself' 142 and is the underlying requirement for the 
transfer of ownership as another means to distinguish a good from a service. 143 
One key differentiator between goods and services resides in the faculty of ownership. As Fiona 
Smith and Loma Woods observe, in the context of the World Trade Organization and EU, on this 
important classification: 
On one level, the notion of property transfer appears inherently bound up with goods and not 
services because the acquisition of ownership from the producer is predicated on the transfer of 
possession of the product. Such possession entails "actual holding or having something as one's 
own," implying either physical existence of the thing possessed or the right to exercise control 
over the product. 144 
Ownership is an "organizing idea" that is central to James Harris's theory of property and justice: 
"ownership powers of control and transmission all involve capacity to create relations with others by 
virtue of a person's ownership of something. Powers to control uses by others are as open-ended a 
class as are ownership use-privileges." 145Thus the essence of ownership is to embed open-ended use 
138 This is illustrated by the exclusion of "choses in action" or "things in action" or from the requirement 
that goods be "tangible" in the various definitions of goods in sale of goods and consumer protection law 
statutes or directives: see supra note 83. 
139 For example see Advent Systems, supra note 87; Horovitz, supra note 43; Rodau, supra note 50. 
140 Smith & Woods, supra note 38 at 60. As the authors explain: "Tradability and tangibility serve as a 
series of filters, containing both objective and subjective criteria. Tractability first acts to distinguish 
between products that are bought and sold and which therefore fall within the economic sphere addressed 
by the rules in bodies such as the WTO and the European Union ..... Tangibility then constitutes a 
rebuttable presumption that intangible items are services while tangible items constitute goods. The 
product's function, in combination with tradability, then acts as the determining factor." 
141 More particularly, see Part II A of this chapter. 
142 As in the concept of "personal" property. 
143 See Smith & Woods, supra note 38 at 45. 
144lbid at 45. 
145Harris, supra note 7 at 67. 
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and some control powers in a resource. 146 Possessory rights of indefinite duration also share the 
attributes of ownership. 147 
To exercise power and control requires a finite quality that has been fixed in time, as opposed to a 
sequential event occurring in time that is not capable of fixation (that can be more readily associated 
with a service). The fact that a musical recording or a film has a sequential quality (i.e., a variable 
duration during which the work is played) does not exclude it from having a finite quality if it has 
been fixed as a whole in time in one medium available to the consumer. 
An interesting parallel can be made between the determinant factors to distinguish goods from 
services and the requirement of "fixation" in copyright law. For a work to be protected by copyright, 
it needs to be "fixed" 148 as opposed to an ephemeral expression (such as an unrecorded a cappella 
performance) that is devoid of stability, repeatability, and of consumption. 149 The requirement of 
"fixation" in copyright law and of "tangible good" in sale of goods law (and consumer law) share a 
common preoccupation, and that is, whether we are witnessing an identifiable and perceptible product 
or not, that persists beyond its moment of creation or interpretation. A musical recording or a film is 
"fixed" in a digital copy. From the perspective of consumers, a musical recording or film captured in a 
copy made available to them gives them the open-ended ability to enjoy the work autonomously. The 
streaming of a film (while it originates from a fixed copy from the perspective of copyright holders) 
does not give the same autonomous capacity to consumers. After the streaming, the representation is 
lost in time and in space without them retaining the possession of a fixed copy. 
146 Ibid. at 5. The application of Harris's theory of property and justice to the nature of copyright and copies 
of copyright works is discussed in Chapter 5 Part IV and in Chapter 6 Part II B. For instance, the three 
components that are present at varying degrees in all forms of property on the ownership spectrum are : (I) 
a juridical relation between a person and a resource; (2) privileges and powers which they comprise are 
open ended (3)they authorize self-seekingness on the part of the individual or group to whom they belong: 
Ibid. 
147 Ibid. at 34.This is particularly important in the context of the commercial practice whereby copies of 
copyright works are licensed for an indefinite duration and not falling under a contract of sale, properly so 
called. 
148 
"Fixation" is not defined in the CCA, supra note 75. CCA, s 2, requires explicitly that computer 
programs, dramatic works and sound recordings be fixed in order to fall under the application of the CCA, 
Ibid. Leading cases on the requirement of fixation include: Galerie d'art du Petit Champlain inc. v 
Theberge, 2002 SCC 34, at para 145: "( ... )The work is, so to speak, the physical outcome of the creative 
process. Fixation of the work in a medium is a condition sine qua non of the production of a work."; 
Canadian Admiral Corporation, LTD. v Rediffusion, Inc. (1954) (Ex. Ct); Gould Estate v Stoddart 
Publishing Co. (1996) 30 O.R. (3d) 520 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.). 
149 In this particular case, one can add that it is lost in time and in space. 
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The power-control characteristics of ownership of goods lead to the same conclusion. While the 
broadcast or streaming of a film or a musical recording cannot be owned by the consumer viewing or 
listening to it (which makes it fall under the category of "services"), the copy of the same film or 
musical recording downloaded from a service provider can be the subject of ownership (which makes 
it fall under the category of "goods"). While consumers can have a transferable interest in a 
subscription to a service, e.g., Internet access services, they do not own or possess the service as a 
whole. They have a right to access the service. Thus, the faculty of ownership of a resource and, with 
it, the ability to exercise prima facie open-ended autonomous control and power over it (i.e., no 
dependence on any other external intervention that is not one's own or dictated by one's own) are 
helpful attributes to distinguish goods from services. 
The increased presence of services through which copyright works are experienced by consumers and 
the blurry line between goods and services lead to important questions on the regulation of 
information products. One of them is the extent to which different treatments for goods and services, 
e.g., with respect to the levels of implied obligations that apply, are warranted. 
The rationale for the different regulations for goods and for services is not always entirely clear. 150 
Looking at goods and services from the perspective of the faculty to own the resource or not provides 
the justifications for regulating services differently from goods in some but not all cases. It is justified 
that the implied obligations of title, quiet possession, and freedom from encumbrances can apply 
primarily to goods where a transfer of title and possession occurs, and unless these implied 
150 As noted in a paper prepared by the Institute of Law Research and Reform, University of Alberta, 
"Statute of Frauds" Background paper no. 2, (I 979) at 83, on the reason for distinguishing goods from 
services for the application of the Statute of Frauds requirement in (what was then) s. 7 of the Alberta Sale 
of Goods Act, that: "Precisely what attributes distinguish a contract for the sale of goods from one for the 
supply of skill and labour is, in reality, a metaphysical question", pointing to the inconsistent qualification 
of goods and services in earlier UK case law: Ibid. at 83-85. The Law Commission's Report On Implied 
Terms in Contracts for the Supply of Goods (Law Com. No. 95, HMSO, 1979) online at 
http://www.google.ca/search?sourceid=navclient&ie=UTF-
8&rlz=1 T4ADBF enCA275CA275&q=the+law+commission%27s+report+on+implied+terms+in+comract 
§.,at paras 56ff. describes the traditional treatment of "Contracts of work and materials" as distinct from 
contracts for the sale of goods, without providing the rationale for the differential treatment. While making 
a recommendation that such contracts should be subject to the same implied terms as regards sales of goods 
for the "materials" portion, it refrained from making any recommendation on the treatment of the "work" or 
services portion (ibid, at para 63). 
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obligations are subject to important modifications for services. 151 A different application of the 
implied obligations of quality and fitness for purpose may also be justified on the basis of practical 
and conceptual considerations. 152 Obviously, if the service does not involve the delivery of a "thing," 
but the performance of a human action that is finite in time, an implied obligation of quality or fitness 
for use of a finished product cannot apply. Rather, the implied obligation that purports to the manner 
by which the action is performed is the appropriate legal framework. There is an element of 
uncertainty in the delivery of a service that involves real-time human action that gives rise to different 
levels of expectations that are not present to the same extent in the delivery of finished goods. 153 This 
can explain the different liability regimes that apply to implied obligations for goods (i.e., strict 
liability regimes) as opposed to services (i.e., fault-based liability regimes). 154 
The different levels of application of implied obligations of quality and fitness for use to goods and 
services seem less justified with respect to automated continuous services. While the concerns on the 
applicable level of implied obligations, based on the distinction between goods and services may 
remain in the case of specific forms of artisanal manual services including the delivery of highly 
customized products, 155 these concerns are not present in largely automated environments of 
continuous services, including Internet service access and other related services that facilitate the 
online distribution of digital copies of copyright works. The uncertainty that surrounds the outcome of 
a future human action in an artisanal type of labour or the lack of control that can be exerted to predict 
the end results of the human labour are not present. In the case of goods, the implied obligations of 
151 The conclusion from the present discussion is that while a good can be owned or possessed, a service 
cannot. Therefore there can be no expectation of "quiet possession", unless it is given a very broad meaning 
or that it is adjusted to the provision of services, where appropriate. Obligations regarding clearance of title 
would not apply to services which do not involve any ownership transfer. 
152 Concepts of property and ownership are at the heart of the practical and conceptual distinctions between 
goods and services as this is discussed further below in Part II B of this chapter. 
153 A good is a finished product at the time that it is sold. On that basis, certain levels of expectations can be 
present (i.e. that it would be verified, tested as to meet certain uniform standards before they are delivered). 
See Bradgate, supra note 22 at 27-28. 
154 I.e. consumer protection obligations imposing minimum standards of quality and of fitness for purpose 
are generally based on strict liability regimes (see the discussion in Chapter 9 Part II) as opposed to services 
which in many of the jurisdictions applying a differential treatment, offer protection on a fault-based 
regime: for example UKSGSA, supra note 5, s. 13, provides that "supplier will carry out the service with 
reasonable care and skill." 
155 E.g. the expectations may be different than with respect to standardized products. In such cases, the 
actual end result is less certain which can justify a regime of liability that would be based on the craft man 
or worker applying diligence and care. 
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fitness for purpose apply to the finite end product, and in the case of services, the quality and fitness 
for use implied obligations could apply to the level at which it is being offered or supplied over the 
relevant period of time. 156 For instance, levels of quality or fitness for use could apply to a streaming 
service of films or musical recordings or to an online storage service. At present, implied obligations 
of services typically require that they be provided in a workman-like manner or impose similar 
requirements. 157 As I argued above, a reasoned approach to the distinction between goods and services 
is critical for the adequate regulation of information products distributed online. By the same token, 
the evolution of the services that are provided, including an increase in automated services, call for a 
revision of the traditional different treatment of goods and services, inter alia, in the application of 
implied obligations. 
To sum up, there is a need for a more coherent approach to the characterization of goods and services. 
The faculty of the ownership of goods, as opposed to services, needs to be emphasized. With it, the 
quality of movability and separateness that is a precondition of the ownership of personal property 
entails the open-ended autonomous and independent faculty to use and consume the good, with no 
reliance on any external forces or operations, which is not the case for services. The adequate 
regulation of information products requires rethinking the different levels of protection (e.g., implied 
obligations of quality, fitness, and quiet possession) that still prevail for goods and services. For 
instance, the automated and highly standardized level of services related to information products 
mandate similar levels of protection as are the case with goods (strict liability v. fault-based liability). 
The distinction between a sale and a licence is another area that leads to similar confusion as the 
distinction between tangible v. intangible and goods v. services. In some cases, the confusion spills 
over to these distinctions. I explore next the possible root causes of the confusion, as well as avenues 
of solution. 
156 A custom term of the industry in software license and maintenance agreements is to refer to "standards 
of service levels" or "service level agreements." 
157 See supra note 128. 
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C. Sale v. licence 
The qualification of the legal transaction through which copies of copyright works are made 
accessible is highly relevant to the application of consumer law implied obligations. 158 In some 
jurisdictions, the absence of a "sale" will preclude the application of sale of goods and consumer 
protection law statutes, leaving any protection to the potential application of other statutes or to the 
application of similar implied obligations under the common law. 159 
The question of "goods" and the nature of the legal transaction through which they are made 
accessible are related, but at the same time they address distinct issues that should be treated 
independently from each other. 160 While the restriction in scope of sale of goods and consumer 
protection law implied obligations to "sale of goods" exists in some jurisdictions, it varies in 
158 In some jurisdictions, the requirement of the sale of a good is relevant to the application of implied 
obligations (e.g. quality, fitness for purpose, title and quiet possession). It is generally not relevant for the 
application of information disclosure requirements and for the application of provisions prohibiting unfair 
terms. See the discussion above in Part II A and B of this chapter. 
159 See supra note 20. In the UK, while the implied obligations under the UKSGA, supra note 5, would not 
apply in the absence of a sale, the implied obligations of the UKSGSA, supra note 5 may apply if the 
transaction falls within the scope of this Act. For example see: SAM Business Systems Ltd v Hedley & Co 
2002 WL 31784544 (QB) and Jonathan Wren & Co Ltd v Microdec Pfc 1999 WL 1953326 (HC, TTC) 
where the court held that the UKSGSA, supra note 5 applied to computer systems. 
160 The UKSGSA, supra note 5, illustrates this distinction. It imposes obligations to suppliers with respect to 
goods that are supplied through various forms of contracts other than a sale, including implied obligations 
that are similar to the ones available under the UKSGA, supra note 5. 
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Canada161 and elsewhere. 162 Goods can be made accessible through various forms of contracts that in 
some jurisdictions can also benefit from the protection of implied obligations. 163 
There is a tendency to characterize the nature of goods and the nature of the legal transaction by 
referencing to each other. This is particularly true in the significance that courts have attributed to the 
"hand-to-hand" exchange of a physical medium supporting the copy of a copyright work to assert that 
goods were the objects of the transaction and to conclude by extrapolation that they were sold even in 
the face of terms to the contrary. 164 It is also true in the confusion that arises between the licence 
granted to consumers to the exclusive intellectual property rights of the copyright holder and the 
transaction that is taking place with respect to the copy itself. 165 As a result, the struggles examined so 
far to define "goods" reverberate on the determination of the nature of the transaction as a sale or a 
licence and need not be repeated here. 166 
The proper determination of the legal transaction through which copies of copyright works are made 
accessible is becoming eminently complex with the proliferation of non-negotiated standard terms and 
conditions and the varying weights that courts are willing to give to those terms in consumer 
161 For example In Manitoba and Saskatchewan, the implied obligations of quality, fitness for purpose and 
quiet possession are restricted to "every retail sale of goods and in every retail hire-purchase of goods": 
MCPA, supra note 83 s. 48(1) or "to consumer products sold": SCPA, supra note 3, s 48. In Quebec and 
New Brunswick, the implied obligations of fitness for purpose and quality and durability apply more 
broadly to "goods forming the object of a contract": QCPA, supra note 3, art 37-40 (while the implied 
obligation related to title and quiet possession ("garantie contre l' eviction") applies to contracts which 
involve the transfer of ownership: ibid. at art 36) or "for the sale or supply of a consumer product": 
NBCPWLA, supra note 83, s. 10(1) (ditto for the implied obligation of quiet possession with particular 
provision for lease-hire transactions: ibid: s 8(1) and 8(2). In Ontario, while the definitions of "sale" in the 
OSGA, supra note I 0, is broad, the sale of goods framework as opposed to the one of consumer protection 
suggests transactions involving the transfer of title: OSGA, supra note 10, s. I (1 ). The Nova Scotia 
Consumer Protection Act RSNS 1989 c. 92 [NSCPA] at S. 26 (1) provides with respect to the application of 
implied obligations "In this Section and Section 27, "consumer sale" means a contract of sale of goods or 
services including an agreement of sale as well as a sale and a conditional sale of goods made in the 
ordinary course of business to a purchaser for his consumption or use but does not include a sale." 
162 UKSGA, supra note 5, limits its scope to sale of goods but the UKSGSA, supra note 5, applies to a 
broader range of transactions for the supply of goods. 
163 Supra note I 6 I and 162. 
164 The significance placed on the physical medium exchanged hand to hand to determine the nature of the 
object of the transaction is discussed in Part II A of this chapter. 
165 This confusion is discussed in Part II A of this chapter. 
166 This is due in part because of the legal requirements that necessitate a distinction between goods and 
services (as discussed in Part II A and B of this chapter). 
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contracts, let alone issues around their enforceability. 167 The absence of an embedding medium for the 
digital copy, such as a CD or a DVD, facilitates a growing commercial practice under which 
copyright holders unilaterally decide that there is no sale in the copy of the copyright work, a practice 
that is far less common in the physical hand-to-hand exchange scenarios of books, music CDs, or film 
DVDs, which have long been considered as sales of goods. 168 
Licence agreements are a common form of contract for the commercialization of copies of copyright 
works and other forms of intellectual property. They typically confirm that the transfer of a copy does 
not entail the transfer of the copyrights that pertain to the work and set out the acts that copyright 
holders allow or forbid consumers to perform on their works. In some cases, a licence agreement will 
extend to the copy of the work that would otherwise be sold, by specifying that consumers enjoy a 
mere right (licence) to use the copy and that they cannot transfer their rights to their copies. Copyright 
holders who restrict the transfer of the copy are technically stepping out of their reserved rights under 
copyright (except for their exclusive rental rights that apply only to specific forms of copyright works) 
and extending the powers conferred by copyright through contract. 
The increased commercial practice of non-negotiated standard end-user agreements seems to bring 
more nebulosity than certainty, especially for consumers, when compared to transactions of copies of 
copyright works that are not accompanied by standard non-negotiated licences. This commercial 
practice exemplifies the exercise of copyright holders' contractual freedom as it is specifically 
contemplated by copyright law. 169 The increased commercial practice of non-negotiated standard end-
user agreements occurs in the midst of various interdependent legal structures, the boundaries of 
167 The enforceability of non-negotiated standard terms and conditions, including "click-wrap," "shrink-
wrap" or "browse wrap" license agreements, varies across jurisdictions: see the report that looks at the 
regulation of digital content in 11 countries mostly European countries, including the UK and France, and 
also the US, prepared by Loos & al., supra note 14 at 65ff. In a US context, the various challenges that 
shrink-wrap agreements pose to traditional contract law are discussed inter alia in N.S. Kim, "Clicking and 
Cringing" (2007) 43 Oregon Law Review 797. In a consumer protection law analysis, the contract can be 
subject to "external" influences that alter its terms, a fortiori when such contract is not negotiated, which 
can include a finding that some or all of its terms are not enforceable. For a discussion on the enforceability 
of click-wrap agreements in a European Union context, see Rott, supra note 30 at 447. 
168 The transfer of CDs, DVDs, and cassettes are commonly treated as sales of chattels movables, unless 
they are provided under a specific rental agreement. By contrast, the software industry has for some time 
adopted the commercial practice to licence (and not sell) copies of software even when they were supplied 
through the physical transfer of a CD or DVD. The U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit briefly discussed 
the historical context of software licenses in Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v Wyse Technology, 939 F.2d 
91, 96 n. 7 (3d Cir.1991), more specifically at footnote 7. 
169 CCA, supra note 75, s 13(4). 
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which are uncertain: the exclusive property rights conferred by copyright law, the ownership or 
possessory rights of consumers and other users to the copy, the existence of limitations to copyright 
holders' exclusive rights (qualified as rights or exceptions to copyright infringement), the creation of 
additional rights for copyright holders through the introduction of technological protection measures, 
and, last but not least, their effect under contract and consumer protection laws. 
No licence for the exclusive rights of copyright holders is required for transactions in copies of 
copyright works, unless copyright holders want to increase consumers' rights (e.g., reproduction, 
telecommunication to the public, etc.) that are otherwise under their exclusive domain, or to limit 
consumers' rights more than they already are under copyright law (e.g., limitations as to time or 
territory could fall in that category). While non-negotiated standard end-user agreements are 
increasingly becoming the norm in an online environment, 170 it is only in these two instances that they 
are necessary. With respect to the rights to the copy, no written contract is required either, and, a sale 
or the equivalent of a rental of personal property would occur. 
The superfluous recourse to licences in commercial transactions involving copies of copyright works 
has been noted before. 171 It points to the paradox of information disclosure, a particularly praised legal 
tool of consumer law. 172 On the one hand, the supply of information to consumers through detailed 
licence terms can be viewed as meritorious, even essential to efficient and enlightened decision-
making. 173 On the other, non-negotiated standard end-user agreements for copies of copyright works 
may raise more questions than they resolve, in contrast with a transaction with no non-negotiated 
170 The review of a sample of online standard terms and conditions for the distribution of copies of books, 
musical recordings and films illustrates this tendency: see the discussion in Chapter 3 Part III C. 
171 In a US context, see Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v ~yse Technology, supra note 168, where the 
United State Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, reviewed the historical background behind the practice of 
software licensing and the fact that the practice was initially justified inter alia to avoid the application of 
the first sale doctrine, and more particularly the case of subsequent rentals of copies, which prior to 
amendments brought to the first sale doctrine provisions of the copyright act, were arguably allowed. Now 
that these reasons were removed, the Court found the practice of licensing to be "largely anachronistic". 
Other courts have pointed to the initial uncertainties around the legal protection of software which have 
since been removed as protected as a literary works: Softman Products Company, LLC, v Adobe Systems 
Inc., 171F.Supp.2d1075, 45 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 945 (CD Cal. 2001) at para 11. See Bradgate, supra note 22 
at 37: In absence of a licence permitting acts that are otherwise reserved to copyright holders, the doctrine 
of implied licence could apply to allow the proper use of the copy of the copyright work, e.g., a software. 
172 The information disclosure requirements are discussed in Chapter 9 Part IV. 
173 I review the theoretical justifications supporting information disclosure requirements in consumer 
transactions in Chapter 10. 
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standard end-user agreement at all, as it has been traditionally the case with respect to the sale of 
books, CDs, and DVDs. 174 
The outcome of the legal characterization of the increasingly prevailing commercial practice of 
licensing in the realm of online distribution remains uncertain for various reasons. The variation of 
statutory definitions of "sale" and "lease", as well as their interpretation, 175 can give rise to important 
discrepancies between the Canadian provinces and territories, 176 and the other jurisdictions examined 
here, 177 on the application of sale of goods and consumer law implied obligations to licences of copies 
of copyright works. There is an ongoing debate on the determination of software licence agreements 
as ultimately falling under sale, rental, or sui generis contracts. 178 As in the determination of the 
174 The questions they raise are discussed through the application of four specific scenarios in Chapter 11. 
175 In a US context, US UCC, supra note 23, § 2-106 (I) defines "sale": "consists in the passing of title from the 
seller to the buyer for a price (Section 2-401)". In some states, the definition of sale has been expanded to any 
"transaction in goods": see infra note 176. US UCC, article 2A applies to leases and includes similar implied 
obligations as for contracts of sale. US UCC, supra note 23, § 2A- l 03 (j), defines lease: "means a transfer of the 
right to possession and use of goods for a term in return for consideration ... ". Braucher, supra note 12 at 275-
276 notes "Article 2 defines a sale in terms of the passing of title for a price, but the reference to title is not meant to 
impose a formal, non-functional approach. Article 2 recognizes that reservation of title is a legal strategy that should 
be limited in its effect. A title retention strategy that had been attempted at the time of Article 2's enactment was as a 
way to have goods sold serve as collateral. Article 2 limited the effect of such a provision to a security interest." 
176 For example In Manitoba and Saskatchewan, the implied obligations of quality, fitness for purpose and 
quiet possession are restricted to "every retail sale of goods and in every retail hire-purchase of goods": 
MCPA, supra note 83, s. 48(1) or "to consumer products sold": SCPA, supra note 3, s. 48 ). In Quebec and 
New Brunswick, the implied obligations of fitness for purpose and quality and durability apply more 
broadly to "goods forming the object of a contract": QCPA, supra note 3, art. 37-40 (while the implied 
obligation related to title and quiet possession ("garantie contre I' eviction") applies to contracts which 
involve the transfer of ownership: ibid. at art. 36) or "for the sale or supply of a consumer product": 
NBCPWLA, supra note 83, s. I 0( 1) (ditto for implied obligation of quiet possession with particular 
provision for lease-hire transactions: ibid: s. 8( I) and 8(2). In Ontario, while the definitions of "sale" in the 
Sale of Goods Act is broad, the sale of goods framework as opposed to consumer protection suggests 
transactions involving the transfer of title: OSGA, supra note 10, s. 1(1). NSCPA, supra note 161, s. 26 (1) 
provides with respect to the application of implied obligations "In this Section and Section 27, "consumer 
sale" means a contract of sale of goods or services including an agreement of sale as well as a sale and a 
conditional sale of goods made in the ordinary course of business to a purchaser for his consumption or use 
but does not include a sale." 
177 For example, the US UCC, supra note 23, State provisions have been adapted to refer to "transaction in 
goods" and not "sale", which would include licence agreements. See for example: Colonial Life Ins. Co. of 
America v Electronic Data Systems Corp., supra note 119, where the Court, citing the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court in: Xerox Corp. v Hawkes, 124 N.H. 610, 615, 475 A.2d 7, 9 (1984) "[t]he use of the term 
'transaction' rather than 'sale' in UCC § 2-202 makes it clear that Article 2 is not to be confined to those 
transactions in which there is a 'sale,' that is a transfer of title." The same rationale applies in the State of 
New York: Architectronics,Inc. v ControlSystems, supra note 84. See also: Horovitz, supra note 43 at 139-
140. 
178 This is particularly true in France where there is a debate on how to define software licences, i.e., as 
amounting to a sales contract, a rental agreement or a sui generis contract: Loos & al., supra note 14 at 33. 
302 
nature of copies of copyright works, there tends to be confusion between copyright holders' exclusive 
rights, which remain their property, and the ownership in the copy of the copyright work. 179 Because 
copyright holders do not transfer their property in the copyright, the assumption is made, in absence 
of a physical supporting tangible medium exchanged from hand-to-hand, that the licence agreement 
cannot embed a transfer of ownership (sale) of the copy of the copyright work. 180 
In determining that the contract is a sale or a licence, courts, especially in the US, will sometimes 
look beyond the suppliers' qualification of the transaction (e.g., as a licence) and look to the substance 
and effects of the agreement. 181 Although there is no consistency on that matter, US courts have at 
times determined as a "sale" a transaction described as a licence that involves a single payment and 
In Beta Computers(Europe) Ltd v Adobe Systems (Europe) Ltd, supra note 49, Lord Penrose qualified 
licence agreements as sui generis agreements. See also Dusollier 2007, supra note 114 at 411-414 who 
reviews the various elements contained in licence agreements which may or may not involve sale in the 
commercial copy of the copyright work. The author notes that there is confusion around what licence 
agreements cover: i.e., confusion between the exploitation of the exclusive rights of copyright holders and 
the delivery of the services involved and between what may constitute a sale and a service. 
179 See for example Bradgate, supra note 22 at 37. 
180 Ibid. 
181 For a recent decision on the treatment of this practice as a licence or as a sale. See: Vernor v Autodesk, 
Inc., F.3d 2010 WL 3516435 (91h Cir. 2010) where the U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit gave more 
weight to the terms used by software licensor than in previous judgments. The Court held that the 
applicable test to determine the nature of the transaction was: "whether the copyright owner specifies that a 
user is granted a license. Second, we consider whether the copyright owner significantly restricts the user's 
ability to transfer the software. Finally, we consider whether the copyright owner imposes notable use 
restrictions." The reasoning applied by the U.S. District Court of California in: Softman Products Company, 
LLC, v Adobe Systems Inc., supra note 171 at para 14, is a good illustration of how courts have qualified the 
transaction, regardless of suppliers labelling the contract as a licence: "the following factors require a 
finding that distributing software under licenses transfers individual copy ownership: temporally unlimited 
possession, absence of time limits on copy possession, p1icing and payment schemes that are unitary not 
serial, licenses under which subsequent transfer is neither prohibited nor conditioned on obtaining the 
licensor's prior approval (only subject to a prohibition against rental and a requirement that any transfer be 
of the entity), and licenses under which the use restrictions' principal purpose is to protect intangible 
copyrightable subject matter, and not to preserve property interests in individual program copies". The 
Court relied on the comments made by Professor Nimmer: "Ownership of a copy should be determined 
based on the actual character, rather than the label, of the transaction by which the user obtained possession. 
Merely labelling a transaction as a lease or license does not control. If a transaction involves a single 
payment giving the buyer an unlimited period in which it has a right to possession, the transaction is a sale. 
In this situation, the buyer owns the copy regardless of the label the parties use for the contract. Course of 
dealing and trade usage may be relevant, since they establish the expectations and intent of the parties. The 
pertinent issue is whether, as in a lease, the user may be required to return the copy to the vendor after the 
expiration of a particular period. If not, the transaction conveyed not only possession, but also transferred 
ownership of the copy". On the distinction between sales and licences under US copyright law, see also 
F.B.T. Productions, LLC v Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d 958 (9th Cir 2010). See also test to establish 
ownership in copies regarding rights of copy owners of computer programs to make limited modifications 
under 17 USC § 1l7(a) (1 ): Krause v Titleserv Inc., 402 F.3d I 19 (2nd Cir 2005); Zilyen Inc., v Rubber 
Manufacturers Association, F. Supp (2d) 2013 WL 1302012 (DDC). 
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that grants possession to the copy of the copyright work for an indefinite duration. 182 As I discuss 
below in the context of copyright exhaustion, the Court of Justice of the European Union made a 
similar determination on the contracts at hand in UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle International Corp 
[UsedSoft]. 183 On the one hand, the decision of courts to abide by the terms of the licence when 
determining the rights in copies of copyright works sometimes results from a confusion on the 
differences between the legal terms with respect to the intangible intellectual property rights and the 
legal terms with respect to the copy. 184 On the other hand, the resistance by courts to enforce the terms 
of the contract may well be explained by the application of the numerus clausus principle, by which 
there is a fixed and closed list of property interests recognized by law that should not be alterable by 
contract. 185 This would explain why courts have been at times reluctant to enforce licence agreements 
that restrict the transfer of copies while allowing their permanent use, which creates, in essence, a new 
form of property interest. It may also be explained by the fact that in doing so, copyright holders 
restrict by contract transfer rights in the copy that are outside the realm of their exclusive rights (but 
for some specific exclusive rental rights). 
The increased commercial practice of (non-negotiated standard form) licence agreements and their 
characterization by courts as sale or licence with respect to the rights in the copy brings an additional 
layer of uncertainty in the application of sale of goods/consumer laws to copies of copyright works, 186 
and as I discuss below, regarding the application of copyright exhaustion. 187 
To sum up on how the uncertainty about the determination of commercial transactions as sales or 
licences can be addressed, first, the presence of a sale is not a condition sine qua non for the existence 
182 Ibid. 
183 C-128/11, [2012] OJ C 287 at 10. In that case, the Court had to determine whether the transfer of 
ownership (sale) of the copy of the computer program had taken place or not which is a requirement of the 
application of exhaustion: see the discussion on that case in Part III of this chapter. 
184 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright, online loose-leaf resource (New York: 
Matthew Bender, 1978), at para 8.08 B 1 C. For a discussion on the distinction between sale and licence in 
US jurisprudence on the first sale doctrine, see Brian W. Carver, "Why License Agreements do not Control 
Copy Ownership: First Sales and Essential Copies" (2010) 25 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1887. See also Aaron 
Perzanowski & Jason Schultz "Copyright Exhaustion and the Personal Use Dilemma" (2012) 96 Minn. L. 
Rev. 2067 at 2124-2129. 
185 I discuss the numerus clausus principle in Chapter 4 Part III, Chapter 5 Part IV C and in Chapter 7 Part 
IV. 
186 In France there is a debate on the nature of the contract involving a software supplied on a CD or similar 
medium: some argue it is a contract of sale, others argues it is a contract for hire and others that it is a sui 
~eneris contract: see Loos & al., supra note 14 at 33. 
87 See Part III of this chapter. 
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of goods and its absence should not be relied upon to determine that specific products are not goods: 
goods can be leased, hired, rented, etc. They do not loose their goods-like nature in the absence of a 
sale. Second, there is a distinction between licences to the intellectual property rights of the right 
holder in the work, which are either explicitly or impliedly part of commercial transactions involving 
copies of copyright works, and the licence or sale to the copy of the copyright work. In the latter case, 
copyright holders who restrict the transfer in the copy are technically stepping out of their reserved 
rights under copyright (except for rental rights that apply to specific forms of copyright works) and 
extending the powers conferred by copyright through contract. I argued in Chapter 7 that, through the 
application of the numerus clausus principle, any commercial transaction that in all material terms 
resembles a sale should be treated as such regardless of its appellation by copyright holders. 188 The 
Court of Justice of the European Union applied a similar reasoning in UsedSoft, as I discuss further 
below in relation to the application of copyright exhaustion. 189 
The dichotomies between tangible and intangible, goods and services, and sale and licence are 
determinant of the qualification of goods under sale of goods and consumer law and, by ricochet, on 
the level of protection offered to purchasers under sale of goods and consumer law. I explore next the 
extent to which the analysis conducted here on these dichotomies can also help to lead to a better 
understanding of the application of copyright exhaustion, which is another important component of 
users' rights to copies of copyright works. 
III. Parallels and implications with respect to exhaustion or the first sale doctrine 
As I discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 7, the prevailing view is that international copyright law (as 
implemented by several national and regional jurisdictions) requires, for the exclusive right of 
distribution to apply and to be exhausted, the presence and transfer of a physical medium exchanged 
from hand-to-hand and that embeds the copyright work. 190 Under that view, the exclusive right of 
distribution and exhaustion would not apply to digital copies distributed online with no physical 
supporting media exchanged from hand-to-hand. I questioned the rationale behind the requirement of 
a physical object in which the copyright work is embedded. 
188 See the discussion on the numerus clausus principle in Chapter 7 Part IV. 
189 See Part III of this chapter. 
190 In particular, in Chapter 3 Part II F and in Chapter 7 Part IV. 
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There are noticeable similarities between the issues raised in the application of sale of goods and 
consumer law and of copyright exhaustion to digital copies of copyright works. Both bodies of law 
tend to require the presence of a supporting physical medium exchanged from hand-to-hand to 
determine the specific products as goods and for copyright exhaustion to apply. Copyright exhaustion 
only applies to copies that are lawfully transferred and not merely leased or licensed and does not 
apply to copyright works experienced through services. I argue here that the misunderstandings about 
the nature of digital copies under sale of goods and consumer law, arising from a misapplication of 
the three dichotomies explored above, i.e., (i) tangible v. intangible (ii) goods v. services, and (iii) sale 
v. licence, are present to some extent in the application of copyright exhaustion. The application of 
sale of goods and consumer law, and of copyright exhaustion all lean toward a potential shrinking of 
consumers' rights to digital copies of copyright works. 
In the recent UsedSoft judgment, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Grand Chamber) was 
confronted at some level with the application of these three dichotomies. 191 For the time being, the 
holding of the UsedSoft judgment may not have ramifications beyond the specific case of computer 
programs distributed online. 192 
In UsedSoft, the Court of Justice of the European Union was seized with a reference to a preliminary 
ruling by the Bundesgerichtshof (Germany), that involved the question of whether exhaustion of the 
distribution right in article 4(2) of Directive 2009124/EC applied to a lawful acquirer who had made 
the copy by downloading the computer program from the Internet to a data carrier. The outcome of 
that question was of significant importance to Oracle who distributed at the time 85 per cent of its 
computer programs through Internet downloads. 193 Article 4(2) of Directive 2009124/EC provides: 
191 UsedSoft, supra note 183. The three dichotomies are: the distinction between tangible and intangible, 
goods and services, sale and licence. 
192 This case involved the interpretation of EC, Council and Parliament Directive 2009124/EC of 23 April 
2009 on the legal protection of computer programs, [2009] OJ L 111116 [Directive 2009124/EC], at art. 4 
(1) (c). As the Court reiterated throughout its reasons, this directive is lex specialis in relation to Directive 
2001129/EC, infra note 194: UsedSoft, supra note 183, for instance at para 56. The wording of the 
exhaustion of the exclusive right of distribution in Directive 2009124/EC which deals with the protection of 
computer programs differs from the one of Directive 2001129/EC on the harmonization of copyright law 
within the EU. The relevant provisions of each directive are summarized by the Court in UsedSoft, supra 
note 183 at paras 8 to 18. 
193 UsedSoft, supra note 183 at para 21. If copyright exhaustion did not apply to such copies, then Oracle would 
retain control on future transfers of the copies. If exhaustion applied, Oracle would loose control on the secondary 
markets of its computer programs. 
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"The first sale in the Community of a copy of a program by the rightholder or with his consent shall 
exhaust the distribution right within the Community of that copy ... " As the Court pointed out, there 
were various possible interpretations of article 4(2) of Directive 2009124/EC that revolved around the 
question of whether there was a need to put the computer program in circulation in a physical medium 
exchanged from hand-to-hand for the exhaustion of distribution rights to apply. 194 The Court found 
that the exhaustion of the distribution right in article 4(2) of Directive 2009124/EC applied regardless 
of whether the right holder put the copies of computer programs in circulation with a physical 
supporting medium exchanged from hand-to-hand. 195 
In arriving at the conclusion that copyright exhaustion applied to the online distribution of copies of 
copyright works, with no exchange of a physical supporting medium, the Court first needed to assess 
whether a transfer of ownership (sale) of the copy of the computer program had taken place, which is 
a requirement of the application of exhaustion. Second, it considered whether the distribution right set 
out in article 4(2) of Directive 2009124/EC only applied when there was the transfer of a tangible 
physical object embedding the computer program. Third, it considered the distinction between the 
right of distribution and the right to communicate the computer program to the public and between 
goods and services. I will look at these three aspects of the Court's judgment in the same order. 
First the Court concluded that, based on the facts of the case, there was a transfer of ownership of the 
copy of the computer program. 196 The Court noted that the download of the copy of the computer 
program combined with the conclusion of a user licence constituted a whole for the purpose of their 
legal classification. 197 The Court relied on two components of the commercial transaction to conclude 
that there was a transfer of ownership of the copy downloaded from the Internet: the payment of a 
one-time fee and the fact that the user was allowed to use the copy for an indefinite period of time. 198 
In property law and theory terms, the open-ended powers and privileges of the usus are transferred to 
194 Ibid, at para 32. The various interpretations are based on different applications of Article 4(2) of 
Directive 2009124/EC, supra note 192 and EC, Directive 2001129/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 
information society, [2001] OJ, Ll67/10 [Directive 2001129/EC], Preamble, recitals 28 and 29 & art 4 read 
in conjunction with Article 8 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty, 20 December 1996, W0033EN, online: 
http://www.wipo.int1treaties/en/ip/wct/lrtdocs wo033.html#P8 189 [WCT] and the agreed statement 
concerning Articles 6 and 7 of WCT, the implementation of which forms part of the objectives of Directive 
2001129/EC. 
195 UsedSoft, supra note 183 at paras 53ff. 
196 Ibid, at paras 44 to 49. 
197 Ibid, at para 44. 
198 Ibid, at para 45. 
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the user with no duty to account to anyone. 199 With the indefinite right to use comes the right to 
further transfer the copy abusus by the application of exhaustion, subject to some conditions. 200 The 
fructus is limited by the language of article 4(2) of Directive 2009124/EC with respect to the exclusive 
1 . h 201 renta ng ts on computer programs. 
In my view, without referring explicitly to the numerus c/ausus principle, the Court's reasons are 
consistent with its application. 202 The Court looked at the essence of the transaction and interpreted 
the requirement of a sale203 in article 4(2) of Directive 2009124/EC broadly. By doing so, the Court 
sided with the opinion of Advocate General Y. Bot and reasoned that what constitutes a sale needs to 
be assessed based on the substance of the transaction, otherwise the principle of exhaustion could be 
easily circumvented by suppliers: 
as encompassing all forms of product marketing characterised by the grant of a right to use a 
copy of a computer program, for an unlimited period, in return for payment of a fee designed to 
enable the copyright holder to obtain a remuneration corresponding to the economic value of the 
copy of the work of which he is the proprietor, the effectiveness of that provision would be 
undermined, since suppliers would merely have to call the contract a "licence" rather than a "sale" 
in order to circumvent the rule of exhaustion and divest it of all scope.204 
This is reminiscent of the earlier discussion of sale of goods and consumer law and on how courts are 
at times reluctant to enforce restrictive contract terms if the essence of the transaction is a sale, in spite 
of copyright holders' characterization of the transaction.205 In particular, I argued earlier that US 
courts' determination of software transactions as sales in spite of their qualification by copyright 
holders as licences can be explained, by the application of the numerus clausus principle.206 Arguably, 
this is indirectly what the European Court of Justice did in the UsedSoft judgment without explicitly 
referring to it. It supported the underlying rationale behind the application of the exhaustion of the 
199 Harris, supra note 7 at 30 defines "full-blooded ownership" as the relationship between persons and 
things such that they have prima facie unlimited privileges of use or abuse over the thing and prima facie 
unlimited powers of control and transmission. For Harris all ownership interests embed some use privileges 
and some control powers that are primafacie open ended: ibid, at 5. 
200 I.e., provided that the user destroys any remaining copy after the transfer of the copy: UsedSoft, supra 
note 183 at para 70. 
201 Supra note 192. 
202 See the discussion on the numerus clausus principle in Chapter 7 Part IV. 
203 UsedSoft, supra note 183 at para 42, the Court acknowledge that "sale" can refer to tangible or 
intangible property: "a 'sale' is an agreement by which a person, in return for payment, transfers to another 
person his rights of ownership in an item of tangible or intangible property belonging to him." 
204 Ibid at para 49. 
205 See the discussion in Part II C of this chapter. 
206 Ibid. See also Chapter 7 Part IV. 
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distribution right to copies that are sold only, i.e., reticence about any restriction to the alienation of 
property. 207 
Second, the Court assessed whether the distribution right in article 4(2) of Directive 2009124/EC 
applied only to "tangible property" or whether it also applied to "intangible copies," the latter being 
the case at hand.208 The Court concluded with no difficulty that the distribution right applied to both, 
through a plain textual interpretation of article 4(2) in conjunction with article 1(2) and recital 7 of the 
Preamble of Directive 2009124/EC.209 Article 4(2) refers generally to the "sale ... of a copy of a 
program," while article 1(2) extends protection of the Directive to the expression "in any form of a 
computer program," which is supported by recital 7 of the preamble.210 
The Court reiterated the lex specialis character of Directive 2009124/EC as regulating the protection 
of computer programs in relation to the broader framework of copyright protection in Directive 
2001129/EC.211 The Court neither sought to explain why there should be a different treatment for 
computer programs from that of other copyright works, nor did it have to decide whether the same 
conclusion could be made in respect of Directive 2001129/EC.212 
It is not clear whether the UsedSoft judgment will have implications in Europe beyond the application 
of the distribution right and exhaustion of copies of computer programs. The result of this case, while 
it may be justified both based on a textual interpretation of article 4(2) of Directive 2009124/EC and 
normatively (i.e., by eliminating the artificial distinction between tangible and intangible copies), is at 
odds with the language of WCT article 6 and how it was implemented by Directive 2001129/EC unless 
it was to be interpreted broadly as extending the distribution right and its exhaustion beyond transfers 
of copies of copyright works involving a tangible object exchanged from hand-to-hand,213 which, 
207 I discuss the theoretical justifications of the exhaustion or first sale doctrine in Chapter 7 Part IIIA(ii). 
208 UsedSoft, supra note I 83 at paras 53-61. 
209 Supra note I 92. 
210UsedSoft, supra note 183 at paras 55, 57. 
211 Ibid, at para 56. 
212 The Court simply stated that Directive 2009124/EC, supra note I 92, could be interpreted independently 
from Directive 2001129/EC, supra note 194 given the clear intent expressed by the European Union 
legislature in article 4(2) of Directive 2009124/EC to apply to all copies of computer programs (tangible and 
intangible):ibid, at para 60. The Court did not explain the relationship and compliance of Directive 
2009124/EC with WCT, supra note I 93, article 6 which has been interpreted as applying only to the 
distribution of copyright works involving the transfer of a tangible object. 
213 In addition to giving a broad interpretation to tangible objects, the same result could be achieved by 
viewing WCT, supra note I 94, art 6 as setting a substantive minima: in other words distribution can extend 
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although preferable, seems to go against the wording and intention of each instrument.214 The 
UsedSoft judgment leads to the odd result of a different application of the distribution right and 
exhaustion rule to computer programs than to other copyright works for no apparent reason. 
The third and last aspect of the UsedSoft judgment discussed here involves the distinction between the 
distribution right and the right to communicate to the public and that between goods and services. The 
Court rejected Oracle's argument that it had "made available to the public" the copy of the computer 
program on its website within the meaning of article 3(1) of Directive 2001129/EC, which, by the 
application of article 3(3) of the same directive, cannot give rise to the exhaustion of the right of 
distribution of the copy.215 Reminding us of the lex specialis character of Directive 2009124/EC in 
relation to Directive 2001129/EC, the Court went on to interpret the transfer of ownership of a copy as 
transforming an act of communication to the public into a distribution under which, if the conditions 
were present, exhaustion would apply.216 This is consistent with the Court's determination of an 
online transmission as "the functional equivalent of the supply of a material medium."217 By 
interpreting the two exclusive rights as such, the Court in my view filled the gap and inconsistency 
that subsists when refusing to apply exhaustion to digital copies of copyright works that are made 
permanently available (transferred) to users for ulterior autonomous consumption. The Court pointed 
to the essence of distribution (which typically involves the transfer of an original or copy of a 
copyright work) by contrast to a communication to the public by communication (which involves a 
service, the consumption of which always necessitates the intervention of a third party). While this 
judgment may only apply to computer programs, it leads to the question: why should it be limited 
beyond physical objects and so can first sale. The tangible object sets the minimum requirement for the 
distribution right. 
214 Directive 2001129/EC, supra note 194. The conclusion derives from the application of art 4.2 in 
conjunction with recitals 28 and 29 to the Preamble: ibid. See however EU, Opinion Advocate General Bot, 
Case C-128/11, Axel W. Bierbach, administrator of UsedSoft GmbH v Oracle International Corp., 24 April 
2012 at paras 75-76, where the Advocate General raises doubts as to whether Directive 2001129/EC, supra 
note 194, limits the distribution right and its exhaustion to copyright works embodied in physical objects. 
See also U.S. Copyright Office, A Report of the Register of Copyrights pursuant to section 104 of the 
DMCA (2001) online :http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/drnca/dmca study.html [DMCA 2001 
Report] at 86-87 where the Register of Copyright held the view that the presence of a physical object 
embedding the copyright work is a defining element of the first sale doctrine arguing that it is based on the 
distinction between the rights in the tangible object and the rights in the intangible object, implying that this 
divide cannot subsist with respect to digital copies distributed online. 
215 UsedSoft, supra note 183 at para 50. 
216Jbid at para 52, where the Court interpreted WCT, supra note 194, art 6(1) and its implementation 
through Directive 2001129/EC, supra note 194, art 3-4. 
217 Ibid, at para 61. 
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computer programs? The UsedSoft judgment emphasizes, in my view, the inconsistencies of Directive 
2001129/EC when applied to digital copies transferred online with no supporting physical medium. 
Directive 2001129/EC trivializes the property rights to the copy that users lawfully acquired, through 
a misapplication of the distinction between goods and services.218 
The Supreme Court of Canada recently came to a similar conclusion in Entertainment Software 
Association v. Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada [Entertainment 
Software Association].219 In that case, the Court had to decide whether the downloading of video 
games through the Internet amounts to a communication to the public by telecommunications of the 
musical works the games contain, and can, therefore, be the object of a separate tariff.220 In a five-to-
four decision, the Court held that this act involved no act of communication to the public and could 
not trigger the application of a separate tariff. Abella and Moldaver JJ. for the majority defined the act 
of downloading copies of copyright works as follows: 
In our view, there is no practical difference between buying a durable copy of the work in a store, 
receiving a copy in the mail, or downloading an identical copy using the Internet. The Internet is 
simply a technological taxi that delivers a durable copy of the same work to the end user.221 
In so holding, the Supreme Court of Canada expressed a view similar to the European Court of Justice 
in UsedSoft on the functional equivalent between the online delivery of the copy of a computer 
program and the supply of a material medium.222 
To sum up, by holding that the exclusive right of distribution and exhaustion apply to copies of 
computer programs distributed online with no supporting physical medium, UsedSoft goes against the 
prevailing interpretation of copyright exhaustion at the international and regional levels. I showed 
how the understanding of the reasons in UsedSoft can be enriched through property law and theory 
principles and how it is consistent therewith. In spite of its lex specialis application to computer 
programs, UsedSoft could have important consequences on the future application of copyright 
exhaustion to copies of copyright works distributed online with no supporting physical media. At a 
218 See the discussion on Directive 2001129/EC, supra note 194, above in this part. 
219 Supra note 115. 
220 In that case, the tariff in question had been submitted by SOCAN to the Canadian Copyright Board for 
approval: Ibid. 
221 Ibid, at para 5. 
222 UsedSoft, supra note 183 at para 61. 
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normative level, UsedSoft questions why this should not also be the case with respect to other forms 
of copyright works beyond computer programs. 
A closer look at the copyright exclusive rights that may be actually involved in the online delivery of 
digital copies of copyright works underscores the inconsistencies that result from singling out digital 
copies delivered online for permanent consumption from the distribution right and from the rule of 
exhaustion. To include digital copies distributed online in the distribution right and in the application 
of the exhaustion rule with respect to all copyright works and not just computer programs, i.e., 
extending the outcome in UsedSoft, would fill that void. 
IV. Unified approach to the qualification of goods.and to the scope of exhaustion (the first sale 
doctrine) through property law and theory 
The presence of a physical medium exchanged from hand-to-hand that embeds copies of copyright 
works is a determinant factor to identify the whole as goods under the sale of goods and consumer law 
and for the exhaustion of the distribution right to apply in copyright law. 223 This leaves the 
increasingly widespread online distribution of copies of copyright works in a zone of legal uncertainty 
and inconsistency about their nature and the application of copyright exhaustion. 
As I argued above in this chapter, this requirement is misguided and artificial, both in the case of sale 
of goods/consumer law and in the application of copyright exhaustion. In the case of the application 
of sale of goods and consumer law, this requirement stems from a narrow application of the concept 
of tangibility224 and from a misunderstanding of its role in the determination the presence of goods as 
opposed to the concept of movability, transferability, and identification at the time of sale. 225 
Occasionally, the requirement flows from a misconception of the presence of copyright embedded in 
the product, i.e., intangible property (or chose in action) that is sometimes excluded altogether from 
the application of sale of goods and consumer law.226 In other cases, the confusion flows from the 
223 See the discussion in Part II A and Part III of this chapter. 
224 I.e., one that fails to recognize the physical nature of a musical recording, computer program or film with 
or without a supporting physical medium exchanged from hand to hand. 
225 See Horovitz, supra note 43. See the discussion on the tangible v. intangible dichotomy in Part II A. 
226 See the discussion on the tangible v. intangible dichotomy in Part II A. 
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distinction between goods and services or as a result of the presence of a licence agreement.227 With 
respect to the application of copyright exhaustion, the requirement of tangibility (in the narrower 
sense) was enshrined by the WIPO Internet Treaties228 as one determining factor for the application of 
the exclusive right of distribution and, potentially, for the concept of exhaustion to apply to the 
transfer of copies embedded in a physical medium. 229 The requirement of a physical object embedding 
the copyright work for the application of the exclusive distribution right and its exhaustion has been 
reinforced by the implementation of the WIPO Internet Treaties at the regional and national levels. 230 
The outcome in UsedSoft, where the European Court of Justice applied the exhaustion of the 
distribution right to computer programs distributed online, contrasts with the prevailing assumptions 
about the non-application of copyright exhaustion to copies of copyright works distributed online. The 
limited application of the judgment to computer programs leads to the question of why computer 
programs should be any different in that regard than other copyright works distributed online. Using 
the interpretation in UsedSoft and in Entertainment Software Association of the exclusive right of 
distribution with the right to communicate to the public by telecommunication, I also raised the 
unintended consequences of a distribution right limited to copies of copyright works transferred with 
a physical supporting medium exchanged from hand-to-hand.231 
In the case of sale of goods/consumer law and in the case of the application of copyright exhaustion, 
the artificial requirement of a physical supporting medium exchanged from hand-to-hand potentially 
leads to the narrowing of copyright users' rights.232 To allow the radically different treatment of 
digital copies distributed online from other copies by focusing exclusively on the interests of 
copyright holders reflects a trivialization of the copy owners' property rights. It exemplifies a 
copyright-holder-centric approach to regulation that too often forgets the property regime from which 
it was elaborated. 
227 See Part II Band C of this chapter. 
228 I.e., WCT, supra note 194, art 6 and WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, 20 December 1996, 
W0034EN, online: http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt/trtdocs_wo034.html [WPPTJ, art 8. 
229 See Chapter 3 Part II F. 
230 Ibid. 
231 Ibid, i.e., that in some cases, neither the distribution right nor the right to communicate to the public by 
telecommunication would be involved. 
232 Except in cases that could lead to the unintended consequences of the non-application of exhaustion of 
the distribution right combined with the non-application of the right to communicate the work by 
telecommunication: see Chapter 3 Part II F. 
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It is not all that surprising that the various fields of law, e.g., sale of goods/consumer law and 
copyright law (i.e., the exhaustion rule) rely on similar concepts to delineate their scope of application 
with respect to digital copies of copyright works. Large segments of sale of goods/consumer law are 
founded upon basic concepts of property law.233 In the case of copyright exhaustion, one of its most 
frequently invoked justifications is to avoid restrictions against alienation of property, which, as I 
argued in Chapter 7, seeks, inter alia, to preserve the integrity of property ownership.234 What may (or 
may not) be more surprising is that they each lead to the similar inconsistent treatment of digital 
copies distributed online with no transfer of a physical suppo11ing medium exchanged from hand-to-
hand. 
In light of the common reliance on foundational concepts of property in sale of goods/consumer law, 
and with respect to copyright exhaustion, a more reasoned approach to digital copies of copyright 
works requires reverting to basic principles of property. First, there is a pressing need to rethink the 
requirement of tangibility both as a determining factor to the goods-like nature of digital copies of 
copyright works and for the application of copyright exhaustion. This should be done in two ways: (i) 
by a broader application of the concept of tangibility, i.e., an application that acknowledges that 
copies distributed online are no less physical than the ones distributed with a supporting medium 
exchanged hand-to-hand, and (ii) by recognizing that movability, transferability, and identification at 
the time of the sale should be the determining criteria for goods, not a narrow application of 
tangibility. At the heart of these criteria lies the concept of ownership that does not need the support 
of a physical medium to exist, but does require movability, transferability, and identification. By those 
requirements, the artificial distinction between digital copies supported by physical medium 
exchanged from hand-to-hand and digital copies distributed online disappears when these elements 
are present. 
Second, copyright works are commercialized through an increasing variety of options, including 
goods only, services only, or a combination of the two. This mandates a clearer understanding of the 
distinction between goods and services. Building upon the criteria that should determine whether 
products are goods, i.e., movability, transferability, and identification at the time of the transfer, the 
233 See the discussion about the foundational principles of property law in sale of goods law in Part II A of 
this chapter. 
234 See the discussion in Chapter 7 Part III A (ii). 
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faculty of ownership of goods and not of services needs to be emphasized. 235 The quality of 
movability and separateness that comes with ownership of personal property entails the open-ended 
autonomous and independent faculty to use and consume the goods, with no reliance on any external 
forces or operations, which is not present in the case of services. 236 
While the concept of property ownership will help in providing a more coherent approach to the 
distinction between goods and services, the adequate regulation of information products requires a 
rethinking of the different levels of protection (e.g., implied obligations of quality, fitness, and quiet 
possession) that still prevail between goods and services. For instance, the automated and highly 
standardized level of services related to information products mandate similar levels of protection to 
those of goods (strict liability v. fault-based liability). 
Third, there is a need to resolve the lingering confusion about licence agreements as opposed to sale 
agreements and the reliance courts have put on the presence of licence agreements to conclude that 
products are not goods or that copyright exhaustion did not apply.237 First, the presence of a sale is not 
a condition sine qua non for the existence of goods, which can be leased, hired, donated, etc. Second, 
there is a distinction between the licence to the intellectual property rights of the right holder in the 
work, rights which are either explicitly or impliedly part of commercial transactions involving copies 
of copyright works, and the licence or sale to/of the copy of the copyright work. In the latter case, I 
argued that through the application of the numerus clausus principle, any commercial transaction that 
resembles in all material terms a sale should be treated as such regardless of its appellation by 
copyright holders.238 This is the approach that the European Court of Justice adopted in UsedSoft, as 
well as the one adopted by some courts in the US. 239 The application of the numerus clausus principle 
will preserve the integrity of copy ownership and bring copyright law closer to its core objectives, 
while ensuring a better balance between the exclusive rights of copyright holders and the property 
rights of copy owners. 
235 See the discussion in Part II B of this chapter. 
236 Ibid. 
237 See the discussion in Part II C and in Part III of this chapter. 
238 See the discussion on the numerus clausus principle in Chapter 7 Part IV. 
239 See the discussion in Part III of this chapter. 
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V. Conclusion 
This chapter introduced the application of consumer law to copies of copyright works by looking at 
basic issues of scope that foreshadow the erratic nature of the exercise. The traditional struggles about 
the treatment of copies of copyright works as goods, services, or of a sui generis nature are 
exacerbated with respect to digital copies made available online. The characterization of the 
commercial transaction under which they are made available, i.e., a sale or a licence, is sometimes 
mixed with the determination of the nature of copies of copyright works, thereby leading to similar 
inconsistent results. With that, the scope of protection of statutory consumer protection obligations is 
unclear, ultimately leaving possible recourse of copyright consumers to the common law. This leads 
to even more uncertainty in an increasingly large segment of copyright consumer products. 
A legal analysis leading to the inapplicability of the statutory implied obligations of sale of goods and 
consumer law to an increasingly large number of copies of copyright works runs against their 
underlying purpose. That is, to codify and clarify the common law and adapt it to the requirements of 
consumer transactions in a legal form that is more readily accessible to consumers. 240 The potential 
inapplicability of statutory implied obligations of sale of goods and consumer law is at odds with the 
recent impetus in Canada and worldwide to adapt consumer laws to electronic commerce and the 
information age so as to make them more relevant and responsive to consumers.241 The deliberate 
approach, or unintended consequences to leave an increasingly large number of information products 
240 In a U.S. context, in the leading case on the nature of computer software Advent Systems, supra note 87, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals, Third circuit referred to the policy objectives behind the adoption of the US 
UCC, supra note 23: "Applying the U.C.C. to computer software transactions offers substantial benefits to 
litigants and the courts. The Code offers a uniform body of law on a wide range of questions likely to arise 
in computer software disputes: implied warranties, consequential damages, disclaimers of liability, the 
statute of limitations, to name a few. The importance of software to the commercial world and the 
advantages to be gained by the uniformity inherent in the U.C.C. are strong policy arguments favoring 
inclusion." See also Horovitz, supra note 43 at 134-135. 
241 Initiatives at the international level relating to consumer protection in the context of electronic commerce 
include the OECD Guidelines for Consumer Protection in the Context of Electronic Commerce (1999) 
available online at: 
h.tt1rf/FW ~~,_Q_~_g_Q_, org[Q_Q_G.!UJleQt/ l 8f.Q~11:Hi&LLZ94 9-_J_4.2fi7_4.4J..J.~-~.4_£__1 _l_LJ_,_QithID.Jl. In Ontario, major 
amendments to the OCPA, supra note 10, including its consolidation with other pre-existing laws, came 
into force in 2005. Several new provisions were added to specifically address electronic commerce, 
including a section dealing specifically with Internet agreements (e.g. ss. 37ff.). See Government of 
Ontario, "Backgrounder The Consumer Protection Act", June 27, 2006, available on line at: 
http://www.mgs.gov .on.ca/en/News/Print/STEL02_04 7088.html . 
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out of the ambit of the protection offered by these laws deserves more attention and a more coherent 
legal framework based on traditional concepts of property and ownership.242 
The identification of root causes of this inconsistent treatment of digital copies of copyright works 
enabled parallels to be made with the application of copyright exhaustion to copies distributed online. 
Current trends will lead to a potential shrinking of copyright consumers' rights and protection of the 
copies they lawfully acquire. Reliance on basic concepts of property law and theory provides a 
reasoned approach to elucidate when copies of copyright works should be treated as goods and when 
copyright exhaustion should apply. 
The ongoing hesitations and tribulations about treating copies of copyright works as goods and to 
protect them as such should come as no surprise. The hesitations in sale of goods and in consumer law 
to protect commercial copies of copyright works as goods, mirror the trivialization in copyright law of 
the property rights in commercial copies of copyright works. 
The inconsistencies that this chapter underscored about the uncertain application of consumer law to 
an increasingly large number of copies of copyright works distributed online should not stand in the 
way of the further exploration of how consumer law can help substantiate consumers' rights to the 
copies. In the next chapter, I dig the trenches further for the application of consumer law to copies of 
copyright works by laying out which of the consumer protection obligations may be of particular 
appeal to help ascertain consumers' rights to copies of copyright works. 
242 For instance, by applying a more informed interpretation of "tangible" and "goods" as encompassing 
digital copies of copyright works, and by a proper characterization of licences with respect to the copy of 
the copyright work as potentially involving a transfer (e.g. a sale). See a proposed framework to guide 
legislative reform in Chapter 12. 
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Chapter 9 
Paving the Way: The Application of Consumer Law Obligations 
to Restrictions of Uses of Commercial Copies of Copyright Works 
I. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I introduced the application of sale of goods and consumer law to copies of 
copyright works, along with troubling issues of scope that put in question the application of consumer 
statutory protection to copies of copyright works, in particular, sellers' implied obligations. 1 I argued 
that the ongoing hesitation to treat copies of copyright works similarly to other consumer goods is 
consistent with the trivialization in copyright law of property rights in copies of copyright works.2 It 
explains to some extent why the application of sale of goods and consumer law to copies of copyright 
works is a relatively little-theorized area of the law. This body of law is a priori inhospitable to 
copyright consumers and other users alike, and the recent growing interest on the place of copyright 
users has mostly been concentrated on showing the shortcomings within copyright law itself.3 
There are exceptions to the narrative whereby copyright consumers and other users are being 
predominantly scrutinized within the confines of copyright law. As I discussed in Chapter 3, scholarly 
work on the limitations to copyright holders' exclusive rights and, in particular, how they interact with 
contract, includes resorting to legal doctrines and policy considerations within and outside copyright 
law. Among those doctrines and considerations, the possible use of consumer protection law as a legal 
tool to substantiate limitations on copyright holders' exclusive rights for the benefit of consumers has 
been invoked.4 The increasing areas of friction between the rights of copyright consumers and those 
of copyright holders5 and recent law and policy work undertaken by the EU on consumer protection6 
1 I.e., the uncertain qualification of copies of copyright works as goods and the inconsistent treatment of the 
legal transaction (i.e., sale or licence) through which they are made available to consumers: see the 
discussion in Chapter 8. 
2 This is one of the central arguments throughout the Second Part of my thesis, i.e., Chapter 4 to Chapter 7. 
3 See the discussion in Chapter 2, in particular Part IV. 
4 See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part III and Part IV. 
5 I discuss the root causes of this increased tension in Chapter 1 Part I and Part II. 
6 The more recent legislative development at the EU level is EC, Council and Parliament Directive 
2011183/EU of 22 November 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93113/EEC and 
Directive 1999144/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 
851577/EEC and Directive 97/7EC of the European Parliament and of the Council [2011] OJ L 304/64 
[Directive 2011183/EUJ. Prior EU papers and other works leading to the adoption of this directive include: 
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have led European scholars, including Lucie Guibault, Natali Heiberger, Bernt Hugenholtz, Robert 
Bradgate, to look at the specific issues raised by the application of sale of goods and consumer law to 
digital content or products that for a great part involve works protected by copyright.7 The objective to 
increase consumer confidence within the broader integration of the European Union market and 
through the harmonization of consumer protection laws brings the question of consumer protection to 
the forefront. 8 As a result, there is a more immediate interest to look at the developments of growing 
markets, including digital content, by policy-makers,9 consumer interest groups, 10 and scholars. 11 The 
EC, The Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer Acquis (Brussels, EC, 2006) and EC, Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on consumer rights (Brussels, EC, 2008). 
7 Lucie Guibault & Natali Heiberger, "Copyright law and Consumer Protection, study carried out for the 
European Consumer Law Group" (2005) ECLG/035/05; Natalie Heiberger & P.Bernt Hugenholtz, "No 
place like home for making a copy, private copying in European copyright law and consumer law (2007) 22 
Berkeley Tech L.J. 1061 at 1078-1095; Robert Bradgate, "Consumer rights in digital products", (2010) 
online: http://www.google.ca/search?sourceid=navclient&ie=UTF-
8&rlz= I T4ADBF enCA275CA275&q=Bradgate%2c+Consumer+tfahts+jn+digital+products+20 l 0; 
Marco B.M. Loos, Natali Heiberger, Lucie Guibault, Chantal Mak, Lodewijk Pessers, Katalin J. Cseres, 
Bart van der Sloot & Ronan Tigner, Analysis of the applicable legal.frameworks and suggestions for the 
contours of a model system of consumer protection in relation to digital content contracts (2011) University 
of Amsterdam, Centre for the Study of European Contract Law (CSECL), Institute for Information Law 
(IViR), Amsterdam Centre for Law and Economics (ACLE), online: 
http://ec.europa.cu/justice/newsroom/consurner-marketing/evcnts/digital conf en.html. 
8 This is reflected in the primary and secondary law of the European Union which refers as a base to a high 
level of protection. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (consolidated version), OJEU 
C83/47, 30.03.2010, provides at art 114 (3): "The Commission, in its proposals envisaged in para I 
concerning health, safety, environmental protection and consumer protection, will take as a base a high 
level of protection[ ... ].Within their respective powers, the European Parliament and the Council will also 
seek to achieve this objective.", and at art. I 69 (I): "In order to promote the interests of consumers and to 
ensure a high level of consumer protection, the Union shall contribute to protecting the health, safety and 
economic interests of consumers, as well as to promoting their right to information, education and to 
organise themselves in order to safeguard their interests." Several European directives impose obligations 
on member states with respect to consumer protection laws. The consumer protection directives that are 
currently in force are available at the European Commission Justice (consumer protection and marketing 
section) official website: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/consumer-marketing/law/index en.htm. 
9 For an overview of the ongoing policy consultation work that is conducted by the European Commission, 
DG Health and Consumers, see the official website of the European Commission (Consumer Affairs 
Division): http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/rights/cons acguis en.htm#comp. 
10 For example, see: BEUC, Digital Products, How to include them in the Proposal for a Consumer Rights 
Directive, Position Paper, Brussels, 2010, online: http://www.beuc.org/Content/Default.asp?PageID=2 I 35. 
Beuc, The European consumers' organisation, is the umbrella organisation for 42 independent national 
consumer organisations across Europe. Its main task is to represent the interests of these organisations and 
all consumers across Europe: see Beuc, The European consumers organisation official website at: 
http://www.beuc.org/Content/Default.asp?PagelD=59 l. The INDICARE Project (2004-2006) focused on 
consumer protection issues around information products, more specifically digital rights management 
issues. As stated on its website: "The INDICARE project was financially supported as an Accompanying 
Measure under the eContent Programme of the Directorate General Information Society of the European 
Commission (Reference: EDC - 53042 INDICARE /28609). INDICARE started first of March 2004 and 
ended February 2006.": online: http://www.indicare.org/application.php. 
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interaction between copyright law and consumer law does not trigger the same interest in Canada as it 
does in the EU, and I am not aware of scholarly work looking in detail at the application of sale of 
goods and consumer law to copies of copyright works. Similarly, there is relatively little case law in 
Canada and in the other jurisdictions examined here, particularly on the application of consumer 
protection law to commercial copies of copyright works. 12 
Different hypotheses can be advanced to explain the lack of consumer protection jurisprudence as it 
relates to commercial copies of copyright works. It could be interpreted as an indicator that the 
commercial distribution of copies of copyright works does not give rise to important concerns and that 
the market functions well in that area. Conversely, it could be an indicator that various factors and 
obstacles that are specific to commercial copies of copyright works make it even more difficult for 
consumers to assert their claims than in relation to other products. 13 Regardless of the root causes for 
the lack of jurisprudence on the application of consumer law to commercial copies of copyright 
works, the sheer complexity of applying sale of goods and consumer protection law to commercial 
11 Two recent reports are of particular interest: Loos & al., supra note 7; Bradgate, supra note 7. 
12 In Canada, there is case law on the application of sale of goods law implied obligations to computer 
software and hardware: see Chapter 8 Part II. One recent highly publicized class action involving the use by 
Sony BMG of technological protection measures on music CDs that had harmful effects on computer 
systems was eventually settled: See Guilbert v Sony BMG Musique (Canada) inc. [2007] R.J .Q. 983, J.E. 
2007-843 (Que SC) which refers to similar class actions undertaken in other provinces in Canada. The 
technological measure allowed Sony BMG to collect personal information by tracking the use made by 
consumers of the CDs without their knowledge. There is jurisprudence on the application of implied 
obligations to computer programs under the Uniform Commercial Code, Official Text (2000) (amended 
2003) online: http://www.law.cornell.edu/ucc/ucc.table.html [US UCC], as implemented by the various 
States: See Chapter 8. In France, there is jurisprudence applying the Code Civil and the Code de la 
Consommation to copies of copyright works in consumer transactions: Trib. gr. inst. 6e Nanterre, 2 
Septembre 2003, Franr;oise M I EMI France, Auchan France, online : 
http://www.legalis.net/jurisprudence-decision [EMI France]; Trib. gr. inst. 5e Paris, IO January 2006, 
Christophe R., UFC Que Choisir I Warner Music France, Fnac ,(2006) JurisData: 2006-292685 [Warner 
Music] reversed on appeal: Court of Appeal 4e A, Paris, 20 June 2007, Fnac Paris I VFC Que Choisir et 
autres, online: http://wwwJegalis.net/jurisprudence-decision; confirmed by Cour de cassation, civ. 1 ere, 27 
Novembre 2008, UFC Que Choisir I Fnac, Warner music France, online: 
http://www.Jegalis.netljurisprudence-decision; Court of Appeal, Paris, 4 April 2007, Studio Canal et al. v S. 
Perquin and Unionfederale des consommateurs Que choisir, Gaz. Pa1. 18/07/2007 N° 199, 23., confirmed 
by Cass civ 1st, 19 juin 2008 (2008) Bull civ, I, N° 177. 
13 As a starting point, there are important obstacles to the enforcement to consumer claims generally. For 
a recent overview of the different theories and strategies employed for the regulation of consumer 
protection and enforcement issues, see, Fabrizio Cafaggi & Hans W.Micklitz, eds., New Frontiers Of 
Consumer Protection: The Interplay Between Private And Public Enforcement (Cambridge: Intersenstia, 
2009), in particular Samuel Issacharoff & Ian J. Samuel, "The Institutional Dimension of Consumer 
protection" at 47-62. 
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digital copies of copyright works should in and of itself be a cause of concern. 14 The European studies 
conducted on the application of sale of goods and consumer protection law to commercial copies of 
copyright works corroborate that view. 15 The predominance of non-negotiated standard end-user 
agreements in the market of information products distributed online, coupled with the general lack of 
attention that copyright holders and distributors give to users' permitted uses under copyright law, is 
one specific area of concern that I discussed in Chapter 3. 16 These characteristics of the incessantly 
growing market of information products distributed online add to the more fundamental issues of the 
ability of consumers to enforce consumer protection law obligations generally. 17 Unearthing consumer 
protection concerns with respect to commercial copies of copyright works may increase the attention 
of consumer protection law agencies in this area, attention that has, so far, been low to non-existent. 18 
By the same token, pointing to specific consumer protection issues can raise consumers' awareness of 
their rights in commercial copies of copyright works as well as their ability to enforce them. 
In this chapter, I intend to fill the void in Canadian scholarly work on, and consumer protection 
agencies' attention to, the application of sale of goods and consumer law to commercial copies of 
copyright works. I develop an argument about how Canadian sale of goods and consumer protection 
law can effectively support consumers in their claims to permitted uses of copies of copyright works. I 
look at the nature of statutory implied conditions and warranties ("implied obligations"), e.g., 
14 See the discussion in Chapter 8 and see the application of sale of goods and consumer protection law to 
commercial copies of copyright works in Chapter 11. 
15 Bradgate, supra note 7; Loos & al., supra note 7. 
16 In particular, in Part III C of Chapter 3. 
17 For a recent overview of the different theories and strategies employed for the regulation of consumer 
protection and enforcement issues, see, Cafaggi & Micklitz, supra note 13. 
18 Consumer protection laws are often construed around the regulation of specific targeted industries that 
present higher risks for consumers (e.g. consumer credit agreements, personal services contracts, tourism 
agency agreements). For example see the Ontario Consumer Protection Act, S.O. 2002, c. 30, schedule A, 
[OCPA] and the Quebec Consumer Protection Act, R.S.Q., c. P-40.1 [QCPA] none of which target 
information products or copies of copyright works. Even categories of contracts that are regulated by 
consumer protection laws (e.g. distance contracts, clauses pertaining to Internet agreements) and that are 
particularly relevant to copies of copyright works, generally cover peripheral contractual issues (contract 
formation, notification, opposability, etc ... ) more than they address the substance of the transaction. The 
corollary is that governmental consumer protection agencies activities will generally mirror their 
constitutive consumer protection legislation. See for example the segments of the industry specifically 
addressed by the Office de la Protection du Consommateur (Quebec) 
http://www.opc.gouv.qc.ca/Webforms/PlanDuSite En.aspx: Vehicules, Home, Furniture and Appliances, 
Computer and Electronics (i.e. purchases online, telecommunication services), Personal effects, Travel, 
Finance & Insurance, Services subscriptions & Membership. See also the segments of industry that are 
under the scrutiny of UK Office of Fair Trading, online: http://www.oft.gov.uk/ : Construction and 
property, Consumer credit, Financial and Professional Services, Pharmaceutical and health, Retail and 
wholesale, Transport. 
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primarily those of quality, fitness for purpose, and quiet possession, 19 and at their application to the 
restrictions on uses of copies of copyright works. 20 I also look at the information disclosure 
requirements and the prohibitions against unfair practices. 21 This will set the foundations for their 
specific application to scenarios involving copies of copyright works in Chapter 11, after looking at 
their underlying theoretical justifications in Chapter 10. 
The application sale of goods and consumer protection law to copies of copyright works is not an 
insignificant task in a context where copyright law has been widely viewed as setting the agenda for 
the rights in copies of copyright works, leading to their trivialization, as I discussed in the Second Part 
of my thesis. This is mirrored by their uncertain protection under sale of goods and consumer law, as I 
discussed in Chapter 8. I argue that in making room for consumers' rights to copies of copyright 
works we need to frame restrictions to consumers' permitted scope of use of copies of copyright 
works as a quality, fitness for purpose, quiet possession, information disclosure, and other consumer 
law obligations' issue. 
In presenting the panoply of consumer protection obligations, I start with the more interventionist 
then move through to the lesser interventionist obligations and their variations throughout the 
provinces and territories of Canada, with comparisons to the other jurisdictions examined here.22 
Interventionism is assessed both from the perspective of how the relevant consumer protection 
obligations impinge on suppliers' freedom of contract in favour of consumers, as well as on the 
remedies that are available to consumers if the obligations are breached.23 I focus on the issues that 
are specific to copies of copyright works that are due to the complex interaction between the property 
rights of copyright holders as dictated by copyright law, the ownership or possessory rights of 
19 And to a lesser extent, implied obligations of conformity with description and of title and freedom from 
encumbrances: see Part II of this chapter. 
20 I apply the consumer protection obligations discussed in the present chapter to various scenarios of uses 
of copies of copyright works in Chapter 11. 
21 In this chapter, "consumer protection obligations", "consumer obligations" or "consumer protection law 
obligations" refers to implied obligations, information disclosure requirements and provisions against unfair 
practices, and are analysed in Part II of this chapter. 
22 I.e., the US, the EU, the UK and France. 
23 See the discussion in Part II, III and IV of this chapter, starting with the review of consumer protection 
statutory implied obligations, then pursuing with a discussion on provisions against unfair practices and 
ending with an analysis of the implications of specific information disclosure requirements in distance 
contracts and Internet agreements. 
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consumers in copies of copyright works, and the extent to which these rights can be altered by 
contract or ascertained by statutory consumer protection obligations. 
Three recent French cases involving consumer groups taking action against film and music 
distributors of music CDs and film DVDs, raise several of the issues central to a consumer law 
analysis to copies of copyright works that are discussed in this chapter and the remainder of the Third 
Part of my thesis. They are: EMI France,24 Warner Music,25 and Studio Canal et al. v S. Perquin and 
Unionfederale des consommateurs Que choisir.26 First, they illustrate the centrality of the 
characterization of limitations to copyright holders' exclusive rights as "exceptions to copyright 
infringement" rather than "rights" to the possible application of consumer law to copies of copyright 
works. Consumers can initiate claims on the basis of rights, but less so on the basis of exceptions to 
copyright infringement. Second, this characterization has rippling effects, including whether limiting 
consumers' exercise of permitted uses without copyright holders' permission (e.g., on the basis of a 
"right" or an "exception" under copyright law) constitutes material information that needs to be 
disclosed to consumers. 27 Third, in the realm of statutory warranties and implied obligations, the 
French cases28 touch upon the potentially narrowing effects of the application of a latent defects 
analysis rather than a broader warranty of quality and fitness for purpose to copies of copyright 
works. 29 Fourth, they exemplify how a juxtaposition of technological protection measures on 
copyright holders' exclusive rights impacts a consumer law analysis to rights in copies of copyright 
works. Last but not least, they illustrate what type of remedies consumers can seek in case of breach 
by copyright holders of statutory warranties, including specific performance, e.g., an order for 
removal of technological measures on the musical recording or film. 
In Part II, I discuss the nature and scope of statutory implied consumer protection obligations that are 
relevant to assert the permitted scope of use of copies of copyright works, i.e., implied obligations of 
24 Supra note 12. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Cour de cassation, civ. lere, 28 February 2006, overruling Studio Canal et al. v S. Perquin and Union 
federale des consommateurs Que choisir, Paris Court of Appeal, 22 April 2005, available at 
http://www.juriscom.net/documents/caparis20050422.pdf [Mulholland Drive]; Court of Appeal, Paris, 4 
April 2007, Studio Canal et al. v S. Perquin and Union federale des consommateurs Que choisir, Gaz. Pal. 
18/07/2007 N° 199, p. 23., confirmed by the Cour de Cassation, civ. lere, 19 juin 2008. 
27 This interaction is discussed in Part IV B of this chapter. 
28 Supra note 25 and 26. 
29 By narrowing the discussion to the existence or not of a defect and whether the purchaser was aware of 
the defect at the time of the sale. This is further discussed in Part II A of this chapter. 
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quality, fitness for purpose, quiet possession, and, to a lesser extent, correspondence with description, 
title, and freedom from encumbrances. In Part III, I look at prohibitions against unfair practices and 
how they are of relevance to current copyright holders' commercial practices. In Part IV, I describe 
the nature and function of information disclosure requirements generally and how they impact on the 
other implied consumer obligations examined in this chapter, as well as more specifically as it 
pertains to certain contracts. 30 In Part V, I conclude by selecting specific features of consumer law as 
well as those consumer protection obligations that are more likely to provide ammunition to 
consumers to assert their claims to permissible uses of commercial copies of copyright works and 
counter the copyright-holder-centric regime of copyright law as amplified by copyright holders' 
commercial practices. 
II. The scope and operation of statutory implied obligations in consumer contracts 
In this part, I will present a Canadian overview of the nature and scope of statutory implied 
obligations in consumer contracts with reference to other jurisdictions,31 focusing on the elements that 
emphasize the unique features of consumer protection as a body of law and that may be of particular 
relevance and appeal for the protection of consumers of commercial copies of copyright works. They 
are: statutory implied obligations of (i) quality and fitness for purpose, (ii) correspondence with 
description, and (iii) title, quiet possession, and freedom from encumbrances. I will start by 
introducing the points of similarity between the statutory implied obligations. 
The consumer protection provisions that specifically address the quality, fitness for purpose, and other 
characteristics of goods sold or services supplied under consumer contracts fall into distinct 
categories. First, these transactions are regulated by statutory implied32 conditions or warranties.33 
30 E.g., distance selling agreements and Internet agreements as it is further discussed in Part IV A. 
31 I.e., the US, EU, UK and France. 
32 As one commentator notes, a better terminology may be to refer to "constructive": Angela Swan, 
Canadian Contract Law, 2d edition (Toronto: Lexis-Nexis Canada, 2009) at 471 ff. See also the discussion 
on the implication of terms at 531 and at 535. 
33 In most provinces in Canada, statutory implied conditions apply with respect to quality, fitness for 
purpose and correspondence with description, with the exception Saskatchewan under the Saskatchewan 
Consumer Protection Act, SS 1996, c C-30.1 [SCPA], and New-Brunswick under the New Brunswick 
Consumer Product Warranty and Liability Act, SNB 1978, c. C-18.1 [NBCPWLA], where statutory implied 
warranties apply. In the SCPA, specific remedies apply when the breach of the implied warranty is of a 
"substantial character: SCPA, s 39 c). In Quebec, although ss 37 and 38 refer to "guaranties" (i.e. 
"warranties" in the English version), they give rise to a broad range of remedies through the application of s 
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They differ from each other by the remedies available to consumers in case of breach. 34 Second, in the 
majority of provinces and territories, the statutory implied obligations are mandatory, and are 
considered as ordre public in Quebec, with penal sanctions applicable in case exoneration clauses are 
used. 35 In other provinces, implied obligations can be overridden by contract. 36 Common law implied 
obligations may continue to apply to certain transactions that fall outside the scope of the relevant 
provincial or territorial statutes.37 For instance, this could be the case if commercial copies of 
copyright works distributed online were to be excluded from the definition of goods. 38 As a result, the 
application of the maxim caveat emptor has progressively become the exception rather than the rule in 
consumer transactions. 39 
The minimum protection offered by the mandatory nature of the statutory implied obligations in some 
of the Canadian jurisdictions and elsewhere40 is of increasing significance for consumers purchasing 
272 of the QCPA, supra note 18. In a11 provinces and territories of common law tradition in Canada, 
statutory implied warranties of quiet possession apply. 
34 Traditionally, the breach of a warranty entitles the claimant to seek damages. The breach of a condition 
entitles the claimant to rescind the contract and/or to seek damages: Stephen M. Waddams, The Law of 
Contracts, 5th edition (Toronto: Canada Law Book Inc., 2005) at para 586); Swan, supra note 32 at 472. 
When the product is not rejected by the buyer, the applicable statutory condition is converted into a 
warranty, with the consequence that the available remedy is damages: Ramnarine v Koren, 2008 Carswell 
Ont 8363 (OSC) at para 36. 
35 See QCPA, supra note 18, ss 261, 277. 
36 This is the case in Alberta (Sale of Goods Act R.S.A. 2000, c. S-2 [ASGA], ss 15-16); Newfoundland & 
Labrador (Newfoundland and Labrador Sale of Goods Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. S-6 [NLSGA], s 15(1), sl6 c) 
and e); Prince Edward Island (Prince Edward Island Sale of Goods Act, R.S. P.E.I. 1988, c. S-1. [PEISGA], 
ss 15, 16 b) and c) and in some cases New-Brunswick (NBCPWLA, supra note 33, ss 24-26, restrict the 
cases where the statutory implied warranties can be excluded by contract if for instance "It is shown that it 
would not be fair or reasonable to allow reliance on such agreement." (s 25 ( 1)) and if the consumer suffers 
losses for which seller would have been otherwise liable had the contract not been made (s26)). 
37 For example, if the supply of copies of copyright works does not qualify as a good or in some case if it 
does not correspond to a sale: see the discussion in Chapter 8. 
38 See the discussion in Chapter 8. 
39 The only transactions for which the maxim caveat emptor may continue to apply would be with respect to 
private sales, unless there was a fundamental breach of the contract: Frey v Sarvajc 2000 SKQB 281, 194 
Sask. R. 249, [2000] 8 W.W.R. 74 (Sask QB) paras 10-14. Caveat Emptor would continue to apply with 
respect to the sale of specific goods where the buyer had a chance to inspect the goods before purchase and 
is deemed to have accepted the goods subject to such defects as his examinations should have revealed: 
Jacob S. Ziegel & Anthony.J. Duggan, Commercial and Consumer Sales Transactions, Cases, Text and 
Materials, 4th ed. (Toronto: Edmond Montgomery publications limited, 2002) at 192. 
40 QCPA, supra, note 18, ss 261, 262; SCPA, supra note 33, s 44 (I); NBCPWLA, supra note 33, s 24, 
however in limited circumstances, it can be limited by contract, unless "it would not be fair or reasonable to 
allow reliance on such agreement.": Ibid, s 25. OCPA, supra note 18, s 9(3); British Columbia Sale of 
Goods Act, RSBC 1996 c.410 [BCSGA] ss 18, 20; Nova Scotia Consumer Protection Act RSNS 1989 c. 92 
[NSCPA], 26 (3) d) and f); Manitoba Consumer Protection Act, RSM 1987, c. C200, CCSM c. C200 
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copies of copyright works online. The transaction of these copies is almost invariably accompanied by 
extensive non- negotiated terms and conditions that can easily alter and even negate the application of 
the statutory implied obligations.41 Without their mandatory nature, statutory implied obligations 
could be seriously undermined in the online environment. 
Typically, statutory implied obligations can be rebutted only by the circumstances that are specifically 
listed in the applicable statutory provisions.42 Consumers bear the burden of proof that the implied 
obligations have been breached, on a balance of probabilities.43 The remedies available for breach of 
an implied obligation include specific performance, damages (i.e., exemplary or punitive damages), 
and rescission of contract,44 and may vary based on the nature of the implied obligation and the nature 
of the breach.45 Although these remedies may be of limited appeal to the individual consumer of 
commercial copies of copyright works, I am particularly interested in how these remedies can shape 
copyright distributors' business practices as a preventive measure to potential class action lawsuits. 
As I discuss further below in the present Part of this chapter, there is a relatively high degree of 
discrepancy among the statutory implied obligations of quality and fitness for purpose across the 
various jurisdictions in Canada.46 By contrast, the statutory language of implied obligations of 
[MCPA], s 58(1); North Western Territories Consumer Protection Act, RSNWT 1988, c.C-17 [NWTCPA] s 
70(1). 
41 See Chapter 3 Part III C. 
42 For example, the statutory implied obligation of quality will not apply to defects specifically brought to 
the attention of the purchaser before the sale took place. Or the implied warranty of title will not apply with 
respect to facts that are specifically brought to the attention of the purchaser and that she agrees to assume: 
See discussion below in Part II A of this Chapter. For the application of these exceptions, see for example: 
Yarechewski v Stadium Ford Sales (1980) Ltd. (1990) 68 Man. R. (2d) 217 (MQB); Martel v Siman (2002) 
SKPC 74 (SPC). Further, the implied obligations of quality will not apply if it is established that the 
purchaser made abusive use of the good. 
43 The burden of proof is to establish, on a balance of probabilities that there was a defect in workmanship 
or defect in the product: Pioneer Grain Co. v Ortynsky (2009) SKQB 513 at para 57. 
44 See for example, Ontario Sale of Goods Act, RSO 1990, c. S-1 [OSGA], ss 51- 52; OCPA, supra note 18, 
s 100; QCP A, supra note 18, art. 272; SCP A, supra note 33, s 57. EC, Parliament and Council Directive 
1999144/EC of 25 May 1999 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees 
[1999] OJL 171/07 at 12 [Directive 1999144/EC], at art 3, lists the remedies available to consumers for 
goods that do not conform to the contract. They include: repair or replacement, reduction in the price, 
rescission of contract. Similar remedies apply in the UK Sale of Goods Act 1979 (U.K.), 1979, c. 54 
[UKSGA], s 48. 
45 See supra note 33 and 34. 
46 See the discussion below in Part III A (i) of this chapter. 
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conformity to the description and of title and of quiet possession is more uniform across Canada,47 
with the important caveat that in some provinces they can be overridden by contract.48 It is, therefore, 
difficult to find a uniform view across Canada with respect to the application of implied obligations of 
quality and fitness for purposes to protect consumers of commercial copies of copyright works. The 
distinctions between the applicable regimes in the various provinces need to be borne in mind as I 
review the statutory implied obligations of fitness for purpose and of quality, which I discuss next. 
A. Statutory implied obligations of quality and of fitness for purpose 
In theory, requirements of "fitness for purpose" may appear to address a broader range of the prima 
facie open-ended uses and privileges that stem from the ownership in goods, including in copies of 
copyright works, than do obligations of "quality". The queries for consumers of copyright works that I 
investigate here are not related to the intrinsic quality of the CD, such as its breakability or durability, 
or the musical or visual quality of the embedded recording. Such cases are no different from instances 
involving other defective consumer products and would receive a similar treatment.49 The present 
field of study revolves around a broader range of expectations, including of usages (or "purposes") 
that consumers have when they buy music CDs, film DVDs, or download a musical recording or film 
from the Internet. An additional layer of complexity is added here because of the application of 
copyright law, which is not present for other consumer goods. The issues to clarify include the scope 
of usage and freedoms that inure to the benefit of consumers as owners of the copies. How many 
reproductions, if any, can consumers make of the copyright works, and for what purposes? Can they 
lend or transfer the copies and, if so, to whom? Can they telecommunicate them via the Internet to 
others? Can they modify the copyright works contained in the copies, and play the copies on any 
devices, anywhere in the world, and for an unlimited period of time? How can consumer law provide 
47 E.g. See OSGA, supra note 44, s 13(b); SCPA, supra note 33, s 48(b) (ii); NBCPWLA, supra note 33, s 
8(1) c; MCPA supra note 114, s 58(1) b); BCSGA, supra note 114, s 16(b), NSCPA, supra note 40, s 26(3) 
b); NWTCPA, supra note 40, s 70 (1) (b); ASGA, supra note 36, s 14(b); NLSGA, supra note 36, s 14(b); 
PEISGA, supra note 36, s 14(b). 
48 ASGA, supra note 36, ss 15-16; NLSGA, supra note 36, ss 15(1), 16 c) and e); PEISGA, supra note 36, ss 
15, 16 b) and c). 
49 As I discuss in Chapter 8, such copies of copyright works, as embedded in physical objects would 
generally be treated as goods under sale of goods and consumer law and their resistance, quality of 
recording raise issues that are not distinct of commercial copies of copyright works but are rather similar to 
other forms of goods. 
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different answers to these questions than the ones provided by Canada's Copyright Act [CCA]so or 
similar copyright statutes in other jurisdictions? This is the primary purpose of the present analysis. 
In practice, the literal meaning of "purpose" and "quality," the statutory language employed to 
describe each implied obligation (i.e., of fitness for purpose and of quality) and their interpretation by 
case law,s 1 lead to fewer distinctions between "purpose" and "quality" than would appear at first 
sight. Implied obligations of fitness for purpose tend to be interwoven or assimilated into issues of 
quality, and in some jurisdictions more than in others.s2 In that context, statutory implied obligations 
of quality and of fitness for purpose are analyzed jointly, while I emphasize any distinctive features 
between the two where applicable. 
The literal meaning of "purpose" points to "the reason for which something is done or made, or for 
which it exists."s3 "Quality" refers to "the standard of something when compared to other things like 
it," or, in its second meaning, "a distinctive, ... attribute or characteristic."s4 The notion of a grading, 
or a standard scale is intimately associated with the first meaning of quality, as a means to compare 
one product from the others.ss "Purpose" requires a different exercise that involves asking whether the 
product is set to do what it was supposed to do, and sometimes the exercise is independent of a 
grading scale to assess one product compared to the others. A failure of qualitys6 usually infers a 
malfunction, an anomaly, or a departure from a standard production point of reference, or a deceit in 
50 RSC 1985, c. C-42. 
51 For instance, there is often an overlap between the statutory implied obligations of fitness for a particular 
purpose and the ones of merchantable quality: see the discussion below in Part II A of this chapter. See also 
Gerald H.L. Fridman, Sale of Goods in Canada, 5th ed. (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2004) at 169; Ziegel 
& Duggan, supra note 39 at 285ff. 
52 This is the case in the province of Quebec, where the warranties of durability and of fitness for purpose 
are often described as being warranties of quality. In the Canadian common law jurisdictions where implied 
obligations of merchantable quality co-exist with implied obligations of fitness for a particular purpose 
specifically brought to the attention of the seller, their interpretation by the courts engender significant 
overlap between two seemingly distinct implied obligations. See the discussion further below in that 
section. The US UCC, supra note 12, § 2-314 on the implied obligation of merchantability specifies that it 
requires that goods be "fit for the ordinary purposes for which goods of that description are used" ibid at 
para (c). UKSGA, supra note 44, s 14 2B (a) specifically includes in the assessment of the quality of goods 
the "fitness for all the purposes for which goods of the kind in question are commonly supplied." 
53 
"Purpose" as defined in the Canadian Oxford Dictionmy, 2ed. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
54 
"Quality" as defined in the Canadian Oxford Dictionary, supra note 53. 
55 The determination of the proper base of comparisons is to be assessed on a case by case basis based on 
surrounding circumstances: Transport Jeroby inc. c. Techno Diesel inc. (2009) Carswell Que 2315 (CQ) at 
para 29. The list of criteria (non-exhaustive) is, in some jurisdictions, explicitly stated in the statute that 
establishes the implied warranty: SCPA, supra note 33, s 48 and 39; NBCPWLA, supra note 33, s 10(1) (a). 
56 More specifically, the first meaning of quality as defined above, supra note 54. 
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the "ranking" of the product, e.g., performance, durability, resistance. For its part, a failure of purpose 
also touches upon a different and arguably more complex array of situations than the defects that are 
present in issues of quality. It includes mistakes or deceit: about the functions or characteristics of 
what the product is able to do. Quality issues also involve, to a certain extent questions of identity of 
the product, but they pertain to its "grade" or "ranking" rather than to the nature of the product.57 
While a highly defective quality in a product will usually engender a defect in the fitness for its 
purpose, the reverse is not necessarily true. In the first case, issues of fitness for purpose are easily 
assimilated to issues of quality. By contrast, the meaning of "purpose" suggests that issues of fitness 
for purpose go beyond issues of quality, at least in its first meaning.58 Under a broader definition of 
"quality" that encompasses its second meaning, e.g., "a distinctive, ... attribute or characteristic,"59 
the differences between "purpose" and "quality" become more tenuous. On that basis, the questions 
raised on the permitted uses that consumers can make of commercial copies of copyright works relate 
to the "purpose" of these copies, but they can also be understood as attributes or characteristics that 
relate to "quality" in its secondary meaning. 
The ability of obligations of quality or of fitness for purpose to ascertain consumers' rights to copies 
of a copyright work may be, at least in theory, more likely in some provinces and territories than in 
others.60 At one end of the spectrum, there are statutory warranties61 that embed consumers' 
57 On the same idea, Christian Twigg-Flesner, Consumer Product Guarantees (Aldershot, Hans: Ashgate 
Publishing Limited, 2003) at 5-6 refers to three types of quality defects: design defects, manufacturing 
defects and defects resulting from the way the good was handled during delivery. Gagnon c. Entreprises 
Faucher & Guerin inc., 2008 CarswellQue 5631 (CQ) is also illustrative. In that case, the consumer had 
purchased a product on the basis of representations by the sellers that he would make energy savings 
between 25-30 %. It turned out that it cost him more in energy after installing the heating devices. The 
Court found that the sellers were in breach of their warranty of fitness for the purpose for which the heating 
devices were intended under s 37 of the QCP A, supra note 18. In that case, the failing characteristics of 
heating devices can be characterized as an identity issue of the quality of the product based on the 
performance of the heating devices below the expected level, as well as of the fitness for the purpose for 
which such products are used, e.g. among others to make energy savings. 
58 E.g. "the standard of something when compared to other things like it," supra note 54. 
59 
"Quality" as defined in the Canadian Oxford Dictionary, supra note 53 and note 54. 
60 I.e. whereby the implied obligations of quality or of fitness for a particular purpose are specifically 
invoked against copyright holders' restrictive terms ofuses. French cases dealt specifically with those 
issues: see supra note 12. Implied obligations are invoked quite frequently regarding the sale of computer 
systems, which would involve hardware and software (i.e. copies of copyright works) but would typically 
involve malfunctions of the system rather than restrictive terms of use: see infra note 97. Also, the 
restrictiveness of some obligations is in some cases compensated by the liberal interpretation that courts 
have given to their application to the benefit of buyers and consumers. See the discussion further below in 
Part II A of this chapter, particularly with respect to implied obligations of fitness for a particular purpose. 
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reasonable expectations with respect to "acceptable quality" or "satisfactory quality,"62 or with respect 
to a "purpose for which goods of that kind are ordinarily used,"63 as the legal test to establish the 
application of the statutory warranties. They establish minimum expectations, on a case-by-case basis 
with respect to the product from the perspective of the consumer,64 that are based on a non-exclusive 
list of factors65 that are not solely dictated by the terms of the contract, but that can also take into 
account external factors.66 They cannot be overridden by contract67 and can only be limited in specific 
61 Within that group, some of the warranties are implied, which means that they can be set aside if the 
implication is not founded: this is the case of Saskatchewan (SCPA, supra note 33, s 48) and in New 
Brunswick (NBCPWLA, supra note 33, s 10(1)). In Quebec, QCPA, supra note 18, art. 37, 38, durability 
and fitness for purpose are required and the statute does not provide for statutory exceptions to this 
requirement. 
62 SCPA, supra note 33, s 48 (d) and 39 (a) provide a statutory warranty that goods sold by a retailer are of 
"acceptable quality" which is defined as "the characteristics and the quality of a consumer product that 
consumers can reasonably expect the product to have,[ emphasis added] having regard to all the relevant 
circumstances of the sale of the product, including: (i) the description of the product;(ii) its purchase price; 
and (iii) the express warranties of the retail seller or manufacturer of the product; and includes merchantable 
quality within the meaning of The Sale of Goods Act" ; see also the UKSGA, supra note 44, ss 14 (2); the 
Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 29 [UKSGSA], s 4(2); Liability for breach of 
implied obligations under the UKSGA, supra note 44, cannot be excluded in consumer agreements against 
consumers and any such term is void as against consumers: UKSGA, supra note 44, ss 6,20. 
63 QCPA, supra note 18, s 37; NBCPWLA, supra note 33, slO (1) (a) further clarifies that such purpose is 
determined having regard to a list of named circumstances and all surrounding circumstances pertinent to 
the sale. 
64 The SCPA, supra note 33, ss 48 (d), 39 provide a statutory implied warranty of acceptable quality, i.e. 
"the characteristics and the quality of a consumer product that consumers can reasonably expect the product 
to have ... "; The NBCPWLA, supra note 33, s 10 (1) (a) states "as it is reasonable to expect.", For the a 
discussion on the application of the QCPA, supra note 18, see Nicole L'Heureux, Droit de la 
consommation, 5e edition (Cowansville, Qc: Yvon Blais, 2000), at 63, 69,71. 
65 For example, the price, the description of the product, the existence of express warranties, the conditions 
of their use: QCPA, supra note 18, s 38; SCPA, supra note 33, i.e. the implied warranty of "acceptable 
quality"; NBCPWLA, supra note 33, s 10 (1) (a). Beaulieu v Leisure Time Sales Ltd 1993 CarswellNB 142 
138 N.B.R. (2d) 215, 354 A.P.R. 215 (NBQB). A good illustration on how these criteria, including the price 
are applied on a case by case basis is the decision: Zarubin v Yorkton Carpet Land Ltd. 1990 CarswellSask 
379 (SQB). In that case, the court commented as follows on the effect of a bargain price for carpet which 
turned out to be defective shortly after its purchase (paras 20-22): "Price is one of the considerations in the 
durability warranty. But, price must be considered in the context of the transaction and, in particular, the 
direct representations made by the salesman who attended the premises and observed the purposes for 
which it was to be installed .... You cannot say that it is worth $24.95 but is a bargain at $13.75, and then 
defend the lack of durability on the basis that it was only worth $13.75." Anderson v Auto Clearing (1992) 
Ltd. (2010) CarswellSask 734 (SPC), involved the purchase of a used car with considerable mileage. The 
court nevertheless found that a breakdown within one year of purchase was a breach of the statutory 
implied warranty of "acceptable quality" under the SCPA, supra note 33. 
66 Ibid. The factors to be taken into account to assess the application of these statutory implied warranties' 
are not exhaustive. 
67 QCPA, supra, note 11, ss 261, 262; SCPA, supra note 33, s 44 (I); NBCPWLA, supra note 33, s 24, 
however in limited circumstances, it can be limited by contract, unless "it would not be fair or reasonable to 
allow reliance on such agreement.": Ibid, s 25. 
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circumstances.68 They alter the traditional contract law of implied terms and reasonable expectation 
by focusing on the perspective of the consumer, rather than implying terms for the benefit of both 
parties.69 The substitution of traditional contract law principles of interpretation is consistent with the 
underlying objectives of consumer law to rectify the detrimental effects of the asymmetries that exist 
between the supplier and the consumer. 70 In that context, general contractual terms that state that the 
product is sold as it is (which could have been interpreted as one of the circumstances to take into 
account when establishing the scope of the statutory implied obligations, e.g., a notice to the 
consumer to be more diligent before she performs her purchase) are often held by the courts to be of 
no legal effect. 71 Typically, they do not a priori negate the application of the statutory implied 
obligations of fitness for purpose or of quality.72 
68 SCPA, supra note 33, s 48 (d) provides that the implied warranty of acceptable quality does not apply: (i) 
respecting defects specifically drawn to the consumer's attention before the contract is made; or (ii) where 
the consumer examines the product before the contract is made, respecting defects that examination ought 
to have revealed. These exceptions were applied in: Martel v Siman, 2002 SKPC 74. See also NBCPWLA, 
supra note 33, section 10(2). There is no specific exclusionary language in the QCPA, supra, note 11. 
However, courts have tended to assimilate statutory warranties of fitness for purpose and of durability in 
sections 37 and 38 of that Act as warranties against latent defects, which brings a similar legal analysis with 
respect to whether the defect had been disclosed to the buyer: see the discussion further below in Part II A 
of this chapter. For a narrow interpretation of statutory warranty of fitness for purpose (QCPA, supra note 
18, art 37) see: Boivin c. Honda Canada inc. (2000) CarswellQue 2741 (CQ) where the court found that this 
warranty had not been breached by a recreational vehicle sold without a side mirror and without rear 
breaking lights. The recreational vehicle could still be used for a purpose for which it was intended (i.e. on 
Eroperties where there was no road safety requirement to have such features). 
9 The doctrine of implied terms is applied and justified on the basis of transaction efficiency: Waddams, 
supra note 34 at para 146. For a comparative law analysis on the doctrine of reasonable expectation in 
contract law in the context of information technology agreements, see Clarisse Girot, User protection in IT 
Contracts: A comparative study on the protection of the user against defective performance in information 
technology (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001) at 33-51. On the concept of "reasonableness" as 
contrasted with "good faith", Swan, supra note 32 at 698-699 notes: "If good faith focuses principally on 
honesty and fairness, reasonableness focuses on rationality or the absence of subjective whim. 
Reasonableness connotes the ability to give reasons, to defend rationally an action or a decision. 
Reasonableness may require the party subject to that standard to have regard to the other party's interests." 
70 L'Heureux, supra note 64 at 53ff. 
71 MacLeodvEns, [1982] 3 W.W.R. 653, 15 Sask. R. 73, 135 D.L.R. (3d) 365 (CA),RadulvDaudrich 
(1983) CarswellMan 135 [1983] 6 W.W.R. 278 (MCA) where the court held that a statement to the effect 
that a good was not of a merchantable quality and sold "as is" did not fulfill the statement of quality that 
could limit the application of the statutory warranties under the Manitoba's Consumer protection Act.; 
Theriault c. Roy (1990) CarswellNB 169 109 N.B.R. (2d) 75, 273 A.P.R. 75 (QB) where the court held that 
a sale "as is" did not remove the implied warranty of quality and durability; see also Munro v Central Auto 
Sales Ltd. 1994 (1997) CarswellSask 798 (SPC); Parsons c. Mont-Bleu Ford inc. 2002 CarswellQue 2932 
(CQ); Adams v J & D's Used Cars Ltd. (1983) CarswellSask 311 (QB) which involved a case where the 
implied statutory warranty of fitness for a particular purpose applied, given that plaintiff had specifically 
brought that purpose of the car to the attention of the vendor. The reference to a sale "as is" was of no legal 
effect for the application of the warranty. 
72 Ibid. 
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At the other end of the spectrum, some provinces provide statutory implied obligations of 
merchantable quality and fitness for a particular purpose that is brought to the attention of the seller; 
those obligations are imported from sale of goods law into consumer law and can be overridden by 
contract. 73 They are less favourable to consumers because of the narrower scope of "merchantable 
quality," because of a focus on both parties and not the consumer in the assessment of "merchantable 
quality," and because they can be set aside by (standard non-negotiated) contract. The scope of 
application of implied obligations of quality and fitness for a particular purpose under the us UCC74 
generally falls into that category. 75 
In the middle of the spectrum, similar implied obligations of quality and fitness for a particular 
purpose become mandatory in consumer transactions. 76 The implied obligation that goods are of a 
"merchantable quality" only applies to goods sold by description,77 which sales of copies of musical 
73 ASGA, supra note 36, ss 15 and 16; NLSGA, supra note 36, ss 15(1), 16 c) and e); PEJSGA, supra note 
36, ss 15, 16 b) and c). To illustrate the impact of narrower statutory implied obligations of quality and of 
fitness for a particular purpose that can be overridden by contract, in Moldenhauer v Alberta Powersports 
Inc., (2009) 2009 ABPC 118, the Alberta Provincial Court ruled that the sale of a bicycle to a consumer "as 
is" for the amount of $5,000.00 that soon thereafter turned out to have serious defects, precluded the 
application of the ASGA, supra note 36. "As is" signified to the consumer that he should have been more 
vigilant when he made the purchase. 
74 Supra note 12. 
75 US UCC, supra note 3, § 2-314 & § 2-315. They fit within this category of the spectrum of implied 
obligations of quality and fitness for purpose primarily because they can be overridden by contract. 
76 OSGA, supra note 44, ss 14 and 15, provide that in a sale by description (i.e. goods that cannot be 
inspected upon purchase) there is an implied condition that the goods are of a merchantable quality. Section 
15.1 limits the applicability of an implied condition of fitness for a particular purpose to those cases "where 
the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods 
are required so as to show that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment, and the goods are of a 
description that it is in the course of the seller's business to supply (whether the seller is the manufacturer or 
not)" then in those cases, an implied condition that the goods will be reasonably fit for such purpose will 
apply. Section I 5 further provides "that an implied warranty or condition as to quality or fitness for a 
particular purpose may be annexed by the usage of trade." These implied obligations cannot be overridden 
by contract: OCPA, supra note 18, s 9(3). British-Columbia and Nova Scotia provide a similar legal regime: 
BCSGA, supra note 40, ss I 8, 20, and NSCPA, supra note 40, s 26 (3) d) and f). There are subtle variations 
to that model, e.g. the fact that the warranty or condition of merchantability applies to all sales and not just 
to sales by description: NSCPA, supra note 40, s 58(1); NWTCPA, supra note 40, s 70(1) e) and h). For the 
purpose of our discussion on the applicability of these implied obligations to copies of copyright works, 
these distinctions do not make a great difference in practice, given that copies of copyright work are likely 
to qualify as sales by description in most cases. 
77 This is the case in The OSGA, supra note 44, s I 5(2); BCSGA, supra note 40, s 18(6); ASGA, supra note 
36, s 16(4); NLSGA, supra note 36, s 6 (c); PEISGA, supra note 36, s 16(b), NSCPA, supra note 40, s 3(f) 
as well as a general implied condition of merchantable quality applicable to all goods, ibid, s 3 (h). 
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recordings or of films would generally be.78 "Merchantable quality" is a narrower concept than the 
"acceptable quality" or "satisfactory quality" standard of some jurisdictions discussed above. 79 For 
instance, if the goods have many functions, they need to fulfill at least one of the functions to be of a 
merchantable quality. 80 In Gordon Campbell Ltd. v Metro Transit Operating Co., 81 the Supreme Court 
of British Columbia held that goods had to be fit for use in some manner in which goods of the same 
quality and general character were ordinarily used.82 Goods with a defect (e.g., contaminated feed) 
have been held to be of a merchantable quality because there was evidence that some buyers were 
willing to buy such goods under that description. 83 
78 
"Goods sold by description" has been held to apply to: "all cases where the purchaser has not seen the 
goods, but is relying on the description alone": Varley v Whipp [1900] I QB 513, 69 LJQB 333. Courts 
have given it a broad meaning. In Shandloff v City Dairy Ltd. and Moscoe, [1936] 4 D.L.R. 712, [I 936] 
O.R. 579, I 936 (OCA), the Court of Appeal of Ontario held that dairy products, which by their nature could 
not be inspected by the purchaser upon their purchase, constituted goods by description. See also Fridman, 
supra note 51 at 165. See also Grant v Australian Knitting Mills Ltd [ 1936] A.C. 85 at 100, per Lord 
Wright: "It may also be pointed out that there is a sale by description even though the buyer is buying 
something displayed before him on the counter: a thing is sold by description, though it is specific, so long 
as it is sold not merely as the specific thing but as a thing corresponding to a description, e.g. woolen 
undergarments, a hot-water bottle, a second -hand reaping machine, to select a few obvious illustrations." 
79 A.G. Guest, (gen. ed.) Benjamin's Sale of Goods, 7th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2006) [Benjamin's 
Sale of Goods, th ed.] at para 11-031. 
80 This is how Lord Reid interpreted the scope of the implied condition of merchantable quality in Hardwick 
Game Farm v Suffolk Agricultural and Poultry Producers association [ 1969] 2 AC 31, [1968] 2 All ER 444 
(HL): " .. .if the description was so general that goods sold under it are normally used for several purposes, 
then goods are merchantable under that description if they are fit for any one of these purposes: if the buyer 
wanted the goods for one of those several purposes for which the goods delivered did not happen to be 
suitable, though they were suitable for other purposes for which goods bought under that description are 
normally bought, then he cannot complain."; see also Gordon Campbell Ltd. v Metro Transit Operating Co. 
(1983) 23 B.L.R. 177 (BCSC); Brown & Son Ltd. v Craiks Ltd. [I 970] I WLR 752, [1970] 1 All ER 823 
(H.L.). In that case, the House of Lords held that clothes that could be used for industrial purposes were of a 
merchantable quality even if they did not meet the purpose of the buyer which was to use them for dresses. 
In Villeseche v Total North Communication Ltd., supra note 36, the Yukon Court of Appeal upheld the 
lower court judgment that the Sale of Goods Act, RSYT 1986-1990, implied obligation of merchantability 
applied to a computer system. In that case, there was an immediate failure of the computer software to 
mount automatically, a significant function of the equipment. 
81 Supra note 80. 
82 Ibid. However, in Edmonton (City) v Lovat Tunnel Equipment Inc., 2000 CarswellAlta 1394 (QB), the 
Alberta Court of Queen's Bench held that the Defendant had breached the implied warranty of 
merchantable quality under ASGA, supra note 36, by providing equipment that was only apt in limited cases 
and not others. For a narrow interpretation of the statutory warranty of fitness for purpose in the seemingly 
more generous jurisdictions of implied obligations of fitness for purpose, e.g. under art. 37 of QCPA, supra 
note 18, see: Boivin c. Honda Canada inc., supra note 68. 
83 Hardwick Game Farm v Suffolk Agricultural and Poultry Producers association, supra note 80 (per Lord 
Reid). 
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The statutory implied obligation that goods (sold under description)84 are of a "merchantable 
quality"85 and the related case law are a good illustration of how the concept of quality is intimately 
related to the notion of purpose. In Cammell Laird and Company, Limited v The Manganese Bronze 
and Brass Company, Limited, 86 Lord Wright stated that "merchantable quality" means that "the goods 
in the form in which they were tendered were of no use for any purpose for which such goods would 
normally be used and hence where not saleable under that description."87 This is the category of cases 
where the quality of a good is so defective that it cannot fulfill any of its intended purposes. 88 In such 
circumstances, the link between quality and lack of fitness for purpose should come as no surprise. In 
other cases, the failure to meet legal standards (such as road safety) has been held to be a breach of the 
implied obligations of fitness for purpose and of quality. 89 This is particularly relevant to the 
application of implied obligations of quality and fitness for purpose to copies of copyright works.90 
The statutory implied obligation of merchantable quality does not apply if the defect was disclosed to 
the purchaser,91 or if the purchaser had a chance to inspect the goods and such an inspection ought to 
have revealed the existence of the defect.92 Could non-negotiated standard end-user agreements that 
explicitly limit the forms of usages and that restrict the devices on which e-books, musical recordings 
or films can be played amount to a disclosure of the "defect"93 or be one that the consumer ought to 
84 In many jurisdictions, the implied obligation of merchantable quality applies to goods sold under 
description. See the discussion below in Part II B of this chapter on the statutory implied obligations of 
correspondence with description. In other provinces or territories, it applies indiscriminately to all sales of 
goods. 
85 
""Quality of goods" includes their state or condition": OSGA, supra note 44, s 1.1. 
86 Cammell Laird and Company, Limited v The Manganese Bronze and Brass Company, Limited [ 1934] 
A.C. 402 at 430 (HL). 
87 Ibid. 
88 See the previous discussion in this section on the various literal meanings of "quality" and "purpose", and 
supra, note 53 and 54. 
89 Taylor v JPK Enterprises Ltd. (2001) CarswellMan 229 (QB). 
90 The link between products not complying with laws and implied obligations is even more explicit with 
respect to implied obligations of title and quiet possession, as this is discussed in Part II C of this chapter 
below. See also the discussion on the possible application of this case law on implied obligations in Chapter 
11. 
91 If however the defect disclosed is such that it renders the good unusable, the disclosure will not relieve 
the seller from the implied condition that goods are of a merchantable quality. For example, see Green v Jo-
Ann Accessory Shop Ltd. Green v Jo-Ann Accessory Shop Ltd. and Baker (1983) CarswellMan 309, 21 
Man. R. (2d) 261 (CC), whereby the court held that a "no ironing label'' on a dress that needed ironing and 
that was damaged after ironing, amounted to a breach of the statutory implied condition of merchantable 
quality. 
92 OSGA, supra note 44, s 15(2); BCSGA, supra note 40, s l 8(b ), NSCPA, supra note 40, s 26(f); PEISGA, 
supra note 36, s 16(b); NLSGA, supra note 36, s 16 (d). 
93 If one were to assume that the restricted usage would be qualified as such by the consumer-claimant. 
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have identified after a reasonable inspection? Could these non-negotiated standard end-user 
agreements allow the musical recording or film distributor to avoid the application of implied 
obligations of merchantable quality to the restrictive terms of use and of devices? Because statutory 
implied obligations of merchantable quality are designed narrowly around whether the defect was 
latent or not, the presence of restrictive terms in standard terms and condition could rather point to the 
description of the product and establish that the restrictive terms are therefore not a defect. In contrast, 
the more generous statutory implied obligations that set minimum standards based on consumers' 
reasonable expectations rely on the contract terms as one among many factors to assess whether the 
statutory implied warranty was breached.94 The presence of restrictive terms in the non-negotiated 
standard end-user agreements are more likely associated to the description of the product (one of the 
factors to consider to decide whether consumers' reasonable expectations were met or not)95 rather 
than as a defect which typically is a derogation from the norm. 
The jurisdictions with the narrower statutory implied obligations of merchantable quality also have a 
statutory implied obligation of fitness for a particular purpose, as do other jurisdictions.96 The 
statutory implied obligation of fitness for a particular purpose relates to a purpose specifically (or by 
implication) brought to the attention of the seller and a reliance on her skill and judgment by the 
buyer.97 This statutory implied obligation of fitness for a particular purpose is distinct from the one of 
94 See the discussion in this Part II A of this chapter on the other end of the spectrum. 
95 For example see SCPA, supra note 33, s 39. 
96 This is the case of Saskatchewan, SCPA, supra note 33, s 48(e). 
97 See the OSGA, supra note 44, s 15.1; MCPA, supra note 40, s 58(1); BCSGA, supra note 40, s l 8(a); 
NWTCPA, supra note 40, s 70(1) h; NSCPA, supra note 40, s 26(3) (e), ASGA, supra note 36, s 16(2), 
NLSGA, supra note 36, s 16 (a); PEISGA, supra note 36, s 16(a). In JP. Enterprises Inc. v Daimler 
Chrysler Canada Inc. (2010) CarswellSask 604 (QB) stated that there are three requirements for the 
warranty to apply, citing G.H.L. Fridman in Sale of Good'i in Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1995) at 
186: (i) that the contract be in the course of the seller's business; (ii) that the seller have knowledge of the 
purpose of the goods; (iii) and that the buyer rely on the seller's skill or judgment. Of those three 
requirements, the first one excludes private sales and will generally apply to consumer transactions of 
copies of copyright works. In Gerber Scientific Instrument Co. v Bell-Northern Research Ltd., supra note 
36, the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the lower court judgement finding that the supply of a computer 
system was in breach of the implied obligation of fitness for a particular purpose under s 15 of OSGA, supra 
note 44, and that this breach went to the root of the contract and entitled appellant to rescind agreement; In 
Lalese Enterprises Inc. v Arete Technologies Inc., supra note 36, the implied condition of fitness for a 
particular purpose was held to apply to a customized computer system (hardware and software). WJ Caul 
Funeral Home Ltd. v Pearce, supra note 36, the Newfoundland Superior Court (TD) applied the implied 
condition of fitness for a particular purpose under NLSGA, supra note 36, to computer software and 
hardware. In that case there had been several interactions with the supplier so that the conditions for the 
application of this implied condition were met. In Michael's Pizzeria Ltd. v LP Computer Solutions Inc, 
supra note 36, the court also found that the implied condition of fitness for a particular purpose applied to a 
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"merchantable quality" in at least two respects.98 In practice, courts have broadly interpreted the 
requirements of the statutory implied obligation of fitness for a particular purpose. 99 
Commentators often point to an overlap between the statutory implied obligations of fitness for a 
particular purpose and the ones of merchantable quality. 100 However, an interpretation based on the 
ordinary meaning of the statutory implied obligation of fitness for a particular purpose would call for, 
inter alia, some form of interaction between the buyer and the seller at the time of the transaction. 101 
Given the mass market for copies of copyright works, such as musical recordings and films, and the 
absence in most, if not all cases, of interaction between the consumer and the seller or distributor, 
especially in the case of online transactions, it seems that even the most generous interpretation of this 
computer system but that in that case it had not been breached. This case also involved extensive interaction 
between supplier and buyer. 
98 First, the effect of the statutory implied obligation of fitness for a particular purpose allows the consumer 
to bring evidence external to the contract that can negate written contractual terms. This is an exception to 
the parol evidence rule. In jurisdictions where the entire implied obligation can be overridden by contract 
(e.g. Alberta, Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland & Labrador) contracts that successfully discard the 
application of the statutory implied obligations would govern the obligations of the parties. Second, by 
relying on the seller's skill or judgment, the buyer is not constrained by the limits of the application of the 
statutory implied obligation of merchantable quality, e.g., with respect to defects that a normal examination 
would have revealed: Frechette v Charles Lage Piano Co. 2006 MBQB 99; Blondeau v Cheyenne Chev-
Olds Ltd. (200 I) Carswell Sask 777 (SPC). 
99 Fridman, supra note 51 at l 70ff. See Paskiman v Meadow Ford Sales Ltd. (1983) CarswellSask 425, 
(SQB) at para 6. See also: Barnet v Techtronics Holdings Canada Ltd. (2002) SKPC 70 at para 8: "It is 
common knowledge amounting to a "usage of the trade", that when a customer makes known to the 
computer seller, what the customer needs a computer to produce, and relies upon the seller to supply the 
same, the customer is not simply purchasing, and the seller is not simply selling a piece of machinery. 
Rather, they are contracting for the purchase and sale of a system or process that will produce the desired 
"needs"". 
10° Fridman, supra note 51 at 169; Ziegel & Duggan, supra note 39 at 285; see Benjamin's Sale of Goods, 
supra note 79 at para 11-025, for an explanation of this overlap based on a historical interpretation of 
"merchantable quality", i.e. that in the earlier case law around the interpretation of the implied obligation of 
"fitness for a particular purpose", this implied obligation was more frequently invoked because of doubt 
around what was a sale by description and around concept of "merchantability". 
101 Hardwick Game Farm v Suffolk Agricultural and Poultry Producers Association, supra note 95, where 
Lord Pearce elaborated on the meaning of a "particular purpose": " ... a particular purpose means a given 
purpose, known or communicated." For example, a purchaser bringing to the attention of the vendor that 
they have a dog upon purchase of flooring which starts off peeling off two months after purchase and is 
judged to be a breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose brought to the attention of 
the seller: Day v 465450 B.C. Ltd. (2009) SKPC 103. See also Hadlandv North-East Recyclers Ltd 2000 
CarswellSask 633, [2000] S.J. No. 653 2000 (SPC), whereby the consumer purchasing replacement part for 
his car was ignorant about technical matters from which court inferred that it was reasonable that he would 
rely on the skills of the seller. 
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implied obligation would be of limited application to commercial (digital) copies of copyright 
works. 102 
The statutory implied obligation of fitness for a particular purpose, even in its broader interpretation, 
remains narrow in its application and limited to exceptional cases (even more so in an online 
environment). It requires a positive act from the consumer (e.g., the act of making known to the seller 
a particular purpose or requirement) 103 and a reliance on the seller's skill or judgment. In the case of 
copies of copyright works, it is not inconceivable that such exceptional situation may occur. 104 Yet, it 
remains of limited application and interest from a consumer protection perspective. First, consumers 
may (legitimately) assume that certain attributes of the product are present without being inclined to 
ask specific questions, in which case it is not clear how they can invoke this implied obligation of 
fitness for a particular purpose, beyond being able to play it on at least one named device for an 
unlimited period of time. 105 Second, in the instances where consumers actively "make known to the 
seller" a specific purpose and are being turned away, they are left with no choice but to buy the music 
CD, film DVD, or download a copy, or to walk away from the transaction and have no ability to 
negotiate with sellers about the possible scope of use of the commercial copies of e-books, films, or 
musical recordings. Thus, in addition to addressing the exceptions rather than the rule of consumer 
transactions, even the exercise of that exception through specific inquiries by consumers to sellers is 
unlikely to favourably alter the permitted scope of use of commercial copies of e-books, films, or 
musical recording to meet consumers' reasonable expectations. 
Across the spectrum of statutory implied obligations of fitness for purpose and of quality, there is 
little guidance offered on the distinction between "fitness for purpose" and "quality" and even "fitness 
102 Benjamin's Sale of Goods, supra note 51 at para 14-010 points to the fact that the implied obligation of 
fitness for a particular purpose is less relevant in consumer contracts than the implied obligation of 
satisfactory quality on the basis that consumers are less likely to rely on sellers' judgment. In PCM 
Technologies Inc. v O'Toole, 2012 ONSC 2534 at para 31, the implied obligation of a fitness for a particular 
purpose was found to apply to a software where the plaintiff had specifically brought its needs to the 
attention of the seller. 
103 The "making known" does not however have to be express, it can be inferred. 
104 For example, when a purchaser makes enquiries about the possible uses of a musical recording or film 
with a sales representative online or at the retail store counter. 
105 For example, in Scraba v Sharpe's Soil Services Ltd. (2009) SKQB 49, the Saskatchewan Court of 
Queen's Bench held that there was no breach of the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose from the 
sale of a seed which was not resistant to a pesticide. In that case, the farmer Scraba had not made his 
particular purpose known to the seller, nor was there a duty to warn the purchaser of the seed's 
incompatibility with certain pesticides. 
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for a particular purpose." The jurisprudence abounds with examples whereby "quality" and "fitness 
for purpose" are assimilated, and where little legal analysis is applied to distinguish one from the 
other. 106 In some instances, the particular set of facts giving rise to the claims justifies the assimilation 
of issues of quality with issues of lack of fitness for purpose. This is the case when the deficiency in 
the quality of the product is such that it renders it unfit to accomplish the purpose for which it was 
intended. 107 
The blend of "fitness for purpose" with "quality" is particularly striking in the province of Quebec 
where a statutory warranty of durability, having regard to a list of factors, 108 co-exists with a statutory 
warranty that the goods "must be fit for the purposes for which goods of that kind are ordinarily 
used."109 Both warranties are often described as "warranties of quality." 110 In the UK, the implied 
obligation that goods must be of a "satisfactory quality" may include "fitness for all the purposes for 
which goods of the kind in question are commonly supplied," which assimilates "fitness for purpose" 
with requirements of quality. 111 Similarly, in the US, the (non-mandatory) implied obligation of 
merchantability is meant to include that the goods are "fit for the ordinary purposes for which goods 
of that description are used." 112 In the US and the UK, this implied obligation co-exists with the 
traditional implied obligation of fitness for a particular purpose brought to the attention of the seller, 
an implied obligation that still exists in several common law jurisdictions of Canada. 113 
106 For example, see: Sumka v Manitoba Pool Elevators [1976] W.W.D. 175 (MQB); Morse v Cott 
Beverages West Ltd., 2001 SKQB 550, para 29. See also Burnett v Autowheels in Motion Ltd., 2002 NSSM 
7; Cooper v Hickey 2004 NSSM 29. See also Fridman, supra note 51 at 169. 
107 Gagnon c. Entreprises Faucher & Guerin inc, supra note 57. 
108 QCPA, supra note 18, s 38 provides: "Goods forming the object of a contract must be durable in normal 
use for a reasonable length time, having regard to their price, the terms of the contract and the conditions of 
their use." 
109 QCPA, supra note 18, s 37. The official version of the act, e.g. the French version, refers to "usage 
normal" which has a slightly different connotation than purpose for ordinary use of the English version. 
110 Desbiens c. Desmeules Automobiles Inc. 1990 CarswellQue 1283 (CQ) at para 42. See also L' Heureux, 
supra note 64, at 68. In one case, the warranty of fitness for purpose has even been assimilated to the 
warranty of quality (durability), the former simply defining "normal use" in the latter: Chouinard c. 9160-
9495 Quebec inc. (2007) CarswellQue 11474 (CQ). 
111 UKSGA, supra note 44, s 14 (2). In France the statutory warranty of fitness for purpose is deemed to 
include legitimate expectations of quality flowing from suppliers' representations: Code de la 
Consommation, art L21 l-5. 
112 US UCC, supra note 12, § 2-314 2 (c). 
113 UKSGA, supra note 44, s 14 (3); UKSGSA, supra note 62, ss 4(4) and 4(5); US UCC, supra note 12, § 2-
315. A similar statutory warranty of fitness for a particular purpose applies in France: Code de la 
Consommation, art. L21 l -5. 
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In some jurisdictions, the implied obligation of quality co-exists with one of fitness for purpose for 
which goods are normally used, 114 and in others, with the additional implied obligation of fitness for a 
particular purpose. 115 In the remainder and majority of jurisdictions examined here, the implied 
obligation of merchantable quality co-exists with the implied obligation of fitness for a particular 
purpose. 116 
In the common law jurisdictions, the two statutory implied obligations of quality and of fitness for a 
particular purpose are the codification117 of a long-standing tradition of addressing issues of 
"merchantable quality" and issues of "fitness for a particular purpose" separately. 118 The ordinary 
meaning of each implied obligation, as well as their separate treatment through their statutory 
codification, suggest distinct meanings and scope for each implied obligation. 119 While the implied 
obligation of quality includes that it must be fit for the purpose for which it is normally used, the 
implied obligation of fitness for a particular purpose must by implication refer to another category of 
purpose. The assimilation of "fitness for purpose" with "quality" can potentially narrow the 
application of implied obligations to a more limited scope of scenarios. 
A consumer protection analysis of these implied obligations, which seeks to promote consumers' 
primafacie open-ended privileges and powers as owners and users of goods, favours a meaning of 
114 This is the case in New Brunswick: NBCPWLA, supra note 33, s 10. 1 (a). 
115 Directive 1999144/EC, supra note 44, art 2 2. (b), (c), (d). 
116 Supra note 97. 
117 While the common law continues to prevail unless inconsistent with the express terms of the statute: for 
example, see OSGA, supra note 44, s 57(1), it is a codification not in the civil law sense: Michael G. 
Bridge, Sale of Goods (Toronto: Butterworths, 1988) at 3: "The Sale of Goods Act may not be a code in the 
sense understood by a civil law jurist, since it is confined to a special contract and permits penetration by 
the general law to fill its lacunae, but it can rightly be called a codification for the conscious attempt behind 
it to summarize rather than reform the antecedent case law."; Fridman, supra note 51 at 158, refers to sale 
of goods law as containing provisions "to reproduce in statutory form the earlier common law 
developments as to conditions and warranties of description and quality in sales of specific goods, sales of 
goods by description, and sales by sample." 
118 Bridge, supra note 117 at 3. 
119 The need to maintain two distinct applications of implied obligations of quality and fitness for a 
particular purpose is discussed in Lord Diplock's dissenting reasons in Ashington Piggeries Ltd. v 
Christopher Hill Ltd [ 1972] AC 441 (HL). 
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"fitness for purpose" distinct from issues of quality that often tend to narrow the discussion about 
defective and non-defective goods. 
Two French cases involved the application of warranties of quality to the scope of use by consumers 
of musical recordings through the purchase of CDs. 120 In both cases, the adequacy (or lack thereof) of 
the permitted scope of use of the purchased CD was analyzed under the latent defect rules of the 
French Code Civil. 121 In EMI France, 122 the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Nanterre held that a 
music CD functioning on some CD players but not on car CD players, as a result of technological 
protection measures restricting the use of the CD, constituted a latent defect that entitled the 
complainant to a rescission of the sale of the CD. 123 In arriving at this decision, the Tribunal took into 
consideration the fact that no such limitations existed on other CDs, as well as the fact that consumers 
were not notified of such restrictions. 124 In Warner Music, 125 the Tribunal of first instance ordered the 
rescission of the sale of CDs for digital music on the basis that the CD, which contained a 
technological measure, could not be used on a specific kind of laptop. 126 The CD contained a 
notification of the technological measure that stated that it could be read on most CD players and 
computers. The Tribunal held that this incompatibility with some computers constituted a latent defect 
under the French Code Civil. 127 The Court of Appeal reversed that order on the basis of a lack of 
evidence. 128 
In Quebec, there is a debate as to whether the statutory warranties of fitness for purpose and of 
durability are distinct from the general warranty against latent defects or if, rather, they are simply 
creating a presumption of the existence of such defects in favour of the consumer. Quebec courts 
120 EM! France, supra note 12, and Warner Music, supra note 12. 
121 Art 1641 C ci v. 
122 Supra note 12. 
123 Ibid. In addition to a named consumer claimant, there was also a consumer association as claimant. The 
latter's claims against EMI France and Auchan were dismissed on procedural grounds. 
124 Ibid. The CD had a notice to the effect that the CD contained a technological measure limiting the 
possibility to make copies. 
125 Supra note 12. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Article 1641 C civ. 
128 Supra note 12. Confirmed by Cour de cassation lere chambre civile 27 novembre 2008, supra note 12. 
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appear to be increasingly leaning toward the latter interpretation, 129 while earlier case law and 
academic commentators are inclined toward the former. 130 
Sections 53 and 54 of the Quebec Consumer Protection Act [QCPA] 131 refer to consumers' remedies 
with respect to latent defects132 and with respect to the implied obligations of durability and of fitness 
for purpose respectively. This supports the interpretation that the implied obligations of durability and 
fitness for purpose impose obligations in consumer transactions that are distinct from the general 
regime of sellers' warranties of quality and against latent defects set out in the Civil Code of Quebec. 
In effect, the increasingly prevailing tendency in Quebec to assimilate the statutory implied 
obligations of fitness for purpose and of durability to warranties against latent defects limits the scope 
of both implied obligations, bringing the statutory warranties of durability and fitness for purpose 
closer to the narrower common law jurisdictions at the other end of the spectrum referred to above. 133 
129 Martin c. Pierre St-Cyr Auto caravanes /tee (2010) QCCA 420 at para 20; L. (F.) c. Astrazeneca 
Pharmaceuticals PLC (2010) CarswellQue 1023, J.E. 2010-675 (CS) at paras 77-78; Moisan c. St-Casimir 
Autos Polaris inc. (2008) CarswellQue 13455 (CQ); Capitale, cie d'assurance generale c. Saturn-Isuzu de 
Trois-Rivieres inc. (2001) Carswell Que 2527 (CQ) at para 32. Tinmouth v General Motors of Canada Ltd 
[I 988] R.J.Q. 1982 (CP); Gadoury c. Solarium de Paris inc. (2009) CarswellQue 5724, 2009 QCCQ 4993. 
In Desbiens c. Desmeules Automobiles Inc. (1990) CarswellQue 1283 (CQ) at para 46, the Court stated that 
for a breach of warranty to be found under art. 37 of the QCPA, supra note 18, the defect needed to be non-
apparent. Although not explicit) y making the link between the warranty of section 37 of the QCP A, supra 
note 18, in effect, this amounted to assimilating this statutory warranty to a warranty against latent defects. 
See also: Claude Masse, Loi sur la protection du consommateur, analyse et commentaires (Cowans ville : 
Les Editions Yvon Blais inc., 1999) at 259. 
130 Letourneau c. Lafleche Auto /tee. (1986) R.J.Q. 1956 (CS) at para 36; Champagne c. Hyundai auto 
Canada Inc. (1988) CarswellQue 1345 (CPQ) at paras 28-33; Forest v Labrecque (1990) J.E.90-11I5 (CQ) 
at 8; and see also the more recent judgment: Couture-Poulin c. Performance NC. inc., 2012 QCCQ 1264, 
at para 30; Alain Olivier "Fitness for Purpose in the Contract of Lease under the Ci vii Code of Quebec" 
(1995) 40 McGill L.J. 187, at 217ff; Jeffrey Edwards, La garantie de qualite du vendeur en droit quebecois, 
(Montreal:Wilson et Lafleur, 1998) at 163, 167. For her part, L'Heureux, without assimilating the statutory 
warranties of purpose for which the goods are normally provided and of durability to the warranty against 
latent defects, notes that they share a lot of similarity between them: L'Heureux, supra note 64 at 70. In 
Larouche c. JVC Canada inc. (2004) CarswellQue 5948 (CQ) the case involved a video camera which had 
a dysfunction in the way the tape was ejected, which appeared one year after the sale. Although technically, 
this could be qualified as a latent defect, the court invoked article 37 and 38 warranties of fitness for 
purpose and of durability, without assimilating these two provisions to remedies against latent defects in the 
CCQ or to section 53 of the QCPA, supra note I 8. 
131 Supra note 18. 
132 Which refers to CCQ's general obligations of sellers with respect to the quality of property they sell (art 
I 726-1731 ). Article 53 of the QCPA, supra note 18, softens the rules for consumers by removing the 
application of the warranty against latent defects only if it could have been perceived from an ordinary 
inspection (the civil code discards the application of the warranty of apparent defects, i.e. "a defect that can 
be perceived by a prudent and diligent buyer without any need of expert assistance" (art. 1726 CCQ). 
133 As outlined above in this Part II A, one end of the spectrum offers representations and warranties that are 
seemingly more generous to consumers while the other end offers more restrictive ones that can be 
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It does so, first, by assimilating them to issues of quality (in the first meaning as discussed above) 134 
and, second, by narrowing their application to whether there exists a defect, whether it was present at 
the time of the sale, and whether it was known to the purchaser or could have been known by an 
ordinary examination. 135 While a latent defect will often involve an issue of quality (durability) or 
lack of fitness for purpose136 - the reverse is not necessarily true. 
The legal framework of latent defects 137 narrows the discussion between defective and non-defective 
products, 138 - while the warranties of durability and fitness for purpose rely more generally on 
consumers' reasonable expectations - to determine whether such warranties were breached, with or 
without the existence of a defect per se. 139 Under a latent defects' analysis, sellers are relieved of their 
warranties if they disclosed the defect or if it was known or could have been known by purchasers. 
The obligations to disclose latent defects are mainly geared toward correcting the information 
asymmetry that subsists between sellers and buyers. The consumers' reasonable expectations 
framework is more suitable to address consumer transactions' particularities and vulnerabilities, 140 
thereby leading to more fair, reliable, and efficient markets. 
It is naturally appealing for the judiciary to assimilate sellers' obligations of durability and fitness for 
purpose to obligations against latent defects, given the well-developed case law in this area, as well as 
the reasonably clear tests that their application requires. By contrast, the more recent consumer regime 
overridden by contract. In the middle of the spectrum, the latter implied obligations cannot be overridden by 
contract. 
134 I.e. the "the standard of something when compared to other things like it," supra note 54. 
135 CCQ art 1726-1731; QCPA, supra note 18, s 53. See also the discussion on the French cases, supra note 
120, applying the Code Civil general warranty against latent defects. 
136 For example, in Larouche c. JVC Canada inc. (2004) CarswellQue 5948 (CQ) the case involved a video 
camera which had an dysfunction in the way the tape was ejected, which appeared one year after the sale. 
Although technically, this could be qualified as a latent defect, the court invoked article 37 and 38 of the 
QCPA, supra note 18, warranties of fitness for purpose and of durability, without referring to the present or 
not of a latent defect. 
137 As well as the narrower implied obligations of quality and fitness for purpose on the spectrum discussed 
above in this section. 
138 L' Heureux, supra note 64 at 69, refers to latent defects being limited to cases where goods are altered or 
deteriorated. 
139 Ibid, at 69-70. The author notes however that warranties against latent defect in the Civil Code of 
Quebec and the warranties of durability and fitness for purpose overlap (ibid, at 70). Pierre-Claude Lafond, 
"Le code civil du Quebec et la loi sur la protection du consommateur: un mariage de solitudes" (2010) 88 
C.B.R. 407, at 419-420 who notes that the presence of a latent defect is not necessary for the application of 
the statutory warranties of quality and fitness for purpose in the QCPA, supra note 18. 
14
° For instance, to rectify other asymmetries prevailing in consumer transactions, including bargaining 
power and in some cases the power to shape or at least influence industry norms and practices. 
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of general durability and fitness for purpose requirements has yet to be more clearly developed and 
understood. Preserving the integrity and distinctiveness of the statutory consumer warranties of 
quality and fitness for purpose mandates a different legal analysis than the more constraining legal 
framework of latent defects. 
As a preliminary conclusion on the nature and scope of implied obligations of quality and fitness for 
purpose, they offer a potentially stronger legal base to consumers of commercial copies of copyright 
works in the Canadian provincial jurisdictions where they cannot be overridden by contract and where 
their application relies on consumers' reasonable expectations. 141 For reasons that are either dictated 
by the wording of the statutory implied obligations, or that result from the case law, 142 there is a 
discemable tendency to assimilate issues of fitness for purpose with issues of quality. 
In those Canadian provincial jurisdictions where an implied obligation or statutory warranty of quality 
or durability co-exists with one of fitness for purpose, 143 an ordinary-meaning approach to "fitness for 
purpose" could potentially broaden the support for consumers' open-ended privileges and powers as 
owners of commercial copies of copyright works and for information products generally. This could 
bring the analysis of consumers' reasonable expectations beyond a defective v. non-defective analysis 
that is more common in the narrower application of implied obligations of quality. Issues of quality in 
the narrower sense are likely to be less prevalent than issues of fitness for purpose in the increasingly 
complex nature and intrinsic interdependence of information products, as well as with the interaction 
between various legal regimes, i.e., copyright, property, contract and consumer law. 144 
It is with the variable scope of the statutory implied obligations of fitness for purpose and of quality 
between the Canadian provinces and territories in mind, as well as the various interpretations that can 
be given to them, that I will argue in Chapter 11 how statutory implied obligations of fitness for 
purpose and of quality can apply to four possible typical scenarios that involve commercial copies of 
141 Such as the implied obligation that goods are of "acceptable quality," sections 48 (d) and 39 of the 
SCPA, supra note 33, which also encompasses issues of fitness for purpose. 
142 As this is the case in the majority of the jurisdictions discussed here, where a narrow implied obligation 
of merchantable quality co-exists with an implied obligation of fitness for a particular purpose brought to 
the attention to the seller, as previously discussed in Part II A of this chapter. 
143 E.g., the more general ones as found in NBCPWLA, supra note 33, s IO (1) (a); QCPA, supra note 18, ss 
37 and 38, as opposed to the narrower fitness for a particular purpose specifically brought to the attention of 
the seller and where buyer relies on sellers' skill or judgement. 
144 I discuss the ramifications of this complex interaction in Chapter 3 Part III, and in Chapter 7 Part V. 
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copyright works. Prior to that, I will consider the potential appeal that statutory implied obligations of 
correspondence with description may have to the protection of consumers' permitted uses of 
commercial copies of copyright works. 
B. Statutory implied obligations of correspondence with description 
The statutory implied obligation that goods sold by description 145 correspond with the description is 
common to all jurisdictions examined here. 146 It is not likely to be of great relevance to ascertain the 
scope of consumers' permitted uses to copies of copyright works. In Canada, courts have settled on a 
narrower meaning of "description" that refers to issues of identity of the product. 147 A broader 
meaning of "description" brings this implied obligation closer to issues about quality and fitness for 
purpose148 and does not give more ammunition to consumers than the above discussion under the 
heading of implied obligations of quality and fitness for purpose. 149 For those reasons, my comments 
on the nature, scope, and application of the implied obligation of correspondence with description to 
commercial copies of copyright works will remain brief. 
The application of the implied obligation that goods sold by description correspond with the 
description involves issues of construction of what is "contractually descriptive of the goods." 150 This 
implied obligation is limited to goods conforming to what sellers have described (for example in non-
145 See supra note 78. 
146 The implied obligation that goods sold by description correspond with the description is a standard 
implied obligation of sale of goods law: OSGA, supra note 44, s 14; BCSGA, supra note 40, s 17 ( 1) ( d); 
ASGA, supra note 36, s 15; NLSGA, supra note 36, s 15(1); PEISGA, supra note 36, s 15. Similar implied 
obligations are found in consumer protection legislation: NSCP A, supra note 40, s 6; NWTCP A, supra note 
40, s 70 (I); MCPA, supra note 40, s 58 (I); NBCPWLA, supra note 33, s 14; SCPA, supra note 33, s 48 c); 
QCP A, supra note 18, s 40. Similar implied obligations or statutory warranties are found in Directive 
1999144/EC, supra note 44, art. 2(2) a); UKSGA, supra note 44, s 13; and in the French Code de la 
Consommation, art. L2 l 1-5 1 ). 
147 In Ashington Piggeries Ltd. v Christopher Hill Ltd, supra note 119, Lord Wilberforce held that the 
defect in contaminated herring meal "was a matter of quality or condition rather than of description and that 
this is what had been provided so that there was no breach of the implied condition of correspondence with 
description. In Rahtjen v Stern GMC Trucks (1969) Ltd. 66 D.L.R. (3d) 566, [1976] W.W.D. 120, (MCA) at 
para 9, the Manitoba Court of Appeal made the distinction between "description" and "quality": " ... the 
word "description" refers to the identification of the thing or things sold and not to quality. On the 
undisputed facts of this case, the respondent received a trailer, albeit one of inferior quality. It is therefore 
my view that sec. 15 has no application." 
148 See Benjamin's Sale of Goods, 7th ed., supra note 79 at para 11-016. 
149 See the discussion in Part II A. of this chapter. 
15° Fridman, supra note 51 at 166. 
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negotiated standard end-user agreements in online transactions) or in the notifications appearing on 
commercial copies of copyright works (such as on musical CDs or film DVD packaging). 151 
Copies of copyright works are sold over the counter with almost no description, 152 or, when 
distributed online, they typically come with extensive non-negotiated standard end-user 
agreements. 153 Under the no terms and conditions scenario, the absence of description leaves little 
room to invoke the implied obligation of correspondence with description. The consumer will 
purchase a specific musical recording CD or a film DVD by relying on the CD or DVD title and 
cover. Any mistake between the title and cover and the actual CD or DVD, or the fact that the CD or 
film cannot be played or listened to would indeed amount to an unequivocal breach of the implied 
obligation of description. This would be the same for any other goods and would raise no particular 
issues specific to copies of copyright works. Under the non-negotiated standard end-user agreements' 
scenario, any difference between the detailed description of the usage rights of the musical recording 
or film and the actual uses that can be made would follow the same logic. It would not solve any 
issues that are specific to the permitted scope of use of commercial copies of copyright works. 
To conclude, given the narrow interpretation of the implied obligation of correspondence with 
description, it makes it a less good candidate to ascertain and protect consumers' permitted uses of 
commercial copies of copyright works than possibly, the implied obligations of quality and fitness for 
purpose that I analyzed earlier, and as I will discuss next, some of the implied obligations of title, 
quiet possession and freedom from encumbrance. 
C. Statutory implied obligations of title, quiet possession, and freedom from encumbrances 
In the common law provinces and territories of Canada, there are three distinct yet closely related 
implied obligations that revolve around sellers' ability to deal with goods. There is an implied 
obligation that sellers have the right to sell the goods, 154 an implied obligation that buyers shall enjoy 
151 See supra note 147. 
152 Other than the name of the artist, title, and very limited notifications of use, if any. 
153 Ibid. 
154 For example, see OSGA, supra note 44, S 13 (a); SCPA, supra note 33, s 48 (a). 
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the quiet possession of the goods 155 and that the goods are free from any charges or encumbrances. 156 
The implied obligations are subject to limited exceptions. 157 Similar implied obligations or statutory 
warranties exist in the other jurisdictions examined here. 158 In the context of ascertaining consumers' 
rights to commercial copies of copyright works, the implied obligation that sellers have the right to 
sell the goods and that buyers shall enjoy the quiet possession of the goods may offer greater appeal 
than would the implied obligation that the goods are free from any charges or encumbrances. 159 
There is jurisprudence to the effect that the seller's implied obligations of title and of quiet possession 
include obligations that the goods comply with laws, 160 which, as I discuss in Chapter 11, may enable 
the development of an interesting argument to support copyright consumers' users' rights as they are 
dictated by copyright law. As for the implied obligation of quiet possession, its exact nature and scope 
is not entirely clear. This leaves room for arguments in favour of ascertaining consumers' rights to 
copies of copyright works, especially in the presence of technological protection measures [TPMs]. 161 
The third implied obligation, e.g., that the goods are free from any charges or encumbrances, 
generally covers instances whereby personal property securities or other forms of lien are attached to 
the purchased goods, 162 which are not relevant to the present discussion. 163 Accordingly, the following 
analysis will focus on the implied obligations of title and of quiet possession. 
155 E.g. See OSGA, supra note 44 s 13(b); SCPA, supra note 33, s 48(b) (ii); NBCPWLA, supra note 33, s 
8(1) c; MCPA, supra note 114, s 58(1) b); BCSGA, supra note 114, s 16(b), NSCPA, supra note 40, s 26(3) 
b); NWTCPA, supra note 40, s 70 (1) (b) ASGA, supra note 36, s 14(b); NLSGA, supra note 36, s 14(b); 
PEISGA, supra note 36, s 14(b). The Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q. I 977, c. C-
l 2, s 6, provides that everyone has a right to the peaceful enjoyment of his property. 
156 For example, see OSGA, supra note 44, s 13 (c); SCPA, supra note 33, s 48 (b) (i). In Quebec, there is a 
warranty that the goods are free from any charges or encumbrances: QCPA, supra note I 8, s 36. CCQ, art 
1724 contains a warranty against any "encroachments" on his part unless it was disclosed at the time of the 
sale. 
157 In several provincial jurisdictions, these implied obligations apply unless the circumstances around the 
contract show a different intention: OSGA, supra note 44, s 13; ASGA, supra note 34, s 14; NLSGA, supra 
note 36, s 14; PEISGA, supra note 36, s 14; BCSGA, supra note 40, s 16. The implied warranty of freedom 
from encumbrance does not apply with respect to such encumbrances that were declared or known to the 
buyer before the contract of sale was entered into: OSGA, supra note 44, s I 3( c ); ASGA, supra note 36, s 
14(c); NLSGA, supra note 36, s 14(c); PEISGA, supra note 36, s 14(c); BCSGA, supra note 40, s 16 (C). 
158 US UCC, supra note 12, § 2-312; UKSGA, supra note 44, s 12; UKSGSA, supra note 62, s 2. 
159 I apply these obligations to copies of copyright works in Chapter I 1. 
160 See the discussion on the jurisprudence pertaining to the implied obligations related to title and of quiet 
possession further below in Part II C of this chapter. 
161 See the discussion in Chapter 11. 
162 Ziegel & Duggan, supra note 39, at 210. 
163 I.e., they are not likely to raise any issues of interest that are specific to copies of copyright works. 
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Unlike statutory implied obligations of quality or fitness for purpose, the legal regime applicable to 
implied obligations of title and of quiet possession is more uniform across the common law provinces 
and territories in Canada. 164 In the majority of provinces and territories, the statutory implied 
obligation of quiet possession cannot be overridden by contract, except in three provinces. 165 
The jurisprudence on the implied obligation that "the seller has the right to sell the goods" interprets 
this obligation broadly, i.e., beyond strict issues of defective title pertaining to the ownership of the 
sold goods (e.g. stolen goods, 166 or goods on hire-purchase agreements that were sold before 
ownership passed on to the buyer167) that raise no issues that are specific to copy ownership of 
copyright works. The implied obligation of title has been applied to instances whereby the seller was 
precluded from selling the goods to the purchaser for reasons other than title in the goods. The seller 
of cases of condensed milk was found to have breached the implied obligation of title in Niblett Ltd. v 
Confectioners' Materials Co. Ltd., 168 because a portion of the cases sold bore a trademark that 
infringed the trademark rights of a third party. 169 Bankes LJ rejected a narrower application of this 
implied obligation that would limit it to acts and omissions of the vendor and those acting by his 
authority: "I think that s. 12 has a much wider effect and that the language did not warrant such 
limitations." 170 In addition, in order to be able to sell the cases of condensed milk, the buyer had to 
strip off each label bearing the infringing trademark. 171 The facts of this case could also have raised 
164 See supra note 155. 
165 Namely in Alberta, Newfoundland & Labrador and in Prince Edward Island: supra note 155. 
166 For example one landmark judgment on the implied condition of title Rowland v Divall [1923] 2 KB 
500, [1923] All ER Rep. 270 (CA), involved the application of the implied condition to a stolen car. In 
Butterworth v Kingsway Motors Ltd. [1954] I WLR 1286, [1954] 2 All ER 694 (QB), the applicability of 
the implied condition of title revolved around the hire-purchase of a car that belonged to a third party. 
167 This was the case in Patten v Thomas Motors Pty. Ltd. (1965), 65 NSWR 458 (Australia). 
168 [1921] 3 KB 387, [1921] All ER Rep. 459 (CA). 
169 Ibid. In that case, the seller argued that it was understood between the parties that the goods would be of 
one or another brand, to which Bankes LJ responded: "But assuming that goods of one or more of three 
brands might be delivered under the contract, that circumstance does not show any intention that if two of 
those brands are free from objection, and the third is an infringement of trade mark rights, the vendor may 
tender goods of the third brand in fulfilment of this contract. The goods tendered must still be goods which 
the vendor has a right to sell. Therefore, in my opinion the appellants have established a right of action 
under s 12, sub-s I of the Act." 
170 Ibid. See also Azzurri Communications Limited v International Telecommunications Equipment Limited 
t/a SOS Communications, [2013] EWPCC 17 at paras 49,51,75, where the Court held that software that 
turned out to be counterfeited and infringed the trade-marks of original software manufacturer was supplied 
in breach of the seller's implied obligation of having the right to sell the goods.( UKSGA, supra note 44, s 
12(1) and of quiet possession ( UKSGA, ibid, s 12 (2) (b )). 
111 Ibid. 
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issues of quiet possession. 172 In J. Barry Winsor & Associates Ltd. v Be/go Canadian Manufacturing 
Co. Ltd., a seller of electric lamps that did not comply with British Columbia regulations 173 was found 
to be in breach of the implied obligation that "the seller has the right to sell the goods." 174 
The exact scope of the statutory implied obligation of quiet possession remains unclear. 175 The 
existence of separate statutory implied warranties of title and freedom from encumbrances suggests 
that the implied obligation of quiet possession refers to issues that are broader than questions related 
to title and encumbrances, as illustrated by Rubicon Computer Systems Limited v United Paints 
Limited. 176 In that case, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales held that the application by a 
software supplier of "time locks" on software delivered to the purchaser constituted a breach of the 
implied obligation of quiet possession under UK Sale of Goods Act [UKSGA]. 177 The implied 
obligation of quiet possession supports the expectations that come with the ownership of goods, e.g., 
the primafacie open-ended privileges and powers with no duty to account to anyone as to their 
merit. 178 Although its co-existence with distinct implied warranties, as well as the case law on quiet 
possession, suggest a broader meaning of quiet possession, there remains a close connection between 
quiet possession and issues related to the title and encumbrances of the goods. 179 
172 Ibid. See the discussion in this section further below in the implied warranty of quiet possession. The 
implied warranty of quiet possession if breached, would give rise to damages, while the implied condition 
of title would give rise to a right to rescind the contract in addition to the right to claim any damages. 
173 Regulations, B.C. Reg. I 66173, made under the Electrical Energy Inspection Act, RSBC 1960, c. I 26, 
174 (1975) 61 DLR (3d) 352 (BCSC); aff'd 76 DLR (3d) 685 (CA). However in Ahlstrom Canada Ltd. v 
Browning Harvey Ltd. ( 1987), 31 DLR ( 41h) 316 (NFLD CA), the Court held that the seller did not breach 
the implied condition that he had the right to sell plastic bottles which were later banned under the 
Hazardous Products Act, RSC I 985, C. H-3, on the basis, that at the time of the sale, such bottles were not 
prohibited and that any risk on the use of the bottles later on had to be borne by the purchaser, not the seller. 
175 For a discussion on the implied warranty of quiet possession in Canada, see Fridman, supra note 5 I at 
104-108. 
176 (2000) 2 T.C.L.R. 453 (C.A.). See also Microbeads, A.C. and another v Vinhurst Road Markings 
Limited, [I 97 5] I W.L.R. 218 (CA) whereby the cause of the alleged breach of quiet possession, i.e. a 
patent that was infringed, did not exist at the time of the sale of the goods: see the discussion of this case 
further below in Part II C of this chapter. 
177 Supra note 44. The Court upheld the lower Court judgment that this amounted to a repudiatory breach by 
the supplier that entitled the purchaser to the return of the purchase money. 
178 James W. Harris, Property and Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) at 65. See the discussion on the 
main attributes of property and ownership in Chapter 4 Part II as well as in Chapter I 0 on the theoretical 
justifications of consumer protection law obligations. 
179 Issues of title will typically interfere with the buyers' possessory enjoyment of the purchased good, 
while the possessory enjoyment of goods does not always involve issues of title. In the provinces of 
Saskatchewan and of New Brunswick, the statutory implied warranties of quiet possession are tied to issues 
of title, e.g. that if the latter are disclosed to the buyer by the seller or are known by the buyer at the time of 
the sale, they do not cause the implied warranty of quiet possession to be breached: supra note I 55. 
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Two cases involving a breach of the implied obligation of quiet possession revolved around the threat 
of patent infringement or actual patent infringement suit from a third party against the purchaser of 
machinery, resulting from the use of the machinery by the purchaser. In Microbeads, A. C. and 
another v Vinhurst Road Markings Limited, 180 the purchaser of a road-marking machine was sued, 
shortly after the purchase, by the owner of a patent pertaining to the machinery. Even though the 
seller had the right to sell the machinery to the plaintiff, this was found by the court to be a breach by 
the seller of the implied obligation of quiet possession. The Ontario Supreme Court was seized with 
similar issues in Gencab of Canada Ltd. v Murray-Jensen Manufacturing Co. 181 In that case, the 
patent owner had not yet taken action against the purchaser of machinery. And yet, the threat of legal 
action and the impact it had on the purchaser's use of the machinery was enough to amount to a 
breach of the statutory implied obligation of quiet possession by the seller. 182 Another case involved 
the unauthorized use by the seller of a newly purchased trailer while it was left in storage with the 
seller by the purchaser. The court found that by using the trailer of the buyer, the seller was in breach 
of the implied obligation of quiet possession. 183 Similarly to the implied obligation of title, the supply 
of goods that do not comply with applicable laws and regulations could also amount to a breach of the 
implied obligation of quiet possession. 184 
180 Supra note 176. 
181 1980 CarswellOnt 841 29 O.R. (2d) 552, 53 C.P.R. (2d) 116 (OSC). 
182 Ibid, at para 32ff. However, in another intellectual property case, a buyer (defendant) could not invoke 
breach of the implied warranty of quiet possession (section l 2(2)(b) of the UKSGA, supra note 44, by the 
supplier for an article that infringed the copyright of the claimant on the basis that the buyer (defendant) had 
explicitly requested the seller to make a copy of the infringing article: Hi-Tech Autoparts Ltd v Towergate 
Two Ltd, [2002] FSR 15 (Patents County Court). 
183 Kralik v Karking Marine Ltd. 1988 WL 873702 (ODC), at para 21. See also Azzurri Communications 
Limited v International Telecommunications Equipment Limited t/a SOS Communications, supra note 170 
at paras 49,51,75, where the Court held that software that turned out to be counterfeited and infringed the 
trade-marks of original software manufacturer was supplied in breach of the seller's implied obligation of 
having the right to sell the goods.(UKSGA, supra note 44, s 12(1) and of quiet possession (UKSGA, ibid, s 
12 (2) (b)).See also Great Elephant Corp v Trafigura Beheer BV & Ors, [2012] EWHC 1745 (Comm). 
184 This question was discussed but not definitively decided in Meyknecht-Lischer Contractors Ltd. v 
Stanford (2005) WL 4904857 (OSC). In that case, the purchaser alleged that the supplier and installer of a 
fence had breached the implied warranty of quiet possession because the fence did not comply with 
applicable laws. The court considered this argument but rejected it in that case because the purchaser had 
the responsibility to obtain any applicable permits. Also, the court did not find that there was a lack of quiet 
possession caused by the non-compliance with laws given that as a result thereof, the purchaser ended up 
enjoying a larger piece of property than had the fence been legally compliant. The issue of the linkage 
between the implied warranty of title and quiet possession and the conformity of products with safety laws 
was also raised but not decisively decided upon in Guillevin International Inc. v Antique Building Supplies 
Ltd. (1991) WL 1142203 (OGD). This case involved the sale of gaskets which did not comply with the 
standards of the Canadian Standard Association, which was a requirement under Quebec laws, where the 
gaskets were to be resold. 
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Failure of products to comply with legal requirements185 interpreted as a breach of implied obligation 
of title, and the still undefined contours of the implied obligation of quiet possession, offer an 
interesting avenue to ascertain consumers' ownership rights in commercial copies of copyright works. 
As I discussed in Chapter 3, copyright holders do not typically make room for consumers' rights 
under copyright law 186 in the non-negotiated standard end-user agreements that consumers have to 
agree to in order to access commercial copies of copyright works online. The interesting question is to 
what extent such ignorance of copyright law could amount to a breach of the implied obligations of 
title or quiet possession? Similarly, access, copy controls, and digital rights management applied to 
commercial copies of copyright works are pressing us to revisit our traditional understanding of 
ownership and possession, the quietness of which is increasingly under attack. 187 In Chapter 10 and in 
Chapter 11, 188 I analyze the theoretical justifications of statutory implied obligations of title, quiet 
possession, and freedom from encumbrances and apply them to specific scenarios involving different 
uses of copies of copyright works 
The extent to which the application of implied obligations of quality, fitness for purpose, title, and 
quiet possession depends (or should) on how much information is disclosed to consumers varies 
across the spectrum of implied obligations reviewed so far. It varies based on the legal test applied 
and how much emphasis is placed on the relevance of whether information was in fact disclosed. The 
fact that courts are usually not impressed with broad disclosures or statements of suppliers as a means 
to notify consumers of the existence of a defect is illustrative of the complex interaction that exists 
between implied obligations and information disclosure. 189 When and how does the disclosure of 
information pertaining to commercial copies of copyright works limit the application of statutory 
implied obligations? 
The interaction between statutory implied obligations and information disclosure is central to the 
understanding of the scope of protection that statutory implied obligations offer to consumers. The 
185 Such as electricity standards, see supra note I 73. 
186 E.g., of the acts that consumers can perform on the copyright works without copyright holders' consent. 
187 The application by the supplier of copy controls i.e. "time locks" to software delivered to the purchaser, 
was held to constitute a breach of the implied obligation of quiet possession in Rubicon Computer Systems 
Limited v United Paints Limited, supra note 176. See the application of this implied obligation to specific 
scenarios involving commercial copies of copyright works in Chapter 11. 
188 More specifically, I discuss the theoretical justifications of statutory implied obligations in Chapter 10, 
and apply them to four scenarios of uses of copies of copyright works in Chapter 11. 
189 See supra note 71. 
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discussion above in this chapter on the opportunity to apply the legal framework of latent defects to 
statutory implied obligations of quality and fitness for purpose in consumer transactions is an 
example. 190 The increased use by copyright holders of elaborate non-negotiated standard end-user 
agreements with the supply online of copies of musical recordings and films presses the merits of that 
investigation even further. The theoretical justifications of statutory implied obligations that I will 
discuss in Chapter 10, as well as the role of information disclosure in consumer protection obligations 
that I discuss below in the present chapter, 191 will help solidify the understanding of that interaction. 
To sum up on the nature and scope of statutory implied obligations and how they can assist consumers 
in their claims against restricted uses of commercial copies of copyright works, the implied 
obligations of title and of quiet possession are likely to offer the strongest legal base for an argument 
that protects consumers. Implied obligations of quality and fitness for purpose also offer an interesting 
avenue to enforce consumers' reasonable expectations of permitted uses of commercial copies of 
copyright works in those provinces and territories of Canada that offer a regime that is more 
favourable to consumers. 
Before moving to the nature and scope of information disclosure requirements in consumer law and 
how they impact on the statutory implied obligations examined here, I will make a brief incursion into 
the potential relevance and application of provisions prohibiting unfair practices to the permitted 
scope of use of copies of copyright works. 
III. Unfair practices 
Most consumer protection law statutes across Canada prohibit unfair practices, e.g., making a false, 
misleading, deceptive, or unconscionable representation. 192 They typically include a non-exhaustive 
list of practices that may be considered as unfair. 193 Among those practices, "a representation that the 
transaction involves or does not involve rights, remedies or obligations if the representation is false, 
190 I discuss the linkages between statutory warranties of quality and warranties against latent defect in 
Quebec and in France in Part II A of this chapter. 
191 See Part IV of this chapter. 
192 For example, see OCPA, supra note 18, ss 14-15; QCPA, supra note 18, art. 8, 10,11 & 215ff. 
193 For examples, a representation claiming sponsorship approvals that are not true or a representation of 
certain attributes or quality of goods or services that are non-existent would fall under that category: OCPA, 
supra note 18, s 14 (2) I & 3. 
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misleading or deceptive" 194 or a "representation using exaggeration, innuendo or ambiguity as to a 
material fact or failing to state a material fact if such use or failure deceives or tends to deceive"195 
may be relevant to terms (or the absence of terms) dealing with the scope of use of copies of copyright 
works. Further, representations, by a person who knows or ought to know, "that the consumer 
transaction is excessively one-sided in favour of someone other than the consumer" or "that the terms 
of the consumer transaction are so adverse to the consumer as to be inequitable"196 may also find 
application with respect to transactions involving commercial copies of copyright works. 197 At the 
federal level, the Competition Act also prohibits certain commercial practices. 198 Similar regulations 
prohibiting unfair practices in consumer commercial transactions exist in the European Union, 199 with 
194 OCPA, supra note 18, s 14 (2) 13. See also the BCPCPA, supra note 114, s 4(3) (b) (iv); MCPA, supra 
note 40, s 2(3) (n); AFTA, supra note 114, s 6(2) (c); SCPA, supra note 33, s 6(k); New Foundland and 
Labrador An Act Respecting Consumer Protection and Business Practices, SNL 2009, c C-31.1 
[NLCPBPA], s 7(1) (p); Prince Edward Island Business Practices Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. B-7 [PEIBPA], s 2 
(a) (xii). 
195 OCPA, supra note 18, s 14 (2) 14. See also the BCPCPA, supra note 114, s 4(3) (b)(vi); AFTA, supra 
note 114, s 6(3) (d); MCPA, supra note 40, s 2(3) (p) & 2(1) (a); SCPA, supra note 33, s 6 (o) & 5(a); 
NLCPBPA, supra note 194, s 7(l)(w); PEIBPA, supra note 194, s 2(a) (xiii). 
196 OCPA, supra note 18, s 15 (2) e) & t). See also British Columbia Business Practices and Consumer 
Protection Act, SBC 2004 c.2 [BCBPCPA], s 8(3) (e); SCPA, supra note 18, s 6 (q); NLCPBPA, supra note 
194, s 8(1) (d); PEIBPA, supra note 194, s 2 (b) (v) & (vi). 
197 See the discussion in Chapter 11 on the application of consumer protection obligations to four scenarios 
involving copies of copyright works. 
198 Competition Act (RSC 1985, c. C-34) S 74 "Deceptive marketing practices reviewable matters", 
including s. 74.01 (a) "representation to the public that is false or misleading in a material respect" and 
includes deceiving practices relating to price, contests, lotteries. The Commissioner has the power to bring 
certain practices for review before the courts referred to in the Act. Courts have the power to issue penalties 
if there is a finding of a deceptive marketing practice: Ibid. s 74.1. The eventual application of these 
provisions is outside the scope of this chapter. 
199 EC, Council Directive 93113/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, [1993] OJ 
L095, at 29 [Directive 93113/EEC] sets general rules concerning contract terms (e.g. use of plain and 
ordinary language, interpretation of ambiguous terms to favour consumers: art. 5; unfair terms to be non-
binding on consumers: art. 6, and characterizes a contract term as unfair "if, contrary to the requirement of 
good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract, 
to the detriment of the consumer.(art. 3 para I). It also provides "an indicative and non-exhaustive list of the 
terms which may be regarded as unfair (art. 3 para 3). Of potential interest to the present discussion on 
terms prohibiting the exercise of consumers' rights (or limitations of copyright) to copies of copyright 
works, the Annex lists as unfair term those terms "(q) excluding or hindering the consumer's right to take 
legal action or exercise any other legal remedy." EC, Parliament and Council Directive 2005129/EC of 11 
May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and 
amending Council Directive 841450/EEC, Directives 9717/EC, 98127/EC and 2002165/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 200612004 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, [2005] OJ L 149 at 29 [Directive 2005129/ECJ the object of which is (article I) to approximate the 
laws of the Member States" on unfair commercial practices harming consumers' economic interests", may 
also be of interest (such as the prohibition against misleading actions (art. 6, in particular paras 1 f and g 
regarding representations on the nature of the intellectual property rights of the trader or is agent or on the 
nature of the rights of consumers) although many of the practices it targets are of a nature that would be 
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their national implementation counterparts in, inter alia, the UK200 and France. 201 In the US, the UCC 
contains provisions conferring powers to the courts to set aside a contract or any term thereof that is 
held to be unconscionable. 202 The remedies that are available against practices held to be unfair 
include restitution, rescission of contract, damages, specific performance, injunction, an order to 
comply with a voluntary compliance agreement, and any other remedies available at law.203 Unfair 
practices may also constitute an offence subject to penal sanctions.204 In some Canadian jurisdictions, 
the body responsible for overseeing the application of consumer protection laws has broad powers to 
intervene against unfair practices, including the authority to seek injunctive relief.205 Similar remedies 
are available in the other jurisdictions examined here. 206 
The prohibition of unfair practices specifically targets non-negotiated standard end-user agreements, 
including copyright notices. 207 The prohibition constrains suppliers' freedom of contract by forbidding 
certain commercial practices to protect consumers against abuses. The remedies that accompany 
prohibitions of unfair practices suggest that they can act as a strong deterrent against such conduct and 
influence behaviours favourably in the marketplace. 
likely outside the scope of the present discussion (e.g. art. 5 prohibits an unfair commercial practice which 
is defined as a practice that (at par. 2 (b) "materially distorts or is likely to materially distort the economic 
behaviour with regard to the product of the average consumer"; art. 8 aggressive commercial practices). 
The potential application of these directives to terms and conditions that restrict inter alia consumers' 
exercise of copyright limitations or use of materials that are in the public domain is discussed in: Lucie 
Guibault, "Accommodating the Needs of iConsumers: Making Sure They Get Their Money's Worth of 
Digital Entertainment" (2008) 31 J Consum Policy 409, more particularly at 4 I 6. 
200 Directive 93113/EEC, supra note 199, was implemented in the UK through the Unfair terms in 
Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999, SI 1999/2083 [UKUTCCR]; Directive 2005129/EC, supra note 199, 
was implemented through the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008, SI 2008/1277 
[UKCPUTR]. 
201 Code de la consommation, art Ll20-lff deals with "pratiques deloyales." 
202 US UCC, supra note 12, § 2-302 and § 2A- l 08. 
203 OCPA, supra note 18, s 18. See also Alberta Fair Trading Act, R.S.A. c. F-2 [AFTA], s 7(1); MCPA, 
supra note 40, s 23(2); SCPA, supra note 33, ss 15-16 under which the consumer or the Director on her 
behalf, can take legal action against unfair practices; BCBPCPA, supra note 196, s 10(1); NLCPBPA, supra 
note 194, s 10; PEIBPA, supra note 194, s 4 (1) & (2). 
204 QCPA, supra note 18, s 277; OCPA, supra note 18, s 116. 
205 For example, see SCPA, supra note 33, ss 15-16. 
206 For example, see, UKUTCCR, supra note 200, s 12. Regarding more generally the remedies that need to 
be available in each member states, see Directive 93113/EEC, supra note 199, art 7, and Directive 
2005129/EC, supra note 199, art 11. 
207 This is the case of Directive 93113/EEC, supra note 199, which specifically regulates non-negotiated 
consumer commercial transactions. 
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The vagueness of what constitutes unfair practices allows flexibility in how the relevant provisions 
may apply to a broad range of transactions. 208 At the same time, the prohibitions against unfair 
practices require an element of falsehood, deceit, or unconscionability, or a practice that is 
misleading, which tends to limit their scope of application. 209 In contrast, statutory warranties or 
implied obligations are deemed to be present in all consumer transactions, and are mandatory in the 
majority of jurisdictions examined here. 210 As I discuss next, information disclosure requirements, 
while they provide less effective remedies for the purpose of our discussion, also apply to a broad 
range of transactions that are pertinent to commercial transactions of copies of copyright works.211 
The named unfair practices that may be particularly relevant with respect to the permitted scope of 
use of commercial copies of copyright works212 are more limited in their effect as they would require 
that the use restriction be notified to consumers to remedy the falsehood or misleading nature of the 
commercial transaction without impacting on the use restriction at a substantive level, as this is the 
case when applying consumer protection implied obligations.213 The operation of prohibitions against 
unfair practices is illustrated by two French cases. In EM! Music France v Association CLCV,214 
CLCV, an association representing the interests of consumers, alleged that EMI Music France was in 
contravention of several articles of the French Code de la Consommation and Code Civil.215 The CDs 
could only be played on a limited number of CD players. CLCV alleged that the brief notice on the 
CDs, i.e., that they were subject to technological measures and use restrictions was misleading 
consumers. The Court of Appeal confirmed the judgment by the Court of First Instance,216 and held 
208 Nicola Lucchi , "The Supremacy of Techno-Governance: Privatization of Digital Content and Consumer 
Protection in the Globalized Information Society" (2007) 15 International Journal of Law and Information, 
192, in particular, at 221 ff, briefly discusses the potential application of consumer tools in the sphere of 
unfair transactions, e.g. the doctrine of unconscionability in the US as well as the pertinent EU secondary 
law to technological protection measures. The author points to the flexibility and yet vagueness that these 
legal mechanisms offer to a consumer protection analysis. 
209 Supra note 194, note 195 and note 196. 
210 The scope of application of implied obligations is discussed in Part II A. of this chapter. 
211 Information disclosure requirements are required in distance contracts and Internet agreements, and in 
some jurisdictions for all consumer agreements, as this is discussed in Part IV of this chapter. 
212 See supra note 194, note 195 and note 196. However, the list of conduct that may constitute an unfair 
practice is not exhaustive. 
213 As discussed in Part III A of this chapter. 
214 CA Versailles, 30 September 2004, S.A. EM! Music France v Association CLCV, online: 
http://www.foruminternet.org/documents/ jurisprudence/lire.phtml?id=809 [EM! Music France, 2004]. 
215 I.e., Code de la Consommation. art L 121-1, L 213-1, L 421-1; L421-2.1; L 421-9 and C civ. art 1382. 
216 Trib gr instance Nanterre, 24 June 2003, Association CLCV/EMJ Music 
France, online: www.legalis.net/cgi-iddn/french/affichejnet.cgi?droite= internet_dtauteur.htm. 
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that EMI Music France had misled consumers on the fitness for use of its CDs, in contravention of 
article L213-1 of the French Code de la Consommation. 217 In doing so, the Court of Appeal confirmed 
the orders by the Court of First Instance i.e., that a specific notice that the CDs could not be played on 
all CD players be placed forthwith on the CDs, and of awarding damages to CLCV.218 
In Association UFC Que Choisir v Societe Sony France, Societe Sony United Kingdom Ltd,219 UFC 
Que Choisir, an association representing the interests of consumers, alleged that Sony France and 
Sony United Kingdom were misleading consumers in contravention of article L213-1 of the French 
Code de la Consommation. Sony United Kingdom operated the online music download site Connect. 
Sony France distributed digital MP3 players that were the only ones able to play the musical 
recordings downloaded from the Connect website. In other words, the technological protection 
measure applied to the musical recordings downloaded from the Connect website restricted the 
transfer, and those recordings could not be played on other digital mp3 players available on the 
market. Moreover, the MP3 players sold by Sony France could not play musical recordings 
downloaded from other platforms. Having reviewed the terms and conditions attached to the Connect 
platform and the MP3 players, the Court of First Instance found that Sony France and Sony United 
Kingdom contravened to their obligations under article Ll 11-1 of the French Code de la 
Consommation. 220 The Court ordered Sony France to place forthwith on its MP3 players a notice that 
specifically mentioned the use restrictions of the MP3 players, and ordered Sony France and Sony 
United Kingdom to pay damages to UFC Que Choisir.221 
In both EMI Music France 2004 and Sony France and Sony UK, the orders required that proper 
notices of the use restrictions be put in place, without impacting on the substance of the restrictive 
uses attached to the musical recordings and to the MP3s players per se. The prohibitions against 
unfair practices may have more drastic effects on other commercial practices, for example, and as I 
211 Ibid. 
218 Ibid. 
219 Trib gr instance Nanterre, 6th chamber, 15 Decembre 2006, Association UFC Que Choisir v Societe 
Sony France, Societe Sony United Kingdom Ltd, online: http://www.legalis.net/jurisprudence-
dccision.php3? id article=l 816 [Sony France and Sony UK]. 
220 Ibid. This case also involved the determination of the existence of "tied selling" (ventes liees). 
221 Ibid. 
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will discuss in Chapter 11, if copies of copyright works are supplied in a manner that does not comply 
with the requirements of copyright law.222 
The willingness of consumer protection agencies to take action against unfair practices is one 
determining factor of the effectiveness of legal prohibitions to address systemic harmful practices. In 
the US, the Federal Trade Commission (FfC) rejected a complaint filed by the Computer & 
Communications Industry Association (CCIA) that alleged that copyright warnings of a list of 
companies223 constituted unfair and deceptive trade practices.224 The CCIA alleged that the copyright 
warnings exaggerated the rights of the copyright holders by ignoring consumers' statutory fair use 
rights. It also argued that notices to the effect that descriptions and accounts of sports games could not 
be disseminated were "manifestly false" as the US Copyright Act does not protect facts and ideas, and 
that the warnings of possible harsh civil and criminal sanctions generally mislead the public.225 The 
FTC responded that it did not have sufficient evidence to conclude that such warnings were unfair and 
deceptive practices and that "consumers would be likely to refrain from engaging in lawful activities 
as a consequence of reading those warnings. "226 The complaint by the CCIA to the FfC illustrates one 
avenue where prohibitions against unfair terms could target specific or more systemic practices by 
which copyright holders falsely depict consumers' rights to commercial copies of copyright works in 
a disparaging way. Recent research conducted in the field of behavioural law and economics tends to 
demonstrate how non-negotiated standard end-user agreements shape consumers' perceptions and 
expectations of the norm and how they are utilized in some cases to exploit consumers' weaknesses 
222 More specifically, Chapter 11 Part IV. 
223 The following companies were listed in the complaint filed by the CCIA to the FfC, infra note 225: 
National Football League, NFL Properties, Inc., NFL Enterprises LLC, Major League Baseball, Major 
League Baseball Properties, Inc., Major League Baseball Advanced Media, LP, NBC Universal, Inc., 
Universal Studios, Inc., Morgan Creek Productions, Inc., Dream Works Animation SKG, Inc., DreamWorks 
LLC, Harcourt, Inc., and Penguin Group (USA), Inc. 
224 For a review of the complaint and the response by the FfC, see: Scott L. Walker & Matthew Savare, 
"Foul Use? FfC Declines to Take Action against Allegedly Overbroad and Misleading Copyright 
Warnings" (2008) 25 WTR Ent. & Sports Law. I. 
225 The Request for investigation and complaint for injunctive and other relief, dated August I, 2007, filed 
by the CCIA with the FfC, online: http://www.google.ca/search?sourceid=navclient&ie=UTF-
8&rlz=l T4ADBF enCA275CA275&g=Computer+%26+Communications+lndustry+Association+complai 
nt+federal+trade+commission+2007 . 
226 FfC' s letter in response to CCIA' s complaint dated December 6, 2007, on line: 
http://www.google.ca/search?sourccid=navclient&ie=UTF-
8&rlz= I T4ADBF enCA275CA275&g=Computer+<~;26+Cornmunications+lndustrv+Association+complai 
n t + federal+tradc+com mission+ 2007 
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and ignorance. 227 The powers conferred on some consumer agencies in Canada and elsewhere to 
investigate and intervene with respect to unfair commercial practices should be used proactively to 
protect and educate consumers of their rights. The sample review, in Chapter 3, of non-negotiated 
terms and conditions of commercial copies of e-books, musical recordings, and films distributed 
online suggests that there could be material worth the investigation. 228 In particular, to what extent is 
the lack of reference in non-negotiated terms and conditions to consumers' users' rights under 
copyright law misleading and an unfair practice? 
In Chapter 11, I will discuss the possible application of prohibitions against unfair terms in restrictive 
terms of use on fair use, fair dealing, and other acts specifically permitted by copyright law without 
the authorization of copyright holders.229 More generally and with these considerations on the nature 
and possible scope of application of prohibitions against unfair practices in mind, I will apply them to 
various scenarios implicating the commercialization of copies of copyright works. 230 
To sum up, prohibitions on unfair commercial practices to protect consumers are particularly relevant 
to commercial transactions involving copies of copyright works. In particular, this is so with respect 
to the increasingly prevailing practice under which they are made available through non-negotiated 
standard end-user agreements that are typically silent on consumers' rights to copyright works under 
copyright law, or that may, in some cases, represent the scope of copyright holders' exclusive rights in 
a manner that is misleading to consumers. I will complete our discussion on the nature and scope of 
consumer protection obligations and their application to commercial copies of copyright works with 
the central role and operation of information disclosure requirements in consumer law and their 
ramifications on the other consumer protection obligations that I discussed above in this chapter. 
227 For example, see: Oren Bar-Gill, "Seduction by Plastic" (2004) 98 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1373. See also: On 
Amir & Orly Lobel, "Stumble, predict, nudge: how behavioural economics informs law and policy", Book 
Review of Nudge: improving decisions about health, wealth and happiness, by R.H. Thaler and C.R. 
Sunstein & Predictably irrational: the hidden forces that shape our decisions, by D. Ariely (2008) 108 
Colum. L. Rev. 2098. 
228 In particular, see the discussion in Chapter 3 Part III C. 
229 In particular, Chapter 11 Part IV. 
230 See the discussion in Chapter 11. 
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IV. Information disclosure requirements in consumer contracts 
A. Specific information disclosure obligations 
Most consumer protection law statutes across Canada require that suppliers provide specific 
information to consumers before and after "distance contracts" or "Internet sales agreements" are 
concluded.231 Of particular interest to our discussion on the scope of consumers' rights to copies of 
copyright works is the obligation to disclose a "fair and accurate description of the goods and services 
proposed to be supplied to the consumer, including the technical requirements, if any, related to the 
use of the goods or services."232 Suppliers are also obligated to disclose "any other restrictions, 
limitations and conditions that would be imposed by the supplier."233 Those requirements apply only 
for contracts concluded above a prescribed monetary amount, which may be an important limitation to 
their application to the purchase of copies of copyright works such as musical recordings or films. 234 
Of particular relevance to commercial copies of copyright works, other restrictions limit the 
application of information disclosure requirements to materials downloaded from the Internet, on the 
basis that those materials can be instantaneously enjoyed by consumers. 235 Similar information 
disclosure requirements exist in the European Union, 236 the UK, 237 and in France. 238 As part of those 
231 This is the case of the provinces of Ontario ( OCP A, supra note 18), Quebec (QCP A, supra note 18) 
British-Columbia (BCBPCPA, supra note 194), Alberta (AFTA, supra note 203), Manitoba (MCPA, supra 
note 40), Saskatchewan (SCPA, supra note 33), Nova Scotia (NSCPA, supra note 40) and New Foundland 
and Labrador (NLCPBPA, supra note 194). 
232 OCPA, supra note 18, s 38 (l); 0. Reg. 17105, s 32 (1). Similar provisions are found in The QCPA, 
supra note 18, at s 54.4 (d); BCBPCPA, supra note 194, s 46(1) (c); Fair Trading Act Internet Sales 
Contract regulation, Alta Reg. 81/2001, s 4(1) (a) (iv); NLCPBPA, supra note 194, s 30(2) (a) ands 29 (1) 
(C); MCPA, supra note 40, s 129(1); Man. Reg. 17612000, s 3(1) (d); SCPA, supra note 33, s 75.52(1); 
Sask. Reg. 212007, s 7(d). 
233 OCPA supra note 18, s 38(1); 0. Reg., supra note 232, s 32(14). Similar provisions are found in the 
MCPA, supra note 40, s 129(1 ); Man. Reg., supra note 232, s 3(1) (m); QCPA, supra note 18, s 54.4 (I); 
SCPA, supra note 33, s 75.52(1); Sask. Reg., supra note 232, s 7(p); Alta Reg., supra note 232, s 4(1) (a) 
(xiii). 
234 Minimum monetary amounts apply in several jurisdiction ($50.00): OCPA supra note 18 s 37; 2002 0. 
Reg., supra note 232, s 31; SCPA, supra note 33, s 75.5(e) (i); Sask. Reg., supra note 232, s 6; Alta Reg., 
sura note 232 s I (d) (i). 
23 NSCPA. supra note 40, s 21W. 
236 Directive 2011183/EU, supra note 6. This directive applies to contracts concluded after 13 June 2014: 
Ibid, art. 28 (2). It provides at article 5 (1) a) and article 6 (1) a) that before the consumer is bound by the 
contract, the trader shall provide the consumer "(a) the main characteristics of the goods or services, to the 
extent appropriate to the medium and to the goods or services". EC, Parliament and Council, Directive 
9717/EC of 20 May 1997 on the protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts, [1997] OJ. 
Ll44/19, which is repealed by Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer rights, imposes a similar obligation at 
article 4 I. (b): "In good time prior to the conclusion of any distance contract, the consumer shall be 
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information disclosure requirements, Directive 2011183/EU on consumer rights specifies that traders 
shall provide to consumers, before they are bound by a contract, information regarding the 
functionality, the presence of technological protection measures, and interoperability requirements. 239 
Prior to the adoption of this directive, there was a debate in Europe as to whether the information 
disclosure requirements required traders to disclose this information.240 
If the supplier fails to provide the required information, consumers have the right to cancel the 
agreement, usually within a very short timeframe.241 The EU regime provides an exception to this 
right of withdrawal in respect of contracts for "the supply of sealed audio or sealed video recordings 
or sealed computer software which were unsealed after delivery," as means to provide stronger 
protection for copyright holders, based on the fear that consumers could inappropriately use their right 
to cancel the agreement while making unlawful copies of the copyright work they accessed prior to 
cancellation. 242 
In the US, the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act [UCITA]243 is a model of state 
contract law that was proposed as an amendment to the us UCC.244 It takes a different approach from 
provided with the following information: ( ... ) (b) the main characteristics of the goods or services." In 
Content Services Ltd v Bundesarbeitskammer, Case C-49/11, 2012 ECR, the Court of Justice of the EU 
held that the business practice of posting a hyperlink on the supplier's website failed to fulfill the 
requirements under Article 5(1) of Directive 9717 to supply information to consumers as is required under 
that directive. 
237 Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) Regulation 2000, U.K., SI 2000/2334, as amended, [UKCPDSR] 
regulation 7 1 (a) (ii). 
238 In France, the information disclosure requirements are not limited to certain forms of agreements. They 
generally apply to all contracts. Code de la Consommation, art L.111-1 and L.111-2 require professional 
sellers to inform consumers, prior to the conclusion of the contract, of the essential characteristics of the 
good and service respectively. 
239 Directive 2011183/EU, supra note 6, art 5(1) g) & h), art 6(1) r) & s). 
240 Loos & al, supra note 7 at 158. In this report, the authors analysed the laws of 11 countries mainly in 
Europe, including the UK and France, and also the US. 
241 QCPA, supra note 18, at S 54.8; MCPA, supra note 40, s 129 (I); SCPA, supra note 33, s 75.61(1); 
BCBPCPA, supra note 194, s 75.61(1); Alta Reg., supra note 232, s 6 (I); NLCPBPA, supra note 194, s 
32(1). Directive 2011183/EU, supra note 6, art 9 (I) (this Directive applies to contracts concluded after June 
13, 2014); Distance Contracts Directive 9717/EC, supra note 236 (which is repealed by Directive 
2011183/EU, supra note 6, article 6(1); UKCPDSR, supra note 237, regulation 10 and 11; Code de la 
Consommation, art L. 121.20, L. 121.19. 
242 Directive 2011183/EU, supra note 6, art 16 (i)(which applies to contracts concluded after June 13, 2014); 
Directive 9717/ECs, supra note 236, article 6(3) (which is repealed by Directive 2011183/EU; UKCPDSR, 
supra note 237, regulation 13 (1) (d); Code de la Consommation, art L.121-20-2 4°. 
2430fficial Text, Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (2002), online: 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucita/2002final.htm [UCITA]. 
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the information disclosure requirements of the provinces and territories of Canada and the other 
jurisdictions examined here. For instance, under UCIT A, suppliers are not obligated to provide the 
terms of the contract to consumers before payment occurs; rather, "an opportunity" to review the 
terms needs to be in place and, in such cases, be accompanied by the "right of return." 245 This has 
been invoked as one of the main flaws of UCIT A which has met fierce resistance from various interest 
groups and commentators. 246 The proposal of UCJTA as an amendment to the US UCC247 was 
withdrawn in 2002 due to a lack of consensus as to its application by the states. UC/TA has only been 
adopted in two states. 248 
Of all the consumer protection obligations examined so far, information disclosure requirements are 
the least intrusive to suppliers' freedom of contract. They do not impose any minimum standard, as is 
the case with statutory implied obligations, 249 or scrutinize the fairness or conscionability of the terms 
imposed by suppliers, as is the case for prohibitions against unfair practices. 250 If suppliers disclose 
the information in the manner prescribed, they are in compliance with the statutory consumer 
protection obligation. The remedies for breach of these disclosure requirements are also more limited 
than with respect to the statutory implied obligations and provisions against unfair terms. In the cases 
244 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws proposed UC/TA, ibid, as a model 
state law to amend the existing US UCC, supra note 12. 
245 UC/TA, supra note 243, s 112-113. The "right ofreturn" is subject to some exceptions: ibid, s l 13(c). 
246 For a discussion of UC/TA, supra note 243, see Gail E. Evans, "Opportunity Costs of Globalizing 
Information Licenses: Embedding Consumer Rights within the Legislative Framework for Information 
Contracts"(l 999) 10 Fordham lntell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 267; Deborah Tussey, "UCITA, Copyright 
and Capture" (2003) 21 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 319; Niva Elkin-Koren, "A Public-Regarding Approach 
to Contracting over Copyrights", in Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Diane Leenheer Zimmerman & Harry First 
eds., Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property: Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Society 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) at 191. Jacques De Werra, "Moving Beyond The Conflict 
Between Freedom Of Contract And Copyright Policies: In Search Of A New Global Policy For On-Line 
Information Licensing Transactions" (2003) 25 Colum. J.L. & Arts 239, at 295ff; Jean Braucher, "12 
Principles for Fair Commerce in Mass-Market Software and Other Digital Products" in Consumer 
Protection in the Age of the "Information Economy", (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2006), online: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=730907. Commentators supporting the model proposed by the UC/TA, supra note 
243, include: Richard Epstein "Contract, not Regulation: "UC/TA and High-Tech Consumers Meet Their 
Consumer Protection Critics", in Consumer Protection in the Age of the "Information Economy", 
(Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2006). 
247 Supra note 12. 
248 UCIT A online, A commercial code for the information age?: http://www.ucitaonline.com/. For a 
chronological history of UCITA, supra note 243, see AFFECT, Americans for Fair electronic transactions, 
online: http://\vww.ucita.com/what history.html. The State of Virginia and of Maryland have adopted 
UC/TA, ibid: Va. Code Ann.§§ 59.1-501. I to -509.2 (2005), available athttp://legl.state.va.us/cgi-
bin/legp504.exe?OOO+cod+59.1-501.1; Md. Code Ann .. Comm. Law§§ 22-101 to -816 (LexisNexis 2005). 
249 As this is discussed in Part II A. of this chapter. 
250 See the discussion in Part III of this chapter. 
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where the information disclosure requirement applies to a breach that touches upon the scope of 
permitted use of copies of copyright works, the consumer is not in a position to require that the 
relevant use be allowed through specific performance. Nor is the existence of information disclosure 
requirements likely to alter suppliers' behaviour in the marketplace, through, inter alia, expanding the 
scope of permitted use. All that the information disclosure provisions require is that the information 
on the rights and obligations of the contract be disclosed to consumers. While information disclosure 
requirements bear relevance to commercial transactions of copies of copyright works as a core legal 
tool of consumer protection law and a manifestation of its underlying theoretical justifications and 
goals,251 their appeal in the context of the present discussion remains more limited than the other 
consumer protection obligations examined so far. 252 I will analyze the theoretical justifications of 
information disclosure requirements and apply them to specific scenarios involving different uses of 
copies of copyright works in Chapter 10 and in Chapter 11. Before doing so, I will tum to a specific 
aspect of information disclosure requirements that revolves around the quality of the information that 
needs to be disclosed. 
B. General requirements of quality of information disclosed 
The breach or not of the consumer obligations examined here (e.g., implied obligations,253 
prohibitions of unfair practices, and information disclosure requirements) depends to some extent on 
the quality of the information that suppliers bring to the attention of consumers. Although not 
determinant in all cases, the nature, quality of, and manner by which the information is disclosed to 
consumers play an important role in establishing a breach of or compliance with consumer protection 
obligations. Information properly brought to the attention of consumers minimizes occurrences of 
deceit and can demonstrate that consumers had the necessary tools to make an enlightened decision. 
In other words, on the basis of the information specifically brought to the attention of consumers, a 
court can infer that this is what consumers should reasonably expect and that no breach of a consumer 
implied obligation, or in some cases no unfair practice, occurred. 
251 The theoretical justifications of information disclosure requirements are discussed in Chapter 10. 
252 I apply information disclosure requirements to four scenarios involving copies of copyright works in 
Chapter 11. 
253 I.e. implied obligations of quality, fitness for purpose, correspondence with description, title, quiet 
possession and of freedom from encumbrances. 
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A question arises on the extent to which non-negotiated standard end-user agreements, prevalent in 
the online distribution of digital copies of copyright works, satisfy the requirements of specifically 
bringing information to the attention of consumers. This question raises issues about the opposability 
and enforceability of online contract terms. There is no uniform answer to that question although 
certain factors will be taken into account to determine whether the parties agreed to enter into a 
binding agreement.254 At the same time, in a consumer protection law analysis, contract terms have a 
relative value in assessing, inter alia, whether an implied obligation was breached or not. Because the 
application of implied obligations that are based on a "consumers' reasonable expectation test" relies 
on a non-exhaustive list of factors (as is the case in some jurisdictions in Canada and elsewhere), the 
effect that the standard terms will have in discarding a breach of the implied obligations is likely to 
vary. From that, the presence of non-negotiated standard end-user agreements is not, in and of itself, 
always sufficient to meet the requirement of bringing information specifically to the attention of 
consumers.255 By contrast, clear short notices on packaging, or that have to be specifically 
acknowledged through online transactions, are more likely to satisfy the requirement that they are 
brought specifically to the attention of consumers.256 
To sum up, the degree of information disclosed by suppliers plays a pivotal role in the various 
consumer protection obligations explored here. To some degree, the information supplied can defeat 
claims alleging breach of implied obligations or other consumer obligations. What is less clear is the 
nature and quality of information that can fulfill that role, including the extent to which lengthy non-
negotiated terms and conditions can amount to adequate disclosure. The more specific information 
disclosure requirements obligations that pertain to certain forms of consumer agreements are of less 
appeal: their limited scope makes them inapplicable to a large segment of commercial transactions 
that involve copies of copyright works, and the remedies available in case of breach are more limited 
than those related to the other consumer protection obligations examined in this chapter. 
254 See Loos et al., supra note 7, where the authors looked at the application of consumer protection law to 
digital product contracts in 11 jurisdictions (mainly European, and also the US), at 65-66: "The intention of 
a party to enter into a binding legal relationship or bring about some other legal effect is to be determined 
from the party's statements or conduct as they were reasonably understood by the other party. Consent is 
presumed to have been given if two conditions are met: first, the trader has to indicate to the consumer that 
license terms are applied; and second, the consumer has to be offered a reasonable possibility to examine 
the terms before or at the time of concluding the transaction." 
255 Ibid. 
256 See Sony France and Sony UK, supra note 219, where in a case involving misleading commercial 
practices, the Court ordered Sony France to place a notice forthwith on its MP3 players that specifically 
mentioned the use restrictions of the MP3 players. 
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V. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I laid the groundwork for the application of consumer protection law to commercial 
transactions of copies of copyright works. The starting proposition is that restrictions on lawful 
consumers' uses of commercial copies of copyright works (through the application of the CCA and 
any existing contract) need to be scrutinized through the lens of sellers' implied obligations, 
prohibitions against unfair practices, and information disclosure requirements. Beyond obvious cases 
of malfunction (e.g., of computer software functionality or technological protection measures causing 
damage to users' equipment) the interaction between these consumer obligations and copyright has 
been relatively little explored. This may be because of the underlying assumption that because 
copyright law confers powers and privileges on copyright holders to restrict others from doing certain 
acts with their works, they are prima facie legitimized in imposing those restrictions on consumers. 
What needs to be explored further is the extent to which consumer law, through the commercial 
transaction that takes place between copyright holders and consumers, imposes limits on how 
copyright holders exercise those powers and privileges. 
First, I described which of consumer law's unique features are of particular appeal to copyright 
consumers. In particular, I looked at those mechanisms of consumer law that can provide ammunition 
to counterbalance what I described in the First Part and in the Second Part of my thesis as the 
copyright-holder-centric regime of copyright law, as amplified through copyright holders' commercial 
practices. One of the most striking components of consumer law is the mandatory nature of implied 
obligations in most jurisdictions in Canada, as well as of prohibitions against unfair practices and 
information disclosure requirements. In addition, the relative nature of contracts as one of the factors 
to take into consideration to assess whether sellers' implied obligations of quality or fitness for 
purpose have been breached257 offers a possible counterbalance to the asymmetric powers that result 
from non-negotiated standard end-user agreements increasingly prevalent with respect to commercial 
copies of copyright works that are distributed online. Other features, including the ease of certain 
evidentiary and procedural rules, are a reminder of the gains that consumers made through statutory 
consumer protection, relative to the existence of similar general obligations at common law, that 
facilitates how consumers can establish their claim. 
257 That is, in those jurisdictions that base the application of these implied obligations on consumers' 
reasonable expectations: see the discussion above in this chapter in Part II A. 
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Second, I looked at the nature and scope of consumer protection obligations to develop arguments 
stemming from the alteration that the commercial relationship between consumers and copyright 
holders creates on the copyright holder-copyright user relationship. On that basis, arguments are 
taking shape on how consumers can assert their claims against restrictions on their use of commercial 
copies of copyright works, on the basis of their reasonable expectations (in some jurisdictions, 
through the application of implied obligations) and on the basis of fairness (through the application of 
the prohibitions against unfair terms and the investigatory and remedial powers of some consumer 
protection agencies). Based on the relevant jurisprudence, I argued that the implied obligations of title 
and of quiet possession offer the base of a cogent argument to assert specific copyright users' rights 
under copyright law when overridden by contract, and with respect to technological protection 
measures and digital rights management. I also argued that implied obligations of quality and fitness 
for purpose offer a legal basis to advance consumers' claims against restrictions on use of copyright 
works in those jurisdictions where the requirement to meet consumers' reasonable expectations is 
built into the implied obligations of quality and fitness for purpose. I also argued that jurisdictions that 
apply a latent defects' analysis to implied obligations of quality and fitness for purpose make them 
narrower in their application and less likely to provide a solid ground for consumers' claims with 
respect to the permitted scope of use of copyright works. Prohibitions of unfair commercial practices 
offer avenues of redress to consumers against copyright holders who commercialize copyright works 
through non-negotiated standard end-user agreements that disregard users' rights under copyright law 
or that misrepresent the scope of copyright holders' exclusive rights in a way that is misleading to 
consumers. Finally, I described how information disclosure requirements are a pillar of consumer law 
that has ramifications over consumer protection obligations, taken as a whole. 
The legal foundations that I laid out in this chapter for the potential applications of consumer law to 
assert consumers' permitted uses of copies of copyright works will be tested through various 
scenarios in Chapter 11. Prior to that, I will look at the various theoretical justifications of the 
consumer protection obligations examined in the present chapter and the extent to which they can 
provide additional arguments in favour of the application of consumer protection obligations to 
commercial copies of copyright works. 
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Chapter 10 
The Justifications and Role of Consumer Protection Law Obligations 
I. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I paved the way for the application of consumer law obligations1 to ascertain 
consumers' rights against restrictive uses of commercial copies of copyright works. Because this 
interaction has been relatively little explored so far, I raised the uncertainties and also opportunities of 
applying consumer obligations successfully to strengthen consumers' rights to commercial copies of 
copyright works, as a counterweight to the copyright-holder-centric regime of copyright law. 
In this chapter, I look at the various underlying justifications of consumer implied obligations (i.e., of 
quality, fitness for purpose, correspondence with description, title, and quiet possession), prohibitions 
against unfair commercial practices and information disclosure requirements, to better understand 
their role and how they relate to property, copyright, and contracts. What is the value of applying 
consumer obligations to strengthen consumers' rights to commercial copies of copyright works? Is 
there a relation between the alteration that consumer obligations effectuate on commercial 
transactions and the nature of the property of consumers in commercial copies and of copyright 
holders in copyright? What are the main debates about the regulation of consumers and how do they 
influence our preferences for one mean of state intervention in the name of consumers over another? 
Answering these questions will facilitate the application of consumer obligations to specific scenarios 
of commercial copies of copyright works in the next chapter. 2 
The most frequently invoked justification to protect consumers through, e.g., implied obligations (of 
quality and fitness for purpose, of correspondence with description, of title, quiet possession, and 
freedom from encumbrances), prohibition of unfair practices, and information disclosure 
requirements, is the need to address the detrimental effects of asymmetry between the consumer and 
the seller. More precisely, these legal mechanisms are grounded in the need to rectify asymmetry of 
1 I.e., implied obligations of quality, fitness for purpose, correspondence with description, title, quiet 
possession, prohibitions against unfair commercial practices and information disclosure requirements. 
2 I.e., Chapter 11. 
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information,3 of bargaining power,4 and in the resources available to remedy an unsatisfactory 
bargain.5 In behavioural economics theory terms, this would include the exploitation of known 
"behavioural biases" to the detriment of the consumer, 6 intensified by the proliferation of standardized 
terms in mass-market transactions. The undesirable outcomes that can flow from the information 
asymmetries in consumer transactions vary from consumers' deceit to outright abuse. 7 In economic 
theory terms, those detrimental effects give rise to a "market failure."8 A deceived consumer may 
loose confidence in the market place, which in tum jeopardizes one of the pillars of a thriving 
market.9 
3 For example, see the Ontario Consumer Protection Act, S.O. 2002, c. 30, schedule A, [ OCPA], ss 6, 38, 
39- 40, which address issues of information asymmetry. 
4 The lack of bargaining power of the consumer is reflected in provisions whereby any ambiguity is to 
benefit the consumer: OCPA, supra note 3, s. 11; Quebec Consumer Protection Act, RSQ c. P-40.1 
[QCPA], s 17. It is also reflected in the fact that certain rights granted under consumer protection law 
cannot be contracted out: OCPA, supra note 3, s 9(3); QCPA, ibid, ss 261 and 262. see also Geraint 
Howells & Stephen Weatherill, Consumer Protection Law, 2d ed. (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 
2005) at 6. 
5 These asymmetries all converge towards the earlier justifications and origins of consumer protection law, 
which has become more prominent post World War Two as a field of law, when consumption of a wide 
array of goods and services became pervasive (consumerism or "la societe de consommation"). Nicole 
L'Heureux, Droit de la consommation, 5e edition (Cowansville, Qc: Yvon Blais, 2000) at 1- 4, describes 
mass production, the need to increase production through increased demand and the instrumental role that 
publicity play(s)(ed), where consumers become guinea pigs with less than perfect goods, even dangerous 
products, etc .. as the dynamics that needed and still need to be counterbalanced through adequate consumer 
protection. 
6 For example, in the context of consumer credit, see: Oren Bar-Gill, "Seduction by Plastic" (2004) 98 Nw. 
U. L. Rev. 1373 at 1373 [Bar-Gill, "Seduction by Plastic"]. See also Oren Bar-Gill & Franco Ferrari, 
"Informing Consumers About Themselves" (2010) 3 Eramus Law Review, 93, where the authors argue that 
suppliers sometimes take advantage of consumers' inaccurate perception of how they intend to use a 
product upon purchase ("use-pattern mistakes") to the detriment of consumers and propose customized 
disclosure requirements to address this issue. 
7 For example, QCP A, supra note 4, art 8, provides that: "The consumer may demand the nullity of a 
contract or a reduction in his obligations there under where the disproportion between the respective 
obligations of the parties is so great as to amount to exploitation of the consumer or where the obligation of 
the consumer is excessive, harsh or unconscionable." See also L'Heureux, supra note 5, at 16-17. 
8 As discussed below in Part II of this chapter, behavioural economic theory suggests that such market 
failures are pervasive. They are not a deviation from a thriving competitive market; rather, they are often its 
product. 
9 Consumers' confidence in the market place is one justification frequently invoked for European Union 
legislation to harmonize consumer protection laws. See EC, Council Directive 93113/EEC of 5 April 1993 
on unfair terms in consumer contracts, [1993] OJ L095, at 29 [Directive 93113/EEC], Preamble and EC, 
Parliament and Council Directive 2005129/EC of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer 
commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 841450/EEC, Directives 
9717/EC, 98127/EC and 2002165/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) 
No 200612004 of the European Parliament and of the Council, [2005] OJ L 149 at 29 [Directive 
2005129/EC], Preamble. 
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Consumer protection obligations seek to rectify various asymmetries to give effect to consumers' 
reasonable expectations, a basic underpinning of consumer protection law. 10 This objective is well 
reflected in consumer implied obligations, which are based on late 19th century sale of goods law 
legislation, 11 which in tum was based on the common law. 12 The main purpose of implied obligations 
was to protect "honest contractors' reasonable expectations." 13 Among those, the expectation of a fair 
market place is a strong underlying principle of consumer law. 14 
I described in Chapter 8 how the application of certain statutory consumer obligations, i.e., implied 
obligations, depended on the presence or not of a good and how this was problematic with respect to 
commercial copies of copyright works distributed online with no supporting physical medium. 15 For 
the mechanisms to apply, designed to rectify asymmetries to give effect to consumers' reasonable 
expectations, the commercial transaction needs to involve a good. The relationship between statutory 
implied obligations, property and reasonable expectations needs to be explored further to shed some 
light on the underlying justifications of implied obligations. 16 
In Part II, I look at the debate that lies around consumer protection: i.e., whether market forces are 
better apt to address consumers' reasonable expectations or whether state intervention is justified and 
if so when and why. In Part III through V, I look at the theoretical justifications that withstand 
information disclosure requirements, prohibitions against unfair practices and implied obligations, 
respectively. I conclude in Part VI by finding the justification to rectify information and other 
asymmetries present in all consumer obligations and why commercial digital copies of copyright 
10 Roger Bradgate, "Consumer rights in digital products" 2010, online: 
http://www.google.ca/search?sourceid=navclient&ie=UTF-
8&rlz= I T4ADBF enCA275CA275&q=Bradgate%2c+Consumer+rights+in+digital+products+20 lO at 26, 
notes:" .. .if we look for core principles of consumer law, a strong case can be made suggesting that the 
basic underpinning is that the law should uphold and give effect to the reasonable expectations of the 
consumer; that for private law consumer protection to be effective, its rules must coincide with reasonable 
expectations of its consumers, ... " 
11 I.e. the Sale of Goods Act, 1893 (UK) c. 71. 
12 Bradgate, supra note 10 at 18. 
13 Ibid. 
140n the link between the legal interpretation tool of "reasonable expectation" and fairness, see Clarisse 
Girot, User protection in IT Contracts: A comparative study on the protection of the user against defective 
performance in information technology (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001) at 33ff who argues 
that contracting parties can reasonably expect that contracts they enter into are not to operate unfairly. 
Bradgate, supra note 10 at 11. 
15 See the discussion in Chapter 8. 
16 See the discussion in Part V of this chapter. 
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works are more likely to give rise to intensified asymmetries than with respect to other goods. I also 
derive two insights from the relation between property, ownership, and the function of consumer 
implied obligations, i.e., how a solid understanding of the nature of digital copies of copyright works 
is critical to the application of implied obligations, and how we need to rethink their application to 
services. 
II. Divergent approaches: market laissez-faire v. state intervention 
The merit and effectiveness of the consumer protection legal mechanisms examined here, and in 
particular how they can help ascertain consumers' rights to copies of copyright works raises 
fundamental philosophical and regulatory design questions that oppose approaches favouring market 
laissez-faire to various degrees of state intervention. 17 They raise issues that touch upon core values in 
our legal system, 18 including freedom of contract19 and how consumers' autonomy and choice may be 
constrained by at least some of the consumer protection legal mechanisms examined here. 20 This has 
led Roger Brownsword to analogize the regulatory effects of consumer protection law to tort law 
more than contract law.21 
18 As one illustration of how consumer protection law disturbs long established legal concepts and 
traditions, at the time of the reform of the Quebec Civil Code in the nineties, Pierre- Claude Lafond, "Le 
code civil du Quebec et la loi sur la protection du consommateur: un mariage de solitudes" (2010) 88 
C.B.R. 407 at 408-410, describes the reluctance to include consumer protection provisions in the Quebec 
Civil Code on the fear that it would disturb contractual stability, and suggests that this is perhaps due in 
part to the wave of liberalism that prevailed at the time. 
19 Howells & Weatherill, supra note 4 at 14ff, provide an historical overview of the earlier justifications of 
freedom of contract, e.g., those based on individual freedom and the conception that it embedded 
safeguards preserving the mutual interest of both parties. They explain why freedom of contract has come 
to be perceived as no longer realistic in modem consumer transactions where the relationship between 
parties is typically imbalanced in favor of the supplier. Notions of free will, bargain and agreement in the 
context of consumer agreements are distorted given the prevalence of standard form agreements which are 
largely unread. L'Heureux, supra note 5, at 16-18, desc1ibes consumer law as the recognition of the 
breakdown of the presumed balance within contract ("rupture de l'equilibre contractuel") and as the 
"revitalization" of contractual fairness ("justice contractuelle"). 
20 The notion that consumers' choice and autonomy are restricted by state intervention includes the line of 
argument by which state intervention in the name of weaker consumers ends up limiting choices for all and 
places a burden on the informed consumer who ends up paying the for the costs of interventionism in their 
favour. See Jane Winn, "Introduction: Is Consumer Protection an Anachronism in the 21st Century?" in 
Consumer Protection in the Age of the "Information Economy" (Aldershot, England:Ashgate, 2006) 1 at 2. 
21 Roger Brownsword, "Regulating Transactions: Good Faith and Fair Dealing" in Geraint Howells & 
Reiner Schulze eds., Modernising and Harmonising Consumer Contract Law (Sellier: European Law 
publishers, 2009): " ... for all practical purposes, consumer transactions are regulated, much as the law of 
tort regulates our interactions. There is nothing voluntary about the assumption of obligation; it is imposed. 
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Geraint G. Howells and Stephen Weatherill summarize the spectrum of approaches to consumer 
protection theory as spanning at one end, from the position that markets are not just. This justifies 
state intervention and interference in the market, with little regard to individual consumer freedoms as 
they are expressed through market transactions. At the other end of the spectrum, markets are sacred, 
and states should only intervene to rectify an identified market failure.22 
The least interventionist approach, supported inter alia, by certain law and economics commentators, 
is based on the premise that through market forces, industry participants are better positioned than the 
state could ever be to respond to consumer needs and more readily adaptable and flexible. 23 
Generally, limits should be placed on the ability of states to interfere with private economic 
freedom. 24 A law and economics approach to consumer protection seeks to identify the "bad deals"25 
for consumers, looking at the substance of the transaction while not making normative judgments as 
to what consumers may want.26 
The more interventionist approach is justified as Tierry Bourgoignie notes, on the basis that 
consumers share "collective interests that are specific and distinct from the general or public interests, 
in the same way as the social order has recognized and seeks to ensure the defense of other collective 
..... so far as suppliers, in particular, are concerned this is simply a regime of command and control 
regulation." 
22 Howells & Weatherill, supra note 4 at 7. 
23 See Michael J. Trebilcock, "Rethinking Consumer Protection Policy," in Charles E. F. Rickett and 
Thomas G.W. Telfer, eds, International perspectives on consumer access to justice (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003) 68 at 77 who argues that the state should only intervene where market 
solutions are likely not to be present; Richard A. Epstein, "Exchange, The Neoclassical Economics of 
Consumer Contracts" (2008) 92 Minn. L. Rev. 803 [Epstein, "Consumer Contracts"]. 
24 Howells & Weatherill, supra note 4 at 7; See for example Richard A. Epstein, "Contract, not Regulation: 
"UC/TA and High-Tech Consumers Meet Their Consumer Protection Critics," in Consumer Protection in 
the Age of the "Information Economy," (Aldershot, England: Ashgate Publishing, 2006) [Epstein, 
"Contract not Regulation"] and more specifically at 10, where the author argues that the generalized use of 
similar standard terms and conditions is indicative of the fairness of such terms. 
25 Gillian.K. Hadfield, Robert Howse & Michael J. Trebilcock, "Information -based principles for 
rethinking consumer protection policy" (1998) 21 Journal of Consumer Policy, 13 I at 132 would phrase it 
as follows: "Are consumers being charged prices that exceed average cost? Are they being discriminated 
amongst on the basis of criteria, such as wealth, class, race or gender, unrelated to cost? Are they obtaining 
goods and services that are defective in some way for which they did not bargain? Are they being offered a 
range of goods of differing quality so that they can make trade-offs between price and quality? Are they 
being offered goods and services on terms that they understand, want and have some choice about?" 
26 Ibid. 
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interests ... "27 Because consumer interests are more diffuse than other groups, state intervention is 
justified to ensure the better promotion and protection of those interests. 28 Most if not all citizens are 
consumers at any given time of their life. Consumer law theory and, in particular, behavioural 
economics applied to law, teach us that rather than a small group of marginalized individuals, all 
consumers are likely to be vulnerable at some point, in varying degrees. 29 
The justification of state intervention to protect consumers has distributive justice underpinnings, i.e., 
that it would be justified "that a cost be placed on society generally to support an identified 
disadvantaged group"30 in specific contexts to promote specific societal values and goals (such as 
access to information, autonomy, education, freedom of expression) that can also go beyond the need 
to fix a targeted market inefficiency. 31 Howells and Weatherill observe that wealth maximization and 
wealth distribution need not be mutually exclusive in the endeavour, through state regulation, to have 
a "more just market and a more harmonious society."32 Consumer protection can contribute to 
thriving markets by giving consumers more confidence in the market place.33 
Distributive justice arguments are particularly apropos in the context of consumers' expectation 
regarding standards of quality, fitness for purpose, and quiet possession with respect to copies of 
copyright works. The allocation of the proper scope of users' rights (and the underlying values that 
they promote )34 run against the scope of the economic rights of copyright holders and their power and 
prerogative to dictate their scope through private ordering.35 In some cases, state intervention to 
27 Thierry Bourgoignie, "Characteristics of Consumer Law" (1992) 14 Journal of Consumer Policy, 293 at 
299. 
28 Howells & Weatherill, supra note 4 at 16-17. 
29 See the discussion further below in Part II of this chapter. 
3
° For a discussion on distributive justice considerations in consumer law, see: Howells & Weatherill, supra 
note 4 at 51-52. 
31 Jbid. On Amir & Orly Lobel, "Stumble, predict, nudge: how behavioural economics informs law and 
policy", Book Review of Nudge: improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness, by Richard H. 
Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein & Predictably irrational: the hidden forces that shape our decisions, by Dan 
Ariely (2008) I 08 Colum. L. Rev. 2098 discuss the redistributive effect of regulatory intervention for the 
benefit of consumers: "If government intervenes to help consumers become more sophisticated about their 
lending, saving, and spending, corporations will lose money. Credit card and mortgage brokers have long 
studied market failures as part of their marketing task forces." 
32 Howells & Weatherill, supra note 4 at 98. 
33 Bradgate, supra note I 0 at 11. 
34 See the discussion on justifications for consumers' ownership rights to copies of copyright works in 
Chapter 6 Part III. 
35 David McGowan, "Some Copyright Consumer Conundrums" in Consumer Protection in the Age of the 
"Information Economy (Aldershot, England: Ashgate Publishing, 2006) I 55 at 165 notes that the main 
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protect consumers can be founded on the need to address vulnerabilities to the respect of fundamental 
values. The same values are sometimes raised to justify opposite approaches. On the one hand, 
consumer freedom and autonomy is often invoked by suppliers to justify less state intervention to 
protect consumers. Indeed, the effect of consumer protection intervention is precisely to limit freedom 
of contract, based on the assumption that private law notions of free will, bargain, and agreement are 
distorted in the context of consumer transactions. 36 On the other hand, the need to protect the weaker 
parties' abilities to exercise their freedom and autonomy, including freedom to access information, 
privacy and non-discrimination, is invoked to justify increased state intervention. 37 This is even more 
so with the proliferation of standard form agreements. State intervention becomes justified to avoid 
the effects of freedom of contract that have "effectively converted big firms into legislators in the 
market. "38 
Implied obligations mechanisms are one example where the state intervenes to limit freedom of 
contract by imposing minimum standards. 39 In this case and others, state intervention is justified under 
the assumption of the instrumental value of certain legal mechanisms to shape the behaviour of 
suppliers towards a specific conduct.40 By doing so, the state does not only favour consumers, but 
seeks to influence behaviours that will benefit all market participants.41 
economic purpose of the Copyright Act being to give authors a chance to (not a guarantee that they can) 
price their works above marginal costs, "a policy goal that explicitly contemplates weaJth transfers from 
consumers to producers." 
36 Even more so with the proliferation of standard form agreements. State intervention becomes justified to 
avoid that "freedom of contract has effectively converted big firms into legislators in the market": Howells 
& Weatherill, supra note 4 at 18-19. 
37 In order to preserve consumers' freedom of choice, state controls are required against unfair practices: 
Directive 2005129/EC, supra note 9, Preamble, Recital 16 "The provisions on aggressive commercial 
practices should cover those practices which significantly impair the consumer's freedom of choice. Those 
are practices using harassment, coercion, including the use of physical force, and undue influence."; 
Chantal Mak, "Fundamental rights and the European regulation of iconsumer contracts" (2008) 31 J. Cons 
Law Policy 425 at 433. 
38 Howells, & Weatherill, supra note 4 at 18, 19. 
39 Ibid at 29-30. See also Peter Rott, "Download of Copyright-Protected Internet Content and the Role of 
(Consumer) Contract Law" (2008) 31 J. Cons um. Policy 441 at 452: "Mandatory rules in sales law would 
set limits to party autonomy, in safeguarding a minimum quality of the product that cannot be abrogated by 
contract." 
40 Brownsword, supra note 21: " ... the crucial point is that the regulatory environment for consumer 
transactions is dominated by a range of imposed standards that are designed to channel suppliers towards a 
particular pattern of dealing." 
41 The benefit of all market participants beyond consumers is often invoked in European Union secondary 
law on consumer protection. See for example Directive 2005129/EC, supra note 9, Preamble, Recital 8: 
"This Directive directly protects consumer economic interests from unfair business-to-consumer 
commercial practices. Thereby, it also indirectly protects legitimate businesses from their competitors who 
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Between market laissez-faire and greater state intervention, behavioural economics theory applied to 
law, questions basic assumptions made in economic theories to support self-reliant efficient markets 
to justify in tum the least state intervention.42 While not completely rejecting the insights of law and 
economics on state regulation and state intervention, it revisits some of the underlying assumptions of 
economic theory, including the fact that consumers behave rationally.43 In their book Nudge, 
Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness,44 Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein 
justify a refined form of state intervention45 - a "nudge" - that can improve welfare without reducing 
freedom, a compromise that they coin as "libertarian paternalism."46 
The new insights of behavioural economics approaches to law point to a less than perfect market 
place and rekindle with the need for state intervention in specific cases: "The behavioral insights 
enormously expand the world of imperfect information. Once one accepts that many of our decisions 
are based on imperfect, biased, and inaccurate calculations of expected benefits and costs, then it 
becomes clear that market failure is pervasive."47 Research based on behavioural economics theory in 
a specific segment of the industry48 suggested that abusive contract clauses were not the result of 
imperfect competition. On the contrary, competitive forces encourage sellers to take advantage of 
consumers' weaknesses.49 For Thaler and Sunstein, '"Nudge' is the real third way between absolute 
laissez-faire and rigid one size fits all intervention plans. Governments, just as much as the private 
sphere can incent people to make the right decisions, while still preserving freedom of choice."50 
do not play by the rules in this Directive and thus guarantees fair competition."; see also, L'Heureux, supra 
note 5 at 5. 
42 Cass R. Sunstein, ed., Behavioral Law and Economics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
43 See also Bar-Gill, "Seduction by Plastic", supra note 6 at 1373. In that article, the author discusses how 
behavioural economics research shows that not only consumers do not behave rationally but that some 
firms are well aware of certain behavioural patterns and are exploiting them to their advantage. 
44 Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: improving decisions about health, wealth, and 
happiness (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008). 
45 I.e., one that relies on sophisticated set of default rules and associated choice architecture. 
46 Thaler and Sunstein, supra note 44 at 4-6, 13, 72: "paternalism" refers to well-orchestrated intervention 
through (default rules) incenting choices that will promote health, wellbeing, happiness; the "libertarian" 
part implies that it should be associated with cost -free ways to opt out to respect individual freedom. 
47 Amir & Lobel, supra note 31at2109-2110. 
48 In this particular case, consumer credit: Bar-Gill, "Seduction by Plastic", supra note 6. 
49 Bar-Gill, "Seduction by Plastic", supra note 6 at 1373; Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 44 at 77-80. 
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Justifications of state intervention to protect consumers vary based on the conception of consumers' 
role and place within the legal design. Are they economic agents, an integral component of a robust 
market economy or are they more broadly citizens,51 the consumption acts of which touch upon 
fundamental values that a just and modem society needs to protect in that specific context, given its 
overwhelming pervasiveness? A less interventionist approach seems to favour the former while more 
intervention may be justified by promoting the latter.52 
While policy makers in the area of consumer protection often rely on economic arguments to justify 
state intervention and may reflect narrower views of the underlying reasons for the protection of 
consumers, there are indications of broader considerations that are not strictly founded upon the 
promotion of dynamic markets and economic efficiency arguments. As Colin Scott argues, regardless 
of influential non-interventionist regulatory models, there will always remain strong political 
impetuses towards some form of state intervention in the name of consumers.53 
The least interventionist of the consumer protection mechanisms explored here are information 
disclosure requirements. Next, and arguably on an equal footing, are the prohibitions against unfair 
50 Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 44 at 253. For a critical view of behavioural economics applied to law see: 
Richard A. Epstein, "Behavioral Economics: Human Errors and Market Corrections" (2006) 73 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 111 [Epstein, "Behavioral Economics"]. 
51 Marco B.M. Loos, Natali Heiberger, Lucie Guibault, Chantal Mak, Lodewijk Pessers, Katalin J. Cseres, 
Bart van der Sloot, Ronan Tigner, "Analysis of the applicable legal frameworks and suggestions for the 
contours of a model system of consumer protection in relation to digital content contracts" (2011) 
University of Amsterdam, Centre for the Study of European Contract Law (CSECL), Institute for 
Information Law (IViR),Amsterdam Centre for Law and Economics (ACLE), online: 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/consumer-marketing/events/di gital conf en.html, at 19 discuss views 
opposing "consumers" and "citizens" and others seeing no incompatibility between the two. 
52 The Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, consolidated version [2010] O.J.E.U., C-83/49, 
art. 169, paragraph 1 addresses the need for consumer protection as follows: "In order to promote the 
interests of consumers and to ensure a high level of consumer protection, the Union shall contribute to 
protecting the health, safety and economic interests of consumers, as well as to promoting their right to 
information, education and to organize themselves in order to safeguard their interests." Howells & 
Weatherill, supra note 4 at 98 view consumer law within the broader scope of shaping society. 
53 Colin Scott, "Enforcing Consumer Protection laws" in Geraint Howells, Iain Ramsay, and Thomas 
Wihelmsson (eds), Handbook of Research on 'International Consumer Law (Cheltenham, UK: Edward 
Elgar, 2010) at chapter 18. Scott looked at enforcement of consumer protection as performed by public 
agencies mostly since the fifties, to analyze the extent to which we have entered a post-interventionist 
phase in the 1980s. For the author, such a claim cannot be supported. Scandal or scare (for example food 
safety) will usually incent state intervention. Also the author points to the inherent vulnerability in non-
state governance, even in countries who are averse to state intervention, such as the U.S. 
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practices and the (mandatory) application of implied obligations.54 From a property theory 
perspective, information disclosure requirements are the least supportive of consumer open-ended 
powers and privileges, and implied obligations offer greater potential for supporting consumer 
expectations as lawful owners or possessors.55 They fill the gaps of unclear consumer agreements or 
strengthen their effects when they run counter to those fundamental open-ended ownership 
freedoms.56 Prohibitions against unfair practices can also have this effect but their application is 
limited to a more restrained scope of commercial transactions.57 
A few remarks are in order with respect to the theoretical justifications that are more specific to 
information disclosure requirements and prohibitions against unfair commercial practices that I 
discuss briefly. Because of their broader scope and ramifications to the ascertainment of the scope of 
use of copies of copyright works, more attention is devoted to the theoretical justifications of 
consumer protection law implied obligations, which I address afterwards. 
III. The justifications for information disclosure requirements 
Information disclosure requirements are one of the first legal mechanisms that may come to mind to 
rectify the information asymmetry that subsists between suppliers and consumers.58 In Canadian 
provinces and territories, and some of the jurisdictions examined here, they are imposed for certain 
categories of (or all) contracts including "distance contracts" and "Internet agreements."59 
That consumers ought to have access to material information prior to entering into a contract is the 
condition sine qua non to validly consenting to a bargain.60 The information disclosure requirements 
provisions and the remedies available to consumers in case of breach, take into account the altered 
54 The consumer implied obligations are discussed in Pait V of this chapter. 
55 The ability of implied obligations to support core expectations as owner of a resource is discussed in 
more detail further below in Part V B of this chapter. 
56 Ibid. 
57 The nature and scope of unfair practices is discussed in Part III of this chapter. 
58 Geraint Howells, "The Potential and Limits of Consumer Empowerment by Information" (2005) 32 
Journal of Law and Society, 349 at 354. As there may be a lack of incentives for producers to supply the 
information, the law requires it: ibid. Girot, supra note 14 at 66 describes the compulsory provision of 
information as "a core method of protection of consumer law" that is in constant expansion. 
59 The consumer protection information disclosure requirements are discussed in Chapter 9 Part IV. 
60 One justification for information disclosure requirements is the lack of consent that results from the 
information being withheld: QCPA, supra note 4, art 8; Centre Hospitalier de Ste-Marie, v Perron J.E. 89-
567 (CQ). 
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environment within which consumers agree to a commercial transaction. The policy rationale behind 
specifically requiring distributors to supply information in distance contracts and Internet agreements 
is to minimize the potential vulnerabilities for consumers created by remoteness and the transient 
nature of the lntemet.61 It also recognizes the additional vulnerabilities that may result from the 
environment in which consumers may enter into such agreements, i.e., outside traditional commercial 
environments. 62 
Independently of whether consumers actually choose to consume the information or not, or of their 
ability to absorb the information, under the premise of required valid consent, suppliers should make 
that information available to potential buying consumers. It promotes transparency,63 faimess64 and 
subject to certain parameters being maintained on the instances and on the level of information 
required,65 efficiency in the market place.66 It reinforces a legitimate expectation that consumers and 
the market will be better off with informed rather than misinformed consumers. 67 It also places a 
61 In a European Union context, see EC, Parliament and Council Directive 9717/EC of 20May1997 on the 
protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts, [1997] O.J. Ll44/19, Preamble, Recitals (11) and 
(13) [Directive 9717/EC]. This directive has been repealed by EC, Council and Parliament Directive 
2011183/EU of 22 November 211 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93113/EEC and 
Directive 1999144/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 
851577/EEC and Directive 97/7EC of the European Parliament and of the Council OJ [2011] L 304/64 
[Directive 2011183/EU]. Directive 2011183/EU seeks to bring a further level of integration regarding 
information disclosure requirements, formalities and remedies for distance contracts, off-premises contracts 
and other contracts. 
62 Ibid. 
63 The OCP A, supra note 3, s 5( I), states that "If a supplier is required to disclose information under this 
Act, the disclosure must be clear, comprehensible and prominent." 
64 One of the arguments made for requiring that information be provided prior to the conclusion of the 
contract is to protect consumers against their own impulsiveness and the sale dynamics at play before they 
make a decision: L'Heureux, supra note 5 at 275. 
65 For example, the information disclosure requirements in consumer protection legislation often only apply 
to contracts over and above a certain amount: OCP A supra note 3 s. 37; 0. Reg. 17 /05, s 31 ($50.00). 
66 A law and economics perspective to the role of information in consumer agreements looks at it from a 
costs/benefits analysis, i.e. the cost of producing it and the cost for consumers to access it and process it. It 
also looks at the gains that consumers can make from accessing the information and at the false perception 
that consumers may be lead to that the cost of information is too high, giving rise to a potential consumer 
protection problem: Hadfield, Howse & Trebilcock, supra note 25 at 141-145. Howells & Weatherill, 
supra note 4 at 65, posit the question by looking at the relatively low cost to provide information by 
suppliers in comparison to the broader actual benefit that it may have to produce more informed consumers. 
67 Efficiency in how consumers arrive at their decisions is one of the justifications for consumer protection 
in the European Union as stated in Directive 2005129/EC, supra note 9, Preamble, Recital 14: "It is 
desirable that misleading commercial practices cover those practices, including misleading advertising, 
which by deceiving the consumer prevent him from making an informed and thus efficient choice." 
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burden on consumers by privileging a certain conduct by valuing the supply and absorption of 
information, as opposed to a more passive role.68 
Although the obligation to disclose material information before consumers enter into a binding 
agreement and its justifications are rather uncontroversial69 (as found in Canadian and in European 
consumer protection legislation), 70 other jurisdictions such as the US have attempted another approach 
with a proposal for uniform codification through the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act 
[UCIT A].71 Under UCIT A, the "opportunity to review" terms as opposed to an obligation to supply 
terms before completing the transaction is justified by the nature of electronic transactions and to 
promote transaction "efficiency."72 The shortcomings of absence of information are compensated by a 
limited cool-off period under which consumers can automatically cancel the transaction at will.73 The 
approach proposed by UCIT A has encountered fierce resistance, with the result that it has been 
enforced in two US states only.74 
A more thoughtful approach to the meaning of "efficiency" needs to favour a meeting of the minds 
that is as close as possible between what the supplier offers and what the consumer bargains for, as 
opposed to focusing solely on the speed of individual transactions and the costs saved by suppliers in 
pre-sale procedures and communications. The teachings of behavioral law and economics also suggest 
that the "opportunity to review" approach proposed by UCIT A, as opposed to the obligation to supply 
information approach largely favours suppliers as it takes advantage of the inertia bias of consumers, 
including disgruntled ones.75 Moreover, a legal design that does not promote the supply of 
information shapes consumers' expectations through the distributors with which they interact. It 
68 Howells, supra note 58 at 364. 
69 Girot, supra note 14 at 66. For the potential pitfalls of consumer disclosure requirements, see Hadfield, 
Howse & Trebilcock, supra note 25 at 141-145; and Trebilcock, supra note 23 at 95. 
70 See Chapter 9 Part IV. 
71 Official Text, Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (2002), online: 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/uk/ucita/2002final.htm. See the discussion on UCIT A in Chapter 9 
Part IV. 
72 See the discussion on UCITA, supra note 71, in Chapter 9 Part IV. Proponents of this model include 
Epstein, "Contract not Regulation", supra note 24. 
73 Ibid. 
74 See the discussion on UCIT A, supra note 71 in Chapter 9 Part IV. 
75 Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 44 at 17ff. The authors describe how people are generally loss adverse and 
how this may lead to the "status quo bias." Applied to the present case, "status quo bias" would make it less 
likely that consumers would return the purchased software after having found out of its unsatisfactory 
terms, hence the increased sales that this represents for distributors, as opposed to a scenario where 
important information would be disclosed before the sale occurs. 
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legitimizes impulse and recklessness rather than reinforcing the merit of reflection and awareness, and 
alleviates the detrimental effects of a passive approach to information gathering. At a normative level, 
providing material information to consumers prior to the transaction is the more reasonable approach. 
The inefficiencies and burdens that it may engender on the part of the supplier are largely 
compensated by the objectives that are promoted and by the overall efficiencies that can result there 
from. 
Information disclosure requirements are the least intrusive of the consumer protection legal 
mechanisms examined in this chapter. They do not interfere with the merit of the terms of the 
transaction or with its reasonableness. While they may be seen as satisfactory on their own, from the 
perspective that entrusts market dynamics to resolve most consumer grievances on their own, they 
suffer from important shortcomings. The breach of information disclosure requirements gives rise to 
limited remedies.76 
While they play an important role in consumer transactions, one should guard against being too 
optimistic about the efficiency of information disclosure requirements to ensure that a bargain will 
meet consumers' reasonable expectations. There is a danger to overestimate consumers' ability to 
understand and process the information that is being provided and its efficacy to resolve the overall 
asymmetry that subsists between consumers and suppliers.77 The distribution online of information 
products, including copies of copyright works, is often accompanied by lengthy standard non-
76 See the discussion on information disclosure requirements in Chapter 9 Part IV A. 
77 Howells & Weatherill, supra note 4 at 25 and 64 point to the shortcomings of information disclosure 
requirements as they assume that consumers are able to absorb the relevant information and rely on "a 
smart and attentive consumer", while empirical evidence tends to illustrate the contrary. Niva Elkin-Koren, 
"A Public-Regarding Approach to Contracting over Copyrights", in Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Diane 
Leenheer Zimmerman & Harry First eds., Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property: Innovation 
Policy for the Knowledge Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) at 201-202. L'Heureux supra 
note 5 at 17-18 takes the position that consumers' ability to read the information is somewhat irrelevant as 
it is unlikely that they would ever be in the position to understand all ramifications behind the transaction. 
Other factors that may temper the efficacy of information disclosure requirements are the lack of time and 
alternatives, market impediments to switching. Insights from behavioural economics explain consumers' 
limited ability to understand and process information because of their tendency to make "self-serving 
interpretations", "over or under optimism", focus on immediate pleasures rather than long term effects, and 
the fact that their preferences can be easily manipulated. These tendencies are discussed in Howells, supra 
note 58. 
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negotiated end-user agreements.78 The industry of digital content is particularly prone to information 
overload, which defeats one of the initial purposes for supplying the information. 79 
The case has not been made that consumers are generally more advantaged by lengthy information 
than they are in an environment that relies on the inherent efficiencies of transactions they are well 
familiar with, such as a sale, with no terms attached on what consumers can and cannot do with 
respect to the copy of the copyright work they recently acquired. On the contrary, the increased 
commercial practice to licence rather than sell the copy of the copyright work is a contract generally 
accompanied by lengthy non-negotiated standard terms and conditions that are still unclear for many 
consumers. Jean Braucher refers to the unfamiliarity of consumers with licence agreements as a "core 
information problem. "80 
While information disclosure requirements can provide helpful guidance to prudent copyright 
consumers, they are not likely to cure any systemic shortcomings in the scope of their permitted use. 
The likelihood of effective competition on the spectrum of permitted uses is uncertain, especially with 
those terms of use involving complex legal issues such as the ability to exercise fair dealing on the 
work. 81 They are more likely to be relegated to pure legal considerations rather than attracting on 
either side the required attention that fuels competition dynamics. Information disclosure 
requirements are not sufficient. They need to be accompanied by legal mechanisms that regulate the 
substance and reasonableness of the transaction, such as prohibitions against unfair practices and the 
construction of implied obligations. 82 
78 See the discussion on non-negotiated standard end-user agreements applicable to commercial copies of 
copyright works in Chapter 3 Part III C. 
79 Loos & al., supra note 51 at 48. 
80 Jean Braucher, "12 Principles for Fair Commerce in Mass-Market Software and Other Digital Products" 
in Consumer Protection in the Age of the "Information Economy", (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing 
Ltd., 2006) at 16. 
81 See the discussion on non-negotiated standard end-user agreements applicable to commercial copies of 
copyright works in Chapter 3 Part III C. 
82 Braucher, supra note 80 at 64 and 69; L'Heureux, supra note 5 at 17-18. 
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IV. The justifications for prohibition of unfair practices 
The justifications for the prohibition of unfair practices and the legal remedies available when 
practices are held to be unfair83 are also grounded in the need to address the detrimental effects of 
asymmetry for the consumer, with a particular focus on asymmetry in resources and in the ability to 
obtain adequate relief. 84 It aims at protecting consumers against abuse of power by sellers or suppliers 
with a particular focus on non-negotiated one sided standard term agreements. 85 It generally supports 
consumers' reasonable expectations that contracts in the market place ought to be fair. 86 The 
prohibition sends a strong public policy signal that certain practices will not be tolerated and that 
freedom of contract and autonomy may be overridden as a means to deter their use in commerce.87 
Prohibitions of unfair practices are not only designed to benefit consumers but also honest and fair 
traders who may also suffer from detrimental and abusive practices. Prohibitions against unfair 
practices have strong economic underpinnings to promote consumers' and sellers' confidence leading 
to thriving markets and to counter possible competitive trends leading to a race to the bottom. 88 From 
a behavioral economics perspective, even more specific unfair practice prohibitions become 
warranted in lieu of general prohibitions targeting unfair and unconscionable practices, when specific 
and widespread abuse is identified. 89 Ultimately, prohibitions against unfair practices are meant to 
redress the inherent conflict between, inter alia aggressive advertising and enticement campaigns and 
83 Contract clauses that are held to be unfair often entitle consumers to rescind the contract and "to any 
other remedy available at law": for example see OCP A, supra note 3, s 18. 
84 C.J. Miller, Brian W. Harvey & Deborah L. Parry, Consumer and Trading Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998) at 4. 
85 Directive 93113/EEC, supra note 9, Preamble; Miller, Harvey & Parry, supra note 84. 
86 On the link between the legal interpretation tool of "reasonable expectation" and fairness, see Girot, 
supra note 14 at 33ff, who argues that contracting parties can reasonably expect that contracts they enter 
into are not to operate unfairly. 
87 L'Heureux, supra note 5 at 275. 
88 Particularly in a European Union context to facilitate harmonization and eliminate barriers to trade 
between member states: Directive 93113/EEC, supra note 9. On the effects that poor quality products 
(lemons) can have in lowering the overall quality of products offered on the market, and on the effects 
(costs) of dishonest practices in taking honest traders out of a particular market, see: George K. Akerlof, 
"The market for "lemons": quality uncertainty and the market mechanism" ( 1970) 84 The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 488, in particular at 495-496. 
89 Bar-Gill, "Seduction by Plastic", supra note 6 at 1415. 
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the reasonable expectations of consumers to be adequately informed and to expect honesty from 
merchants. 90 
In Chapter 9, I discussed the scope and operation of prohibitions against unfair commercial practices 
and how they applied in cases involving commercial copies of copyright works.91 In particular, I 
explained how by their nature, they may be of more limited appeal for the purpose of confronting 
restrictions of uses of commercial copies of copyright works at a substantive level, provided that 
adequate disclosures of the restrictions are made.92 I also discussed how on that terrain, consumer 
implied obligations may be more attractive to consumers93 because their application depends on a 
non- exhaustive list of factors (within and outside the terms of the agreement) which need to be 
considered to assess whether consumers' reasonable expectations of uses have been met. I will now 
tum to the justifications that withstand consumer implied obligations. 
V. The justifications for implied obligations 
A. Rectification of information asymmetry 
Similarly to other consumer protection obligations, the most frequently invoked justification in 
support of implied obligations (e.g., implied obligations of quality, fitness for purpose, 
correspondence with description, title, quiet possession and freedom from encumbrances) is the 
information asymmetry that prevails between the seller and the buyer, and the gap that it can create 
between what consumers can reasonably expect and what they receive.94 The justification of 
90 L'Heureux, supra note 5 at 306 discusses the inherent conflict between publicity aims and the need to 
inform consumers adequately. Consumers should be able to expect honesty from merchants, justifying state 
intervention. 
91 See the discussion in Chapter 9 Part IV. 
92 Ibid. 
93 At least with respect to a significant part of Canada's provincial and territorial jurisdictions and the EU, 
UK and France: see the discussion in Chapter 9 Part II. 
94 Christian Twigg-Flesner, Consumer Product Guarantees (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2003) at 7. 
This is, according to the author, the foundation of the three main implied quality warranties of English law: 
correspondence with description, satisfactory quality and fitness for a particular purpose, as well as of EC, 
Parliament and Council Directive 1999144/EC of 25 May 1999 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer 
goods and associated guarantees [1999] OJL 171/07 at 12[Directive1999144/EC]; Howells & Weatherill, 
supra note 4 at 29-30 and at 146; L'Heureux, supra note 5 at 63. In economic theory terms this asymmetry 
can give rise to a market failure, a "consumer protection problem": i.e. when consumers are not getting 
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minimum standards underlying implied obligations is founded upon the greater knowledge and 
control that suppliers have or should have about or over the good or service, in contrast with the one 
of consumers.95 The corollary of information asymmetry being the main justification of implied 
obligations is that once a specific feature or defect of the product is specifically brought to the 
attention of consumers, suppliers are relieved of their implied obligations with respect to the object 
that was specifically disclosed.96 This is the exception regime applicable to defects being disclosed in 
most consumer statutory implied obligations.97 Here, the aim is to encourage transparency and 
fairness in commercial transactions, while preserving consumers' freedom of choice.98 
Information asymmetry cannot be the sole justification to support the existence of consumer implied 
obligations especially when they are mandatory. Courts have not hesitated to construe implied 
obligations setting minimum standards of quality, fitness for purpose or quiet possession, regardless 
of information provided by the supplier to the contrary. 99 In consumer contracts, the written terms of 
the agreement are tempered by other factors that courts consider to assess consumers' reasonable 
expectations with respect to quality or fitness for purpose. 100 Information asymmetry cannot therefore, 
on its own, fully justify how implied obligations are construed in the agreement between suppliers and 
what they intended to buy, where information costs are relatively high or value of information perceived to 
be low: Trebilcock, supra note 23 at 70. 
95 This is the case with respect to warranties against latent defects which are often assimilated to warranties 
of quality and of durability: see the discussion in Chapter 9 Part II A.; ABB Inc. v Domtar Inc, (2007) 3 
RCS 461 (SCC) at paragraph 41; Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Sale of Good, ( 1979) 
[OLRC Report on Sale], at 207; see also Howells, & Weatherill, supra note 4 at 29-30 and at 146; 
L'Heureux, supra note 5 at 63. 
96 This is how Twigg-Flesner, supra note 94 at 11, summarizes the effects of the application Directive 
1999144/EC, supra note 94: "statutory rights of consumers only operate to the extent that the consumer was 
completely unaware of the standard of quality of a particular product. Once the consumer is made aware of 
that shortcoming, he cannot complain about this subsequently. The Directive therefore creates a basic 
quality standard, but this can be displaced by disclosing to the consumer any quality defects that exist." 
97 The disclosure of the defect is one of the most important exceptions to the application of implied 
obligations of acceptable or merchantable quality, as discussed in Chapter 9 Part II A. This is also central to 
the operation of warranties of quality and against latent defects in the Civil Code of Quebec, art 1726-
1731 CCQ. A similar regime applies in Europe to limit the effect of implied terms: Directive 1999144/EC, 
supra note 94, art 14(2C) where matter "which would usually render a product unsatisfactory is specifically 
drawn to the consumer's attention before he buys the product, or where the consumer examines the product 
before purchase and where this examination should have revealed the defect." 
98 This would include the opportunity to negotiate (obtain) the product at a lower price as a result of the 
defect. I discuss the application of the exception of defects specifically brought to the attention of 
consumers to standard terms and conditions setting the scope of use of copies of copyright works is 
discussed in Chapter 11 Part I. 
99See the discussion in Chapter 9 Part II A. For example, courts' reluctance to give any effect to contract 
clauses stating that the good is sold "as is." 
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consumers, regardless of sometimes contradictory information being provided. Information 
asymmetry raises broader concerns that are not curable alone by supplying the information to 
consumers. The assumption that this imbalance and other asymmetries101 are always present to some 
extent raises issues of fairness that the construction of implied obligations seeks to preserve. 102 
An instrumental economic approach to consumer protection also promotes fairness 103 , which is likely 
to create more confidence in the market place, 104 an essential component of thriving markets. 105 
Implied obligations with respect to quality and fitness for purpose can lead to greater efficiencies by 
discouraging the production of goods and services that are below consumers' reasonable expectations, 
to reduce instances of market failures. 106 On the premise that suppliers are in a privileged position 
with respect to the products they sell, 107 they should bear the burden of products falling below these 
standards, which can be spread across production costs. 108 
100 See the discussion in Chapter 9 Part II A. 
101 This includes the asymmetry of bargaining power between suppliers and consumers. The lack of 
bargaining power includes the lack of means to have consumers' aspirations taken into account regarding 
available products: Girot, supra note 14 at 72, invokes this lack of power as one of the justifications for 
setting minimum standards through implying terms of quality in consumer agreements. It is also a 
justification for provisions under which any ambiguity is to benefit the consumer: OCPA, supra note 3, s. 
11; QCPA, supra note 4, s. 17, and in the fact that certain consumer rights and remedies under consumer 
legislation cannot be contracted out: OCPA, supra note 3, s. 9(3); QCPA, supra note 4, s. 261 and 262. See 
also Howells & Weatherill, supra note 4 at.6. 
102 Fairness is one justification invoked for construing implied obligations in contracts: Stephen M. 
Waddams, The Law of Contracts, 5th ed (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 2005) at para 146. 
103 Directive 1999144/EC, supra note 94, Preamble, Recital 2; EC, The Green Paper on the Review of the 
Consumer Acquis (Brussels, EC, 2006) [Green Paper on Consumer Acquis] at 17, proposed the 
introduction of general good faith and fair dealing provisions. EC, Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on consumer rights (Brussels, EC, 2008), refers to the principle of 
good faith in assessing the fairness of contract terms. 
104 Green Paper on the Consumer Acquis, supra note 103 at 4,7. 
105 Directive 1999144/EC, supra note 94, Preamble, Recital 2, 4. Howells & Weatherill, supra note 4 at 48 
describe the critical role of consumers in efficient competitive markets: "Consumers benefit from 
competitive markets, but they generate them too. Policy is therefore sensibly directed at improving 
consumer information and education, so that people are able to perform the role as demanding consumers 
which is a pre-condition to efficiently functioning markets." 
106 For the analysis of the benefits and limitations of warranties on goods and services as effectively setting 
minimum standards of quality, durability, etc ... see Howells & Weatherill, supra note 4 at 145-212 
(chapter "Quality of goods and services"). In contrast to the requirement of the safety of goods, around 
which there is more unanimity justifying legal standards and even state intervention, the question of 
whether any general standard should apply to the quality of goods is a more controversial proposition. The 
authors argue that a minimum standard of quality is desirable in the modern economy while recognizing the 
need to allow flexibility in the meaning of the term to allow for various markets. 
107 I.e., by generally benefiting from information, bargaining power, ability to influence the market of given 
products (design, terms of sale, applicable rules, etc ... ). 
108 OLRC Report on Sale, supra note 95 at 207; L'Heureux, supra note 5 at 63. 
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If the rectification of information and other asymmetries cannot account fully for the underlying 
justifications of (mandatory) implied obligations, what other rationale provides a more cogent 
explanation to their existence? This is what I explore next. 
B. Property theory 
A less explored justification of implied obligations in consumer protection literature is based on 
property theory. The need to imply obligations may be necessary to reconcile the effects of contracts 
with concepts of property and ownership as a fundamental institution regulating human interactions 
and allocating resources since times immemorial. 109 
Through the lens of property, the justification for implying terms arises from the need to fill the gap 
between consumers' reasonable expectations based on their ownership or possessory rights in a 
resource, and the effects of the consumer transaction. This view looks at implied obligations beyond 
the contract terms that they constrain and under which copies of copyright works are made available 
to consumers. It looks at the broader implications of statutory implied obligations as they directly 
interface with property, e.g., how they can heavily rely on, support and/or shape the ownership or 
possessory rights that consumers acquire in the copy of the copyright work, as well as the property 
rights of copyright holders in the copyright work. 
Contract terms and the implied obligations construed into them do not operate in a vacuum, nor do 
they only involve two parties. They exist within a complex web of relationships, laws and regulations, 
including property law. If anything, warranties of quiet possession and of quality or fitness for 
purpose are the confirmation and protection of core attributes of ownership, e.g., prima facie open-
ended powers and privileges to the enjoyment of the owned good. 110 Statutory implied obligations of 
quality and fitness and of quiet possession apply in contracts for the sale of goods or the provision of 
services. In the former case, this involves the transfer of ownership or possession to the copy of the 
copyright work. Through that lens, property law and concepts of ownership, become highly relevant 
109 James W. Harris, Property and Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) at 4. 
110 Ibid, at 5. 
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in determining the scope of implied obligations, including through the assessment of consumers' 
reasonable expectations. 111 
A property perspective of consumer implied obligations will not in and of itself cure all deficiencies 
and obstacles raised in the previous chapters, as I applied property and copyright law to articulate 
consumers' rights in copies of copyright work. This is particularly the case in the context of the 
expanding property rights of copyright holders, 112 with the possibility to extend these rights further 
through contract. It also needs to be situated within the constraints of the application of consumer law 
to commercial copies of copyright works that I discussed in Chapter 8 and Chapter 9. However, it can 
provide a framework of analysis from which safeguards can be developed, to ensure the application of 
basic concepts of property and ownership, when these were unjustly altered by contract to the 
detriment of consumers, or when the contract was silent or unclear on those terms. Thus, statutory 
implied obligations provide additional support to clarify ownership rights in copies of copyright 
works as they mediate between the consumers' expectations in their ownership or possession sphere, 
and how it can be altered in the contract sphere. There are specific scenarios under which consumer 
statutory implied obligations are more likely to support and clarify copy ownership than in others, as I 
will explore in Chapter 11.113 With this property framework in mind, I will now tum to the potential 
and limitations of statutory implied obligations. 
C. Potential and limitations of statutory implied obligations 
A criticism of (mandatory) statutory implied obligations is that they set minimum standards (e.g., with 
respect to quality and fitness for purpose) that have the potential of narrowing the freedom of choice 
of consumers to specific levels of quality or purposes. 114 The fear is that mandatory levels of quality 
and fitness for purpose can lead to a standardization of market offerings to the detriment of consumers 
who face a lesser range of quality or panoply of functionalities and uses. This concern is particularly 
111 Consumers' reasonable expectations is the test to determine the application of statutory implied 
obligations in Saskatchewan, New Brunswick, Quebec and the United Kingdom: see the discussion on 
implied obligations of quality and fitness for purpose in Chapter 9 Part II A. 
112 I discuss the progressive expansion of copyright holders' exclusive rights in Chapter 5 Part II. For a 
discussion on the introduction of technological protection measures to protect copyright holders' exclusive 
rights further, see the discussion in Chapter 3 Part III B. 
113 See Chapter 11. 
114 Rott, supra note 39 at 452, characterizes mandatory rules in sales law as follows: they "set limits to 
party autonomy, in safeguarding a minimum quality of the product that cannot be abrogated by contract." 
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relevant with respect to the commercialisation of copies of copyright works for which the variety of 
offerings on how consumers experience copyright works prevails. 115 This view implies that 
unhindered market forces will address consumers' needs to have access to a broad range of choices. 
A closer look at the operation of consumer statutory implied obligations shows that they are not 
irreconcilable with freedom of choice, because they embed flexibility through the factors that need to 
be taken into account when deciding whether there existed an implied obligation and whether it was 
breached. 116 Among those, price is an important factor that ensures that a differentiation in the quality 
and variation in the functionalities offered is maintained. 117 The reason is that implied obligations 
revolve around the promotion of commercial practices to ensure consumers' reasonable expectations 
are met, which vary on a case-by-case basis. At the same time, it also implies that in some cases, the 
implied obligations step in to protect consumers against events that they cannot foresee at the time of 
the commercial transaction but that nevertheless form part of what those reasonable expectations 
should be. The implied obligation of quiet possession is one example whereby without specifically 
articulating it or being aware of it when they enter into a contract to purchase a good, consumers 
reasonably expect that they will have the quiet enjoyment of the commercial copy, free of 
encumbrances and hindrances once they own it. 
In the particular case of permitted uses of copies of copyright works, the criticism that statutory 
implied obligations could interfere in a way that would narrow the freedom of choice of consumers 
may rely on an overly optimistic view of the breadth of choices and influence power that consumers 
actually have, 118 given the asymmetry in bargaining power and information that is characteristic of 
115 See Chapter 1 Part I. 
116 See the discussion on the various factors to be taken into account to determine the applicability of 
implied obligations of quality and fitness for purpose in Chapter 9 Part II A. See also Howells & 
Weatherill, supra note 4 & supra note 106; Twigg-Fleshner, supra note 94 at 7. 
117 See the discussion on the various factors to be taken into account to determine the applicability of 
implied obligations of quality and fitness for purpose in Chapter 9 Part II A. 
118 For example, the view of the empowered consumer is reflected in the consultation paper: Office of Fair 
Trading, Consumer Affairs Strategy- A consultation paper, (1996), online: 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared oftireports/consumer protection/oftl 66.doc, at 11, Section 6 "Guiding 
Principles" at paragraph 6.1: "We believe that the interests of consumers are best served by a marketplace 
in which they are able to exercise genuine choice. It is essential, therefore, that our work should promote 
consumers' confidence, and thus their ability to spend effectively and efficiently. This will not only help 
consumers to help themselves, but should in its tum lead to more effective and efficient production, and 
growth in the economy as a whole. Consumers are, generally, the best judges of their own interests, and it 
is therefore for them to make their own choice based on those interests and according to their own values. 
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consumer transactions. Their "freedom of choice" in an increasingly non-negotiated standard terms 
environment, and more particularly with respect to the legal terms attached to the scope of permitted 
uses for copies of copyright works supplied online, such as e-books, musical recordings or films, may 
be more limited than it would appear at first. 119 In that particular sphere, the freedom of choice may 
boil down to completing the consumer transaction or walking away. 
The need to preserve consumers' autonomy and freedom of choice needs to be invoked in the proper 
context. 120 If the argument is made without any qualification, as a means to condemn any laws that 
affect the substantive terms of private transactions, it can have the contrary effect and limit 
consumers' autonomy and freedom of choice. While price can act as an important differentiator in 
ensuring a variety of quality levels and functionalities in the market place, there are fundamental 
elements of a transaction that should not even be part of the in or out equation in the first place. This 
can include restrictions that suppliers impose on goods that offend the most basic expectations of 
ownership: prima facie open-ended quiet possession and enjoyment, free from encumbrances with the 
freedom to transfer. It can also include restrictions that for instance copyright holders would impose 
in the name of their rights in copyright works but that go against the overall objectives of copyright 
law. One of the precepts of consumer law is that there are certain rights that can simply not be sold. 121 
I explore in Chapter 11 whether any of consumers' rights in copies of copyright works (should) fall in 
While direct intervention may be necessary when things go wrong, the main emphasis of consumer affairs 
work should be to empower consumers to look after themselves." 
119 See the discussion on non-negotiated standard end-user agreements of commercial copies of copyright 
works purchased online in Chapter 3 Part III C. 
120 Natali Heiberger and P. Bernt Hugenholtz, "No place like home for making a copy, private copying in 
European copyright law and consumer law" (2007) 22 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1061 at 1095, summarize this 
dilemma in the context of the private copying regime in European copyright law as the need to adopt a 
balanced and cautious approach, i.e. that the interests of consumers to clarity and certainty and a reasonable 
scope of use of copyright materials needs to be balanced with consumers' interest to choice (i.e., more 
limited rights to use at a cheaper price) and the overall economics, societal and also copyright objective to 
promote innovation in the variety and marketing of copyright products. 
121 This principle is reflected in consumer protection clauses under which implied obligations cannot be 
overridden by contract, as discussed in Chapter 9 Part II A. This is also reflected by the treatment of 
arbitration clauses, the effect of which is constrained in some consumer protection laws, to the extent that 
they limits consumers' ability to take legal action before courts of law to ascertain their claim. The 
treatment by consumer protection law of arbitration clauses was reviewed by the Supreme Court in Dell 
Computer Corp. v Union des consommateurs, 2007 SCC 34 and in Seidel v TELUS Communications Inc., 
2011 SCC 15. See also Rott, supra note 39 at 455: " .. .it must be prevented that online content providers 
circumvent consumer law by simply naming something a "new business model," or a service where it is 
truly a sale. The benchmark should be whether or not different needs of consumers are satisfied. What is 
not sufficient is simply to give the alternatives of "more rights-higher price" and "less rights-lower 
price" since the very idea of mandatory rights is to prevent consumers from "selling" their rights." 
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that category through various applications of copyright holders' exclusive rights. 122 Starting with the 
reasonable expectations that should come with ownership of commercial copies as a base of reference 
for the application of implied obligations the role of which is to support such reasonable expectations 
may reduce the chances of making a highly deceiving transaction, leading to greater consumer 
confidence in the market place. The reference point of the prima facie open-ended privileges and 
powers of ownership in commercial copies offers the vehicle to promote important values such as 
innovation, the dissemination and access to information and culture for the benefit of copyright 
consumers. 
123 
Consumer statutory implied obligations are typically interpreted on the basis of "internal factors" as 
expressed by the contract (e.g., the terms of the agreement including the price and express warranties, 
their validity, the effectiveness and applicability of notification provisions) and "external factors" to 
the contract (e.g., advertisement, representations of the supplier made outside the contract, 124 verbal 
agreements, descriptions of the product, custom and usage). Jurisdictions that explicitly ground the 
application of implied obligations on "consumers' reasonable expectations" typically list a non-
exhaustive list of factors to be considered to make the proper determination. 125 In the other 
jurisdictions importing "merchantable quality" and "fitness for a particular purpose" tests from sale of 
goods law, the standards they set are less expressly lenient towards consumers' reasonable 
expectations. 126 
The ability that suppliers have to influence relevant industry factors is a broader manifestation of the 
various asymmetries subsisting in consumer transactions. The extent to which the application of 
implied obligations, more particularly of quality and fitness for purpose can succeed at alleviating 
these imbalances relies in part on the factors considered to determine what is "satisfactory," 
"acceptable," or "merchantable" quality. More specifically, it depends on the extent to which those 
factors are within the control of suppliers of not. On the one hand, the price, the description of the 
product, and other representations made by the supplier are factors that are within suppliers' control 
122 See the discussion in Chapter 11. 
123 I discuss the theoretical justifications of the property rights in copies of copyright works in Chapter 6 
Part III. 
124 QCPA, supra note 4, s. 263; Directive 1999144/EC, supra note 94, art 2 (2), 2 (3). 
125 This is the case in Saskatchewan, New Brunswick and in the United Kingdom: see the discussion on 
implied obligations of quality and fitness for purpose in Chapter 9 Part II A. 
126 See the discussion on implied obligations of quality and fitness for purpose in Chapter 9 Part II A. 
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and specifically listed in provisions based on consumers' reasonable expectations on "acceptable" or 
"satisfactory" quality. 127 On the other hand, factors such as "all the purposes for which goods of the 
type are commonly supplied,"128 as well as the non-exhaustiveness of factors to be considered, 129 
allow courts to normalize the transaction by taking into account circumstances that are outside 
suppliers' control. From that standpoint, they have the potential to alleviate the detrimental effects of 
the asymmetries that subsist in consumer transactions. In the context of copies of copyright works, 
other relevant factors to assess consumers' reasonable expectations can include: consumer habits, 
relevant surrounding products and technologies having an effect on usage and, other parties' rights, 130 
e.g., the exclusive rights of copyright holders. These sets of conditions may vary in time and in space. 
This enables the mechanism of statutory implied obligations to easily adapt to new markets, legal and 
technological environments. 
The efficacy of statutory implied obligations to guide and shape market behaviour toward acceptable 
standards has been put in question. 131 More specific to copies of copyright works, their aptitude to 
127 See Saskatchewan Consumer Protection Act, 1996 c C-30.1 [SCPA], ss 48(d), 39(a); UK Sale of Goods 
Act 1979 (U.K.), 1979, c. 54 [UKSGA], s 14(2). 
128 UKSGA, supra note 127, s 14(2). 
129 Ibid; SCPA, supra note 127, ss 48(d), 39(a). 
130 See the report prepared by the Center for Democracy & Technology, Evaluating DRM: Building a 
Marketplace for the Convergent World (2006), online: http://www.cdt.org/copyright/20060907drm.pdf., at 
14; see also Pamela Samuelson & Jason Schultz, "Should copyright owners have to give notice of their use 
of technical protection measures?" (2007) 6 J. Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 41, at 44-45, where the authors 
describe how consumers' expectations are increasing with new technologies: 'It is thus not surprising that 
consumers expect to be able to time-, place-, space-, and platform-shift as to digital media products, as well 
as to make backup copies. [citations omitted] Because digital technologies enable new flexibilities in ways 
to use and consume digital information, consumers have come to expect to be able to do more with digital 
media products than they could do with analog media products.[citations omitted] Consumers may, for 
example, expect to be able to link works together, format-shift, annotate them, tinker with them, remix and 
mashup existing digital content, and share their new creations with others."[ citations omitted] 
131 Hugh Collins, Regulating contracts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) At 293, discusses the 
efficacy of implied warranties or conditions as a means to guide market behaviour: "The general standard 
of "satisfactory quality" becomes particularized to an individual case during trial. It is always arguable that 
another case on slightly different facts should receive a different treatment. The standard now becomes so 
detailed in its application that it still cannot serve as a guide to market behaviour. This argument may 
exaggerate this weakness of private law regulation of quality standards, for it is possible to obtain guidance 
by reasoning by analogy from decided cases. Nevertheless, it is true that private law regulation provides 
indeterminate guidance in borderline cases. For example, the law may clarify the point that the durability of 
goods is an aspect of satisfactory quality, but it remains for the courts in isolated and un-publicized 
decisions to specify what this requirement may mean in practice. Does it mean, for instance, that the goods 
should remain in working order for a reasonable time after purchase?"; see also Twigg-Fleshner, supra note 
94 at 19. 
388 
adequately promote and protect the interests of copyright consumers is uncertain. 132 The factors to the 
contract that courts generally consider to determine the applicability of statutory warranties or implied 
obligations, are shaped to a large extent by, and are within the control of the supplier, not the 
consumer. The reasonable expectation of the consumer remains largely influenced by the supplier, 
through how they offer their product(s) including the standard contract terms under which they can be 
purchased (or licensed). 
The report on consumer protection in relation to digital content133 which looks at the laws of 11 
jurisdictions (European states, and the US) notes how the suppliers' ability to shape consumers' 
reasonable expectations is more acute in areas where the industry conformity standards are less 
established, such as in the case of digital content. 134 In this context, rules of conformity, e.g., that the 
goods are of satisfactory quality and fit for their purpose may be of little assistance to consumers. 135 
The information provided by suppliers can take a disproportionate place in assessing consumers' 
reasonable expectations compared to other factors such as the legal framework (including copyright 
laws) and other surrounding circumstances under which the digital content is provided. The report 
therefore recommends legislative reform that would clarify that in the case of digital content 
contracts, statements made by suppliers can limit consumers' reasonable expectations only in so far as 
reasonable in the circumstances. 136 
The legitimacy of consumers' expectations with respect to copies of copyright works can be 
established by looking at how the consumer transaction is aligned with the legal framework' 
objectives in which it takes place. For example, consumers' expectations of uses of copyright works 
for personal uses can be legitimized by copyright's exceptions to infringement or users' rights or more 
generally, copyright's instrumental design to favour the creation of works and their dissemination to 
the public. 137 They can also be legitimized by the expectations they have as owners of copies within 
property law. When the effects of consumer transactions create obstacles that go against consumers' 
132 Lucie Guibault & Natali Heiberger, "Copyright law and Consumer Protection, Study carried out for the 
European Consumer Law Group" (2005) ECLG/035/05; Niva Elkin-Koren, "Making Room for Consumers 
Under the DMCA" (2007) 22 Berkley Technology Law Journal, 1119 at 1130- 1131; Heiberger & 
Hugenholtz, supra note 120. See also Mc Gowan, supra note 35. 
133 Loos & al., supra note 51. 
134 Ibid at 222ff. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Ibid. 
137 I discuss the theoretical justifications of copyright in Chapter 6 Part III. 
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legitimate expectations as evidenced by their misalignment to their legal framework and objectives, 
the consumer protection legal mechanisms explored here have the potential, through rippling effect, of 
addressing deceit beyond the consumer's personal experience, and rectifying systemic imbalances 
created by the targeted commercial practice for the benefit of all consumers. 138 
The malleability of consumers' expectations through copyright holders' ability to set the agenda in 
how they make commercial copies available is particularly relevant in the context of copies of 
copyright works as "cultural artefacts." 139 Consumers' vulnerabilities in areas of education, culture, 
and freedom of expression should alert policy makers even more than with respect to other areas of 
consumption. In the case of copy ownership of copyright works, this imbalance in favour of suppliers 
is compounded by the application of the copyright holders' centric legal regime of copyright law in 
shaping consumers' reasonable expectations through the will and actions of copyright holders. 140 Has 
a result, consumers' reasonable expectations and the scope of statutory/implied obligations are indeed 
largely tributary of suppliers' (e.g., copyright holders) will and power, then there is nothing that 
statutory/implied obligations can add to our attempts so far to substantiate the ownership rights in the 
copy of a copyright work through property theory, within a predominantly copyright-holder-centric 
regime. 
The French cases Warner Music 141 and Mulholland Drive142 illustrate the effects of copyright holders' 
power on the applicability of consumer protection obligations. In these two cases, French courts were 
swift at setting aside consumer protection arguments to preserve the consumers' ability to make 
138 See Bourgoignie, supra note 27 at 299, who notes that the damage suffered by a deceitful practice of 
suppliers is rarely suffered by the consumer complainant alone but potentially all consumers who have 
come in contact with that practice. 
139 Elkin-Koren, supra note 132 at 1145. 
140 Heiberger and Hugenholtz, supra note 120 at 1096-1097. The authors argue that the shortcomings on the 
applicability of consumer law principles lie on the author centric view of European copyright laws, which 
makes any claim for greater consumer considerations an "uphill battle." 
141 Trib. gr. inst. 5e Paris, 10 January 2006, Christophe R., UFC Que Choisir I Warner Music France, Fnac, 
(2006) JurisData: 2006-292685 [Warner Music] reversed on appeal: Court of Appeal 4e A, Paris, 20 June 
2007, Fnac Paris I UFC Que Choisir et autres, online: http://www.legalis.net/jurispruclence-decision; 
confirmed by Cour de cassation, civ. lere, 27 Novembre 2008, UFC Que Choisir I Fnac, Warner music 
France, online: http://www.legalis.net/jurisprudence-decision. I discuss the implications of this case in 
Chapter 9 and in Chapter 11. 
142 Cour de cassation, civ. lere, 28 February 2006, overruling Studio Canal et al. v S. Perquin and Union 
federale des consommateurs Que choisir, Paris Court of Appeal, 22 April 2005, available at 
http://www.juriscom.net/documents/caparis20050422.pdf. [Mulholland Drive]. I discuss the implications of 
this case in Chapter 9 and in Chapter 11. 
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private copies of lawfully purchased copies of copyright works, in favour of the exclusive rights of the 
copyright holders. 143 To be sure, copyright law currently allows copyright holders to expand their 
exclusive rights by contract beyond their copyright statutory rights (which is particularly problematic 
with respect to consumer non-negotiated transactions). Further, copyright holder commercial practices 
increasingly involve the removal of any ownership rights of consumers in copies of copyright works. 
From that perspective, the inability of statutory implied obligations to intervene in favour of 
consumers becomes a further illustration and application of the imbalances between copyright holders 
and consumers. 
The statement by the Supreme Court of Canada in CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper 
Canada144 that exceptions to copyright infringement are users' rights offers a promising outlook on 
the role that implied obligations can play within a consumer protection law framework in defining and 
delineating the scope of such rights. The go-between function that they can exercise to fill the gap 
between consumers' reasonable expectations as owners or possessors, and what they are receiving 
through the consumer transaction, can enhance consumers' grounds in a manner that has been little 
explored so far, with respect to copies of copyright works, as well as with respect to other goods. 
VI. Conclusion 
The most frequently invoked justification to protect consumers through, e.g., implied obligations (of 
quality and fitness for purpose, of correspondence with description, of title, quiet possession and 
freedom from encumbrances), prohibition of unfair practices and information disclosure requirements, 
is the need to address the detrimental effects of various asymmetries between the consumer and the 
seller. These rectifying tools are meant to ensure that consumers' reasonable expectations are met and 
among those, the expectation of fairness, for their benefit and the one of all market participants. 
The justifications of intervention to protect consumers give rise to ideological debates that revolve 
around the role of the state in the regulation of private transactions and interfering with the market 
place. 145 State intervention and thriving markets are not mutually exclusive and the former may be 
required to strengthen consumers' confidence in the market place by incenting fair commercial 
143 Ibid. 
144 2004 sec 13. 
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practices for the benefit of all market participants. In the case of copies of copyright works, state 
intervention is also justified to ensure that consumer transactions are aligned and consistent with the 
relevant legal framework within which they subsist and their objectives, for instance property and 
copyright law. 
Various levels of asymmetry are likely to be more present for consumers accessing (digital) copies of 
copyright works because (i) copyright law tends to be copyright-holder-centric though its primary 
purpose of defining copyright holders' exclusive rights with percolating effects in the application of 
other fields of the law (i) copyright law which regulates to a large extent what consumers can and 
cannot do with their copies is complex and largely misunderstood (iii) there is widespread use of non-
negotiated standard terms and conditions imposing licence terms that not only limit consumers' rights 
to use, but fundamental ownership rights such as transfer in the ownership of the copy that are not 
present in physical copies of copyright works exchanged from hand to hand (i.e., books, CDs, DVDs) 
(iv) the application of sale of goods and consumer protection laws to digital copies of copyright works 
still give rises to many areas of uncertainty. These factors alone raise a red flag that calls for more 
attention regarding the regulation of digital content. 
The rectification of information and other asymmetries cannot alone explain the raison d'etre of 
consumer obligations and in particular, consumer implied obligations (of quality, fitness for purpose, 
correspondence with description, title and quiet possession). I argued that the main underlying 
justification of consumer implied obligations is to protect consumers' reasonable expectations flowing 
from their ownership of the goods they purchased, to counter any distortion resulting from the manner 
by which the goods are supplied to consumers. 
Justifying statutory implied obligations through their function in filling the blanks to meet consumers' 
reasonable expectations as owners of goods provides two important insights. First, the reconnaissance 
of the property rights, e.g., in commercial copies of copyright works is the condition sine qua non to 
the relevance and application of the statutory implied obligations. Without a firm understanding of the 
nature of commercial copies of copyright works as goods, copyright holders have the leisure to 
temper at will with what they offer to consumers and with it the possibility to remove the application 
of statutory implied obligations. In essence, statutory implied obligations cannot play their role of 
145 See the discussion in Part II of this chapter. 
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rectifying commercial transactions to meet consumers' reasonable expectations without the clearer 
recognition of their ownership rights in commercial copies and its significance. 
Second, the centrality of property and ownership in how implied obligations operate precipitates the 
need to revise the scope of application of statutory implied obligations beyond goods to also cover 
services or mixed transactions, with the necessary adaptations. 146 As consumers increasingly 
experience copyright works through services without necessarily owning a copy, their reasonable 
expectations with respect to, e.g., the quality and fitness for purpose of the services need to be 
adequately taken into account. 
The review of various scenarios on how the consumer protection obligations presented here can 
enhance (or not) consumers' ability to assert their rights to copies of copyright works is examined 
next. It is one mean to test this hypothesis and the beginning of an answer to the research question of 
this chapter on the extent to which consumer protection law can support consumers in ascertaining 
their rights to copies of copyright works. 
146 See the discussion in Chapter 8 Part II B, where I argued that the traditional justifications for regulating 
goods differently than services in consumer implied obligations are questionable in the context of mass 
standardized services (as opposed to craftsmanship type of services). 
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Chapter 11 
Restrictions of Uses of Copyright Works as a Breach of Consumer Law Obligations 
I. Introduction 
In this chapter, I apply consumer law obligations to four scenarios involving use restrictions on 
commercial copies of copyright works. Threading through the uncertainties of the nature and scope of 
copyright users' rights that I discussed in Chapter 3, and the application of consumer law to 
commercial copies of copyright works in Chapters 8 and 9, I test the efficacy of consumer law as a 
property-limitation rule1 on copyright holders' exclusive rights, more specifically, how it can support 
consumers' claims against copyright usage restrictions. 
To what extent can consumer law intervene at the contractual level to cure the uncertainties and 
deficiencies identified with respect to copyright consumers' and copyright holders' rights at the 
property level?2 How can it support claims to strengthen copyright consumers' rights against the 
manner by which copyright holders commercially exploit their exclusive rights? While Canada's 
Copyright Act [CCA]3 allows the courts to grant a broad range of remedies to copyright holders 
against copyright infringement,4 and provides defences to counter any allegation of copyright 
infringement,5 it does not provide any remedies to consumers. Consumers' claims are generally based 
on breach of contract and, potentially, as I explore here, on statutory consumer protection laws. 
The starting proposition is that copyright holders' restrictions on uses of commercial copies of 
copyright works potentially breach consumer implied obligations, information disclosure 
requirements, and may give rise to unfair commercial practices on the basis of the privileged 
relationship that they enter into with consumers. As consumers are more empowered than ever before 
1 I.e. "when prima facie normative claims founded on the prevailing ownership conception are overridden. They 
are premised on the notion that but for the limitation they contain, the owner would be free to do as he pleases": 
James W. Harris, Property and Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) at 34. 
2 I refer here more specifically to the discussion on the nature and scope of exceptions to copyright infringement 
in Chapter 3 and on the application of property law and theory to mediate between the competing rights of 
consumers and copyright holders in the works in chapter 7. 
3 RSC 1985, c. C-42. 
4 CCA, supra note 3, s 34ff. Copyright infringement can also give rise to criminal sanctions: ss 42-43. 
5 CCA, supra note 3, ss 29-32.2. 
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as to how they experience copyright works in a multitude of ways,6 they may receive conflicting 
signals between those uses that they can reasonably expect to perform with copyright works and what 
copyright holders allow them to do. 
The four scenarios that I analyze here on the possible application of statutory consumer law to 
commercial copies of copyright works situate the contemplated uses within or outside the exclusive 
domain of copyright holders and within the reserved uses, based on a contractual authorization of use 
by copyright holders (or absence thereof) or on uses that are specifically authorized by the CCA. For 
each scenario, I apply the relevant statutory provisions of consumer protection obligations examined 
so far, as well as related case law dealing with a broad range of goods or services.7 The approach that 
I adopt here emphasizes the duality of two competing sets of ownership rights that subsist within 
copies of copyright works. Consistent with the property theory framework developed in the Second 
Part of my thesis to characterize the nature of copyright and of commercial copies of copyright works, 
I apply consumer protection law obligations and distinguish between obligations that derive from the 
exclusive property rights of copyright holders and the contractual obligations that are outside the 
scope of their exclusive property rights. Through this exercise I seek to emphasize the unique 
dynamics that are at play with respect to commercial copies of copyright works and what 
distinguishes them from other goods, our point of departure within a consumer law analysis. 
In Part II, I apply statutory consumer law obligations to contemplated uses of copies of copyright 
works that are restricted and that fall within the exclusive rights of copyright holders. 8 In Part III, I 
apply statutory consumer law obligations to contemplated uses that go beyond the exclusive acts that 
copyright holders partially a~thorize. In Part IV, I look at uses that fall within the exclusive realm of 
copyright holders' exclusive rights and are specifically authorized by copyright law,9 but are limited 
by the contract through which the copies are made accessible or through technological protection 
measures [TPMs]. In Part V, I look at contemplated uses that are outside the realm of the exclusive 
6 See the discussion in Chapter I Part I. 
7 See the discussion in Chapter 9. 
8 Such as the exclusive right to produce or reproduce the work or to communicate the work to the public. 
9 For example, an act which constitutes a fair dealing of the work under CCA, supra note 3, s 29.1 or that is 
permitted under the private copying regime: ss 79 - 88. 
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rights of copyright holders 10 but are limited by contract or TPMs. In Part VI, I comment on the 
distinction between goods and services and how it impacts on the application of the consumer law 
obligations discussed in this chapter. I conclude in Part VII by situating the complementary role of 
consumer law vis-a-vis copyright law to help assert consumers' claims against restrictive terms on 
uses of commercial copies of copyright works. Consumer law's ability to play a remedial function is 
highly dependent on the allocation of rights, powers, and privileges that are set out in the CCA. 
In each of the four scenarios examined here, I contemplate the terms under which the commercial 
copies are made available, i.e., with no or unclear terms, for example, upon the purchase of a music 
CD, 11 or with explicit standard terms and conditions of use, for example, upon the download of a 
musical recording or e-book. 12 I also discuss the implications of the presence of TPMs. All 
contemplated usages are for the personal use of consumers. 13 
II. Uses that fall within the exclusive rights of copyright holders 
The scenario explored here contemplates by far the broadest scope of restrictions of use that are of 
interest in ascertaining consumers' rights to commercial copies of copyright works. The restrictions at 
stake are within the sphere of the exclusive property rights of copyright holders: the prohibition on 
making copies of the copyright work, on communicating the work to the public, on creating a 
derivative work from the copyright work, on performing the work in public, and the exclusive right 
newly introduced in the CCA to sell or transfer ownership of the work that is in the form of a tangible 
object. 14 Here, the contemplated uses that are restricted are not allowed by exceptions to copyright 
holders' exclusive rights, such as fair dealing, the private copying regime, or the newly introduced 
four user provisions 15 that I discuss in another scenario below in this chapter. 16 
1
° For example, portions of the works that are not protected by copyright, or the right to transfer the copy of the 
copyright work is restricted, contrary to the application of the first sale doctrine, as discussed in Chapter 3 Part 
II F. 
11 Music CDs typically include a notice, such as"© [date], all rights reserved." 
12 See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part III Con online standard terms and conditions for the on line distribution 
of musical recordings, films and e-books. 
13 The personal use or purposes is a requirement to determine the application of consumer law to a commercial 
transaction: see the discussion in Chapter 2 Part IV. 
14 As those exclusive rights are set out in CCA, supra note 3, ss 3, 15,18,21,26. 
15 Canada's Copyright Modernization Act, SC 2012, c. 20 [CCMA], amended the CCA, supra note 3 by adding 
exceptions to copyright holders' exclusive rights, i.e. s 29.21 "Non -commercial User-generated content", s 
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The question to be answered is whether consumers can have reasonable expectations of uses that give 
rise to consumer protection remedies with respect to acts exclusively reserved to copyright holders 
and that they have not authorized .. For instance, can lawful consumers reasonably expect to have the 
right to make private copies beyond the fair dealing provisions, the scope of the private copying 
regime, or the four user provisions recently introduced in Canada? If so, what are the implications 
under consumer protection law? To answer this question, I look at two approaches: one that focuses 
predominantly on the opposability to all nature of copyright and one that assesses the opposability to 
all nature of copyright as one of the factors to consider whether consumers' reasonable expectations 
are met. While my analysis looks predominantly at the application of consumer implied obligations 
(i.e., quality, fitness for use, and quiet possession), I also look at the implications of information 
disclosure requirements and provisions against unfair commercial practices. 
A. Primary focus on the property attributes of copyright holders' exclusive rights 
The approach presented here focuses predominantly on the property attributes of the exclusive rights 
of copyright holders, including the right to authorize the copying of their work, i.e., that the rights are 
opposable to all. From that perspective, no notification is required and therefore it is irrelevant 
whether terms and conditions advising consumers of their inability to make copies are present. 
Consumers are expected to be aware of the copyright holders' exclusive rights (ignorantia Juris 
neminem excusat) to copy the copyright work. 17 This approach leads to the least conducive 
application of implied obligations that would acknowledge consumers' uses beyond what copyright 
holders specifically authorize. 
By selling copies of copyright works that preclude the possibility of making copies, copyright holders 
have simply withheld, as is their right, the authorization to make copies, that is, their "default 
position." Through that lens, it seems difficult to argue that the musical recording or film breaches the 
29.22 "Reproduction for private purposes," s 29.33 "Fixing Signals and Recording Programs for Later Listening 
or Viewing" ands 29.24 "Backup Copies". I discuss the four new user provisions in Chapter 3 Part II D. 
16 See the discussion in Part IV of this chapter. 
17 In copyright law particularly, ignorance of copyright infringement or the good faith of copyright infringers is 
irrelevant to assess whether primary infringement took place or not under CCA, supra note 3, s. 27(1 ). However, 
knowledge of infringement is required for secondary infringement: s. 27(2). Absence of knowledge of copyright 
infringement by the infringer limits the remedies available to copyright holders: s 39. 
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implied obligation of description, 18 merchantability, 19 and of fitness for purpose.20 At the very least, 
the requirements of these implied obligations would be met in the less generous jurisdictions within 
the Canadian consumer law landscape.21 The requirement that the copy of the copyright work 
complies with laws under the implied obligation of title and of quiet possession would be met as 
well.22 Similarly, suppliers limiting use of their copyright works in accordance with the copyright 
holders' exclusive rights could hardly be said to be using unfair practices.23 By virtue of this analysis, 
copyright holders would not be in breach of their implied obligations for not permitting uses of copies 
of copyright works that are within their exclusive powers, including the power to authorize. This 
reasoning could hold even in the jurisdictions in Canada and elsewhere that base implied obligations 
on consumers' reasonable expectations, 24 on the basis that it would be unreasonable for consumers to 
expect copyright holders to grant consumers rights of use that copyright law specifically reserves 
exclusively to copyright holders and that they can authorize at their discretion. 
In an analysis that gives prominence to the property nature of copyright, an argument may be made 
that in order to comply with the information disclosure requirements to disclose material information 
about the transaction, suppliers need to formally notify consumers that the copy of the work is subject 
to copyright and inform them of the relevant use restrictions.25 On the one hand, this position may 
18 See the discussion on statutory implied obligations of correspondence with description in Chapter 9 Part II B. 
19 As discussed in Chapter 9 Part II A, the implied condition of merchantable quality is a fairly low standard to 
meet. All that is required is that the goods meet one of the purposes for which such goods are normally used 
which the unlimited listening or viewing of the musical recording or film would easily fulfill. 
20 I refer here to the implied obligations of fitness for a particular purpose which in most Canadian provinces 
and territories, require that the purpose be expressly or by implication brought to the attention of the distributor 
and that the consumer relied on the distributor's skill and judgment. Even if these two requirements have been 
broadly interpreted, it is not clear how the implied condition could find application in the present case: see the 
discussion in Chapter 9 Part II A. 
21 See the discussion in Chapter 9 Part II. A. 
22 See the discussion on the case law suggesting goods that do not comply with applicable laws can be in breach 
of the implied obligations of title and of quiet possession in Chapter 3 Part II C. 
23 I discuss the type of unfair practices prohibited under consumer law that are potentially relevant to the scope 
of permitted uses of copies of copyright works in Chapter 9 Part III. 
24 See the discussion on the legal regime of statutory implied obligations in Canada and the other jurisdictions 
examined here in Chapter 9 Part II A. 
25 This requirement flows from the information disclosure requirements imposed by consumer law to suppliers 
for distance and Internet agreements. See the discussion in Chapter 9 Part IV. See the report analysing the law of 
11 jurisdictions (ie. some European countries and the US) by Marco B.M. Loos, Natali Helberger, Lucie 
Guibault, Chantal Mak, Lodewijk Pessers, Katalin J. Cseres, Bart van der Sloot, Ronan Tigner, "Analysis of the 
applicable legal frameworks and suggestions for the contours of a model system of consumer protection in 
relation to digital content contracts" (2011) University of Amsterdam, Centre for the Study of European 
Contract Law (CSECL), Institute for Information Law (IViR),Amsterdam Centre for Law and Economics 
(ACLE), online: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/consumer-marketing/events/digital conf en.htm at 88-89 
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contradict the intrinsic notification embedded in the opposable to all nature of copyright. On the other 
hand, as I discussed in Chapter 5, copyright may not sit comfortably with the numerus clausus 
principle and therefore be less able to embed the notification element that other forms of tangible 
property convey. 26 Also the consumer protection provisions that impose information disclosure 
requirements for distance contracts and Internet agreements27 are a priori non-discriminating on the 
nature of the material information that needs to be disclosed. 28 In a market where different offerings 
of use of copyright works co-exist, for copyright holders to comply with their information disclosure 
requirements, consumers should be specifically informed of their rights of use The argument is even 
stronger for less recent works that may no longer be subject to copyright protection than it is for 
newly created ones, on the basis of what consumers' reasonable expectations about the existence of 
copyright should be. 29 Even if consumers could successfully claim that copyright holders breached 
their information disclosure requirements, the remedies for breach of the information disclosure 
requirements are more limited than for breaches of an implied obligation.30 
While a focus on the property nature of copyright holders' exclusive rights is defensible in the context 
of the scope of application of consumer protection obligations, it sits uncomfortably with the remedial 
functions of consumer law. This approach may place a too great emphasis on the exclusive rights of 
copyright holders, while consumer law, by design, intervenes as a means to address the detrimental 
effects of suppliers' stronger powers and the various asymmetries that result therefrom. 31 While 
copyright holders are entitled by law to restrict the performance of certain acts under copyright law, is 
it what consumers can reasonably expect, having regard to all the relevant circumstances? The 
analysis that looks at all relevant circumstances prevails in those jurisdictions in Canada and 
where the authors make the argument that the right to make private copies or not can be considered as a material 
term under European consumer information disclosure requirements. 
26 See the discussion on the application of the numerus clausus principle to copyright in Chapter 5 Part IV C. 
27 I discuss the information disclosure requirements provisions in Chapter 9 Part IV. 
28 Ibid. 
29 I.e. that consumers ought to be aware that newly released musical recording or film is subject to copyright 
while this may not be true of older works, given that the exclusive rights conferred by copyright expire, 
generally 50 years after the life of the author: CCA, supra note 3, s 23, or even later in other jurisdictions. 
30 See the discussion on information disclosure requirements in consumer transactions in Chapter 9 Part IV. 
31 Nicole L'Heureux, Droit de la consommation, 5e edition (Cowansville, Qc: Yvon Blais, 2000) at 1-61. See 
generally the discussion in Chapter I 0 on the theoretical justifications of consumer protection obligations. 
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elsewhere that assess consumer implied obligations through a consumers' reasonable expectations' 
test with a list of non-exhaustive factors. 32 
B. Secondary focus on property attributes of copyright holders' exclusive rights 
The approach that I present here considers the property attribute of copyright, i.e., being opposable to 
all as one of the factors to assess whether any implied obligation was breached by the supplier of 
copies of copyright works by restricting uses, such as the right to make copies of the works for 
personal use, but that for some reason would fall outside the exceptions to copyright infringement 
under the CCA. 33 In essence, under this approach, consumers' claim against copyright holders that the 
restricted use is a breach of an implied obligation (e.g., quality, fitness for purpose, or quiet 
possession) can be successful only to the extent that consumers can establish that their commercial 
transaction with copyright holders, as well as the other relevant factors, altered the default property 
regime of exclusive rights and exceptions that is set out in the CCA. 
The statutory implied warranties under which goods are of an "acceptable quality"34 or "satisfactory 
quality"35 or that they are fit for the purposes for which such goods are supplied, as are applicable in 
some Canadian and other jurisdictions, 36 focus on consumers' reasonable expectations. With respect 
to copies of copyright works, quality and fitness for purpose can include the ability to make copies or 
to perform other acts specifically reserved to copyright holders.37 To assess consumers' reasonable 
32 See the discussion on the legal regime of statutory implied obligations in Canada and the other jurisdictions 
examined here in Chapter 9 Part II. 
33 Supra note 3. See the discussion on the exceptions to copyright infringement in Chapter 3 Part II. This is the 
scenario contemplated in the present Part II of this chapter. It includes uses that would fulfill most but not all of 
the conditions to meet one of the exceptions to copyright infringement in the CCA. For uses that are restricted 
by copyright holders but that fall under one of the exceptions to copyright infringement, see the discussion in 
Part IV of this chapter. 
34 The Saskatchewan Consumer Protection Act, SS 1996, c C-30.1 [SCPA], ss 48 (d) and 39 (a) provides a 
statutory warranty that goods sold by a retailer are of "acceptable quality" which is defined as "the 
characteristics and the quality of a consumer product that consumers can reasonably expect the product to 
have,[ emphasis added] having regard to all the relevant circumstances of the sale of the product, including: (i) 
the description of the product;(ii) its purchase price; and (iii) the express warranties of the retail seller or 
manufacturer of the product; and includes merchantable quality within the meaning of The Sale of Goods Act". 
35 Sale of Goods Act 1979 (U.K.), 1979, c. 54 [UKSGA], sl4(2). 
36 This is the case in Saskatchewan, Quebec, New Brunswick and the United Kingdom: see the discussion in 
Chapter 9 Part II A. 
37 Peter Rott, "Download of Copyright-Protected Internet Content and the Role of (Consumer) Contract Law" 
(2008) 31 J. Consum. Policy, 441 at 448 includes in the broader notion of "quality" the ability to make copies as 
part of the social life of many. See Loos & al, supra note 26 at 112 -114 who make the argument that in spite of 
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expectations, the relevant statutory provisions of implied obligations require the consideration of a 
non-exhaustive list of factors. 38 Among them, the existence of exceptions to copyright infringement, 
their legal nature and scope in the relevant jurisdiction, 39 including their proximity to the relevant 
restricted use,40 the presence and clarity of notifications restricting the relevant use, including non-
negotiated standard end-user agreements, representations and advertisement made outside the 
contract, industry norms of permitted uses, uses of available technological devices by consumers, and 
consumer surveys on expectations of uses would be considered.41 As for the property nature of 
copyright holders' exclusive rights, i.e., as opposable to all, the fact that they may not embed a 
notification element as strong as other forms of tangible property could also be a factor that would be 
taken into account. 42 
The existence of non-negotiated standard end-user agreements or notifications that explicitly limit 
consumers' rights to make copies of the musical recording or film becomes more relevant under the 
present approach43 than under the previous approach that focused predominantly on the property 
attributes of copyright as being opposable to all and as embedding the notice function.44 The existence 
and quality of notifications restricting uses would be more relevant to determine the application of 
copyright holders' exclusive rights to restrict the right to make copies, such restrictions do not necessarily 
conform with the contract under which they are supplied if they do not comply with consumers' reasonable 
expectations. 
38L Heureux, supra note 32 at 70. 
39 E.g. a regime within copyright law whereby users are allowed to make copies for their own private personal 
use under specific circumstances, such as the private copying regime in the CCA, supra note 3 ss 79 - 88, which 
applies solely to sound recordings or musical works, or the "Reproduction for Private Purposes" exception to 
copyright infringement: s 29.22. As to their nature, whether these permitted uses constitute users' rights or 
exceptions to copyright infringement would be another determinant factor: see the discussion below in Part IV 
of this chapter. 
4° For example, consumers who would make reproductions for personal uses but who would have circumvented 
a TPM to do so, which is one of the conditions that would disqualify the application of the reproduction for 
£rivate purposes exception to copyright infringement in the CCA, supra note 3, s 29.22. 
1 L'Heureux, supra note 32 at 70, enumerates the factors to be considered: the nature of the product, its 
function, the state of technology, the information transmitted by the distributor, and the terms of the contract. 
42 See the discussion on the application of the numerus clausus principle to copyright in Chapter 5 Part IV C. 
43 I.e., the approach that considers the property nature of copyright as being opposable to all as one of the many 
factors to consider the application of consumer law obligations. In a European context, Rott, supra note 37 at 
446ff. makes the distinction between consumer transactions whereby consumers are expressly notified of the 
presence of technological measure and their }imitative effects on their usage of the copy and when they would 
not be. In the first case, notification would be sufficient to make this limitation compliant. However, in absence 
of notification, consumers' reasonable expectation would include the right to resell, lend the copy, download it 
and play it anywhere and anytime, but would not necessarily include an expectation of the ability to make copies 
of the work. 
44 See the discussion above in Part II A of this chapter. 
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statutory implied obligations. For instance, the notice "© all rights reserved" may not be sufficient on 
its own to set aside the application of mandatory statutory consumer implied obligations.45 Under that 
approach, the opposable to all nature of copyright holders' exclusive rights and the notification 
element that it entails would be taken into consideration within the broader framework of information 
disclosure, which is intrinsically part of statutory implied obligations as well as a formal requirement 
of specific forms of consumer agreements.46 The evidence of an increasing commercial practice by 
other copyright holders allowing consumers to make multiple copies beyond what is permitted under 
the CCA or similar copyright statutes47 would be weighed in when assessing whether the implied 
obligations of quality and fitness for purpose were breached by copyright holders.48 
Even in jurisdictions with less auspicious implied obligations of quality and fitness for purpose for 
consumers,
49 the consideration of a broader range of factors, beyond the ones dictated or within the 
control of copyright holders, is more consistent with consumer law objectives and the consumer law 
framework. For instance, the implied obligation of quiet possession within a consumer law framework 
would weigh in the widespread presence in the marketplace and use of multiple music- and film-
playing devices (MP3s, PCs, cellphones, iPads, PVRs) against the exclusive rights of copyright 
holders to determine whether a limitation on making copies of the musical recording or film is a 
breach of the implied obligation of quiet possession, 50 or does not meet consumers' legitimate 
expectations of fitness for the purpose for which copies of copyright works are normally used. In such 
case, an effective application of consumer protection law to support a use within the exclusive rights 
of copyright holders, but which, for lack of proper notification, leads to the breach of an implied 
45 Similar notices are not required under the CCA, supra note 3, for a work or other subject matter to be 
protected by copyright. See the discussion in Chapter 9 Part II on the effect of notices sold "as is" as not being 
sufficient to remove the application of mandatory statutory consumer implied obligations. 
46 See the discussion on consumer law information disclosure requirements in Chapter 9 Part IV. 
47 For instance, suppliers including Apple, allow users of iTune to make multiple copies on multiple devices of 
music downloaded from the iTune website, online: http://www.apple.com/itunes/. See the survey that I 
conducted on non-negotiated standard end-user agreements for the purchase of copies of musical recordings, 
films and e-books online in Chapter 3 Part III C. 
48 Loos & al, supra note 26 at 112-114. 
49 I.e., in some of the provincial jurisdictions in Canada, as discussed in Chapter 9 Part II. 
50 See the discussion on the scope of application of the implied warranty of quiet possession in Chapter 9 Part II 
C. Other factors to be weighed in include the nature of exceptions to copyright infringement, such as the private 
copying regime or the reproduction for private purposes (as mandatory rights or exceptions or not): see the 
discussion in Part IV of this chapter. 
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obligation, could act as a property-limitation rule, even more so to the extent that a court would order 
specific performance. 51 
If copyright holders are found in breach of their implied obligations (e.g., of quality, fitness, or quiet 
possession) for restricting certain uses of copyright works because they go against consumers' 
reasonable expectations, copyright holders can be subject to a panoply of remedies, including specific 
performance. 52 In the case of specific performance, copyright holders would be required to allow acts 
to be performed with respect to their copyright works. Consumer law would then act as a property-
limitation rule and limit the scope of rights that normally fall within the exclusive domain of 
copyright holders for the benefit of consumers in the context of specific consumer transactions. An 
award of specific performance was initially ordered in the French judgment in Warner Music,53 with 
the effect that the copyright holder would have had to lift a technological measure that limited the 
devices on which a musical recording could be played. This order was reversed on appeal. 54 I discuss 
the Warner Music judgment further below in this chapter.55 The application of other remedies 
available for breach of an implied obligation (i.e. damages, rescission of the contract, etc.) would not 
act as a property-limitation rule to the same extent.56 
Nothing should a priori preclude consumer law from acting as a property-limitation rule to restrain 
the scope of exclusive rights of copyright holders through a court ordering specific performance or 
other available remedies where, having regard to the relevant circumstances of the consumer 
transactions, the copyright holders breached an implied obligation. Under the present scenario, this 
would be possible only to the extent that consumers can establish that their commercial transaction 
with copyright holders and the other relevant factors altered the default property regime of exclusive 
rights and exceptions that is set out in the CCA. In other words, there could be a breach of a consumer 
51 Remedies for breach of implied obligations often include specific performance including an obligation of 
repair: see the discussion in Chapter 9 Part II. 
52 See the discussion on the scope and operation of consumer implied obligations in Chapter 9 Part II. 
53 Trib. gr. inst. 5e Paris, 10 January 2006, Christophe R., UFC Que Choisir I Warner Music France, Fnac 
,(2006) JurisData: 2006-292685 [Warner Music] reversed on appeal: Court of Appeal 4e A, Paris, 20 June 
2007, Fnac Paris I UFC Que Choisir et autres, online: http://www.legalis.netliurisprudence-decision; confirmed 
by Cour de cassation, civ. Jere, 27 Novembre 2008, UFC Que Choisir I Fnac, Warner music France, online: 
http://www.1 egal is .net/j uri sprudence-decisi on. 
54 Ibid.I discuss the Warner Music judgment in Chapter 9 Part II A. 
55 See the discussion in Part IV of this chapter. 
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protection implied obligation only to the extent that an implied licence in copyright law could also be 
read into the transaction. Otherwise, granting consumers' claims would amount to allowing copyright 
infringement to take place. 
C. Assessment 
In this Part, I presented two approaches on the treatment of restricted uses that fall within the 
exclusive rights of copyright holders and whether they can give rise to breach of consumer law 
implied obligations. The first approach that emphasizes the property attributes of copyright and its 
opposability to all as the determining factor may be more aligned with a hierarchy of norms between 
property and contract and the application of the numerus clausus principle. 57 Copyright holders are 
legitimized by the rights that the CCA confers to restrict such uses, which plays an important 
notification function for consumers. As a result, there would be no legal base for the claim of a breach 
of a consumer law obligation. The second approach, that considers copyright holders' exclusive rights 
(as opposed to giving them predominance) as one of the factors to consider when assessing whether 
use restrictions are in breach of consumer law implied obligations, is more aligned to the corrective 
and remedial function of consumer law with respect to imbalances favouring suppliers, including 
copyright holders. Under this approach, copyright holders' exclusive rights to authorize works are 
only partially relevant to assess their compliance with consumer implied obligations if the commercial 
environment is such (e.g., prevailing non-restrictive usage offerings) that consumers can reasonably 
expect to perform certain acts and were not adequately notified of the usage restrictions by copyright 
holders.58 The reason is that the consumers' reasonable expectations test effectively sets a standard 
that copyright holders need to meet having regard to the relevant surrounding circumstances as 
established on a case-by-case basis. Under that approach, the surrounding circumstances would have 
to infer a licence (implied licence) and the restriction to such inferred use would lead to a breach of 
the consumer law implied obligation. Rather than being in opposition, the two approaches reflect 
different emphases on the notification per se that results from the exclusive rights of copyright 
56 In such case, copyright holders would have to give effect to the remedy without limiting the exercise of their 
exclusive property rights by allowing the contested use. For the definition of a property-limitation rule, see 
Harris, supra note 1. See also the discussion in Chapter 4 Part V. 
57 See the discussion on the numerus clausus principle in Chapter 4 Part III. 
58 Commentators argue that the restriction of use would need to be prominent. Restrictive terms of use buried in 
lengthy non negotiated standard terms and conditions would not meet the notification requirement: see the 
report evaluating 11 jurisdictions (some European states and the U.S.):Loos & al., supra note 26 at 112-114. 
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holders. While the first approach that places more emphasis on the exclusive rights of copyright 
holders may be the more likely approach that courts will follow, the second approach may be more 
appropriate, depending on the other relevant surrounding circumstances, for the determination of an 
implied licence and the breach of a consumer implied obligation. 
III. Uses that fall within the exclusive rights of copyright holders and are authorized with 
restrictions 
The present scenario is similar to the previous scenario under which the contested usage restriction is 
part of the exclusive rights of copyright holders and is not otherwise permitted by the CCA.59 The 
difference here is that copyright holders authorize consumers to make restricted uses only partially, 
e.g., time or territorial limitations apply to the authorization to perform acts otherwise restricted to the 
copyright holders' domain. Under the current scheme of the CCA and similar copyright statutes, any 
acts performed outside that authorization amount to copyright infringement. As a result of the 
commercial transaction, those acts would also amount to breaches of the contracts between copyright 
holders and consumers. The partial usage restriction could amount to the breach of an implied 
obligation only to the extent that the commercial transaction and relevant circumstances altered the 
default property regime created by the CCA by creating an inference or implied licence that would be 
broader than the partially restrictive use. The reasoning of the previous scenario would apply here 
with one distinction. The possibilities of partial authorizations of copyright holders' exclusive rights 
are potentially infinite, which illustrates once more that copyright sits uncomfortably with the 
numerus clausus principle.6° From that perspective, the notification function embedded within 
copyright holders' exclusive rights as being opposable to all would be even weaker. 61 As a result, 
compared to the previous scenario, the approach putting greater emphasis on the exclusive rights of 
copyright holders would be slightly less compelling in the present scenario and the approach putting 
less emphasis of the exclusive rights of copyright holders would be somewhat reinforced. Still, as the 
restricted acts are within the exclusive domain of copyright holders, a claim of breach of an implied 
obligation would be more difficult to make than when the restricted acts are either permitted by the 
CCA or fall outside copyright holders' exclusive rights, which are the two scenarios that I explore 
next. 
59 See the discussion in Part II of this chapter. 
60 See the discussion on the application of the numerus clausus principle to copyright in Chapter 5 Part IV C. 
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IV. Uses that fall within the exclusive rights of copyright holders' exclusive rights and are 
specifically authorized by the CCA 
Under this scenario, copyright holders (distributors) restrict consumers' ability to perform acts that are 
within their exclusive domain (such as making copies of the musical recording or film, or 
telecommunicating it to the public, e.g., by posting it on the Internet), and yet they are acts that 
consumers can perform under copyright law. A usage that is a fair dealing62 or that is specifically 
allowed under the private copying regime or reproduction for private purposes of the CCA63 would 
fall in that category. In property theory terms, by permitting those acts without the authorization of 
copyright holders in specific cases, copyright law creates a property-limitation rule on the exclusive 
rights of copyright holders. 64 
In Chapter 3, I described the uncertainty in Canada and other jurisdictions on the nature of exceptions 
to copyright infringement (i.e., whether they are rights or mere defences), as well as whether they are 
mandatory or not.65 I discussed how the recent introduction of TPMs in the CCA and other 
amendments had shaken the conception of users' rights as they were enunciated by the Supreme Court 
in CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada [CCH].66 I discussed how those changes 
seriously undermine any arguments about the mandatory nature of some of the exceptions to 
copyright infringement and compromises the mandatory nature for the other exceptions that I 
examined. 67 
Given these unresolved questions, I will apply here consumer protection law obligations to acts 
specifically authorized by the CCA, but restricted by copyright holders by considering two different 
hypotheses. Under the first hypothesis, exceptions (users' rights) to copyright infringement are 
61 Ibid. 
62 I.e. that falls within one of the purposes specifically enumerated in sections 29 to 29.2 of the CCA, supra note 
3 (such as research and private study). In CCH Canadian Ltd. v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 SCC I 3 at 
para 53ff., the Supreme Court set a legal test that comprises a non-exhaustive list of factors to consider when 
asserting whether the dealing is fair, and stated that the fair dealing provisions needed to be interpreted broadly. 
63 CCA, supra note 3, ss 79 - 88, 29.22. 
64 1.e. when the primafacie open-ended privileges of ownership are overridden: Harris, supra note I at 34. The 
operation and significance of property limitations is discussed in Chapter 4 Part V. 
65 See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part IV. 
66 Supra note 62 at para 48; Ibid, in particular Chapter 3 Part IV Band C. 
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mandatory, and under the second one, they are not. Based on CCH, I will work under the assumption 
that the exceptions to copyright infringement are rights even though I have already expressed doubts 
as to their actual strength. 68 In each case, I will look into how legal claims under consumer law can 
supplement traditional claims for breach of contract and fill the gap in the CCA, as legislation that 
does not specifically contemplate legal claims and remedies for copyright consumers. 
A. The exceptions to copyright infringement (users' rights) are mandatory 
Although there is no definitive answer in Canada as to whether exceptions to copyright infringement 
are mandatory, I argued in Chapter 3 that a reasonable argument could be made with respect to some 
or all of the following exceptions, at least with respect to non-negotiated standard end-user 
agreements: fair dealing, non-substantial part, private copying regime, computer programs, and non-
commercial user-generated content.69 
There are various situations in which lawful consumers can be constrained by contract or TPMs from 
performing certain acts on the commercial copies of copyright works that they purchased, that they 
would otherwise be authorized to do under copyright law. For instance, consumers may want to reuse 
parts of the musical recording of a song as part of an audio-visual original creation that they want to 
post on YouTube or on Facebook for non-commercial purposes. Non-negotiated standard end-user 
agreements would typically forbid such reuse. 7° Consumers or other users may want to reproduce a 
non-substantial part of a film as part of an online discussion forum of amateur film critics or for 
professional purposes but would be unable to do so without the consent of copyright holders because 
of the TPMs that apply to their DVD. Consumers or other users may want to reproduce and 
communicate to the public parts of a book in the context of a parody or satire but are restrained from 
doing so by the terms of the contract pursuant to which they purchased the e-book online. Consumers 
or other users may want to present portions of a musical recording at community training sessions on 
the effects of music on children, which would amount to a performance in public and would typically 
not be allowed under non-negotiated standard end-user agreements of commercial copies. And the list 
goes on and on. 
67 Ibid. 
68 See the discussion in Chapter 3, Part IV. 
69 See Chapter 3 Part IV B (i). 
70 See the discussion of non-negotiated standard terms and conditions in Chapter 3 Part IV C. 
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What is remarkable from the few examples of possible restrictions by contract or TPMs applicable to 
commercial copies of copyright works is that if it were not for the commercial transaction and 
restrictive contract clause or TPMs, users accessing copyright works through other means (e.g., by 
browsing the Internet) would be allowed to perform all of those acts without the authorization of 
copyright holders. Common wisdom would dictate that by entering into a commercial transaction with 
the copyright holders or their distributors, consumers would be placed in a more advantageous 
situation vis-a-vis any other user accessing the same copyright works. With respect to the application 
of exceptions to copyright infringement, the reverse is true. This leads to an absurd and 
counterintuitive result. Here the dissonance does not come from the law but from commercial 
practices that prevail in the field. 71 
If such exceptions to copyright infringement (users' rights) are mandatory under copyright law, the 
contract clause or TPMs restricting the permitted use would be unenforceable or would have to be 
lifted to allow consumers to perform the permitted use. The mandatory nature of the users' rights 
under copyright law could serve as the basis of a claim for breach of contract. 72 The CCA does not 
specifically contemplate grounds of action or remedies for copyright consumers and other users. 73 
What other claims are available under consumer law? To what extent are they more beneficial to 
copyright consumers than a traditional breach of contract claim? 
The consumer law arguments that I will develop here have more strength, to the extent that the 
exceptions to copyright infringement that consumers invoke are rights, that is presently the 
assumption in Canada pursuant to CCH. To start with, a legal claim can be initiated on the basis of a 
right and usually cannot be invoked on the basis of a defence. The French cases Warner Music74 and 
Mulholland Drive75 illustrate that point.76 To the extent that an exception to copyright infringement 
71 See the sample review of online non-negotiated standard end-user agreements for the purchase of copies of 
musical recordings, films and e-books in Chapter 3 Part III C. 
72 The breach could be based on unconscionability. 
73 The CCA, supra note 3, ss 34ff provides remedies in case of copyright infringement. Procedures for a 
declaratory judgment, eg., to confirm the lawfulness of acts performed on copyright works may be initiated by 
consumers and other users pursuant to relevant provincial /federal rules of procedure. 
74 Supra note 53. 
75 Cass ci v. 1 ere, 28 February 2006, overruling Studio Canal et al. v S. Perquin and Union federate des 
consommateurs Que choisir, Paris Court of Appeal, 22 April 2005, available at 
http://www.juriscom.net/documents/caparis20050422.pdf. [Mulholland Drive]. 
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that is mandatory could give rise to a legal claim regardless of whether it is a right or not (e.g., breach 
of contract), the arguments that I develop here could also apply. 77 
Any restriction on commercial copies of acts normally allowed without the authorization of copyright 
holders (under the present hypothesis that they are mandatory) would not be compliant with the CCA 
to the extent that the allowance of such acts is mandatory. On that basis, there is a reasonably strong 
argument that copyright holders (or distributors) who sell such restricted copies would be in breach of 
their implied obligations under consumer law. The implied obligations of quality, fitness for purpose, 
title, or quiet possession each contain, to various degrees, a requirement that the goods sold comply 
with law.78 The non-compliance with law will trigger the breach of the implied obligation unless this 
"defect" was specifically brought to the attention of consumers.79 
In a quality or fitness for purpose analysis, there will be a breach of the implied obligation if the non-
compliance with law limits or impairs the purposes for which such good is normally used, 80 or if 
consumers can reasonably expect that copies of copyright works comply with laws,81 depending on 
the jurisdiction considered. Under the current scenario, copies of copyright works that restrict 
consumers from making a fair dealing use of the work or copying the copyright work under the 
private copying regime would still allow consumers to play the musical recording or film within the 
framework of the CCA82 and any standard terms and conditions attached to the musical recording or 
film. 
76 In Mullholland Drive, ibid, the Cour de Cassation held that to make private copies of copyright works under 
French copyright law did not create rights but was an exception to copyright infringement. Therefore, 
restrictions on the ability to make private copies could not serve as the basis of a legal claim. The Court of 
Appeal came to the same conclusion in Warner Music, supra note 63. The judgment was upheld by the Cour de 
Cassation: ibid. 
77 I discuss the nature of exceptions to copyright infringement as rights or defences or as being mandatory in 
Chapter 3 Part IV. 
78 I discuss the nature and scope of the consumer protection implied obligations in Chapter 9 Part II. 
79 Ibid. For example, there would be no implied warranty of quality or fitness for purpose with respect to a good 
sold which requires a certification or a repair for it to be operational and compliant with laws, if the certification 
or repair is specifically brought to the attention of the consumer before the sale. 
80 This is the case in most jurisdictions in Canada. See the discussion in Chapter 9 Part II A of this chapter. 
81 The jurisdictions applying the consumers' reasonable expectation test to assess the scope of implied 
obligations of quality and fitness for purpose are: SCPA, supra note 34, s 48 (d) and 39 (a); Quebec Consumer 
Protection Act, RSQ., c. P-40.1 [QCPA], s 37; New Brunswick Consumer Product Warranty and Liability Act, 
SNB 1978, c. C-18.1 [NBCPWLA] slO (1) (a); see also the UKSGA, supra note 35, s 14 (2); the Supply of Goods 
and Services Act 1982 (U.K.), I 982, c. 29 [UKSGSA], s 4(2). 
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It is reasonably safe to predict that copyright holders would normally not specifically notify 
consumers that they are not allowed to exercise acts specifically authorized by the CCA. 83 Non-
negotiated standard end-user agreements listing acts that are permitted and restricted would not 
necessarily amount to a notification that consumers are not allowed to exercise acts specifically 
authorized by the CCA, such as fair dealing. 84 While the deficiency to comply with copyright law may 
not be a breach of implied obligations of quality or fitness for purpose in the jurisdictions where the 
standard to meet is relatively low,85 it may be a breach in jurisdictions that ground the application of 
copyright holders' or distributors' implied obligations on the reasonable expectations of the consumer. 
In the latter case, the point of departure is whether consumers can reasonably expect that products are 
compliant with law,86 whereas in the former case the question is framed around whether the 
deficiency of legal compliance makes the product of non-merchantable quality or disenable it to 
perform at least one of the purposes for which copies of copyright works are supplied. 87 
There may be a stronger argument that copies of copyright works that do not comply with law breach 
the implied obligations of title and quiet possession. The jurisprudence on obligations of title and of 
quiet possession has qualified the failure of goods to comply with laws or regulations as breaches of 
the sellers' implied obligations. 88 It depends on how courts are willing to qualify the restrictions 
imposed by copyright holders on consumers' uses of copies of copyright works that would be 
otherwise permitted by law. The scope of the implied obligation of quiet possession is less clearly 
82 Supra note 3. 
83 Supra note 3. See the survey conducted on selected non-negotiated standard end-user agreements in Chapter 3 
Part C which typically do not contain reference to those acts that are specifically authorized by copyright law. 
84 See by analogy treatment by courts of contract clauses stating that a product is sold "as is" as not invalidating 
the application of implied obligations: Macleod v Ens, [1982] 3 W.W.R. 653, 15 Sask. R. 73, 135 D.L.R. (3d) 
365 (CA), Radul v Daudrich (1983) CarswellMan 135 [1983] 6 W.W.R. 278 (MCA) where the court held that a 
statement to the effect that a good was not of a merchantable quality and sold "as is" did not fulfill the statement 
of quality that could limit the application of the statutory warranties under the Manitoba's Consumer protection 
Act.; Theriault v Roy (1990) CarswellNB 169 109 N.B.R. (2d) 75, 273 A.P.R. 75 (QB) where the court held that 
a sale "as is" did not remove the implied warranty of quality and durability; see also Munro v Central Auto Sales 
Ltd. 1994 (1997) CarswellSask 798 (PC); Parsons v Mont-Bleu Ford inc. 2002 CarswellQue 2932 (CQ); Adams 
v J & D's Used Cars Ltd. (1983) CarswellSask 311 (QB) which involved a case where the implied statutory 
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose applied, given that plaintiff had specifically brought that purpose of 
the car to the attention of the vendor. The reference to a sale "as is" was of no legal effect for the application of 
the warranty. 
85See the discussion in Chapter 9 Part II A. 
86 Supra note 81. 
87 See the discussion in Chapter 9 Part II A. 
88 See the discussion in Chapter 9 Part II C. 
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defined than implied obligations of quality or fitness for purpose.89 By its terminology, and perhaps 
also by design, the implied obligation of quiet possession refers to a broader array of cases where the 
expectations of owners and possessors about their open-ended powers and privileges are 
compromised than is the case of implied obligations of title, quality, or fitness for purpose. The 
leading cases on quiet possession suggest that a constraint on how possessory or ownership rights can 
be exercised, even though not entirely impairing any use, can amount to a breach of the implied 
obligation of quiet possession.90 The public policy aspects and balancing act between competing 
interests that these specific authorizations under the CCA embed could provide a strong argument that 
by unilaterally taking these permissions away, copyright holders are in breach of their implied 
obligation of quiet possession. 
In addition to claims based on breaches of implied obligations of title, quiet possession, quality, and 
fitness for purpose, consumers could invoke a breach of copyright holders' information disclosure 
requirements.91 Typically, consumers are not explicitly notified when the restrictions imposed by 
copyright holders on their uses of copyright works restrict their ability to exercise fair dealing or other 
users' rights that would otherwise not require the consent of copyright holders. 92 Consumer law 
imposes on sellers and distributors minimum disclosure information requirements for certain 
contracts,93 the non-compliance with which gives rise to more limited remedies than in the case of 
breach of implied obligations. 94 Among the information disclosure requirements, any material term of 
the transaction needs to be disclosed to consumers. 95 Contractual restrictions on acts that are 
otherwise specifically authorized without the permission of copyright holders should be regarded as a 
material term of any transaction involving copies of copyright works.96 The French Cour de Cassation 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
91 See the discussion in Chapter 9 Part IV A. 
92 See the survey of selected online non-negotiated standard end-user agreements in Chapter 3 Part III C. 
93 Such as distance contracts and internet agreements. See the discussion in Chapter 9 Part IV A. 
94 The remedies for failure to disclose information required by law are more limited (e.g. include very limited 
time periods to cancel the contract) than with respect to the other consumer protection obligations examined in 
this chapter (i.e. which normally also include specific performance, damages, rescission of contract): see the 
discussion in Chapter 9 Part IV A. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Information disclosure requirements imposed for specific form of agreements require that any term material to 
the conclusion of the contract be disclosed in writing prior to the conclusion of the agreement: See the 
discussion in Chapter 9 Part IV A. 
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in one of the Mulholland Drive cases decided otherwise.97 Having held that the ability to make private 
copies was a defence to copyright infringement and not a right, the Cour de Cassation held that any 
restriction on that ability did not constitute material information under the French Code de la 
Consommation. 98 The fact that under French law the private copying regime exception is not a right 
and is non-mandatory likely played an important role in the Court's judgment. Nevertheless, this 
should not preclude a restriction on the private copying exception to be material information. This is 
especially true given the underlying goal of consumer law to address asymmetry of information and 
bargaining power between sellers and consumers.99 Given the complexity of copyright law, 
consumers should be informed of their basic rights (privileges) and how the commercial transaction 
alters them, even more so in non-negotiated standard end-user agreements. 
Last but not least, a non-negotiated agreement that deprives consumers of rights that they would 
otherwise have by law could constitute an unfair practice. 10° Consumers may generally not be aware 
of acts that they can perform without the authorization of copyright holders. 101 Yet those acts are 
permitted by copyright law to preserve and promote important public policy interests. 102 The absence 
of notification of such restrictions, inter alia through the presence of TPMs, could amount to an unfair 
practice. 103 Another argument is that the contract term or TPM places the lawful consumer at a 
97 CA Paris, 4 April 2007, Studio Canal et al. v S. Perquin and Union federale des consommateurs Que choisir, 
Gaz. Pal. 18/07/2007 N° 199, p. 23., confirmed by the Cour de Cassation, Cass civ I st, 19 juin 2008 (2008) Bull 
civ, I, N° 177. 
98 Ibid. More particularly Code de la Consommation art LI 11-1. 
99 See the discussion in Chapter 10. 
100 See Loos & al., supra note 26 at 199 where the authors recommend that terms in digital content agreements 
that would limit uses that are otherwise authorized by copyright law should be added to the list of terms that are 
presumed to be unfair under the "grey list" of unfair contract terms in European law regulation. I discuss the 
prohibition against unfair commercial practices in consumer law in Chapter 9 Part III. 
101 See the discussion on the main clauses contained in selected online non-negotiated standard end-user 
agreements in Chapter 3 Part III C. 
102 See the discussion on the nature of exceptions to copyright infringement in Chapter 3 Part IV. 
103 In a European context, this is the argument made by Peter Rott, "Download of Copyright-Protected Internet 
Content and the Role of (Consumer) Contract Law" (2008) 31 J. Consum. Policy 441 at 447ff. Relying on the 
EC, Council Directive 93113/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, [1993] OJ L095, at 29 
[Directive 93113/EEC] and particularly the article regarding as unfair any non-negotiated contracts "if, contrary 
to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising 
under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer" the author argues that the non notification of technological 
protection measures that limits the exercise of private copying would be an unfair term. Once the limitation is 
specifically brought to the attention of consumers, it would no longer be an unfair term and such restriction 
would be in conformity with the contract. The author relies on article 6 of EC, Directive 2001129/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright 
and related rights in the information society, [2001] OJ, Ll67/l 0 [Directive 2001129/EC], that endorses 
technological protection measures that support copyright holders' rights to restrict private copying. The 
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disadvantage in comparison to other users who access the copyright work through other means and 
that, on that basis, the practice is unfair. An analogy can be made with consumer protection law 
provisions that forbid contract terms that deprive consumers of rights conferred by the law and limit 
their right of action before courts of law. 104 In the same vein, a contract term that substantially 
deprives consumers from exercising their rights under a law, i.e., the CCA, would constitute an unfair 
practice. 
What additional benefits can the claims based on consumer law that I examined here bring to 
copyright consumers enforcing their rights against restrictions of uses of commercial copies of 
copyright works? What do they add to the non-enforceability of contract clauses or TPMs restricting 
acts otherwise permitted without the authorization of copyright holders under the CCA, on the basis 
that such authorizations are mandatory? First, consumer law eases the procedural requirements to 
make a claim, 105 and may provide additional remedies to consumers to those that would be available 
under breach of contract. 106 Second, in some jurisdictions, consumer protection offices have broad 
investigatory and remedial powers with respect to widespread commercial practices that violate 
consumer law. 107 The exercise by consumer protection offices of their power to intervene with respect 
to widespread unfair commercial practices could bring more immediate effective results with a 
broader reach than individual litigation. 
To sum up, copyright holders who limit uses otherwise permitted by the CCA based on the hypothesis 
that such authorizations are mandatory, either through contractual restrictions or TPMs, 108 would be 
potentially in breach of the consumer protection obligations discussed here, and even more likely so 
in the more auspicious provincial jurisdictions with broader consumer law obligations. 109 In addition 
to supporting consumers' claims through various remedies, restrictions of uses otherwise permitted by 
exception to this interpretation would be in jurisdictions where the right to make private copies is mandatory, 
such as in Belgium. 
104 See Ontario Consumer Protection Act, SO 2002, c. 30, schedule A, [ OCPA] s. 7; QCPA, supra note 81, s. 
11.1. 
105 See Chapter 8 Part I. 
106 See the discussion in Chapter 9 Part II, Part III and Part IV on the various remedies available for breach of 
implied obligations, information disclosure requirements and prohibition against unfair practices. 
107 See the discussion on the prohibition against unfair commercial practices Chapter 9 Part III. 
108 And other jurisdictions around the world in a similar situation as Canada: see supra note 641, or who have 
adopted technological protection measures that subject the prohibition of circumvention acts to copyright 
infringement. 
109 See supra note 81 . 
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the CCA are one area where the special investigatory and remedial powers of consumer protection 
offices could be applied and be of assistance to, and raise awareness about, copyright consumers' 
claims. 
B. The exceptions to copyright infringement (users' rights) are not mandatory 
Under the present hypothesis, the exceptions to copyright infringement or users' rights can be 
overridden by contract or TPMs. The following users' rights recently introduced in the CCA likely fall 
in that category: i.e., (i) the reproduction for private purposes, (ii) later listening or viewing, and (iii) 
backup copies exceptions to copyright infringement. 110 Two of these three exceptions to copyright 
infringement pertain specifically to owned or licensed commercial copies. 111 The argument that the 
restriction would place the consumer at a disadvantage vis-a-vis other users who did not enter into the 
commercial transaction does not apply here as the acts allowed by the CCA only pertain to lawfully 
purchased, licensed copies of copyright works. 112 The fact that these three exceptions are made 
explicitly subject to the non-circumvention of TPMs suggests that they are not mandatory. 113 This 
contrasts with other exceptions to copyright infringement, 114 although the reasoning that I develop in 
this section would also apply to them to the extent that they are found to be non-mandatory. 115 
Various examples of usage restrictions come to mind under the present hypothesis. An avid music 
consumer purchases ten CDs and buys several musical recordings online, only to find out that he is 
unable to copy half of them to various playing devices for personal consumption, as he would 
typically do, because the musical recordings are protected by TPMs. A similar scenario occurs to a 
consumer who cannot make otherwise permitted backup copies for the same reason. In another case, a 
consumer purchases a device allowing recordings for later viewing, only to find out that she is unable 
110 See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part IV Band C. 
111 i.e. the reproduction for private purposes and backup copies exceptions to copyright infringement: see the 
discussion in Chapter 3 Part II D (ii) and (iv). 
112 Ibid. In the case of the Later listening or viewing exception (CCA, supra note 3, s. 29.23) the program needs 
to have been received legally (s 2.23 (1) (a)): see the discussion in Chapter 3 Part II D (iii). 
113 An argument could be made that the exceptions to copyright infringement cannot be set aside by contract but 
are only subject to TPMs as provided by the relevant provisions in the CCA, supra note 3: See the discussion in 
Chapter 3 Part IV B (ii) and Part C. 
114 This is the case for the application of fair dealing, the non-substantial part doctrine, the private copying 
regime, computer program exceptions, exhaustion or first sale doctrine and the non-commercial user-generated 
content rights: see the discussion on whether these exceptions to copyright infringement are mandatory in 
Chapter 3 Part IV B (i). 
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to use this recording capability with at least three of her favourite shows to which TPMs apply. The 
list goes on and on. In all those cases, the CCA explicitly endorses such commercial restrictions. 116 
If exceptions to copyright infringement are not mandatory under the CCA, it follows that the 
commercial practice to override them by contract or through the application of TPMs is not 
inconsistent with the CCA. It also means that consumers could not invoke a breach of contract on the 
basis of restrictions imposed on non-mandatory users' rights. If consumer law provides grounds to 
successfully challenge contractual restrictions that limit the exercise of exceptions to copyright 
infringement, it would allow consumers to strengthen their usage rights in a way that copyright law 
does not currently permit. 
Claims made under consumer law to challenge restrictions of uses that go against consumers' non-
mandatory users' rights are less likely to be successful than if the commercial practice restricts the 
performance of users' rights that are mandatory, which I explored under the previous hypothesis. 117 
Because the users' rights are not mandatory, consumers would not be able to claim that the 
commercial practice does not comply with law, which provides grounds to successfully claim a 
breach of the implied obligations of quality, fitness for purpose, and quiet possession. 118 
A claim based on a breach of implied obligations of quality and fitness for purpose would also be less 
likely to succeed, although not impossible, particularly in those jurisdictions that base the application 
of the implied obligations on consumers' reasonable expectations. 119 To assess consumers' reasonable 
expectations, these statutory provisions require the consideration of a list of non-exhaustive factors. 120 
Factors that would support consumers' claims would include the fact that the permitted acts under the 
CCA ~re users' rights as opposed to mere defences. 121 Industry practices allowing consumers to 
perform the permitted acts freely would be another. The absence of an explicit notification advising 
consumers that they are restricted to exercise acts that are otherwise permitted by copyright law would 
115 See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part IV C. 
116 See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part II D (ii) to (iv). 
117 See the discussion in Part IV A of this chapter. 
i 18 Ibid. 
119 Supra note 81. See also the discussion on implied obligations in Chapter 9 Part II. 
120 Ibid. 
121 See the discussion on the nature of exceptions to copyright infringement in Chapter 3 Part IV A. 
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be an important factor. 122 The fact that the users' rights under the CCA are explicitly not mandatory 
would be one factor that would weigh against consumers' reasonable expectations that they could 
exercise such users' rights, but it would not in and of its own be conclusive. The existence of the user 
right, even if it can be overridden by contract, can serve as a base to set expectations that the acts that 
it allows can be performed. Ultimately, a breach of the implied obligations of quality or fitness for 
purpose can be found if the restrictions of use failed to meet consumers' reasonable expectations, 
regardless of whether copyright holders are entitled to limit those acts. 123 
In addition to a potential breach of consumer implied obligations, copyright holders applying TPMs 
that restrict consumers' ability to perform acts that they would be otherwise authorized to do under 
copyright law, were it not for the TPMs, may be in breach of their information disclosure requirement 
obligations and their restrictions could constitute an unfair commercial practice. 124 The analysis that I 
presented under the hypothesis that copyright users' rights are mandatory would also apply here. 125 
Claims alleging unfair commercial practices are less likely to be successful with respect to restrictions 
on users' rights that pertain solely to lawfully owned or licensed copies. 126 In that case, consumers 
cannot claim that they are placed at a disadvantage vis-a·-vis copies of copyright works available 
through other means. 127 
To sum up, claims alleging breach of consumer implied obligations are less likely to be successful 
with respect to users' rights that are non-mandatory under the CCA than with respect the users' rights 
that are. Claims alleging breach of information disclosure requirements or unfair commercial practices 
could be successful, but to a lesser extent, with respect to restrictions on users' rights that pertain 
122 See the discussion on the scope of implied obligations in Chapter 9 Part II. 
123 I.e. in those jurisdictions where reasonable expectations test applies regarding implied obligations: see supra 
note 81. The argument that I make here goes along the same lines as the one that I made in Part II of this chapter 
with respect to the application of consumer obligations to restricted acts that specifically require the 
authorization of copyright holders. 
124 I discuss the scope of prohibitions against unfair commercial practices and the information disclosure 
requirements in consumer law in Chapter 9 Part III and IV. 
125 See the discussion in Part IV A of this chapter. 
126 I.e. the reproduction for private purposes, and backup copies' exceptions to copyright infringement (CCA, 
supra note 3, ss 29.22, 29.24). 
127 As this would be the case with respect to exceptions to copyright infringement that do not impose a 
requirement that the exercise of the exception can only be made with respect to a lawful copy that the user 
owns: e.g., fair dealing, the non-substantial part doctrine, the private copying regime, computer program 
exceptions, and the non-commercial user-generated content rights: see the discussion on whether these 
exceptions to copyright infringement are mandatory in Chapter 3 Part IV B (i). 
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solely to lawfully owned or licensed copies. The last scenario that I explore in this chapter targets use 
restrictions on commercial copies of copyright works that move further away from the sphere of 
copyright holders' exclusive rights as conferred by the CCA. How consumer law responds to such 
user restrictions is what I explore next. 
V. Uses outside the realm of the exclusive rights of copyright holders 
Unlike the three scenarios examined so far, 128 the scenario explored here concerns use limitations that 
are outside the realm of copyright holders' exclusive rights. It includes cases where use restrictions 
(including through the application of TPMs) apply to works not protected by copyright (e.g., works 
that are in the public domain, that are supplied with works subject to copyright). It includes instances 
where copyright holders seek to limit consumers' right to transfer their ownership in commercial 
copies of copyright works embedded in physical objects (DVDs or CDs) that were initially transferred 
with copyright holders' consent. 129 It also includes restrictions on playing devices and territorial or 
time restrictions that do not involve any act exclusively reserved to copyright holders. 130 Under the 
present scenario, any violation of the use restriction would be a breach of contract that would not 
involve copyright infringement. Consumer law would not act as a property-limitation rule as its 
effects would not limit the exclusive property rights of copyright holders. 131 Rather, it would intervene 
in the contract sphere, outside the realm of their exclusive rights. 
The treatment of the restrictions of use that are outside the realm of the exclusive rights of copyright 
holders shares some similarity with the third scenario that I explored in this chapter. 132 The 
application of TPMs restricting the use of a large portion of works not protected by copyright that are 
128 I.e. "uses that fall within the exclusive rights of copyright holders" and "uses that fall within the exclusive 
rights of copyright holders and that are authorized with limitations" and to some extent, "uses that fall within the 
exclusive rights of copyright holders and that are specifically authorized by the CCA" (Part II Part III and Part 
IV respectively of this chapter). 
129 In that case, the limitation on the right to transfer the physical object embedding the copyright work would go 
against the application of the exhaustion or first sale doctrine: see the discussion in Chapter 3 Part II F. 
13
° For example, TPMs that would render the copy of a musical recording unusable after playing the song 30 
times, as opposed to a time or territorial limitation that would restrict the performance of acts exclusively 
reserved to copyright holders, which is the scenario that I explore in Part III of this chapter. 
131 See Harris, supra note I. 
132 I.e., "uses within the realm of copyright holders' exclusive rights and specifically authorized by copyright 
law," as discussed in Part IV of this chapter and more specifically Part IV A, under the hypothesis that the 
exceptions to copyright infringement are mandatory. 
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supplied with a significantly lesser portion of works protected by copyright could give rise to a breach 
of consumer implied obligations 133 and even be an unfair commercial practice. 134 The doctrine of 
copyright misuse, 135 which shares concerns that are similar to the application of sanctions against 
unfair commercial practices in consumer law, 136 could also apply here. Where all the works supplied 
are not protected by copyright and are subject to TPMs restricting access and use, consumer 
protection obligations would apply to these usage limitations without the interaction of the exclusive 
rights of copyright holders. 137 The application of TPMs could raise concerns about unfair practices, 
including on the ground that the application leads consumers to believe that the works are protected 
by copyright and on the basis that the restrictions are undue and not legitimate, having no legal 
foundation. 138 
Usage restrictions that limit consumers' ability to use commercial copies of copyright works they own 
by limiting the amount of times they can play the song, film, or read the book, or the devices on which 
they can play such works also fall under the present scenario. The usage restrictions limit acts that are 
outside the exclusive rights of copyright holders: they do not seek to limit consumers from making a 
copy of the musical recording or film, telecommunicating it to or performing it in public, or 
distributing the copyright work. 139 The right to play the copy of the film or musical recording for an 
133 Ibid. 
134 I discuss the nature and scope of prohibitions against unfair commercial practices in Chapter 9 Part III. 
135 The doctrine of copyright misuse is a defence in U.S. copyright law to copyright infringement under which 
the alleged infringer invokes the abusive use by the copyright holder of her exclusive rights, which may or may 
not involve anti-trust considerations. In Canada, the intersection between competition law and the use of 
exclusive intellectual property rights, including copyright is addressed inter alia by the Competition Bureau, 
Intellectual Property Enforcement Guidelines, 2000, online: http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-
bc.nsfJeng/O l 286.html. I refer to various legal doctrines that limit the exercise of copyright holders' exclusive 
rights in Chapter 3 Part III A. 
136 E.g., an imbalance in the contractual relationship that has detrimental effects for consumers: For example: 
"taking advantage of a consumer by including in a consumer agreement terms or conditions that are harsh, 
oppressive or excessively one-sided" is one example of an unfair practice: SCPA, supra note 34, s. 6 (q); See 
also OCPA, supra note 104, s. 15(2) e). OCPA, supra note 104, s. 15(2) (f) provides that one of the elements to 
consider as to whether a practice is unconscionable or not is "that the terms of the consumer transaction are so 
adverse to the consumer as to be inequitable." 
137 1.e., there is no exercise of copyright holders' exclusive rights which affect consumers' reasonable 
expectations of use. 
138 I discuss the consumer protection provisions sanctioning unfair commercial practices in Chapter 9 Part III. 
139 CCA, supra note 3, ss 3, 15, I 8, 2 I and 26. Uses beyond what is permitted by the contract would not 
constitute copyright infringement. 
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unlimited time, in unlimited territories 140 flows from consumers' primafacie open-ended powers and 
privileges as owners of the commercial copies of copyright works. 141 
In the jurisdictions with narrower implied obligations of quality and fitness for purpose, 142 usage 
restrictions affecting uses of copies of copyright work by territory, duration, or types of playing 
devices and that are outside the exclusive rights of copyright holders may be in breach of the statutory 
implied obligations of copyright holders (distributors) unless the usage restrictions are specifically 
brought to the attention of consumers. The specific notification of these usage restrictions to 
consumers is relevant to determine their application. 143 The usage restrictions would likely fall under 
the material information that needs to be disclosed to consumers under consumer law information 
disclosure requirements. 144 
With respect to consumer protection implied obligations, even in the absence of a specific notice of 
the usage restrictions or in presence of a general limitation notice, 145 they may still meet the low 
threshold of merchantability, although this would be a harder case to make than if consumers are 
specifically notified of the limitations at the time of purchase. 146 It would depend on the weight given 
to the prima facie open- ended powers and privileges associated with ownership or possession of 
commercial copies of copyright works for an indefinite duration. 147 The usage restrictions limiting the 
duration, territory, or playing devices still allow consumers to play their copies of copyright works 
within defined boundaries, which may be sufficient for courts to decide that they are of a 
merchantable quality. 148 The broader application of the implied obligation of fitness for a particular 
purpose149 would follow a similar analysis to the one of the implied conditions of merchantability. 
140 This is subject to any restriction on parallel imports, for instance as it applies in Canada with respect to 
books: see CCA, supra note 3, s 27. I. 
141 See the discussion in Chapter 7 Part III A (iii) on how ownership in copies of copyright works can act as a 
property-limitation rule of copyright holders' exploitation of their copyright works. 
142 See the discussion in Chapter 9 Part II A. 
143 Ibid. 
144 See the discussion on consumer law information disclosure requirements in Chapter 9 Part IV. 
145 Such as "limitations of use apply". Overarching limitations including "sold as is" have generally been held to 
be not sufficient to notify the consumer of certain characteristics of the good under which the implied obligation 
would not apply, and even more so in those jurisdictions where the implied obligations of seller cannot be 
overridden by contract: see discussion in Chapter 9 Part II A. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Ibid. 
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With respect to the narrower application of the implied condition of fitness for a particular purpose, 
consumers would be less likely to be successful in establishing a breach of that implied obligation by 
copyright holders or distributors than under the broader application of this implied obligation. 150 
Under the scenario where there is no notification of the usage restrictions affecting uses of copies of 
copyright work by territory, duration, or types of playing devices and that are outside the exclusive 
rights of copyright holders, consumers may also be able to successfully claim that these limitations 
breach the implied obligation of quiet possession. 151 The implied obligation of quiet possession may 
give even greater consideration to the general features of the open-ended privileges and powers that 
come with ownership and possession for an indefinite duration than under the implied obligations of 
quality or fitness for a particular purpose. 152 The focus shifts away from issues of specific features or 
performance of the goods that are characteristic of the implied obligations of quality and fitness for 
purpose. 153 
If copyright holders specifically notify consumers of such limited uses (e.g., on the box cover of the 
CD or DVD or in the online terms and conditions) there would be no implied obligation of 
merchantability and of fitness for a particular purpose applicable to these limitations. 154 For the same 
reason, an argument that these limitations would breach the implied obligations of title and of quiet 
possession would most likely fail. 155 Finally, a general distinction needs to be made between the 
jurisdictions within that group where the implied obligations can be overridden by contract156 and 
150 Unless a specific purpose (for example use on a precise playing device) was expressly or by implication 
brought to the attention of distributors and that the consumers relied on the distributors' skill and judgment, Ibid. 
151 See the discussion in Chapter 9 Part II C. 
152 Ibid. 
153 Ibid. 
154 See the discussion in Chapter 9 Part II A. 
155 At least in the majority of jurisdictions where the application of implied obligations of title and of quiet 
possession is tempered by any circumstances around the contract that show a different intention: Ontario Sale of 
Goods Act, RSO 1990, c. S-1 [OSGA] s. 13; Alberta Sale of Goods Act, RSA 2000, c. S-2 [ASGA], s 14; Nova 
Scotia Consumer Protection Act RSNS 1989 c. 92 [NSCPA], s. 14; Prince Edward Island Sale of Goods Act, RS 
PEI 1988, c. S-1. [PEISGA], s. 14; British Columbia Sale of Goods Act, RSBC 1996 c.410 [BCSGA], s.16. The 
implied warranty of freedom from encumbrance does not apply with respect to such encumbrances that were 
declared or known to the buyer before the contract of sale was entered into: OSGA, s. 13(c); ASGA, s. 14(c); 
NSCPA, s. 14(c); PEISGA, s. 14(c); BCSGA, s. 16 (C). 
156 The mandatory nature of implied obligations is discussed in Chapter 9 Part II. 
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would have been successfully excluded, from the jurisdictions where the implied obligations are 
mandatory. 157 
Consumers may be generally more successful claiming that restrictions of use, such as limited 
durations, territory, and playing devices, breach the statutory implied obligations of copyright holders 
(distributors) in the other Canadian jurisdictions, including some jurisdictions outside Canada that 
apply a test of consumers' reasonable expectations. 158 The test for the application of the statutory 
implied obligations of sellers is assessed by a non-exhaustive list of factors to assess what is 
"acceptable quality" or what are the purposes for which such goods are normally intended. 159 Under 
that framework, more emphasis may be placed on other factors, such as the widespread presence in 
the marketplace and use of playing devices and how they may reasonably shape consumers' 
expectations. This would be particularly the case in instances where such limitations were not 
specifically brought to the attention of consumers or where there was only a general notice of use 
restrictions. 160 
The absence of specific notification of these limitations to consumers would be an important factor to 
consider when assessing what their reasonable expectations should be with respect to these use 
limitations. Conversely, the notification of these limitations would be an important factor to assess 
consumers' reasonable expectations with respect to the copy of the musical recording or film and 
whether it should have been provided with or without limitations as to duration, territory, or types of 
playing devices. In that case, the quality and efficacy of the notification would be weighed against the 
other relevant factors, including whether consumers had actual knowledge of the limitations at the 
time of purchase. In some cases, the specific notification of those limitations could remove the 
application of the implied obligations of quality and fitness for purpose if such notification amounts to 
a "defect" specifically brought to the attention of the consumer. 161 The contractual restrictions 
157 Ibid. 
158 Supra note 81 . 
159 Ibid. 
160 See supra note 84. 
161 SCPA, supra note 34, s 48 (d) provides that the implied warranty of acceptable quality does not apply: (i) 
respecting defects specifically drawn to the consumer's attention before the contract is made; or (ii) where the 
consumer examines the product before the contract is made, respecting defects that examination ought to have 
revealed. These exceptions were applied in: Martel v Siman (2002) 2002 SKPC 74. See also NBCPWLA, supra 
note 81, s 10(2). There is no specific exclusionary language in the QCPA, supra note 81. However, courts have 
tended to assimilate statutory warranties of fitness for purpose and of durability in sections 37 and 38 of the 
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imposed on consumers, as discussed here, may in some cases amount to unfair practices. 162 They may 
also raise other legal issues relating to interoperability that are not discussed here. 163 
As we saw in the EMI Music France164 and Sony France and Sony United Kingdom 165 cases, 
depending on its nature, the unfair practice prohibition may not act as a property-limitation rule on 
copyright holders' exclusive rights but simply require that consumers be notified of the use 
limitations. 166 In other cases, the limitations on copyright holders' contractual rights under the present 
scenario, resulting from the application of consumer protection obligations, could act as a property-
limitation rule. 167 Even though the limitation would limit a contractual term, and not exclusive 
property rights of copyright holders per se, such limitation would operate on their freedom of 
contract, which derives from and is a prerogative of their exclusive property rights conferred by 
copyright. 168 
To sum up, use restrictions that apply to works not protected by copyright, i.e., beyond the scope of 
the exclusive rights of copyright holders, are the most likely to give rise to breaches of consumer 
implied obligations and are the least likely to meet consumers' reasonable expectations test. In some 
cases such use restrictions could amount to unfair practices. A restriction of use limited in time, to a 
territory, or to specific devices, but that does not involve performing an act exclusively reserved to 
copyright holders, can breach the consumer implied obligations of quality and fitness for purpose with 
more likelihood of success in jurisdictions that base their implied obligation of quality and fitness for 
QCPA as warranties against latent defects, which brings a similar legal analysis with respect to whether the 
defect had been disclosed to the buyer: see the discussion further below in Part II A of this chapter. For a narrow 
interpretation of statutory warranty of fitness for purpose (QCPA, supra note 18, art. 37) see: Boivin c. Honda 
Canada inc. (2000) CarswellQue 2741 (CQ) where the court found that this warranty had not been breached by 
a recreational vehicle sold without a side mirror and without rear breaking lights. The recreational vehicle could 
still be used for a purpose for which it was intended (i.e. on properties where there was no road safety 
requirement to have such features). 
162 The consumer protection law prohibitions against unfair practices are discussed in Part III B. of this chapter. 
163 Rott, supra note 103, in particular at 445, discusses the issue of interoperability as it applies to copies of 
copyright works. 
164 CA Versailles, 30 September 2004, S.A. EM! Music France v Association CLCV, online: 
http://www.forumintemet.org/documents/ jurispmdence/lire..phtml?id=809 [EM! Music France, 2004]. 
165 Trib gr instance Nanterre, 6th chamber, 15 Decembre 2006, Association UFC Que Choisir v Societe Sony 
France, Societe Sony United Kingdom Ltd, online: http://www.legalis.net/jurispmclence-clecision.php3? 
id artic1e=J 816 [Sony France and Sony UK]. 
166 Ibid; supra note 164. See generally the discussion in Chapter 3 Part III. 
167 E.g. in cases where specific performance would be granted as a remedy, ordering that the usage restriction 
imposed by copyright holders be removed. 
168 See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part III A. 
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purpose on consumers' reasonable expectation than in the jurisdictions that imply an obligation of 
"merchantable quality." It can also amount to breach of the implied obligation of quiet possession 
and, based on the circumstances, amount to an unfair practice. In all cases, the notification of the 
restriction and its degree of prominence will play an important role in assessing whether there is a 
breach. 169 
VI. Goods v. services 
In Chapter 8, I discussed the uncertainty about the distinction between goods and services and, in 
particular, as the distinction pertains to the nature of commercial copies of copyright works. 170 While 
information disclosure requirements and prohibitions against unfair commercial practices generally 
apply equally to goods and services, in some jurisdictions, in Canada and elsewhere, statutory implied 
obligations of quality, fitness for purpose, title, and quiet possession only apply to goods. 171 I have 
argued that singling out services from the application of implied obligations is less and less justified 
in an environment of standardized automated services, and that consumers should be able to rely on 
similar minimum standards of protection to the ones that relate to goods, with the necessary 
adaptations. 172 
The distinction between goods and services is highly pertinent as consumers experience copyright 
works through increasingly diversified commercial offerings. In addition to traditional offerings of 
(digital) commercial copies embedded in a physical object, whether they are sold, rented, or licensed, 
consumers can download a commercial copy of the musical recording, book, or computer program 
that will allow them to consume it for indefinite duration, or they can subscribe to streaming services 
of films on the Intemet. 173 Consumers can acquire a commercial copy of a musical work or book that 
they then store on the Internet for convenience. Consumers can record and replay TV broadcasts on 
their personal video recorder box or can benefit from similar service offered directly from their TV 
service provider. 
169 This is the case for the application of consumer implied obligations, unfair practices provisions and 
information disclosure requirements which are discussed in Chapter 9 Part II, Part III and Part IV. 
170 See in particular the discussion in Chapter 8 Part II B. 
i11 Ibid. 
172 Ibid. 
173 For example, offerings of suppliers like NetFlix and the like: see the discussion on non-negotiated standard 
terms and conditions of commercial copies of copyright works in Chapter 3 Part III C. 
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Based on my analysis of the application of consumer law conducted so far, 174 implied obligations of 
quality, fitness for purpose, title, and quiet possession are more likely to be breached by copyright 
holders' usage restrictions regarding commercial copies that consumers own (rent or license) than 
with respect to a service that consumers access to enjoy a copyright work. Consumers generally have 
different expectations vis-a-vis a commercial copy that they acquire than in relation to a service that 
they enjoy. The questions of course are the extent to which consumers can always appreciate the 
distinction between the two and what are the terms of the commercial transaction they enter into. 175 
Otherwise, the main issues of contention, e.g., the ability to make multiple copies of the work for 
personal use or backup purposes, to communicate the work to the public, the ability to transfer the 
ownership in the commercial copy (and the application of the first sale or exhaustion doctrine) will 
not arise if consumers enjoy copyright works through services rather than through a commercial copy 
they own (rent or license). Copyright holders' restrictions that impair consumers' ability to produce 
derivative works or to exercise a fair dealing on the work could, in theory, arise with respect to 
services, but are less likely than with respect to commercial copies of copyright works that consumers 
own. Experiencing copyright works through services do not empower consumers with the same 
degree of autonomy of usage as owning a copy does. 176 The prima facie open-ended powers and 
privileges that flow from ownership in a resource and the underlying values that support them do not 
manifest themselves in the same manner, if at all, when consumers experience services. 177 
Restrictive usages of copyright works can give rise to other issues of quality, fitness for purpose, and 
quiet possession (with the necessary adaptations) that are specific to services providing access to 
copyright works. For instance, a TV service provider offering whereby consumers can replay TV 
broadcasts at their leisure could breach the minimum standards imposed by implied obligations if, for 
instance, TPMs restrain the replay of an important proportion of TV broadcasts. Other breaches of 
implied obligations of quality, fitness for purpose, title, and quiet possession (with necessary 
adjustments) may apply to services providing access to copyright works. They are of no concern to 
174 I.e., Chapters 8, 9, 10 and 11. 
175 See the review of a survey conducted on selected non-negotiated standard end-user agreements in Chapter 3 
Part III C where I discuss how certain terms refer to purchases of copies while they then refer to licensing of 
copies and discuss services and purchases without making clear distinctions between the two. 
176 See the discussion on the central role of the presence of copy ownership to distinguish goods and services 
and on the different level of autonomy that it confers to consumers in Chapter 8 Part II B. 
177 Ibid. 
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the present discussion because they are similar to breaches that can arise with other types of services 
that are unrelated to copyright works. 178 
VII. Conclusion 
In this chapter, through four scenarios, I investigated the extent to which consumer law can support 
claims to strengthen copyright consumers' rights against copyright holders' restrictive terms of use. 179 
More specifically, I developed arguments on how restrictive terms of use of commercial copies of 
copyright works potentially breach consumer (implied) obligations. I looked at the function and 
operation of consumer law in comparison with copyright law in support of copyright consumers' 
rights to commercial copies of copyright works. In contrast with copyright law, which often regulates 
the relationship between copyright holders and end-users indiscriminately of the legal relationship 
between the two, 180 consumer law intervenes on the basis of a commercial transaction pertaining to 
copyright works and, in some cases, acts as a property-limitation rule on copyright holders' exclusive 
rights. 
The analysis of the four scenarios of restrictive uses of commercial copies of copyright works that I 
presented in this chapter lead to the following conclusions and arguments. First, it is more difficult to 
challenge restrictions of uses imposed by copyright holders on commercial copies of copyright works 
that are based on their exclusive rights to authorize certain acts under the CCA. 181 Nevertheless, I 
developed an argument whereby consumer law (implied) obligations could be invoked to modulate 
copyright holders' exclusive right to authorize certain acts because of the privileged relationship that 
they enter into with consumers and the reasonable expectations that result therefrom. 182 This is 
consistent with consumer law's function to rectify asymmetries that are detrimental to consumers. 183 
178 For example, standards of availability, consistency and quality in how the signals, streaming or other types of 
services are delivered. As I discussed in Chapter 9 Part II A, these types of scenarios are not the focus of my 
thesis as they do not involve issues that are specific to copyright works. 
179 The four scenarios are discussed in Part II to Part V of this chapter and situate the contemplated uses within 
or outside the exclusive domain of copyright holders and within the reserved uses, based on a contractual 
authorization of use by copyright holders (or absence thereof) or on uses that are specifically authorized by the 
CCA. 
180 See the discussion on the place of users in copyright law in Chapter 2 Part II and on the operation of 
exceptions to copyright infringement or so-called users' rights in Chapter 3 Part II. 
181 See the discussion in Part II and to a certain Part III of this chapter. 
182 See the discussion in Part II B of this chapter. 
183 I discuss the theoretical justifications of consumer protection obligations in Chapter 10. 
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Second, as a corollary to the first conclusion, breaches of consumer law (implied) obligations are 
more likely to be successful when copyright holders' restrictions of use derive from contractual 
obligations or TPMs and are outside the scope of their exclusive right to authorize certain acts on their 
works. 184 Third, I argued that restrictions of uses on acts otherwise permitted by copyright law (as 
exceptions to copyright infringement) are likely to constitute breaches of implied obligations of quiet 
possession (and potentially other implied obligations) and unfair commercial practices to the extent 
that they are not consistent with copyright law. 185 The argument stands on firmer grounds if the 
exceptions to copyright infringement are qualified as users' rights and if they are mandatory than if 
they are defences to copyright infringement and are not mandatory. 186 Fourth, I argued that copyright 
holders' restrictions on acts otherwise permitted by copyright law constitute material information that 
should be disclosed to consumers and that failure to do so constitutes a breach of information 
disclosure requirements and could constitute an unfair commercial practice. 187 Fifth, I underscored the 
need to expand consumer implied obligations to services and the need to distinguish clearly between 
commercial transactions that involve the transfer of commercial copies of copyright works and the 
transactions that involve services or a combination of the two, and how the four scenarios that I 
investigated in this chapter will be impacted by these distinctions. 188 
From these conclusions, a sharper image arises on the complementary role that consumer law can play 
in ascertaining consumers' rights to commercial copies of copyright works and, more importantly, 
how the substantive allocation of rights, powers, and privileges in copyright law influences the 
function of consumer law to a large extent. I argued that the rights that the CCA grants to copyright 
holders and the manner by which it restricts them are determinant on the extent to which consumer 
law can respond to consumer claims against restrictive uses. For instance, courts will be more likely 
to support copyright holders' restrictive terms of use by giving prominence to the exclusive rights 
upon which copyright holders rely. The underlying premise is that exclusive rights conferred by law 
on copyright holders should play an important role in what consumers can reasonably expect. Also, 
consumers are more likely to successfully claim that restrictions of uses otherwise permitted by 
184 This is the case of the scenario discussed in Part V of this chapter. 
185 See the discussion in Part IV of this chapter. 
186 Ibid. 
187 Ibid. 
188 See the discussion in Part VI of this chapter. 
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copyright law breach consumer (implied) obligations if those permitted acts (or exceptions to 
copyright infringement) are rights and ~f they are mandatory. 189 
The application of consumer law to the four scenarios involving commercial copies of copyright 
works that I discussed here reveals that consumer law plays a supporting role for copyright 
consumers' reasonable expectations of quality, fitness for purpose, quiet possession, and fair 
commercial transactions as they derive, inter alia, from copyright law, more than as a corrective 
function to any imbalance or frustration resulting from copyright law itself. While consumer law's 
main justification is to rectify asymmetries that may impair the meeting of consumers' reasonable 
expectations, this rectification is justified when the asymmetry and restrictions of use result from 
copyright holders' commercial practices. The need for rectification is less justified when the 
asymmetry and restrictions of use directly derive from the exclusive rights conferred by copyright 
law. 
To posit restrictions of uses of commercial copies of copyright works as giving rise to potential 
breaches of implied obligations of quality, fitness for purpose, title, and quiet possession or unfair 
commercial practices, opens up the possibility of ascertaining consumers' rights to commercial copies 
of copyright works in a manner that has yet to be more fully explored. Based on the arguments that I 
developed in this chapter, the potential of consumer law is likely to be even greater once structural 
issues on the scope of copyright holders' and users' rights are addressed at the foundational copyright 
level. In this chapter, I built a path for how consumer protection law can help ascertain the scope of 
use of commercial copies of copyright works, while pointing to structural deficiencies along the way. 
In the next chapter, I explore how a more coherent legal framework can strengthen this path even 
further. 
189 I.e., consumers' reasonable expectations of permitted uses will be greater if they are mandatory rights under 
copyright law than if they are non-mandatory defences to copyright infringement. 
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Chapter 12 
The Renovation Project: A Hospitable Home for Copyright Consumers 
I. Introduction 
How can property and consumer law and theory help define and substantiate consumers' rights to 
commercial copies of copyright works? This is the central question that I explored through out my 
thesis. The hypothesis that animated my research work is that the articulation and substantiation of a 
positive right to commercial copies of copyright works is an essential means by which to resolve 
increasing conundrums and regulatory incoherence resulting from competing interests in commercial 
copies of copyright works. In this chapter, I apply the metaphor of the house renovation to underscore 
the property theory foundations of my thesis, as well as to propose a structural framework that stems 
from the research and analysis conducted in my thesis. The house renovation metaphor is also 
conducive to making the copyright house more hospitable to copyright consumers. 
In Part II of this chapter, I present how, through the various findings of my research, an already 
furtive image of consumers' personal property rights to commercial copies of copyright works is 
progressively effacing itself. I highlight the structural root causes that explain why rights to 
commercial copies of copyright works increasingly evade us at the peril of a coherent and credible 
copyright system. The progressive drift away of consumers' personal property rights to commercial 
copies of copyright works justifies the need for a principled approach to ground copyright consumers' 
rights. In Part III, I present the structural framework by which consumers' rights need to be 
substantiated. In Part IV, I propose guiding principles and formulate the legal shape that a personal 
purpose right could take. In Part V, I look at three outcomes that will result from the solidification of 
consumers' rights to commercial copies of copyright works: c 'est a dire, an invigorated application of 
consumer law to commercial transactions involving copyright works, a more robust articulation of the 
copyright holder end-user relationship, and a finer balance within copyright law. 
428 
II. The copyright house evaluation report: structural defects and inhospitable home for 
consumers 
Copyright law is, paradoxically, increasingly inhospitable to copyright consumers. On the one hand, 
Canada may perhaps be perceived as one of the flagships of copyright users' rights given the recent 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and in particular CCH Canadian Ltd. v Law Society of Upper 
Canada [ CCHJ, 1 where the Court unanimously declared that exceptions to copyright infringement are 
users' rights.2 Also, recent amendments to Canada's Copyright Act [CCA]3 brought on four new user 
provisions that substantiate more explicitly than ever before the permitted scope of individuals' uses 
of copies of copyright works.4 On the other hand, an examination of how the CCA constructs 
consumers' rights to commercial copies of copyright work reveals another story, as summarized 
below.5 The sobering property law and theory account of rights to commercial copies of copyright 
works does not make the story more cheerful, but has the merit of underscoring why and how 
consumers' personal property rights to commercial copies of copyright work need to be strengthened. 
For its part, consumer law could offer a legal base to copyright consumers who wish to enforce their 
rights against copyright holders' rights, but cannot play its remedial function fully until certain issues 
affecting the nature of copyright consumers' rights are addressed at the constitutive property level. In 
this part, I will summarize the main structural defects that need to be addressed, as observed in the 
CCA, through property law and theory, as well as in consumer law and theory. 
A. Structural defects in the CCA 
There are two facets of consumers' rights that are relevant to the present discussion. The first one 
addresses the status of exceptions to copyright infringement, or the so-called users' rights that I 
1 2004 sec 13. 
2 Ibid, at para 48, as subsequently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Society of Composers, 
Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Bell Canada, 2012 SCC 36 [Bell Canada], in Alberta 
(Education) v Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access Copyright) 2012 SCC 37 [Alberta] (see the 
discussion in Chapter 3 Part II C) and in Reference re Broadcasting Regulatory Policy CRTC 2010-167 and 
Broadcasting Order CRTC 2010-168, 2012 SCC 68. 
3 RSC 1985, c. C-42. 
4 Canada's Copyright Modernization Act, S.C. 2012, c. 20 [CCA1A] amended the CCA, supra note 3, by 
introducing s 29.21 "Non-commercial user-generated content", s 29.22 "Reproduction for Private 
Purposes", s.29.23 "Fixing Signals and Recording Programs for later Listening or Viewing", s 29.24 
"Backup copies": see the discussion in Chapter 3 Part II D. 
5 See the discussion in Part II A of this chapter. 
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discuss here. 6 The second one concerns the nature and scope of rights in embodiments of copies of 
copyright works, something on which the CCA is silent and which I discuss below in this chapter.7 
After having reviewed how the CCA constructs consumers' rights to use copyright works, including 
how the so-called users' rights interact with copyright holders' freedom of contract and use of 
technological protection measures [TPMs], I concluded in Chapter 3 that copyright law has little 
regard for copyright consumers' rights. Many of the permitted uses of copyright works without 
copyright holders' consent are not of particular relevance to consumers. 8 Recent amendments to the 
CCA, adding education, parody, or satire to the purposes of fair dealing, and introducing the four new 
user provisions, are short-changed to be able to improve matters effectively for consumers.9 While the 
recent amendments to the fair dealing provisions and the Supreme Court jurisprudence on fair dealing 
indicate a greater recognition of the interests that compete with the exclusive rights of copyright 
holders (e.g., the interests of users, the public interest), the fair dealing doctrine is ill adapted to 
address the needs of copyright consumers. 10 It is true that the introduction of the four new user 
provisions shows an unprecedented attempt to address specific needs of copyright consumers. 
However, the four new user provisions are piecemeal and are subject to many caveats. 11 While the 
CCA now specifically provides for an exclusive distribution right and and its exhaustion after the first 
transfer of the copies of the copyright works were authorized by the copyright holders, I discussed 
how copyright holders' commercial practices circumvent that rule and how the prevailing view is that 
exhaustion does not apply to copies of copyright works distributed online with no embedding physical 
object. 12 Finally, the status of freedoms and privileges that have been traditionally considered outside 
the purview of the exclusive rights of copyright holders, i.e., the unlimited power and privilege to 
play, read, view and listen to copies of copyright works is threatened in the digital environment. 13 
6 See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part II and Part IV. 
7 See the discussion in Part IV B (ii) and in Part IV C of this chapter. See also the discussion on the nature 
of commercial copies of copyright works in Chapter 6 Part II. 
8 For instance, I discussed in Chapter 3 Part II A, B and C why the non-substantial part doctrine, the private 
copying regime and fair dealing were not particularly useful user rights for consumers. 
9 CCMA, supra note 4, amended the CCA, supra note 3, s 29, and added ss 29.21-29.24. 
10 See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part II C. 
11 See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part II D. 
12 See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part II F. 
13 See the introductory comments in Chapter 3 Part II. 
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The legal landscape of copyright consumers is a maze: the paths of users' rights include many dead 
ends. What Parliament created and gave to consumers, it also gave explicit permission to copyright 
holders to take back from them, or turned its head away from copyright holders' ability to do so. Of 
the four new user provisions, three can be explicitly overridden by TPMs. 14 This highly compromises 
their status as rights and makes it less likely that the new user rights are mandatory. 15 As to other 
exceptions to copyright infringement, their nature and scope as rights is debatable and so is their 
mandatory nature. 16 
The constraints that the CCA permits, or does not disallow, on users' rights, lead one to question the 
true nature and scope of those rights, and to reflect on the effects of this uncertainty. In addition to 
leaving consumers in an undesirable state of legal uncertainty and exposing them to increased risk of 
litigation, the permitted constraints to users' rights dictate to a large extent how copyright holders and 
intermediaries develop their business models and their offerings to consumers. 17 In light of how the 
CCA constructs copyright consumers' rights, the question becomes whether we can provide a simpler 
floor plan to copyright consumers and, if so, on what legal and normative base? 
B. Consumers' rights in commercial copies of copyright works: the property law and theory 
evaluation 
In the Second Part of my thesis, I looked at how property law and theory explicate the peculiar nature 
of copyright and of commercial copies of copyright works as two distinct forms of personal property 
and how they provide the theoretical justifications and normative framework to substantiate copyright 
consumers' rights thereto. 18 I also argued that property law and theory embed tools to mediate 
between copyright holders and consumer rights as they relate to copyright works. In this Part, I 
summarize the six main insights gained from the application of property law and theory to copyright 
and to copy ownership. 
14 See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part II D. 
15 See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part IV. 
16 Ibid. 
17 See the concluding remarks in Chapter 3 Part IV. 
18 I.e., "The Application of Property Law and Theory to Copyright and Commercial Copies of Copyright 
Works" (Chapter 4 to Chapter 7). 
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The first insight that can be derived from the application of property law and theory to copy 
ownership and copyright is that copyright is a limited-in-scope proprietary interest to begin with and 
that, as for any other proprietary interest, it is not absolute; it can always be subject to limitations, 
which are widespread in modern legal systems. 19 As the scope of ownership rights in commercial 
copies of copyright works is increasingly subject to important limitations through copyright, the scope 
of the ownership interest of copyright holders is progressively expanding, taking a reverse course.20 
The recent expansion of copyright may be attributable in part to an erroneous understanding of the 
nature of property, but not as a result of acknowledging the property nature of copyright. 
The second insight that can be derived from the application of property law and theory to copy 
ownership and copyright comes from selected theoretical justifications of property and copyright, 
which lead to the following observations: (i) that there is a primafacie normative status of all 
ownership freedoms quite independent from instrumental considerations that tend to be stronger in the 
case of personal property than real property.21 Property by nature allows countless acts that are 
exercises of freedom and autonomy; without the ability to exercise freedom and autonomy, those 
innumerable acts would be potentially open to constant suspicion and ultimately subject to state 
scrutiny; 22 and (ii) that the prevailing instrumental justification of copyright, i.e., to incent and reward 
creativity and the dissemination of works also needs to apply to copy owners.23 Failure to promote the 
interests of copy owners through those objectives is an inherent contradiction that can lead the 
evolution of copyright to turn against its stated instrumental justifications.24 
The third insight that can be derived from the application of property law and theory to copy 
ownership and, in particular, its nature and justification, is to take copyright away from isolationist or 
sui generis analyses and to bring copyright within the broader framework of property institutions and 
how they co-exist with other legal regimes, e.g., contracts. While we could previously bear the 
minimalist articulation of personal property rights in commercial copies of copyright works as we 
19 See the discussion on the limitations to property in Chapter 4 Part V. 
20 I discuss the progressive expansion of copyright holders' exclusive rights in Chapter 5 Part II. 
21 See the discussion in Chapter 6 Part III A. 
22 Ibid 
23 See the discussion in Chapter 6 Part III B. 
24 Ibid 
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have traditionally known them up until now,25 recent technological evolutions, the primafacie 
normative status of ownership freedoms, and the commonly invoked instrumental justifications of 
copyright show us that this is no longer viable. The lack of attention to and understanding of the scope 
and normative goals embedded within copy ownership is one of the possible root causes that have 
allowed the progressive expansion of copyright holders' exclusive rights.26 
The fourth insight that can be derived from a property law and theory analysis to copy ownership and 
copyright is that it underscores the existence of two competing property rights in the same object, i.e., 
the copyright work.27 The acknowledgment of two competing property rights reinforces the place of 
copy owners: it levels the field for copyright and copy owners, as it becomes harder to justify a double 
standard to two co-existing property rights. 28 The personal property foundation of copyright 
consumers' rights provides a stronger base to argue for consumer and other user rights to commercial 
copies of copyright works than broad public interest policy arguments that are nevertheless 
complementary to ascertaining stronger consumers' rights to commercial copies of copyright works. 29 
The fifth insight that can be derived from a property law and theory analysis to copy ownership and 
copyright is that the application of the theory of property limitations situates personal property in 
commercial copies of copyright works as a distinct property - limitation rule of copyright holders' 
exclusive rights. The theory of property limitations provides a framework to articulate when and why 
copy ownership should act as a justifiable property limitation to copyright, and vice versa. It 
underscores how and when an unbridled expansion of copyright at the expense of copy owners' 
proprietary interests takes copyright out of its property-specific justice reasons. 30 
The sixth insight that can be derived from a property law and theory analysis to copy ownership and 
copyright is that the numerus clausus principle, under which the list of property interests that exist is 
closed and cannot be tampered with through contract, can be a useful norm of judicial self-
25 i.e. the common view was that copy owners of copyright works could enjoy the work (read, listen, play) 
for an indefinite period and without limitations and could lend and transfer the work at their entire 
discretion, without any duty to account to anyone. 
26 I discuss the progressive expansion of copyright in Chapter 5 Part II. 
27 I discuss the interaction between these two competing ownership rights in Chapter 7. 
28 Ibid. 
29 The policy arguments put forward to support a greater recognition of the place of users in copyright law 
are discussed in Chapter 2 in particular in Part II and Part V, and in Chapter 6 Part III B. 
30 See the discussion in Chapter 7 in particular in Part III. 
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governance31 to secure copyright consumers' rights to copy ownership and counter copyright holders' 
commercial practices that in effect denature the personal property of copyright consumers into an 
unknown form of proprietary interest. 32 
To sum up, the property law and theory analysis that I presented in the Second Part of my thesis 
underscored how the ownership of commercial copies of copyright works is progressively denatured 
and in need of urgent reinforcement. The property law and theory analysis has provided a framework 
to identify and explain some of the defects of the copyright house, the legal and normative base for 
strengthening the scope of ownership rights in commercial copies of copyright works, as well as 
flexible and adaptable tools to mediate between the competing rights and interests of copyright 
holders and consumers. 
C. Rippling effects of structural defects 
In the Third Part of my thesis, I looked at how consumer law and theory can further help substantiate 
copy owners' rights to commercial copies of copyright works. 33 I summarize here the four main 
insights gained from the application of consumer law and theory to copyright consumers. 
The first and main insight that can be derived from the application of consumer law and theory to 
copyright consumers is that consumer protection law cannot play its remedial function if the root 
cause of the consumers' dissatisfaction occurs at the structural property level of consumers' rights in 
commercial copies of copyright works. In other words, consumer law and theory cannot rectify 
structural deficiencies that are determined or allowed by the scope of the personal property of 
copyright holders and of copyright consumers. The reason why I arrive at this conclusion is that the 
relevant areas of consumer protection law for my study support consumers' reasonable expectations 
by, inter alia, filling the gaps occasioned by the contested consumer transaction to confirm the open-
31 Thomas Merrill & Henry Smith, "Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: the Numerus Clausus 
Principle" (2000) 110 Yale L.J. 1 at 11. See also the discussion on the standardization of property in 
Chapter 4 Part III. 
32 I apply the numerus clausus principle to commercial copies of copyright works in Chapter 7 Part IV and I 
discuss the principle in Chapter 4 Part III, Chapter 5 Part IV C and Chapter 6 Part II. 
33 Le: The Application of Consumer Law and Theory to Commercial Copies of Copyright Works (Chapters 
8 to 11). 
434 
ended powers and privileges that they are entitled to as personal property owners.34 One example is 
the suppliers' implied obligation to guarantee the quiet possession of the goods they sell to 
consumers.35 Because courts are more likely to defer to the law of property (in our case, personal 
property law and copyright) to evaluate what consumers' reasonable expectations should be with 
respect to the scope of use of commercial copies of copyright works, the effect of consumer protection 
law in this particular context is better described as a supportive function, rather than a curative one. If 
consumers are dissatisfied with the scope of permitted use of commercial copies of copyright works, 
but this scope is legitimate under current copyright law, it is unlikely that consumer protection law 
can come to the rescue of consumers.36 
The second important insight that can be derived from the application of consumer law and theory 
follows the same logic on the supporting rather than curative function of consumer law on the 
proprietary interests of copyright holders and copyright consumers as they derive from the CCA and 
personal property law. If exceptions to copyright holders' exclusive rights (e.g., fair dealing, the 
private copying regime, or the four new user provisions) are privileges and not rights (or if their status 
as rights is not clear under a copyright law analysis) it is unlikely that consumer law can come to the 
rescue of consumers and provide them with remedies that would allow them to exercise those 
privileges against copyright holders. This is very apparent from the French cases Warner Music31 and 
Mulholland Drive. 38 Conversely, if the exceptions to copyright holders' exclusive rights are rights, 
consumer protection law can play an important complementary role in providing remedies to 
consumers who are deprived of their rights to specific usages of commercial copies of copyright 
works. 
The third insight that can be derived from the application of consumer law and theory to copyright 
consumers' rights is that the remedies available under consumer law can redress the asymmetry that 
34 I.e. implied obligations of fitness for purpose, quality, quiet possession, title, as well as information 
disclosure requirements and prohibitions of unfair practices. See the discussion in Chapter 9 Part II and in 
Chapter 10 Part V. 
35 See the discussion on the scope and application of the implied obligation of quiet possession in Chapter 9 
Part II C and on the theoretical justifications for this implied obligation in Chapter 10. 
36 See the discussion in Chapter 11. 
37Trib. gr. inst. 5e Paris, I 0 January 2006, Christophe R., UFC Que Choisir I Warner Music France, Fnac, 
(2006) JurisData: 2006-292685. See the discussion on the Warner Music case in Chapter 3 Part IV A. 
38 CA, Paris, 4 April 2007, Studio Canal et al. v S. Perquin and Union federale des consommateurs Que 
choisir, Gaz. Pal. 18/07/2007 N° 199, 23; confirmed by the Cour de Cassation: Cass civ 1st, 19 juin 2008 
(2008) Bull civ, I, N° 177. See the discussion on the Mulholland Drive case in Chapter 3 Part IV A. 
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subsists between copyright holder distributors and consumers if the usage restrictions result from 
copyright holders' freedom to commercially exploit their exclusive rights by contract but do not 
involve acts that are exclusively reserved to copyright holders.39 Consumer law can play the same 
remedial role with respect to usage restrictions that are imposed by copyright holders but are outside 
the scope of their exclusive rights.4° Consumer protection law can also play a role in protecting 
copyright consumers when important information regarding copyright holders' exclusive rights is not 
adequately supplied to them.41 
The fourth insight that can be derived from my analysis of the role that consumer protection law can 
play in substantiating consumers' rights to commercial copies of copyright works is that a narrow 
application of the concept of tangibility limits what qualifies as "goods," which in turn can preclude 
the applicability of consumer law implied obligations.42 This is particularly relevant with respect to 
digital commercial copies of copyright works that are increasingly distributed online with no hand-to-
hand exchange of a supporting medium. Their status under statutory consumer protection law is less 
than certain, which brings another layer of complexity as to whether copyright consumers can 
successfully make statutory consumer protection claims against copyright holders. 
The analysis conducted in the Third Part of my thesis reveals that consumer law could play an 
important supporting role in ascertaining copyright consumers' rights to commercial copies of 
copyright works. As a result of the structural deficiencies of copyright and copy ownership that I 
identified by the analysis that I presented in the First Part and in the Second Part of my thesis, the 
supporting function of consumer law remains limited for the time being. To be sure, the increasingly 
anaemic and malleable scope of the ownership interests in commercial copies of copyright works 
identified at the property level are carried over at the consumer protection law level, undermining 
consumer protection law remedial functions to the detriment of copyright consumers. 
While our laws have progressively secured greater protection for copyright holders in order to address 
the new exigencies of the digital environment, they have been slow at fully taking into account the 
39 See the discussion in Chapter 11 Part V. 
40 Ibid. 
41 I refer here to the remedies available to consumers in case of breach by copyright holders of their 
information disclosure requirements in consumer law: see the discussion in Chapter 9 Part IV and in 
Chapter 11. 
42See the discussion in Chapter 8 and in particular Part II. 
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rights and interests of copyright consumers, thereby creating a legal framework that is increasingly 
and unjustifiably inhospitable to them. The shrinking scope of the ownership interests in commercial 
copies of copyright works, the unclear nature of so-called users' rights under the CCA, and as a 
rippling effect, the less efficient role of consumer protection law to support consumers' claims, 
contrast sharply with the theoretical justifications and normative framework that point toward 
embracing more fully the role of lawful copyright consumers as part of the objectives pursued within 
the copyright house. 
The structural problems at the property level of copy ownership and copyright, as well as the negative 
rippling effects they have on the efficacious protection of copyright consumers under consumer law, 
as both have been summarized here, dictate to a large extent the framework and substance of the 
recommendations to which I devote the remainder of this chapter. 
III. The building blocks of a robust and hospitable home for copyright consumers 
The future of copyright relies in part on bringing consumers in the copyright house as coveted 
residents, for copyright to retain its credibility and legitimacy. In this part, I propose five guiding 
principles by which copyright consumers' rights to commercial copies need to be substantiated to 
create a much more hospitable and coherent legal framework. The first proposal is that the cloud of 
uncertainty that subsists between the status and proper treatment of the competing interests between 
copyright holders and copy owners can only be effectively resolved at the inception 
(property/copyright) level. The second proposal is that the ambiguity about whether copyright 
consumers have rights or privileges to commercial copies of copyright works needs to be resolved in 
favour of rights or at a minimum, mandatory exceptions. The third proposal is that the concept of 
tangibility needs to be substantially renovated. The fourth proposal is that we need to take the 
distinction between goods and services seriously. The fifth proposal is that copyright holders' 
freedom of contract needs to be steered toward the broader objectives of copyright and of the property 
institution. 
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A. The foundations: property 
The foundational role of the property institution in allocating entitlements to resources needs to 
manifest itself at two distinct levels. First, I will propose that the substantiation and articulation of 
copyright consumers' rights to commercial copies of copyright works need to occur at the level of the 
inception of copyright, i.e., the CCA or similar constitutive acts. Second, I will argue that the 
foundational structure of property rights conferred on copyright holders by the CCA should also 
include limits on how copyright holders devise their exclusive rights. 
First, regarding the most efficient location to articulate copyright consumers' rights, commentators 
who have looked at the vulnerabilities of copyright consumers and how they are treated in copyright 
and in consumer law propose that legal reform should occur at the consumer and contract law level.43 
Other commentators propose that effective reform should take place at the copyright level, or both at 
the consumer contract and copyright law level, or within a general framework of information policy.44 
Commentators who advocate a consumer contract law approach as the better means to address the 
interests of copyright consumers point to the copyright-holder-centric nature of copyright law 
43 Natali Helberger & P. Bernt Hugenholtz, "No place like home for making a copy, private copying in 
European copyright law and consumer law" (2007) 22 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1061 at 1078-1097, in particular 
at 1096- 1097; Peter Rott, "Download of Copyright-Protected Internet Content and the Role of (Consumer) 
Contract Law" (2008) 31 J. Cons um. Policy 441 at 455, on the treatment of an i-consumer contract law: 
"The right place for such an i-consumer contract law is not copyright law. Consumers' affordable access to 
content and their right to a fair deal lies somewhere in between copyright law and classical consumer 
contract law. In essence, it is not only the protection of the author that is at stake but the balancing of the 
commercial interests of the content providers with the interests of the end users." See also Joris van 
Hoboken & Natali Helberger, "Looking Ahead-Future Issues when Reflecting on the Place of the 
iConsumer in Consumer Law and Copyright Law" (2008) 31 Journal of Consumer Policy, 489-96, where 
the authors introduced papers presented at a symposium on consumers and copyright and digital content 
and argue that the best area of law to address e-consumer concerns is in consumer law. 
44Thomas Dreier, "Balancing Proprietary and Public Domain Interests: Inside or Outside of Proprietary 
Rights?" in Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Diane Leenheer Zimmerman & Harry First eds., Expanding the 
Boundaries of Intellectual Property: Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Society (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001) 295 at 311-314 views copyright law as the better framework to address interests 
competing with the exclusive rights of copyright holders; see also Jens Schovsbo, "Integrating Consumer 
rights into Copyright law: From the European Perspective (2008) 31 J Cons Policy 393, at 403ff; Niva 
Elkin-Koren, "Making Room for Consumers Under the DMCA" (2007) 22 Berkley Technology Law 
Journal, 1119 at 1131-1132 argues that issues around copyright consumers need to be addressed beyond 
consumer protection laws, at the broader information policy level; Lucie Guibault, "Accommodating the 
Needs of iConsumers: Making Sure They Get Their Money's Worth of Digital Entertainment" (2008) 3 I J 
Consum Policy 409 at 4 l 7ff. looks at solutions to address copyright consumers' interest within copyright 
law and consumer contract law. 
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opposing the property rights of copyright holders against narrowly defined privileges or exceptions.45 
Other commentators doubt that consumer law is able to address consumers of information products' 
interests because consumer law doctrine is too narrow and focuses on the economic aspects of 
consumption.46 For Niva Elkin-Koren, consumer law requires a baseline of "consumer expectation[s]" 
that is hard to define and that the determination of such expectations is largely dependant on contracts 
and, in a copyright context, on the liberties of right holders.47 The interests of consumers of 
information products need to be tackled at a broader information policy level.48 
Commentators who advocate that the needs of copyright consumers can be better addressed within 
copyright constitutive statutes rely on a broader perspective of copyright law that should promote 
public interest policy goals and not just be concerned with the protection of copyright holders' 
rights.49 Thomas Dreier argues that addressing copyright users and broader public interests within 
copyright law itself offers a more user-friendly, transparent, and tailor-made approach than under 
other legal frameworks. 5° For instance, setting limitations to how copyright holders exploit their 
exclusive rights through contract only concerns copyright that needs not be addressed in broader 
consumer or contract legislations.51 Other propositions include increasing copyright limitations within 
copyright constitutive acts to better balance the interests between copyright holders and consumers.52 
As I have explained above in this chapter, my research on the application of consumer law to 
commercial copies of copyright law leads me to conclude that deficiencies regarding the interests of 
copyright consumers need first be addressed at the property or constitutive copyright level.53 No 
reform at the consumer law level can meaningfully improve the protection of copyright consumers 
without first addressing the property structural issues and incongruence identified in the First Part and 
45 See for example, Helberger & Hugenholtz, supra note 43 at 1096-1097: " ... even a copyright system that 
does consider certain consumer interests will always fall short of fulfilling the real needs of information 
consumers. In Europe, copyright is chiefly designed as a property right, as are its structure and its discourse. 
Exclusive rights are the rule, while freedoms are framed as "exceptions" that must be narrowly construed, 
especially in the author's rights tradition. Due to copyright law's systemic pro-right-holder bias, as reflected 
in the property model, achieving a proper balance between protecting the interests of copyright holders and 
the interests of users will always be an uphill struggle for consumer groups." 
46 Elkin-Koren, supra note 44 at 1121. 
47 Ibid at 1130-1131. 
48 lb id at 1131-113 2. 
49 See for example, Dreier, supra note 44, in particular at 311-314; Schovsbo, supra note 44 at 403ff. 
50 Dreier, supra note 44 at 311. 
51 Ibid at 314. 
52 Schovsbo, supra note 44 at 403ff; Dreier, supra note 44 at 312-313. 
53 See the discussion in Part II A and C of this chapter. 
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in the Second Part of my thesis.54 Consumer law supports consumers' expectations with respect to, 
inter alia, things they own, including commercial copies of copyright works. The applicable tests, 
including consumers' reasonable expectations, will tend to defer to the property regime that gives rise 
to contentious rights and their limitations.55 As a result, the propositions for legal reform that I present 
here predominantly seek to transform the copyright holder centricity of copyright constitutive acts, 
e.g., the CCA,56 by advancing copyright consumers and other users' interests closer to the forefront. 
The proposed changes are less foreign to the CCA framework than it may first appear. The CCA refers 
to diverse groups of copyright users through the exceptions to copyright infringement that it 
enumerates.57 Also, the CCA acknowledges the inevitable interactions between the property interests 
that it creates and their commercial exploitation.58 In parallel, interpretative tools in the field of 
contract, consumer law, or tools that more generally concern the judiciary, supplement the copyright 
legal reform that I propose here. 59 
Second, the foundational structure of property should manifest itself through the application of the 
numerus clausus principle under which the list of property interests is closed, as a legal interpretation 
tool that should guide the judiciary when interpreting the commercial agreements under which 
copyright holders make their works available.60 While it is a prerogative of copyright holders to 
decide how, when, and to whom they authorize acts that are within their exclusive domain,61 
copyright holders' powers and privileges should not denature the personal property of lawful 
copyright consumers who acquire commercial copies of their works, by creating unknown property 
interests.62 More specifically, copyright holder contractual restrictions on consumers' ability to 
transfer the copies of copyright works that they lawfully acquire should be interpreted in accordance 
with the numerus clausus principle.63 The application of the numerus clausus principle is also 
conducive to maintaining the integrity of exhaustion or the first sale doctrine that serves a balancing 
54 See the discussion in Part II A and B of this chapter where I summarize the main areas of contention that 
need to be addressed for the more coherent articulation of copyright consumers' rights. 
55 See the discussion in Chapter 10 and Chapter 11. 
56 This is the case with respect to the guiding principles that I propose to follow in Part III B, E and to some 
extent C, and in Part IV of this chapter. 
57 CCA, supra note 3, ss 29-33. 
58 CCA, supra note 3, ss 13(3)-13(7). 
59 This is the case with respect to the guiding principles that I propose to follow in Part III C and D of this 
chapter. 
60 See the discussion on the numerus clausus principle in Chapter 4 Part III and in Chapter 7 Part IV. 
61 See the discussion in the introductory comments of Chapter 3 Part III. 
62 See the discussion on the numerus clausus principle in Chapter 4 Part III and in Chapter 7 Part IV. 
63 See the discussion in Chapter 7 Part IV. 
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function of competing interests within copyright law.64 In addition to preserving the efficiencies that 
withstand it, the numerus clausus principle secures more robust powers and privileges of ownership 
by allowing copyright consumers to retain their right to transfer the copies that they lawfully acquired. 
Further consideration should be given to effectively setting boundaries on copyright holders' freedom 
of contract by incorporating statutory language inspired by the numerus clausus principle. 65 To set 
limits through statute on copyright holders' freedom of contract in accordance with the numerus 
clausus principle would contrast with jurisdictions that have gone the other way and explicitly 
endorsed copyright holders commercial practices that limit copyright users' rights to transfer the 
copies that they lawfully acquired.66 
As a foundational rule, the level at which copyright consumer interests first need to be considered and 
addressed is at the copyright constitutive act level. In many ways, the CCA and similar copyright 
statutes in other jurisdictions set the agenda as to how the scope of consumers' and copyright holders' 
rights are interpreted and lead to rippling effects in other areas of the law. And yet, what justifies 
conferring greater rights on copyright consumers and, if those rights are justified, what shape or form 
should they take? These are the question that I explore next. 
64 I discuss the exhaustion or first sale doctrine in Chapter 3 Part II F, in Chapter 7 Part III A (ii) and in 
Chapter 8 Part Ill. 
65 This could be achieved either within copyright law or consumer protection law. I discuss the possible 
legal mechanisms to align copyright holders' freedom of contract with the overall objectives of copyright 
law in Part III E of this Chapter. 
66 See for example the Copyright, Design and Patents Act 1988 (UK), c. 48, s. 56 (2) which endorses by 
implication commercial practices under which copyright holders license copies to copyright works and 
makes the restrictions apply to subsequent owners: 
"If there are no express terms- (a)prohibiting the transfer of the copy by the purchaser, imposing 
obligations which continue after a transfer, prohibiting the assignment of any licence or terminating any 
licence on a transfer, or (b)providing for the terms on which a transferee may do the things which the 
purchaser was permitted to do, anything which the purchaser was allowed to do may also be done without 
infringement of copyright by a transferee; but any copy, adaptation or copy of an adaptation made by the 
purchaser which is not also transferred shall be treated as an infringing copy for all purposes after the 
transfer." 
441 
B. The bricks and mortar: consumers' rights or mandatory exceptions to copyright 
infringement 
There are two facets of consumers' rights that deserve clarification and fortification in the CCA. The 
first one addresses the status of exceptions to copyright infringement or the so-called users' rights, 
which is the aspect of consumers' right that I focus on here.67 The second one concerns the scope of 
the personal property rights of lawful acquirers of commercial copies of copyright works68 to which I 
refer to here and develop further below in this chapter. 69 While these two aspects of copyright 
consumers' rights are distinct, they are also interrelated. Exceptions to copyright infringement are, in 
most cases, not concerned with the status of the user as the personal property owner and, in that sense, 
are independent of personal property rights in commercial copies of copyright works. 70 At the same 
time, exceptions to copyright infringement delineate to some extent the scope of copyright holders' 
exclusive rights that in tum determine the scope of copyright holders' non-ownership proprietary 
interest in commercial copies embedding their copyright works. 71 From that perspective, exceptions to 
copyright infringement and the scope of the personal property rights in commercial copies of 
copyright works are interrelated. 
In Chapter 3, I concluded that while the nature of exceptions to copyright holders' exclusive rights has 
been characterized as "rights" by CCH, their nature and scope remain uncertain, even more so with 
the recent amendments to the CCA that brought on the legal protection of TPMs. 72 I argued that the 
legal protection of TPMs effectively institutes a hierarchy of users' rights. The mandatory nature of 
the so-called rights is also unclear and is subject to various interpretations.73 
The uncertainty as to whether exceptions to copyright infringement are rights or privileges may 
originate from diverging conceptions about the scope of copyright holders' obligations as they make 
67 See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part II and Part IV. 
68 See the discussion on the nature of commercial copies of copyright works in Chapter 6 Part II. 
69 See the discussion in Part IV B (ii) and in Part IV C of this chapter. 
70 In some cases, the exceptions to copyright infringement apply only to the extent that the user owns the 
copy of the copyright work: see the discussion in Chapter 6 Part II A. 
71 See the discussion on the nature of copyright holders' non-ownership interest in commercial copies of 
copyright works in Chapter 5 Part IV B. 
72 CCH, supra note 1 at para 48. CCMA, supra note 4, which amended the CCA, supra note 3. See the 
discussion in Chapter 3 Part IV. 
73 See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part IV. 
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their works available to the public. There is, at times, confusion between copyright holders' 
obligations to make their works (commercially) available to the public (obligations that they do not 
have) and what copyright holders' obligations should be once they make their works (commercially) 
available to the public. 74 The same confusion lingers in debates on the legitimacy of technological 
protection measures in copyright law.75 From the starting point that copyright holders have no 
obligation to make their works available to the public, the inference is sometimes made that copyright 
holders have no obligation on the manner in which they make their works available to the public. The 
same lenience that endorses copyright holders' flexibility in how they make their works available to 
the public is, by extension, reflected in the progressive expansion of copyright holders' exclusive 
rights at the expense of the personal property rights in commercial copies of copyright works.76 The 
confusion around copyright holders' obligations results more from the degree of flexibility that they 
enjoy as to how they make their works available than not having any obligation at all with respect to 
how they make their works available.77 
Copyright holders do not make their works commercially available in a vacuum. They resort to 
contracts of sale (or lease) that confer property (and other) rights to others. Those property rights can 
enter into conflict with copyright holders' own rights and need to be mediated by understanding how 
they limit one and other. The competing property rights and the contracts of sale are subject to a web 
of other laws, including consumer protection laws. Copyright cannot operate without these legal 
institutions, many of which preceded it. 
The theoretical justifications of copyright consumers' copy ownership revealed how a lack of 
substantiation of those rights and their progressive hollowing out is not only damaging to consumers, 
but also undermines the justifications of copyright at its core, making copyright increasingly 
counterproductive and dissonant. 78 The application of consumer law to commercial copies of 
copyright works revealed how this lack of substantiation and hollowing out of personal property 
74 For example, see the discussion on whether copyright readers have rights or privileges (or liberties) in 
Jessica Litman, "Readers' Copyright" (2011) 58 J. Copyright Society of the USA 325 [Litman, "Readers' 
Copyright"] at 346. 
75 I discuss the scope and debate that surrounds TPMs in Chapter 3 Part III B. 
76 See the discussion on the progressive expansion of copyright in Chapter 5 Part II. 
77 I.e. that producers and suppliers are free to supply goods or not. Once they do, they are subject to laws, 
regulations, contracts and exposed to liability claims. Copies of copyright works that are commercialized 
follow a similar path. 
78 See the discussion in Chapter 6 Part III. 
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rights in commercial copies and the unclear status of copyright limitations had detrimental rippling 
effects on the effectiveness of consumer protection law's remedial role. 
With respect to how the CCA should address the ownership of commercial copies of copyright works, 
there is no choice between whether copy ownership confers rights or whether it confers privileges. 
The choice lies in what the proper scope of the ownership rights should be.79 
With respect to how the CCA should address the nature of exceptions to copyright infringement, more 
particularly the gap between their qualification by the Supreme Court in CCH as rights80 and the 
ambiguous status of exceptions to copyright infringement as they are laid out in the CCA, we need to 
take a hard look at the obstacles that undermine the righteous nature of exceptions to copyright 
infringement. 81 As courts and legislators seek to strike a proper balance between competing interests 
directly affected by the scope of copyright, the more consequential and effective manner for 
exceptions to copyright infringement to balance copyright exclusive rights would be to give way to 
their status as rights, in line with the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court,82 or at a minimum to confer 
them the status of mandatory exceptions to copyright infringement. 83 To take another path would 
leave the important task of balancing the competing interests of copyright holders and users and 
broader public interests in the hands of copyright holders. 
79 See the discussion in Chapter 6 Part II and Part III. See also the discussion in Chapter 7. I discuss how to 
secure greater protection of the personal property rights to commercial copies of copyright works in Part IV 
B (ii) and in Part IV C of this chapter. 
8° CCH, supra note I at para 48, as subsequently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Bell 
Canada, supra note 2 and in Alberta, supra note 2. 
81 See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part IV. 
82 Ibid. As David Vaver, "Copyright and the Internet: From Owner Rights and User Duties to User Rights 
and Owner Duties?" (2007) Case Western L. Rev. 731 [Vaver 2007] at 747 observes, the language of 
exceptions and limitations that is employed in international treaties (in the specific instance the WIPO 
Internet treaties) and also in the CCA and other domestic laws is pernicious: "It treats what owners can do 
as rights (with all that word connotes), and what everyone else can do as indulgences, aberrations from 
some preordained norm, activities to be narrowly construed and not extended. The metaphor language of 
balance cannot sensibly work from such a starting point: how can rights be balanced against exceptions? 
The scales already start weighted on one side." See also, Schovsbo, supra note 44 at 405- 406 who favours 
the implementation of formal users' rights within copyright law not mere exceptions. 
83 As I discussed in Chapter 3 Part IV, mandatory exceptions to copyright infringement to not confer the 
basis of legal claims to users but contract terms that limit their exercise (as a privilege) are of no force and 
effect. 
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Copyright, as any other form of property, entails responsibilities.84 Once copyright holders make their 
work (commercially) available to the public, they should be obliged to do so in a manner that is 
consistent with the objectives of copyright and with the broader institution of (personal) property. The 
counterbalances that exist within copyright law to address various competing interests need ideally to 
translate into rights that users can invoke to counterweight the exclusive rights of copyright holders. 
Defined users' rights should not be subject to being set aside unilaterally by copyright holders. 
There is nothing exceptional or revolutionary in affirming that copyright users, just as copyright 
holders, have rights that they should be able to enforce from time to time. Elevating exceptions to 
copyright infringement in the CCA to rights in the spirit of the Supreme Court jurisprudence requires 
weighing up various considerations. Based on Wesley Hohfeld's theory of rights and correlations,85 
there are important ramifications to the characterization of copyright consumers' relationship with 
copyright holders as one conferring rights rather than privileges. 
The first implication of exceptions to copyright infringement being user rights rather than privileges is 
that if consumers are in a position that they cannot exercise an exception to copyright infringement 
(e.g., a fair dealing of a work or cannot exercise their private copying right under the CCA), they can 
assert a legal claim against copyright holders who have a duty toward copyright users. Should all 
copyright users be entitled to that right (e.g., inadvertent internet browsers) or only lawful acquirers of 
commercial copies of copyright works?86 Should copyright holders bear the cost of the exercise of 
users' rights? The effective actualization of users' tights in the CCA requires giving due consideration 
to the legal relationship that users have vis-a-vis the copyright work that they access. At a minimum, 
these rights should be available to lawful copy owners on the basis of their prima facie open-ended 
powers and privileges in the commercial copies. 
84 See the discussion on the nature of property and ownership in Chapter 4, in particular in Part II and Part 
V. With respect to copyright holders' obligations specifically, see Vaver 2007, supra note 82 at 749-750. 
85 I.e. that someone's right implies that someone has a duty towards it. A privilege is the ability to do 
something with no correlation from anyone obligated towards it (no right). For example, a defence to 
copyright infringement would qualify as a privilege, not as a right. See Wesley N. Hohfeld, "Fundamental 
Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning", (1917) 26 Yale L.J. 710; Wesley N. Hohfeld, "Some 
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning" (1913) 23 Yale L.J. 16. 
86 As I discussed in Chapter 6 Part II A, the exceptions to copyright infringement in the CCA, supra note 3, 
do not always discriminate between lawful owners of copies of copyright works and other users. 
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The second implication of treating exceptions to copyright infringement as users' rights is that the 
exceptions could only be set aside under a contract by waiver unless the right concerns a matter where 
the doctrine of ordre public would apply. 87 The justification and effects of users' rights in balancing 
competing interests within copyright law would dictate that they could not be waived in non-
negotiated contracts.88 Some commentators argue that users' rights should be subject to express 
waivers, even in consumer transactions, to avoid consumers paying for rights that they do not need.89 
The express waiver or similar approaches concede to a predominant a priori strong copyright holders' 
exclusive domain to control any act of copying (hence the private copying treatment as an exception) 
as opposed to more substantial personal property rights in copies allowing a broad range of acts to be 
performed in the private sphere.90 Borrowing from a consumer protection law approach, users' rights 
should be mandatory in consumer transactions.91 At least three reasons should guide the obligatory 
nature of copyright users' rights in consumer transactions: (:i) the various asymmetries that subsist 
between consumers and copyright holders,92 (ii) the function of users' rights within the broader 
objectives of copyright, and (iii) the notion that certain rights are not for sale.93 
87 Art 1411 CCQ. 
88 Guibault, supra note 44 at 421 argues in favour of limitations to copyright being made mandatory, but 
only with respect to non-negotiated agreements. Ian Hargreaves, "Digital Opportunity, a review of 
intellectual property and growth" 2011, at 51 (para 5 .40) in a report that was commissioned by the UK 
Prime Minister, goes even further by recommending that exceptions to copyright cannot be overridden by 
contract, without making a distinction between negotiated and non- negotiated contracts. The report 
supports this position, inter alia through an efficiency argument of providing more legal certainty to users. 
Ibid. See also Marcella Favale, "Fine-tuning European copyright law to strike a balance between the rights 
of owners and users" (2008) 33 E.L. Rev. 687 at 708 where the author recommends that copyright 
limitations that are of high public policy interest should be made mandatory by European Union secondary 
law to favour a greater harmonization amongst member states towards an more balanced approach towards 
the exclusive rights conferred to copyright holders by copyright law. 
89 Schovsbo, supra note 44 at 406 refers for example to the right to private copying stating that it could be 
made subject to express waivers to ensure that copyright users would only pay for uses that they actually 
need. 
90 See the discussion in Part IV C of this chapter on the proposal for a broad right to use copyright works for 
personal purposes. 
91 See for example: EC, Council and Parliament Directive 2009124/EC of 23 April 2009 on the legal 
protection of computer programs, [2009] OJ L 111/16 [Directive 2009124/EC] art 5 (2) (3) as an example of 
exceptions to copyright infringement that cannot be limited by contract. See also Guibault, supra note 44 at 
42 I who argues in favour of limitations to copyright being made mandatory, but only with respect to non-
negotiated agreements. See also Hargreaves, supra note 88 at 5 I (para 5.40). 
92 Including asymmetries in bargaining power, information, resources to take legal action etc ... see the 
discussion on consumer protection theory in chapter 10. 
93 See the discussion chapter 10 where I discuss the theoretical justifications that withstand the non-
enforceability of mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer agreements. 
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The third implication of treating exceptions to copyright infringement as users' rights is that copyright 
holders who make their works available with TPMs would have the onus to grant access to users' 
rights.94 Because of the uncertainty in the CCA on the interaction between TPMs and exceptions to 
copyright infringement,95 copyright holders' obligations to facilitating the exercise of exceptions to 
copyright infringement need to be made explicit in the CCA. 
To sum up, the CCA should be free of obstacles that prevent exceptions to copyright to be considered 
as rights, in accordance with the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court on users' rights.96 At a 
minimum, exceptions to copyright infringement should constitute user privileges that are mandatory. 
The CCA should also explicitly address the nature and effect of lawful ownership of commercial 
copies of copyright work on the scope of the exclusive rights of copyright holders, which I will 
discuss below in this chapter.97 
C. New floor plan: rethinking the division between tangibility and intangibility 
In Chapter 8, I discussed how the presence of a physical medium exchanged from hand-to-hand that 
embeds commercial copies of copyright works is a determinant factor to qualify the whole as goods 
under sale of goods and consumer law and for the exhaustion of the distribution right to apply in 
copyright law.98 The requirement of a physical object places the increasingly widespread online 
94 On the obligation to accommodate the exercise of exceptions to copyright infringement with respect to 
works protected by TPMs see EC, Directive 2001129/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 22 May 2001 on the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information 
society, [2001] OJ, Ll67/10 [Directive 2001129/ECJ, art 6(4):"Notwithstanding the legal protection 
provided for in paragraph 1, in the absence of voluntary measures taken by rightholders, including 
agreements between rightholders and other parties concerned, Member States shall take appropriate 
measures to ensure that rightholders make available to the beneficiary of an exception or limitation 
provided for in national law in accordance with Article 5(2)(a), (2)(c), (2)(d), (2)(e), (3)(a), (3)(b) or (3)(e) 
the means of benefiting from that exception or limitation, to the extent necessary to benefit from that 
exception or limitation and where that beneficiary has legal access to the protected work or subject-matter 
concerned.[ ... ]". See also in France, art L.331-7 CPI, under which the onus is placed on copyright holders 
employing technological measures to ensure that certain limitations to copyright holders' exclusive rights, 
including the right to make private copies are preserved. See also Rott, supra note 43 at 455; Jerome H. 
Reichamn, Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Pamela Samuelson, "A reverse notice and takedown regime to enable 
public interest uses of technically protected copyrighted works" (2007) 2 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 
981. 
95 See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part III B. 
96 In particular, CCH, supra note 1. 
97 See the discussion in Part IV B (ii) and Part IV C of this chapter. 
98 See the discussion in Chapter 8 Part II and Part III A. 
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distribution of copies of copyright works in an area of legal uncertainty and raises inconsistencies 
with respect to their nature and the application of copyright exhaustion. I argued that the requirement 
of a physical object is misguided and artificial, both to determine whether commercial copies of 
copyright works are goods in sale of goods/consumer law and for the application of copyright 
exhaustion. 99 Both in the case of sale of goods/consumer law and of the application of copyright 
exhaustion, the artificial requirement of a physical supporting medium exchanged from hand-to-hand 
potentially leads to the narrowing of copyright users' rights. Joo 
In light of the common reliance on foundational concepts of property in sale of goods/consumer law 
and with respect to copyright exhaustion, a more reasoned approach to digital copies of copyright 
works requires going back to basic principles of property. Joi There is a pressing need to rethink the 
requirement of tangibility, both as a determining factor of the goods-like nature of digital copies of 
copyright works and for the application of copyright exhaustion. This should be done in two ways: (i) 
by a broader application of the concept of tangibility, i.e., one that acknowledges that copies 
distributed online are no less physical than the ones distributed with a supporting medium exchanged 
hand-to-hand, and (ii) by recognizing that movability, transferability, and identification at the time of 
the sale should be the determining criteria of goods, not a narrow application of tangibility. At the 
heart of these criteria lies the concept of ownership that does not need the support of a physical 
medium to exist, but does require movability, transferability, and identification. By recognizing the 
ability to own commercial copies of copyright works as the determining factor, the artificial 
distinction between digital copies supported by physical medium exchanged from hand-to-hand and 
digital copies distributed online disappears when the required elements of ownership are present. 
99 See the discussion in Chapter 8 Part IV. 
100 Ibid. See generally Robert Bradgate,"Consumer rights in digital products," 2010, available online at 
http://www.googlc.ca/search?sourceid=navclicnt&ie=UTF-
8&rlz= I T4ADBF enCA275CA275&g=Bradgate%2c+Consumer+rights+in+digital+products+20 l 0 at 30 
on the need for digital products needing the same level of protection as goods under sale of goods laws. See 
also Marco B.M. Loos, Natali Heiberger, Lucie Guibault, Chantal Mak, Lodewijk Pessers, Katalin J. 
Cseres, Bart van der Sloot & Ronan Tigner, "Analysis of the applicable legal frameworks and suggestions 
for the contours of a model system of consumer protection in relation to digital content contracts" (2011) 
University of Amsterdam, Centre for the Study of European Contract Law (CSECL), Institute for 
Information Law (IViR),Amsterdam Centre for Law and Economics (ACLE), online: 
http://cc.europa.eu/justicc/newsroom/consumer-markcting/events/digital conf en.htm, at 172-174. 
101 For a discussion on how sale of goods and consumer law, e.g. implied obligations, rely on property law, 
see Chapter 10, and on how copyright exhaustion or the first sale doctrine can be explained through chore 
principles of property law and theory in Chapter 7 Part Ill A (ii). 
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D. Knowledge of the trade: goods v. services and sales v. licences 
The determination of what constitutes goods under sale of goods and consumer law and the 
application of copyright exhaustion or the first sale doctrine are closely related to the distinction 
between goods and services and between what constitute a sale and a licence. 102 Whether consumers 
access copyright works through the ownership of goods or as a service also determines which 
copyright holders' exclusive rights are involved in the transaction. A renovation project geared toward 
solidifying copyright consumers' rights needs to bring clarity to the dichotomy between goods and 
services and between sales and licences. 103 
As was the case with the characterization of commercial copies of copyright works as goods, the 
capacity to own needs to be the determinant factor distinguishing between goods and services. In 
addition to the criteria that should be determinant to qualify a product as a good, i.e., movability, 
transferability, and identification at the time of the transfer, the faculty of ownership of goods and not 
of services needs to be emphasized. 104 The quality of movability and separateness that comes with 
ownership of personal property entails the open-ended autonomous and independent faculty to use 
and consume goods, with no reliance on any external forces or operations, which is not present in the 
case of services. 105 
While the concept of ownership will help in providing a more coherent approach to the distinction 
between goods and services for a more coherent application of sale of goods, consumer law, and 
copyright law, 106 the adequate regulation of information products also requires a rethinking of the 
different levels of protection (e.g., implied obligations of quality, fitness, and quiet possession) that 
still prevail between goods and services. 107 For instance, the automated and highly standardized level 
of services related to information products mandate similar levels of protection to those of goods 
(strict liability v. fault-based liability). 
102 See the discussion in Chapter 8 Part II Band C and in Part IV. 
103 See the discussion in Chapter 8 Part II B and C and in Part III and Part IV. 
104 See the discussion in Chapter 8 Part II B. 
105 Ibid. 
106 In the case of copyright law, the distinction between goods and services is central to the determination of 
the exclusive rights of copyright holders involved and on the collective administration (including 
remuneration to copyright holders) thereof: see the discussion in Chapter 8 Part III and Part IV. 
107 I discuss the various levels of protection between goods and services in sale of goods and consumer law 
in Chapter 8 Part II B. 
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The coherent application of sale of goods, consumer law, and copyright law also depends on resolving 
the lingering confusion between licence agreements and sale agreements. Courts rely on the 
distinction between the two legal transactions to conclude that a product is not a good or that 
copyright exhaustion does not apply. 108 First, it goes without saying that the presence of a sale is not a 
condition sine qua non for the existence of goods, which can be leased, hired, rented, etc. Second, 
there is a distinction between the licence to the intellectual property rights of the right holder in the 
work, rights which are either explicitly or impliedly part of commercial transactions involving copies 
of copyright works, and the licence or sale of the copy of the copyright work. 109 In the latter case, 
through the application of the numerus clausus principle, any commercial transaction that resembles a 
sale in all material respects should be treated as such, regardless of its definition by copyright 
holders. 110 This is the approach that the European Court of Justice adopted in UsedSoft GmbH v 
Oracle International Corp, 111 as well as the one adopted by some courts in the US. 112 An 
interpretative approach that focuses on the essential characteristics of sale and ownership rather than 
on copyright holders' contractual designs will preserve the integrity of copy ownership, bring 
copyright law closer to its core objectives, and ensure a better balance between the exclusive rights of 
copyright holders and the property rights of copy owners. 
E. Structural stabilizer: steering freedom of contract toward the objectives of copyright and 
property 
The full actualization of the previous bricks and mortar principles to create an hospitable home for 
copyright consumers cannot be complete without the alignment of freedom of contract with property 
and copyright's main objectives. 113 Freedom of contract is a strong value enshrined as a legal 
principle in modem legal systems. It is precisely because of our strong reliance on freedom of contract 
and the innumerable ramifications that derive therefrom that a more hospitable home for copyright 
consumers needs to include some counterweight mechanisms to ensure that the implementation of 
108 See the discussion in Chapter 8 Part II C and in Part III. 
109 See the discussion in Chapter 8 Part II C. 
110 See the discussion on the numerus clausus principle in Chapter 7 Part V. 
111 C-128/11, [2012] OJ C 287 at 10. 
112 See the discussion in Chapter 8 Part II C and Part III. 
113 I.e., the foundational role of property and the hierarchy of norms that it embeds, equipping consumers 
with users' rights or at a minimum, mandatory privileges, redefining the division between tangible and 
intangible, goods v. services and sales v. licences: see the discussion in Part III A, B, C & D of this chapter. 
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general objectives of our laws are not left at the mercy of the more powerful private interests. 114 While 
there are several legal mechanisms that temper the effects of freedom of contract in consumer 
protection law, 115 copyright holders' powers and privileges as to how copyright holders exploit their 
works are unconstrained under copyright law, with some limited exceptions. 116 In addition to the 
structural renovations recommended here at the property level that will enable consumer law to more 
effectively limit copyright holders' freedom of contract, 117 statutory interpretative provisions of 
copyright contracts, in particular end-user agreements, could be brought within the framework of 
copyright. 118 Statutory interpretive provisions of copyright contracts would promote greater 
consistency between the general objectives and allocation of exclusive rights in the CCA and the 
commercial exploitation of those rights by copyright holders. 
114 See Schovsbo, supra note 44 at 403, who notes that "To "reclaim copyright" in midst of "privatisation" 
does not mean that it is to be hostile to contracts" but that there is a need to set up clearer boundaries on 
how freedom of contract can be exercised. Eduardo M. Penalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010) at 172-182 recommend "against delegation" as a general 
guiding principle for the regulation of copyright on the basis that copyright holders tend to exaggerate the 
scope of their rights in standard form agreements. See also Guibault, supra note 44 at 415 who discusses 
how standard form contracts limit legitimate copyright uses and how European directives do not help much 
in that regard. 
115 See the discussion on various legal mechanism of statutory consumer law that limit freedom of contract 
to protect consumers in Chapter 9 (e.g. the prohibition of unfair commercial practices, the mandatory nature 
of implied obligations, including of quality, fitness for purpose and quiet possession) as well as their 
specific application to the commercialisation of copies of copyright works in Chapter 11. 
116 For example, see Guibault, supra note 44 at 417ff, citing the example of article 95d) of the German 
Copyright Act, which as a result of the implementation of Directive 2001129/EC, supra note 94, now 
requires that all goods protected by technological measures be marked with clearly visible information 
about the properties of the technological measures. Guibault also cites examples in Belgian and Portuguese 
copyright law whereby certain limitations to copyright are mandatory. In France, contracts for the 
exploitation or assignment of copyright in copyright works by the author are subject to rules that touch 
upon the form and substance of the contracts. For example, see CPI art L.131-2 , L. 131-.3. See generally 
the discussion on various doctrines setting outer limits to the applicability of contract terms in Chapter 3 
Part III A. 
117 I.e., when they would go against consumers' reasonable expectations as clarified under copyright law: 
see the discussion in Part III A of this chapter. 
118For example, an interpretative provision that any clause in non-negotiated agreements that departs from 
the main objectives of copyright to preserve a balance between the interested parties shall be deemed unfair 
or any clause that causes a significant imbalance in the parties rights and obligations shall be null and void. 
See Guibault, supra note 44 at 418, who suggests that similar rules could be adopted at the contract law 
level "to declare any clause in a non-negotiated licence null and void which, contrary to the requirement of 
good faith, causes a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract to 
the detriment of the other party. Alternatively, the rule could simply dictate that any contractual clause in a 
standard-form contract is deemed unfair if it departs from the provisions of the national copyright act." This 
could also include interpretative provisions recognizing property rights and supporting the application of 
the numerus clausus principle: see the discussion in Part III A of this chapter. 
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The foundational role of property and the hierarchy of norms that it embeds, equipping consumers 
with users' rights or, at a minimum, mandatory privileges, redefining the division between tangible 
and intangible, goods v. services, and sales v. licences, and steering freedom of contracts toward the 
objectives of copyright and, more generally, the property institution are the building blocks to define 
and safeguard copyright consumers' rights to commercial copies of copyright works. In the remainder 
of this chapter, I will utilize the building blocks to give shape to copyright consumers' rights to 
commercial copies of copyright works. 
IV. The architectural features: the shape of consumers' rights to commercial copies of copyright 
works 
A. Preliminaries 
In Chapter 3, I discussed the piecemeal restrictive approach in the CCA to permitted acts without 
copyright holders' authorization, or so-called users' rights, and discussed generally the acts that 
copyright consumers could perform without copyright holders' authorization. 119 I also looked at the 
interaction between the exceptions to copyright infringement in the CCA and copyright holders' 
commercial practices, including recourse to TPMs. Through a legal and normative approach to the 
nature of copyright and to ownership in commercial copies of copyright works, I questioned in 
Chapter 5 and in Chapter 6 the adequacy of the current scope of copyright consumers' rights to 
commercial copies of copyright works, which in turn raises issues about the coherence and legitimacy 
of copyright. 120 I discussed in Chapter 7 how the primafacie open-ended powers and privileges of 
copy ownership need greater recognition as a property-limitation rule of copyright. 121 
The nature and number of often unintentional copyright infringements by consumers, and general 
trends of consumer usage, contain rich sources of information in searching for the legitimate scope of 
copyright and of rights to commercial copies of copyright works. In Property Outlaws, 122 Eduardo 
119 See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part II. 
120 See the discussion in Chapter 5 and in Chapter 6 Part II and Part III. 
121 See the discussion in Chapter 7 Part III. 
122 Penalver & Katyal, supra note 114. 
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Penalver and Sonia Katyal look at how property disobedience made property evolve in history. 123 
They refer, in particular, to the effect of disregard for the interests of "non-owners" within 
copyright: 124 
Discussions of disobedience ... fail to grasp the complex relationship between disobedience, 
enforcement, and the overall dynamism and long-term health of the intellectual property system. 
This tendency is even more damaging in the intellectual property context than it is in the domain 
of traditional property law because, in contrast to disobedience in the context of tangible property, 
where boundaries and doctrines are more settled, intellectual property challenges tend to center on 
the most unsettled areas of technological innovation ... Precisely because the law is so unsettled, 
the occurrence of unauthorized behaviour signals important information to the courts and 
legislatures about the purpose, intent and effect of such activities and whether the law should shift 
to accommodate these interests by instituting forms of compulsory licensing or other means, as it 
has done in the past. 125 
Penalver and Katyal present a framework for how to assess the significance and effects of various 
forms of transgressions on property and intellectual property and how in some cases "these 
transgressions may demonstrate the need for responsible legal shift to update an ossified regime of 
entitlements or to address the presence of high transaction costs that precluded efficient transfers." 126 
Paying attention to the messages beneath transgressions, beyond responding with stricter laws, is 
consistent with a flexible approach that keeps the legitimacy of property institutions in check and 
counters their inherent stickiness factor. 127 
The recommendations that I present here favour a statutory implementation, rather than a personal 
property common law approach, that is consistent with a consumer-oriented spirit in relation to 
123 Ibid. 
124 Ibid at 50. 
125 Ibid at 50-51. 
126 Ibid, at I 74. The authors refer to cases of "acquisitive altlaws" which they define as actions that are 
oriented primarily toward direct appropriation and that are in the grey zone of lawfulness. 
127 Penalver & Katyal, supra note I 14 at 45: "[ ... ]intellectual property rights, no less than rights in tangible 
property, are sticky. Once created, endowment effects, transaction costs, and political inertia combine to 
keep them in place. In many cases, some free riding may be essential to combat this inertia and force 
decision makers to consider altering the status quo. Within this dialectic between legal inertia and 
transgression, the free rider plays an integral role by exposing existing entitlements to a degree of instability 
and forcing either the parties, the judiciary, or the legislature to at least consider a reallocation of 
entitlements." See also David Vaver, Intellectual Property Law Copyright, Patents, Trade-Marks, 2d ed. 
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2011) [Vaver 201 I] at 259, commenting on the lack of empirical evidence justifying 
the imposition of a levy for private copying under CCA, supra note 3, ss. 80ff, and yet on the fact that once 
the right is created, it is difficult to dislocate it, as is common with copyrigh.t: "Cyclical declines in record 
sales continue despite the levy, but the charge obeys a familiar principle of copyright: an owner's right, 
once enacted, is never repealed, whether the economic justification for its introduction proves true or false." 
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copyright consumers' rights. 128 My inclination toward legislative reform as the more effective means 
to effect desirable change is also consistent with the need to repair important structural defects 
resulting from a copyright-holder-centric system and its rippling effects on other areas of the law. 129 
An instrumentalist view of law as a tool that can effect change is particularly suited to the context in 
which we need to address copyright users' rights. 130 Once in place, complementary means of 
regulation and self-regulation, including voluntary industry codes, 131 and other independent 
initiatives132 can also contribute to reducing the disjunctions and incoherencies between the competing 
rights and competing legal regimes identified in my thesis. 133 
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide a detailed account of recent proposals for copyright 
reform that have been made to address the new balances of powers and dynamics in the digital 
environment. While my remarks focus primarily on how to better implement consumers' rights to 
commercial copies of copyright works, it is worth mentioning here some of the more fundamental 
structural reforms that would be compatible with and even enhance the hospitability of copyright law 
for copyright consumers. Among them, Jessica Litman' s proposal to redesign copyright as an 
128 See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part II, in particular A and C, where I discuss how the current provisions 
of the CCA do little to address copyright consumers' reasonable expectations with respect to copies of 
copyright works. Legal doctrines that heavily rely on jurisprudence, such as the non-substantial part 
doctrine or fair dealing, even with broader interpretation rules, are not the preferred legal framework for 
their vagueness, difficulty of interpretation and application for consumers. 
129 See the discussion in Part II C of this chapter. 
130 More particularly the level at which we need to effect changes concerns corporate copyright holders in 
the music, film, entertainment and publishing industries and their commercial practices. My personal 
experience and years of practice of law in a law firm and as corporate counsel, in particular, how companies 
change their practices to ensure compliance with new laws inform my preference for statutory reform in the 
f resent case. 
31 Guibault, supra note 44 at 421-422. Self-regulatory industry codes of conducts remain voluntary and are 
often framed to serve the interests of the industry group. They can still play an important complementary 
role. In a consumer protection context, see Nicole L'Heureux, Droit de la consommation, 5th ed 
(Cowansville, Qc: Yvon Blais, 2000) at 6. 
132 As one example, initiatives such as principles for fair commerce in mass-market digital products 
proposed by Americans for Fair Electronic Commerce Transactions" (AFFECT) as analysed in Jean 
Braucher, "12 Principles for Fair Commerce in Mass-Market Software and Other Digital Products" in 
Consumer Protection in the Age of the "Information Economy" (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2006), 
available online at: http://ssm .corn/ abstract= 7 30907. 
133 For the various regulatory approaches to consumer transactions in information products in a European 
context see: Natali Heiberger, "Standardizing consumers' expectations in digital content" info, Vol. 13 Iss: 
6, 69 - 79. Among the various approaches, the author explores the merit of establishing a "Designated 
Digital Content Authority." 
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"exclusive dissemination right for commercial exploitation," 134 Lawrence Lessig's and other scholars' 
invitation for the more generous application of liability rules through compulsory licensing, 135 in 
particular with respect to file sharing, 136 are appealing and are worth investigating further. Legislative 
reform proposals for the preservation of a stronger public domain and greater accessibility to works of 
the arts and intellect include: the reduction of the term of copyright137 and a safe harbour for the use of 
orphan works. 138 These proposals are also worth further investigation to the extent that they would 
have more positive benefits than the status quo for consumers and the public, and enhance the 
pertinence and coherence of copyright. 
Other proposals for legislative reform focus specifically on users' and consumers' permitted uses of 
copyright works. Among them, Jessica Litman's work defining "lawful personal use" in American 
copyright law, 139 Deborah Tussey's work about the creation of a "privilege of personal use" within 
copyright law, 140 and work of other commentators141 provide important guidance and frameworks of 
analysis to give a legal shape to consumers' rights to commercial copies of copyright works. While 
Litman and Tussey do not recommend the creation of users' rights stricto sensu, referring to 
"liberties" and "privileges", respectively, 142 Jens Schovsbo143 refers to the necessity of creating users' 
rights, and Lucie Guibault refers to the need to strengthen the application of copyright limitations. 144 
The personal use right or privilege is framed around varying combinations of factors, including the 
purpose of the use, 145 as opposed to acts reserved to copyright holders, and as a further subset, 
134 Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (Amherst: Prometheus Books 2001) [Litman, "Digital Copyright"] at 
17lff; see also Jessica Litman, "Lawful Personal Use" (2007) 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1871 [Litman, "Lawful 
Personal Use"] at 1911-1912. See also Wendy Gordon, "Harmless Use: Gleaning from Fields of 
Copyrighted Works," (2009) 77 Fordham Law Review 2411. 
135 Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas (New York: Random House, 2001) at 454-455; 
Penalver & Katya], supra note 114 at 198, propose compulsory licensing as a means to counter 
uncontrollable instances of copyright infringement. 
136 Lessig, ibid at 454-455. 
137 Lessig, ibid at 251. 
138 Penalver & Katyal, supra note 114 at 198ff. 
139 Litman, "Lawful Personal Use", supra note 134. 
140 Deborah Tussey, "From Fan Sites to File sharing: Personal Use in Cyberspace" (2001) 35 Ga. L. Rev. 
1129 at 1182ff. 
141 Schovsbo, supra note 44. 
142 Litman, "Lawful Personal Use", supra note 134; Tussey, supra note 140. 
143 Schovsbo, supra note 44 at 405-407. 
144 Guibault, supra note 44 at 419ff, where the author explores, in a European context, the effects of 
rendering statutory limitations to copyright holders' exclusive rights imperative. 
145 More specifically whether it falls within the goals promoted by copyright law or not , for example, . 
Litman, "Lawful Personal Use", supra note 134 at 1879 classifies categories of uses based on the degree at 
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whether the use is consumptive or transformative. 146 The scope of the permitted personal use also 
involves the ability to share the work with others, e.g., by looking at whether it is a closed circle or an 
open one through redistribution. 147 Finally, the personal use right or privilege is based on the effect 
that the uses of copies of the copyright works may have on their commercial exploitation. 148 
The various factors to take into account in shaping a personal use right or privilege resonate with the 
considerations applied to justify the legal protection of private property, in our case copy ownership, 
as well as its limitations. 149 Applied to the purpose of shaping consumers' rights to commercial copies 
of copyright works, the factors to consider can be regrouped under two broad headings: (i) the 
purpose of the use, which includes the character of the use as consumptive or transformative, and (ii) 
the effect of the use on the commercial exploitation of the work, which includes the considerations of 
the distinction between closed-circle uses and redistributive uses. I respond to the considerations 
proposed by the copyright scholars to help delineate consumers' rights or privileges to commercial 
copies of copyright works by laying out guiding principles that build upon the insights brought by the 
application of property and consumer law and theory to copy ownership and copyright as summarized 
above in this chapter. 150 
which they promote copyright liberties for users or not i.e. the fact that "copyright law was designed to 
maximize the opportunities for non-exploitative enjoyment of copyrighted works in order to encourage 
reading, listening, watching, and their cousins". The author argues that they are "both deeply embedded in 
copyright's design and crucial to its promotion of the 'Progress of Science."' Schovsbo, supra note 44 at 
406-407 classifies two distinct purposes: democratic or information uses, i.e. uses of consumers engaged as 
citizens and private uses. 
146 For example Tussey, supra note 140 at 1136-1138 describes four distinct personal uses, one of the 
criteria being whether the use is consumptive or adaptive; Schovsbo, supra note 44 at 405 includes a 
specific category of transformative use or user-created content. See also the discussion on the various types 
of uses by consumers in Chapter 2 Part V. See also Penalver & Katyal, supra note 114 at 185: "We believe 
the law should be mindful of the distinction between free riding for the purposes of innovation and free 
riding for other purposes, such as consumption and should avoid conflating the two." 
147 Tussey, supra note 140 at 1136-1138. 
148 For example, Litman, "Lawful Personal Use", supra note 134 at 1911-1912, distinguishes uses that 
undermine copyright holder's incentive to create from uses that do not. 
149 More particularly, see the discussion in Chapter 6 Part III and in Chapter 7. 
150 I.e. in Part IV C of the present chapter. 
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B. Guiding Principles 
The following principles derive from the findings of my research and offer guidance for the 
codification of lawful consumers' personal property rights to commercial copies of copyright works in 
the CCA. 
(i) Consumer-oriented 
A primary concern about the articulation of consumers' rights to commercial copies of copyright 
works is that they should be easily understood and applied by consumers as their primary intended 
beneficiaries. Simplicity and clarity, and the use of plain language, should take precedence over 
vagueness and uncertainty. While a broader and vague drafting approach can bring the benefit of 
greater adaptability and usually better stands the test of time, simplicity and clarity as well as 
adaptability are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The adaptability of the statutory provision can be 
served by its explicit reliance on the regime of personal property, a legal concept that is reasonably 
well understood and accessible to all. With the same objective in mind, the implementing provision 
should seek to be technologically neutral. In the same vein, government agency functions that include 
ongoing opinion statements clarifying acceptable consumer uses of copyright works 151 or consumer 
complaint procedures about restrictive uses152 could further the goals of improving transparency, 
accessibility, and predictability of consumers' rights to commercial copies of copyright works. 
(ii) Confirming personal property prima facie open-ended privileges and powers in commercial 
copies of copyright works 
As I argued above, the non-articulation of the personal property rights of lawful copyright consumers 
has been one of the facilitators for the progressive expansion of copyright holders' exclusive rights 
151 See Hargreaves, supra note 88 at 95-96 who proposes giving statutory functions to the UK Intellectual 
Property Office through the issuance of non-binding "copyright opinions." 
152 UK, Councillor of the Exchequer, Gowers Review of Intellectual .Property, Andrew Gowers, 2006, 
online: W\l\/W.official-documents.gov.uk/document/other/ .. ./0118404830.pdf. at 73, proposes notice of 
complaint procedures relating to digital rights management tools by providing governmental intellectual 
property agency web interfaces accessible to the public. The review is an independent study of UK 
intellectual property law focusing on copyright that was commissioned by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. 
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and as one result, of the increasing hollowing out of copy ownership. 153 There needs to be a general 
presumption that lawful copyright consumers should have the full enjoyment of the copies they own, 
except as expressly provided otherwise. 154 Lawful copyright consumers should have the a priori right 
to use, copy, display, communicate to the public, perform in public, transform, lend, and transfer their 
copies of copyright works, subject to copyright holders' exclusive rights acting as property-limitation 
rules on the ownership of commercial copies of copyright works. 155 The general presumption in 
favour of lawful copy owners is aligned with the Supreme Court reasons by the majority in Theberge 
v Galerie d'Art du Petit Champlain Jnc 156 on the characterization of owners' entitlements to 
commercial copies of copyright works. 157 
The general presumption that lawful copyright consumers shall have the full enjoyment of the copies 
they own, except as specifically provided otherwise, is consistent with the intrinsic nature and 
framework of copyright, but not with how the scope of copyright has been interpreted and how it has 
progressively expanded. As I argued in Chapter 5, copyright holders cannot own their works under 
core principles of property law and theory; their ownership interest pertains to the bundle of exclusive 
rights as they relate to the work as materialized. 158 Inserting a general presumption affirming the 
primafacie open-ended privileges and powers of lawful copy owners would rehabilitate the very 
essence of copyright and its operating structure, which is a specific list of acts on works that are 
exclusively reserved to copyright holders. 159 The general presumption in favour of lawful copy 
owners would counter the erroneous assumption reflected in court decisions and legislative reform 
that views copyright holders as owners of their works, and lead to the progressive expansion of 
153 See the discussion on the nature of commercial copies of copyright works in Chapter 6 Part II. 
154 I.e., in the CCA, supra note 3 or similar copyright constitutive acts. 
155 See the discussion in chapter 7 Part II. I discuss how copyright exclusive rights should limit ownership 
of commercial copies of copyright works in Part IV B (iv) of this chapter. 
156 2002 sec 34. 
157 Ibid, at paras 31-32 Binnie J. for the majority: "Once an authorized copy of a work is sold to a 
member of the public, it is generally for the purchaser, not the author, to determine what happens to it. 
Excessive control by holders of copyrights and other forms of intellectual property may unduly limit 
the ability of the public domain to incorporate and embellish creative innovation in the long-term 
interests of society as a whole, or create practical obstacles to proper utilization." See the discussion on 
the Theberge judgment in Chapter 7 Part III A (i). 
158This results from the separateness between the work protected by copyright and its multiple 
materializations as they are made available to the public. It is aligned with the objective of copyright to 
encourage the dissemination of works. AS a result, copyright holders' correlative trespassory powers do not 
forbid uses by others of their works once they are published but only restrict specific acts as enumerated in 
the CCA, supra note 3 or similar copyright constitutive statutes: see the discussion in Chapter 5 Part IV A 
(ii). 
159 See the discussion in Chapter 5 Part IV A (ii). 
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copyright. 160 By the same token, the presumption in favour of lawful copy owners' rights may help 
counter the double standard that applies to the ownership interest of copyright holders in contrast to 
the ownership interest of copyright consumers. 161 
The general presumption that lawful copyright consumers shall have the full enjoyment of the copies 
they own, except as specifically provided otherwise, is consistent with a broader application of the 
concept of copyright exhaustion beyond setting limits on copyright holders' exclusive right of 
distribution. 162 Under a broader application of the copyright exhaustion doctrine, lawful copy owners 
are implicitly allowed to perform several acts reserved to copyright holders. 163 While the entitlements 
attached to the personal property of copy owners of copyright works may previously have been taken 
for granted, as the digital environment redefines the rules of engagement and entitlements, including 
new legitimate expectations by lawful copy owners of copyright works, we need to bring back core 
principles about ownership, with the concepts of goods and sales to the fore, for the sake of the 
integrity and credibility of our legal system. 
The presumption in favour of lawful copy owners is subject to important limitations. As I discuss 
below, the mediation between the exclusive rights of copyright holders and consumers' rights in 
commercial copies of copyright works can be achieved through two limitations: one driven by the 
purpose of the consumers' uses and the other by the effect the uses may have on the commercial 
exploitation of the copyright works. 164 
160 See the discussion in Chapter 5 Part II and Part III. 
161 See the discussion in Chapter 7 Part III B. 
162 See Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, "Digital Exhaustion" (2011) 58 UCLA L. Rev. 889, in 
particular at 913ff, who rely on earlier copyright case law that recognized lawful copy owners with 
privileges: e.g., rights of repair and renewal, adaptation and modification, display and performance to argue 
in favour of a copyright exhaustion doctrine to be applied to digital copies of copyright works. By contrast, 
the principle of exhaustion or the first sale doctrine applies as a limitation to copyright holders' exclusive 
distribution right only: see the discussion in Chapter 3 Part II F. 
163 Ibid at 943, where the authors summarize some of the effects of applying a broader copyright exhaustion 
doctrine as follows: "Copy ownership offers a much more intuitive basis for embracing incidental copying 
by consumers than either the fickle permission of copyright holders or the four fair use factors. The 
exhaustion principle teaches that the ability to make personal use of a copy is implicit in its purchase. For 
digital works, use and copying are deeply intertwined. Owners of lawful copies are best positioned to assert 
a privilege to reproduce copies in the course of personal use." 
16 See the discussion in Part IV B (iv) and Part IV C of this chapter. 
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The personal property nature of commercial copies of copyright works needs be secured and made 
explicit in the CCA. 165 While explicit statutory reference to the personal property rights of copy 
owners has not stopped copyright expansionism in other jurisdictions, 166 a broader and positive 
articulation attesting to the existence of personal property rights, coupled with an articulation of the 
powers and privileges that personal property entails, may do so in the future. 167 
(iii) Purposive approach v. act-based approach 
Copyright consumers' rights to commercial copies of copyright works should extend to innumerable 
acts not subject to surveillance or policing, so long as they are performed for personal non-
commercial purposes. The proposal is based on the above analysis of the personal property nature and 
theoretical justifications of copy ownership, and how to better achieve the instrumental goals of 
copyright. 168 The proposal also borrows from consumer protection law definitions of consumers and 
consumer transactions in Canada and worldwide. 169 Like any definitions, the demarcation between 
consumers and non-consumers is not immune to inadequacies and to some arbitrariness in how the 
line is drawn between the two. 170 It leaves other copyright users behind, who may have equally 
compelling reasons to benefit from users' rights that are more clearly demarcated. 171 For example, use 
of copyright works can be made in a business non-personal purposes environment without competing 
with the commercial exploitation of the works by copyright holders. By resorting to the criteria that 
define consumers in consumer protection law, to broaden the scope of permitted uses of copyright 
works in the CCA, serves the double function of providing an established "personal purpose sphere," 
as well as ensuring a consistent identity treatment of consumers by the law. It is also legitimized by a 
preoccupation that is shared with consumer protection law, i.e., to remedy the possible asymmetries 
that subsist between consumers and copyright holders. 172 
165 See the discussion below on the shape that this statutory right should take in Part IV C of this chapter. 
166 For example the US and France copyright acts refer explicitly to the personal property nature of 
commercial copies of copyright works: see the discussion in Chapter 6 Part II A. 
167 See the discussion below on the shape that this statutory right should take in Part IV C of this chapter. 
168 See the discussion in Chapter 6 Part II and Part III. 
169 See the discussion on how copyright consumers are defined within the larger group of copyright users in 
Chapter 2 Part IV. 
170 Ibid. 
171/bid. 
172 See the discussion on the theoretical justifications of consumer protection law in Chapter 10. 
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Confirming copyright consumers' rights within a sphere of personal purposes is a simple concept that 
is familiar to consumers and to which they can easily relate. 173 In the context of copyright works, the 
distinction between personal uses and commercial uses would likely be perceived by most consumers 
as the just division to distinguish copyright infringement from non-infringement, even though this is 
not how the CCA is presently structured. 174 The distinction is consistent with the main characteristics 
and justifications of the existence of (personal) property, i.e., the normative status of all ownership 
freedoms and the primafacie open-ended powers and privileges that provide self-seekingness. 175 On 
that basis, we ought not to be too regarding and discriminating about the acts that are performed, so 
long as they fall within the personal purpose sphere. 176 The personal purpose sphere transcends the 
consumptive v. transformative use dichotomy that is prevalent in the copyright user literature. 177 The 
distinction between consumptive and transformative uses (triggered in part by the different 
authorizations required with respect to acts to be performed on the work) underestimates the equally 
important function of "passive" uses of copyright works within the purpose and framework of 
copyright law. 178 The personal purpose sphere limitation, coupled with the other limitation of 
permitted uses that is based on the effects that the use may have on the commercial exploitation of the 
copyright work eliminates the need for the consumptive v. transformative use distinction. 179 
The personal purpose sphere brings copyright into the information age by focusing on the purpose of 
the use rather than on the traditional "acts performed with the work" approach to copyright. In that 
sense it is similar to the fair dealing provisions180 and yet distinct in that it provides a broader sphere 
of use that is reserved for the specific group of consumers among the vast population of copyright 
users. 181 The personal purpose sphere resembles the elements of the four new user provisions that 
173 See the discussion in Chapter 2 Part IV. 
174 Ibid. 
175See the discussion on the main characteristics of property and ownership in Chapter 4 Part II and on their 
application to commercial copies of copyright works in Chapter 6 Part II B, in particular (iii). 
176 Litman, "Readers' copyright," supra note 69 at 350. 
177 On the distinction between transformative and consumptive uses in copyright law, see the discussion in 
Chapter 2 Part V. 
178 More particularly, see the discussion in Chapter 2 Part V and in Chapter 6 Part III B. See also Litman, 
"Readers' Copyright", supra note 74 at 350. who recommends a similar approach that does not make 
"camps" between types of use that are performed within the personal sphere. 
179 See the discussion in Part IV B (iv) of this chapter. 
180 See the discussion on fair dealing in Chapter 3 Part II C. 
181 Regarding the broader sphere of uses or acts reserved to copyright holders with respect to their works, 
this is the approach of CCA, supra note 3 s 29.21This is the approach that is proposed by Bill C-11, clause 
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focus on the purpose of the use as exceptions to copyright infringement, but is distinct in that it does 
not target specific acts exclusively reserved to copyright holders. 182 A focus on the exact number of 
copies or other acts performed for personal purposes is becoming anachronistic in the digital 
environment. Consumers reasonably expect that they should have the right to make copies for 
convenience for their own personal purposes. Parliament acknowledged this reality to some extent 
with the introduction of the four new user provisions in the CCA. 183 What remains relevant within the 
framework of copyright is the purpose for which the use is made and its effect on the commercial 
exploitation of the copyright work, which I explore next. 
(iv) Non-competition with copyright holders' commercial exploitation 
While the personal purpose sphere limitation on the rights of copyright consumers evacuates 
commercial uses and exploitations of copyright works, the proper mediation between the competing 
rights of consumers and copyright holders dictates that consumers' uses should not compete with the 
commercial exploitation of the copyright works. 184 Otherwise, consumers would be exercising their 
copy ownership powers and privileges beyond their property-specific justice reasons. 185 The limitation 
on consumers' rights to perform acts that do not compete with the commercial exploitation of the 
copyright work is inspired in part by Litman's general recommendation that copyright should be 
redesigned as an exclusive dissemination right for commercial exploitation. 186 
22 which would introduce a new section 29.21 which in this case is limited to non-commercial user-
generated content." 
182 See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part II D. Except for the non-commercial user-generated content 
exception to copyright infringement, the four new user provisions authorize specific acts exclusively 
reserved to copyright holders (e.g. the exclusive right to reproduce) coupled with specific purposes. 
183 Ibid. 
184 One of the recently introduced user provision in the CCA, supra note 3, s 29.21, "Non-Commercial 
User-generated Content" contains a similar concept. The use of the copyright work is permitted as long as it 
"does not have a substantial adverse effect, financial or otherwise on the exploitation or potential 
exploitation of the existing work or other subject matter-or copy of it-or on an existing or potential market 
for it, including the new work or other subject matter is not a substitute for the existing one." David Vaver, 
"Harmless Copying" (2012) 25 I.P.J. 19 at 27, proposes that copyright infringement should be redefined to 
include the concept of substantial harm to copyright holders that could include acts performed on 
copyright works that compete with copyright holders' exploitation of the work. 
185 See James W. Harris, Property and Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) at 168. See the discussion 
on the limits of the powers and privileges of copy ownership in accordance with the competing interests of 
c~yright holders in Chapter 7 Part III B. 
18 Litman, "Digital Copyright", supra note 134 at Chapter 12. 
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There are several uses that are made within the personal sphere of consumers and yet can compete 
with the commercial exploitation of the copyright works. File sharing is one example that comes to 
mind. Uploading the entire copy of an e-book or musical recording on a personal webpage without the 
authorization of the copyright holder is another example of an act performed in the personal sphere 
for non-commercial purposes that may still interfere with the economic rights or commercial 
exploitation of the work. 
Conversely, there are several uses that are made in a business non-personal purpose environment that 
do not compete with the commercial exploitation of copyright works, but in order to maintain 
consistency with consumers as currently defined under consumer protection laws these uses would not 
be permitted under the personal purpose right. 187 
In setting adequate limitations on the primafacie open-ended powers and privileges to ownership of 
commercial copies of copyright works, the word "competition" is preferred to "interference" with 
copyright holders' commercial exploitation of the work. By the word "competition" I want to 
emphasize that not just any interference or positive benefit of the use of the copyright work should 
allow copyright holders to limit consumers' use. The realization that some acts reserved to copyright 
holders should be permitted for specific purposes without triggering compensation for copyright 
holders is reflected to some extent by the four new user provisions that were recently introduced in the 
CCA. 188 As lawful personal owners, consumers are entitled to the enjoyment of the copy in 
accordance with the guidance principles enumerated here. As I argued in Chapter 7, it is the 
consequence of copy ownership acting as a property-limitation rule of copyright. 189 
187 See the discussion in Part IV B (iv). 
188 CCMA, supra note 4, amending the CCA, supra note 3, by adding ss 29.21-29.24. See also the 
discussion on the four new user provisions in Chapter 3 Part II D. See also Hargreaves, supra note 88 at 48 
(para 5.28) where the author recommends the introduction of a limited right to make copies for private 
purposes without a remuneration scheme to copyright holders, pointing that there was no evidence that such 
uses were harmful to copyright holders. The recommendation of a limited right to make copies for format 
shifting and private purposes, without a levy to compensate copyright holders was also made in the Gowers 
report: Gowers, supra note 152 at 63- para 4.75 and 4.76. Other commentators argue that the right to make 
private copies be maintained with a levy for copyright holders. See for example Christopher Geiger, "The 
answer to the machine should not be the machine: safeguarding the private copy exception in the digital 
environment" (2009) 30 European Intellectual Property Review 121, at 128-129 
189 See the discussion in Chapter 7 Part III. 
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(v) Promoting markets for lawful commercial copies of copyright works 
The affirmation of a personal purpose right only applies with respect to lawfully acquired commercial 
copies of copyright works. Without the requirement of lawful acquisition, the structure that will 
enable a more effective and legitimate mediation between the competing property rights of copyright 
holders and copy owners starts to crumble. How can consumers otherwise justify ownership rights as 
the basis of the exercise of their autonomy and freedom? Commentators have raised concerns about 
the onus that the requirement of lawful copies places on consumers. 190 The requirement of lawfully 
acquired copies for the application of the personal purpose right seems inevitable, and just. The 
requirement of lawfully acquired copies is the means to legally ground and legitimize the personal 
purpose right that consumers have. 191 The requirement also strengthens the legal structure of lent 
copies of copies made to friends and family as a result of the exercise of consumers' personal purpose 
right. The reproductions made from lawful copies of copyright works would not benefit from the 
same personal purpose right. 192 
The five guiding principles toward substantiating of consumers' rights to commercial copies of 
copyright works mediate between competing property rights by balancing the justifications for copy 
ownership with the justifications for copyright. The principles lead to various forms of legal 
implementation, one of which I explore next. 
B. A proposal: consumers' right to use for personal purposes 
The path that I propose here to solidify copyright consumers' rights is a copyright law statutory 
provision enunciating general principles that would implement the guiding principles as founded upon 
19
° For example, see European Parliament, DG for Internal Policies, Policies Department: Citizens' Rights 
and Constitutional Affairs, "The Relations Between Copyright Law And Consumers' Rights From A 
European Perspective" by Severine Dusollier (2010) at 20 (para 2.1.4) where the author summarizes the 
difficulty posed by the requirements of lawful origin of the copy. 
191 See for example two of the newly introduced provisions in the CCA, supra note 3: s. 29.21 "non-
commercial user-generated content" ands 29.22 "Reproduction for private purposes'', two exceptions to 
copyright infringements which refer respectively to a reasonable ground to believe that the existing work 
was not infringing copyright and that the permissible use is subject to the copy not being an infringing 
copy. 
192 Copies made as a result of the personal purpose right that I propose here should be treated as lent copies 
with the unlimited right to read, play, listen but for which no acts exclusively reserved to copyright holders 
can be performed without the authorization of copyright holders. 
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the building blocks that I presented above in this chapter. 193 The statutory provision would confirm 
that consumers who lawfully acquire commercial copies of copyright works have the right to use the 
copies for personal non-commercial purposes in a manner that does not compete with copyright 
holders' commercial exploitation of the works and that respects the moral rights of authors. 194 
Reference to personal and non-commercial purposes is somewhat tautological but consistent with the 
definition of consumers and consumer transactions. 195 Reference to personal as opposed to private 
purposes is also more consistent with the public performance (or communication to the public) 
elements that may be involved in consumers' personal purpose rights. 196 As I argued above in this 
chapter, the personal purpose right would be mandatory in consumer transactions. 197 Likewise, the 
onus would be on copyright holders to ensure that copyright works commercialized with 
technological protection measures comply with the personal purpose right. 198 
The personal purpose right would depart significantly from existing statutory clauses that seek to 
address the personal property rights of copy owners, as is the case in the US and in France, 199 by 
193 See the discussion in Part III and Part IV A and B of this chapter. 
194 Similar proposals have been made to address users' rights within copyright law. See for example 
Thomas Riis & Jens Schovsbo, "Users' rights: reconstructing copyright policy on utilitarian grounds" 
(2007) 29 E.I.P.R. I at 2-3, where the authors recommend the introduction of a user right "Users of works 
eligible for protection under copyright law have the right to reproduce and communicate to the public 
copyrighted works provided that this activity does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
rightholders [ ... ]the scope of the right would be evaluate by function of the type of use: democratic use, 
information use, transformative use, personal use, and reasonable commercial use. In addition, the authors 
would redefine copyright by narrowing the scope of the exclusive rights "to the extent that such rights 
enhance social and economic welfare, creativity and technological innovation and promote cultural 
development." 
195 See the discussion on how consumers' statutory law define consumers and on the justifications for 
adopting these definitions in the context of defining consumers' rights to commercial copies of copyright 
works in Chapter 2 Part IV. 
196 See the discussion in Chapter 2 Part IV on the possible distinctions between "private purposes" and 
"non-commercial purposes" as such concepts are presently utilized in the CCA, supra note 3. 
197 See the discussion in Part III B of this Chapter. 
198 Ibid. 
199 For example in the US, I 7 USC § 202 provides: "Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive 
rights under a copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied. 
Transfer of ownership of any material object, including the copy or phonorecord in which the work is first 
fixed, does not of itself convey any rights in the copyright work embodied in the object; nor, in the absence 
of an agreement, does transfer of ownership of a copyright or of any exclusive rights under a copyright 
convey property rights in any material object." In France, art L. l I 1-3 CPI, makes the distinction between 
ownership of copyright as intangible property and ownership in the material object that embeds the 
copyright work as follows: "La propriete incorporelle definie par !'article L.111-1 est independante de la 
propriete de l'objet materiel... ... Ces droits subsistent en la personne de l'auteur ou de ses ayants droit qui, 
pourtant, ne pourront exiger du proprietaire de l'objet materiel la mise a leur disposition de cet objet pour 
l'exercice desdits droits." 
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broadening consumers' permitted scope of use by allowing the performance of acts that are reserved 
to copyright holders on the basis of their lawful ownership of commercial copies of copyright works, 
the personal purpose of the uses, and the non-competition with copyright holders' commercial 
exploitation of the works. The general personal purpose right that I propose here, as delimited by the 
non-competition with copyright holders' commercial exploitation of copyright works, and respect of 
moral rights, enables consumers' rights to adapt to the exigencies of new circumstances and 
environments. 
The personal purpose right would allow consumers to perform all acts reserved to copyright holders 
as long as those acts comply with the personal non-commercial purpose and do not compete with 
copyright holders' commercial exploitation of copyright works. In that sense, it resembles the newly 
introduced non-commercial user-generated content exception to copyright infringement but expands 
the permitted uses beyond transformative uses of pre-existing works.200 It would overlap with, and yet 
be broader than, other newly introduced exceptions to copy1ight infringement.201 By contrast to the 
four new user provisions and other exceptions to copyright infringement, the personal purpose right 
would explicitly take precedence over any contract or TPM that would limit or constrain its 
exercise. 202 The personal purpose right would co-exist with other exceptions to copyright 
infringement, including the private copying regime, 203 fair dealing, and non-substantial part provisions 
of the CCA. 204 Each of these exceptions to copyright infringement serves distinct functions beyond 
consumers' enjoyment of commercial copies of copyright works for personal purposes.205 
The positive affirmation of the personal property rights of consumers would embed the exhaustion 
principle or first sale doctrine, i.e., the right to transfer the copy without any duty to account to the 
copyright holder. The exhaustion or first sale doctrine would apply to commercial copies of copyright 
20° CCA, supra note 3, s 29.21. See the discussion on the non-commercial user-generated content exception 
to copyright infringement in Chapter 3 Part II D (i). 
201 For example, CCA, supra note 3 s 29.22 "reproduction for private purposes" ands 29.24 "backup 
copies" exceptions to copyright infringement. 
202 See the discussion on the uncertainties of the nature of exceptions to copyright infringement that result 
from the interaction with contracts and TPMs in Chapter 3 Part IV. 
203 The latter is about to become obsolete because of its current narrow scope. 
204 The scope of the private copying regime, the fair dealing and the non-substantial part exception are 
discussed in Chapter 3 Part IL 
20s Ibid. 
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works distributed online with no physical supporting media, with some exceptions.206 The normative 
and legal force of personal property in the copy repatriates this ownership freedom, as well as others 
that have been gradually taken away by the progressive expansion of copyright.207 
The personal purpose right is the articulation of what most consumers do on a daily basis with 
commercial copies of copyright works, without suspecting that they could ever be performing 
unlawful acts. 208 The recent introduction in the CCA of the four new user provisions as exceptions to 
copyright infringement validates certain consumers' uses of copyright works without requiring 
compensation for copyright holders in return for those permitted acts. 209 The personal purpose right 
also challenges the general structure of copyright holders' exclusive rights and the general economy 
of the CCA.210 The personal purpose right is founded on the reasonable expectations of personal 
property owners, a fundamental institution of our legal system upon which copyright relies in great 
part. 211 At the same time, the personal purpose right would take into account the legitimate interests of 
copyright holders. The personal purpose right would confirm the legitimacy of innumerable acts that 
are performed on a daily basis by consumers and that are not counter to the main objectives of 
copyright. It would implement a forgotten part in the digital agenda, the one that also brings copyright 
consumers into the information age. 
C. Further considerations 
There are many other considerations on the solidification of consumers' rights to commercial copies 
of copyright works and their implementation through the statutory provision that I propose here. For 
instance, any legislative reform needs to comply with Canada's international copyright obligations, in 
particular, the "three-step test" that sets the conditions that need to be met when national jurisdictions 
206 I.e. with the exception of instances where the copyright work is accessed as a service or under a limited 
term rental arrangement: see the discussion in Chapter 8 Part II B and C, Part III and Part IV. 
207 See the discussion in Chapter 5 Part II. 
208 See Hargreaves, supra note 88 at 49, where the author arrived at a similar conclusion and recommended 
the introduction of a limited private copying exception that would legalise the acts that most consumers 
already perform with copies of copyright works on a daily basis. 
209 See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part II D. 
210 Essentially by shifting from an act- based approach to copyright exclusive rights and hence copyright 
infringement, as reflected in how copyright is defined: CCA, supra note 3, ss 3,15,18,21,26 to a purpose-
based approach to copyright exclusive rights and infringement. 
211 The theoretical justifications of copy ownership of copyright works are discussed in chapter 6. 
467 
impose restrictions or exceptions on copyright holders' exclusive rights.212 As I discussed in Chapter 
3, the vague wording of the three-step test, as contextualized by the objectives pursued by 
international intellectual property conventions more generally, should give member states of the 
relevant international intellectual property law treaties the flexibility they need to create the proper 
level of exceptions and limitations to copyright to meet the needs of their specific domestic 
exigencies.213 Another consideration around the solidification and ongoing maintenance of copyright 
consumers' rights is to ensure adequate representation of the interests of consumers in legislative 
reform processes.214 
V. The renovations outcome 
I end this chapter by looking at three of the outcomes that will result from the solidification of 
consumers' rights to commercial copies of copyright works and the clarification of the concepts of 
"tangibility" and "goods". The three outcomes provide an invigorated application of consumer law to 
commercial transactions of commercial copies of copyright works, a more robust articulation of the 
copyright holder end-user relationship, and a finer balance within copyright law. 
212 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, 
September 9, 1886; rev. in Berlin November 13, 1908, art. I I, I 3, I 4; rev. in Rome June 2, I 928, art. 11 bis, 
art 9(2); Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex JC, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 29, 33 I.L.M. 1197 
(1994) [TRIPS], art 13; WIPO Copyright Treaty, 20 December 1996, W0033EN, online: 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocs wo033.html#P8 l 89 [WCT], art 10; WIPO Performances 
and Phonograms Treaty, 20 December 1996, W0034EN, online: 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt/trtdocs_wo034.html [WPPT], art 16. The three-step test is limited 
to reproduction rights in the case of the Berne Convention, ibid, and applies to all exclusive rights in the 
case of TRIPS, WCTand WPPT, ibid. See the discussion on Canada's international obligations in Chapter 3 
Part V. 
213 See the discussion in Chapter 3 Part V. 
214 In Canada, a vast consultation of the public on copyright reform was initiated by the Government of 
Canada. See: http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/008.nsf/eng/horne. On the lack of involvement of the public in 
intellectual property matters see: Vaver 2011, supra note I 27 at 680-681; On the dangers of legislative 
reform capture by powerful interests particularly in the area of copyright, see Hargreaves, supra note 88 at 
93 (para 10.9ff). On how European copyright consumers are becoming increasingly organized, see : 
Antonina Bakardjieva Engelbrekt, "Accomodating the interests of the copyright consumer: New 
institutional dynamics in the wake of the infosoc directive" in Antonina Bakardjieva Engelbrekt, Ulf 
Bernitz, Bengt Domeij, Annette Kur & Jonas Nordell, eds, Siirtryck ur Festskrift till Marianne Levin 
(Norstedts Juridik: 2008) where the author applies institutional choice theory to demonstrate the increased 
involvement of consumer groups in Europe in the legislative process of copyright and consumer law 
reforms and before the courts. 
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A. The reinvigorated function of consumer protection law 
As a result of the structural deficiencies of the allocation of rights between copyright holders and 
consumers in the CCA,215 and of the narrow interpretation of tangibility to define goods,216 consumer 
protection law cannot intervene effectively to attenuate the detrimental effects of various forms of 
asymmetry between producers, suppliers, and consumers.217 The substantiating of copyright 
consumers' rights as proposed in this chapter, as well as the confirmation that exceptions to copyright 
infringement are rights or, at a minimum, that they are mandatory,218 will enable consumer law to play 
a greater role in protecting consumers of information products against commercial practices that 
deviate from the renovated structure of copyright. Invigorating copyright consumers' rights through 
changes in the CCA will modify the substantive bases that help determine "consumers' reasonable 
expectations" in the application of consumer law implied obligations.219 The statutory clarification of 
copyright consumers' rights within copyright law, together with an expansion of our understanding of 
tangibility and goods, will remove conceptual obstacles for the application of implied obligations of 
quality, fitness for purpose, and quiet possession that are presently out of reach for copyright 
consumers. The scope of permitted use is an element of the quality, fitness for use, and quiet 
possession of a product to the same extent that the quality of the image of a film or of the sound 
recording is.220 It should be subject to the same scrutiny and remedies as any other goods or services. 
Similarly, any standard consumer commercial transaction that goes fundamentally against the 
allocation of rights between consumers and copyright holders as per the renovations proposed here 
may be seen as unfair commercial practice and give rise to specific remedies for consumers.221 
215 See the discussion in Part II A and B of this chapter summarizing the main deficiencies underscored in 
the First Part and in the Second Part of my thesis. 
216 See the discussion in Chapter 8 and the recommendations made in Part III C of this chapter. 
217 I summarize the rippling effects of deficiencies of the CCA, supra note 3, on its treatment of copyright 
consumers on the application of consumer protection law in Part II C of this chapter. 
218 See the discussion in Part III and Part IV of this chapter. 
219 See the discussion in Chapter 9 Part II. 
220 See the arguments that I develop under four scenarios for the application of consumer law obligations to 
the scope of permitted uses of commercial copies of copyright works in Chapter 11. 
221 For example see Lucie Guibault & Natali Heiberger, "Copyright law and Consumer Protection, study 
carried out for the European Consumer Law Group" (2005) ECLG/035/05 at 23 where the authors discuss 
the application of the "Presumption of unfairness of restrictive license clause" and use the example of 
standard consumer contracts derogating from copyright act regimes of private use. They refer to a concept 
borrowed from German law on unfair contract terms, that share similarities with the doctrine of 
unconscionability in the common law, ie. Article 307(2) of the German Civil Code which specifies that 
(from the translation given by the authors) 'in doubt, an unreasonable disadvantage is to be presumed, when 
469 
Overall, the various mechanisms within consumer protection law that bridle freedom of contract in 
order to protect consumers against the detrimental effects of asymmetries will be applied more 
effectively to support the renewed balance of rights between copyright holders and consumers.222 
B. A more robust articulation of the copyright holder-end-user relationship and a finer balance 
within copyright law 
The current framework of the CCA does not provide all the necessary tools to actualize the balance 
between copyright holders, authors, consumers, and other users, an objective that has increasingly 
become central to Canadian copyright law and policy. 223 Due to their uncertain mandatory nature, the 
so-called users' rights cannot fully counterweigh copyright holders' exclusive rights that they are 
entrusted with. The exploitation of copyright in the copyright holder-end-user relationship, where the 
need to balance competing interests is increasingly in demand, is poorly articulated. 
Solidifying copyright consumers' rights in the manner proposed in this chapter, as well as confirming 
that exceptions to copyright infringement are rights or, at a minimum, mandatory,224 bring more 
substantiality to the concept of balance in Canadian copyright law. The articulation of copyright 
consumers' rights addresses the loose ends of a poorly articulated copyright holders-end-user 
relationship in the CCA that contributes to the declared balance objectives of the CCA. As a result, the 
copyright framework will be reconfigured closer to its declared instrumental objectives to encourage 
and reward the creation and dissemination of works and reduce the counterproductive effects of the 
progressive expansion of copyright holders' exclusive rights. 
A more substantive balance within copyright law, as opposed to broad aspiration goals, will make 
copyright more credible and coherent within the broader web of laws on which it relies and with 
which it interacts. It will bring changes that more fully embrace the new exigencies of the digital 
a term is incompatible with the rationale behind the legal provision from which it differs; or when a term 
restricts the essential rights or obligations that flow from the nature of the contract to such an extent as to 
endanger the achievement of the contract's purpose.' 
222 Statutory consumer protection law provisions constrain freedom of contract either through mandatory 
obligations or by attenuating the effects of contract obligations in favour of consumers. See the discussion 
in Chapter 8 Part I. 
223 See the discussion on the balance of competing interests as a central objective in the CCA, supra note 3 
in Chapter 2 Part II. 
224 See the discussion in section in Part III B of this chapter. 
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environment, this time with other participants in mind rather than just copyright holders. At the same 
time, a safe, flexible, and evolving area of lawful permitted use of copyright works for consumers 
may also encourage more compliance with copyright holders' exclusive rights.225 
VI. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I presented the five building blocks that my research work identified as important to 
adequately address consumers' rights to commercial copies of copyright works. The building blocks 
can be achieved through legislative reform or through judicial interpretation, as the context dictates. 
With the strength of theses foundations in mind, I enumerated five guiding principles for solidifying 
consumers' rights to commercial copies of copyright works. I have given one application of the five 
guiding principles, that is, the recommendation of a statutory provision confirming a broad personal 
purpose right to consumers acquiring lawful copies of copyright works. In addition to solidifying 
copyright consumers' rights, the expected outcome of these proposals and recommendations include a 
reinvigorated function of consumer protection law, a more robust articulation of the copyright holder-
end-user relationship and a finer balance within copyright law. 
225 As noted in Gowers, supra note 152 at 40 (para 3.29): "The fact that the letter of the law is rarely 
enforced only adds to the public sense of illegitimacy surrounding copyright law. [ ... ]If uses such as 
transferring music from CDs to an MP3 player for personal use are seen to be illegal, it becomes more 
difficult to justify sanctions against copyright infringement that genuinely cost industry sales, such as from 
freely downloading music and films using the Internet." 
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Chapter 13 
Conclusion 
The purpose of my thesis was to evaluate the copyright consumers' bargain by defining 
consumers' rights to commercial copies of copyright works legally and normatively. The 
legitimacy and subsistence of copyright increasingly depend on the ability of our laws and 
policies to account even-handedly for the interests of consumers and other users alongside 
the interests of copyright holders and authors. I argued that property law and theory, in 
particular the concept of property limitations, offer tools to adequately define and mediate 
between the competing rights and interests of copyright holders and consumers in copyright 
works. I also argued that the primafacie normative force of ownership freedoms and the 
instrumental justifications of copyright to incent the creation and dissemination of copyright works, 
justify a broader scope of consumers' ownership rights in commercial copies of copyright works. 
Properly defining the scope of ownership rights in commercial copies of copyright works serves as 
the baseline to define copyright consumers' rights in a broad range of other legal relationships 
involving copyright works. I argued that the scope of consumers' and other users' rights to 
commercial copies of copyright works needs to be clarified in Canada's Copyright Act [CCA] 1 and 
similar statutes in other jurisdictions. Only once the proper scope of consumers' rights is established 
by the CCA can consumer law more fully play its remedial function to support consumers' claims 
against restrictive uses of copyright works. 
The evolving technological environment in which copyright works are made available to 
consumers forces us to constantly reconsider the legitimate scope of ownership and the 
prima facie open-ended powers and privileges of copyright holders, consumers, and other 
users. Approaching the copyright consumers' bargain through the lens of property, 
copyright, contract, consumer law and theory exposed the copyright consumers' bargain 
paradox. The constant evolution of technology empowers consumers to interact with 
commercial copies of copyright works in unprecedented ways, as well as copyright holders' 
ability to control every single use consumers make of copyright works. Through the 
I RSC 1985, c. C-42. 
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interaction between the law and how copyright holders commercialize their works, 
consumers may not be getting the bargain that they can reasonably expect: they may not 
own the copies that they lawfully purchased and be able to transfer the copies to another 
party, and may be constrained in their ability to exercise the so-called user rights that the 
CCA or similar statutes in other jurisdictions confer by default. 2 With respect to the exercise 
of the CCA' s exceptions to copyright infringement, copyright consumers may end up in a 
worse position than users who access copies of copyright works without a commercial 
transaction. 
As a starting point, copyright consumers' rights to commercial copies of copyright works 
emerge as a complex form of personal property, the rights in which are determined in great 
part by the so-called users' rights that the CCA or similar statutes in other jurisdictions 
confer, and by the commercial transactions through which consumers access copyright 
works. I argued that a clearer understanding in law of tangibility and intangibility, of goods 
and services, and of sales and licences is essential for the adequate treatment of copyright 
consumers' rights, and to properly support copyright consumers' claims in property, sale of 
goods, and consumer protection law. The research that I conducted enabled me to expose 
many uncertainties and defects with respect to copyright consumers' rights to commercial 
copies of copyright works. The framework that I developed in my thesis led to guiding 
principles and recommendations to solidify copyright consumers and other users' rights. 
The research that I conducted and the analysis that I presented here point to the double 
standard that often applies to copyright consumers with respect to the concepts of property, 
ownership, tangibility, and freedom of contract, and with respect to the promotion of 
autonomy, innovation, creativity, and other core values of modern democratic societies. 
Each time, I questioned the legitimacy of the different weight that is given to the application 
of core principles of law and fundamental values by bringing forward the more neglected 
2 See David Vaver, "Intellectual property: still a "bargain"?" (2012) 34 E.I.P.R. 579, in particular at 584-586, 
where the author asks whether intellectual property generally is a good bargain as between right holders and the 
public. 
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interests of copyright consumers in the regulation of commercial copies of copyright works. 
The arguments that I developed throughout my thesis sought to provide the tools to better 
account for the copyright consumers' interests in the digital environment, through mediating 
frameworks that acknowledge conflicting values and interests in the copyright house. 
In the First Part of my thesis, I presented the current landscape of copyright consumers. I 
described that through recent legislative reform, the CCA acknowledges the interests of 
copyright users and consumers more than it ever did in the past. However, the framework 
and purpose of the CCA remains focused on protecting the rights and interests of copyright 
holders. The predominant act-based approach, as opposed to the purpose-based approach, to 
determine copyright infringement still poses many challenges for consumers and other users 
in the digital environment. I argued that copyright consumers who do not produce creative 
outputs from their consumption of copyright works deserve as much attention as the 
consumer-authors, on the basis that seemingly more passive uses of copyright works also 
form part of the innovation and creative processes that the CCA seeks to promote. I 
analyzed the nature and scope of exceptions to copyright infringement in the CCA - the so-
called users' rights - and concluded that they were either ill-suited to the needs of copyright 
consumers or too narrowly defined. I argued that their nature as rights was precarious in 
light of the interaction of exceptions to copyright infringement with non-negotiated end-user 
agreements and the application of technological protection measures, and in light of their 
uncertain mandatory nature. I concluded that copyright consumers' current landscape as 
sketched by the CCA leads to a complex maze of limited permitted acts authorized by 
Parliament, that are heavily subject to the will of copyright holders through non-negotiated 
standard end-user agreements and the application of TPMs. 
In the Second Part of my thesis, I applied concepts of property law and theory to better 
understand the nature of commercial copies of copyright works, with a particular focus on 
ownership, property limitations, and the numerus clausus principle. I concluded that copyright 
embeds two distinct limited proprietary interests. The first one is an ownership interest that is the 
object of commercial exploitation: it does not confer ownership in the work, but in the bundle of 
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exclusive rights as they pertain to the work as materialized. The second one is a limited non-
ownership proprietary interest in the embodiments of copyright holders' works. I argued that the 
progressive expansion of copyright might be attributable in part to a misunderstanding of the limited 
proprietary interests of copyright, including the misconception that copyright holders can own their 
work. The proper application of the property attributes to copyright reveals the constrained scope of 
copyright, rather than justifying its expansion. For their part, commercial copies of copyright works 
are an increasingly contested form of personal property. The non-ownership proprietary interest of 
copyright holders to interfere with commercial copies of copyright works continues to expand, 
transfiguring commercial copies of copyright works into an increasingly peculiar form of personal 
property. When the ability to transfer the rights in commercial copies of copyright works is 
constrained, copies of copyright works may no longer be considered as traditional forms of personal 
property. I concluded that copy owners might be getting less and less of what they should reasonably 
expect through their juridical relation with the resource that they lawfully acquired. I argued that the 
proper scope of rights to commercial copies of copyright works needs to be considered on the basis 
of the primafacie normative force of ownership freedoms, the specific role that copy ownership 
plays in the instrumental design of copyright, and on the basis of greater transaction efficiency 
between copyright holders and consumers. I argued that consumer owners of commercial copies of 
copyright works had a specific relationship with copyright holders that created a property-limitation 
rule on the exclusive rights of copyright holders. The property-limitation rule can intervene to secure 
copyright consumers' rights in the copies they own, when the scope of the exclusive rights of 
copyright holders are unclear, to reinforce the application of the exhaustion or first sale doctrine and 
to assert the open-ended privileges and powers to play, view, listen, and read. At a normative 
level, to posit copy ownership as a property-limitation rule on copyright holders' exclusive 
rights justifies setting boundaries to the expansionist tendencies of copyright holders' 
exclusive rights just as much as copyright can be invoked as a property-limitation rule on 
the ownership interest in commercial copies of copyright works. I concluded the Third Part 
of my thesis by arguing that the numerus clausus principle as a norm of judicial self-
governance can act as a mediating tool to calibrate copyright holders' commercial 
exploitation of their works by constraining their ability to modify the scope of rights and 
interests of consumers who lawfully access commercial copies of copyright works. 
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In the Third Part of my thesis, I looked at how consumer law and theory can help further 
assert consumers' rights to commercial copies of copyright works. First, I observed that for 
sale of goods and consumer law to perform their proper role, we need to resolve the 
uncertainty about the nature of commercial copies of copyright works as goods, particularly 
when the copies are not embedded in a physical object. I argued that a proper understanding 
of the concept of tangibility, of what distinguishes goods from services, and the differences 
between sales and licences is essential to achieve that goal. I demonstrated how clarifying 
the distinctions between these concepts in law can also resolve conflicts on the application 
of the exhaustion or first sale doctrine in copyright law, as well as help determine the 
exclusive rights of copyright holders that are implicated in a commercial transaction. 
Second, I argued that the function of the relevant consumer law obligations that can help 
consumers assert their claims against restrictive uses of commercial copies of copyright 
works relies in part on consumers' reasonable expectations regarding their proprietary 
interests in commercial copies of copyright works. I applied consumer law obligations to 
assert claims against restrictive uses of commercial copies of copyright works in four 
distinct scenarios. I concluded that the remedial function of consumer law to support 
consumers' reasonable expectations (of quality, fitness for purpose, quiet possession), to 
ensure that they are adequately informed, and to protect them against unfair commercial 
practices, are limited to the extent that the restrictions of uses are legitimized or unclear as a 
result of the property framework designed by copyright. 
In the Fourth Part of my thesis, I made proposals to solidify consumers' rights to 
commercial copies of copyright works as justified by the primafacie normative force of 
ownership freedoms and the instrumental justifications of copyright to incent creativity and 
innovation and the dissemination of copyright works. Beyond ensuring the adequate treatment of 
copyright consumers' interests, the underlying objective is to make copyright law more coherent in 
order to preserve its legitimacy and to improve the overall regulation of information products. The 
scope of consumers' rights to commercial copies of copyright works needs to be clarified through 
the instrument that confers exclusive rights to copyright holders, i.e., the CCA or similar statutes in 
other jurisdictions. Among other things, the proposals include the recognition that exceptions to 
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copyright infringement are mandatory rights or, at a minimum, that they are mandatory exceptions in 
non-negotiated standard end-user agreements. The guiding principles of integrating the interests of 
consumers and other users within the copyright house include the formal recognition of the personal 
property primafacie open-ended privileges and powers of ownership in commercial copies of 
copyright works, a purposive approach to acts permitted without the authorization of copyright 
holders that should not compete with the commercial exploitation of copyright works, and should 
respect the moral rights of authors. In parallel, there needs to be a renewed understanding of the 
concepts of tangibility and intangibility in sale of goods, consumer and copyright law, as well as a 
more refined understanding of the distinction between goods and services and between sales and 
licences. Consumer law can play its remedial role of supporting consumers' reasonable expectations, 
of supporting their interests to be adequately informed, and of protecting them against unfair 
commercial practices only to the extent that consumers' rights to commercial copies are clarified at 
the foundation level of property and copyright. 
As the debate continues about the proper scope of rights that copyright should confer on 
copyright holders, the arguments that I developed throughout my thesis emphasized the 
stakes of locating copyright consumers in the copyright house and of understanding the 
nature of their rights among the larger group of users. I offered tools on how to better 
address conflicting values and interests in a constantly evolving technological environment. 
Solidifying the rights of copyright consumers will not only benefit consumers, it will also 
benefit copyright holders, other users, and various business intermediaries who facilitate 
access to copyright works. It may also increase the confidence that the public has in our 
laws. 
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